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Preface 
The overall and first goal of the thesis is about finding if possible, a true (most) general 
ground of morality basically relying on impartial arguments independent of time 
(history), culture and personal values and interest. The belief is that morality will 
acquire more convincing authority if its narrative could rely upon such a ground. 
Philosophically diverse approaches has been done before, especially by using the 
hypothetical conception of a 'veil of ignorance', a method to assure an impartial 
position. Impartiality is needed for the fair selection or development of principles of 
morality. David Hume (judicious spectator) and Adam Smith (impartial spectator) are 
classic examples who used the impartial position for their moral theories. A more 
modern version of the veil is Rawls' impartial position as a first starting point to 
envisage a just society. Impartial arguments however will gain stronger authority when 
based not alone on hypothetical, but also on empirical grounds. I fully realize that a 
true impartial and thus 'universal' or 'most general' property of morality, but based on 
empirical grounds, not on hypothetical grounds is hard to find. 
The thesis has three goals, which are linked. The second goal of the research is to 
search for a new qualitative method of inquiry to gather verifiable and true impartial 
information from respondents, with a method that to the best of my knowledge has not 
been done before. What was needed for the developing of a new method was to delve 
(within relevance for the thesis), into a diversity of topics which in the end are related 
and linked. Topics like the sometimes paradoxical nature of categories (Rosch), 
objectivity (e.g. Kant; Husserl; Dow) versus (inter) subjectivity (e.g. Popper; Kuhn,), 
causality (Hume; e.g. Russell; Popper), language (e.g. Maturana; Bakhtin), meaning 
(e.g. Maturana; Jackson, Carter) and emotions (e.g. Lazarus; Eysenck; Gross & 
Barrett). Especially Husserl's Transcendental Consciousness, autopoiesis (Maturana 
&Varela) and its biology of organisms, and the fundamental difference of Circular 
Logic and observer's logic turned out to be indispensable for the search. The chapters 
3 and further build upon each other and need each other in the search for a non-
hypothetical impartial position.  
If a method can be developed to gather true impartial information and a plausible 
universal basic property of morality can be deduced or witnessed, the third goal will 
be how the findings will affect moral leadership actions in organizations. 
One of the many complex factors causing the 2008 financial crisis gave occasion to the 
thesis although the thesis is not about the crisis. A main factor next to the many 
conditional factors appears to be the questionable behavior of many managers and 
leaders in the financial industry, in the end fully exploiting asymmetric information. 
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My hope is when a plausible universal property of morality can be found it will help a 
percentage of leaders to be intrinsically motivated to express themselves naturally, 
matching a moral code of conduct which has not been imposed.  
To impose regulations in order to safeguard a system as good as possible from internal 
errors is the logical first choice for more 'technical' systems. To impose regulations in 
the 'social domain' of economics however is not only depending on technical insight, 
but depends more so on political and ideological values, which makes "safeguarding" 
suddenly a much more difficult and complex process. 
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Chapter 1: US Financial crisis 2008, and the difficulty of regulating 
ideologies. 
  
 
Introduction 
In the modern world, a major structure that keeps societies together is the financial 
system as a support system of the economic system. Both systems overlap and are 
deeply intertwined. It is safe to say that economic / financial systems which rely 
existentially on transactions need trust and are based on trust. Some may argue that 
political systems or even military systems are the major forces behind modern 
societies. But history shows otherwise (Hirschman 1977, section 1.0).  
 The 2008 global financial crisis displayed how deeply financial systems are 
embedded and intertwined in the core of modern societies and it is imperative that 
such a deep crisis should be avoided in the future. 
 But what has history shown and how do the historical findings influence possible 
solutions in order to avoid the next global crisis? How do the relevant historical 
findings relate to possible external regulations and to morality, which is of interest 
for the thesis? The first section begins with the historical development of nations, 
trying to illustrate how much they form the background of the contemporary 
struggle between different points of view on how to solve the causes of the last 
global financial crisis. It paves the way to the following section, where the major 
causes of the 2008 global financial crisis will briefly be surveyed.  
 
1.0 The historical development towards modern free and prosperous nations. 
Hirschman, in his book “The Passions and the Interests” (1977), does not present a 
new theory but a thorough account of the historical development (from the Middle 
Ages to the 19th century) of ideas about what kind of state would be most beneficial 
for itself and for its citizens. The development of these ideas rests on the basic 
assumption that human agents have ‘passions’, and ‘passions’ need to be 
neutralized. Passions (passiones), a word deriving from the Latin pati, “to suffer or 
undergo”, refer in this context to our primitive urges, our “vices” centered on 
“egoism”. Anarchy would give free reign to these passions and it can be argued that 
an anarchic “society” would fall apart. If anarchy, in the sense of no state, is not an 
option, then what kind of state is an option? 
 To “control” man's passions two different approaches are possible. The first is 
the “inner” approach, in which man himself voluntarily takes care of his passions 
by way of disciplined reasoning or by subscribing to certain “virtues” and living by 
them. The second approach involves “external control”, where the state controls 
man's passions through law and regulations. The latter approach assumes that too 
much individual freedom can lead to abuse, violence or politically problematic 
ideas. A more subtle version of “outer control” refers to the individual's 
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identification with the rules and values of a certain group to which the individual 
(wants to) belong. 
Theoretically, the most obvious options for a state to contain “vices”, the use of 
force and coercion, became philosophically unacceptable as early as the 17th 
century. During that time, philosophers and other thinkers understood that the 
suppression of “…misery and havoc…” is based on the wishing away of these and 
not on the solving of “...the very difficulties that had been discovered” (Hirschman, 
1977 p.16). Already then, the existence of a rather fundamental difference between 
causes and symptoms (effects) was recognized. Slowly, from 1600 onwards, certain 
passions were named “interests” and were no longer simply regarded as “vices”.  
A new idea developed in which the passion of (self)-interest was seen as 
counteracting other passions with positive results. Self-interest accepts its 
dependence on the need of others. To fulfill the need of others for services and/or 
products is recognized as providing opportunities for the self. The expectation is 
that self-interest incorporates prudence towards the “commercial” medium that it 
needs to express itself. It was especially this prudent part that turned self-interest 
into a counteracting passion. Strangely, during those centuries, the meaning of the 
word “interest” developed towards referring to the personal pursuit of material, 
economic advantage. Hirschman quoted Adam Smith (1723-1790) as a possible 
explanation of this shift towards an economic meaning of “interest”: “An 
augmentation of fortune is the means by which the greater part of men propose and 
wish to better their condition...” (Hirschman 1977 p.39). The idea that self-interest, 
under the new economic meaning, would counteract the passions is worded literally 
by Keynes (1883-1946):  
“Moreover, dangerous human proclivities can be canalised into 
comparatively harmless channels by the existence of opportunities for 
money-making and private wealth, which, if they cannot be satisfied in this 
way, may find their outlet in cruelty, the reckless pursuit of personal power 
and authority, and other forms of self-aggrandisement. It is better that a man 
should tyrannise over his bank balance than over his fellow-citizens; and 
whilst the former is sometimes denounced as being but a means to the latter, 
sometimes at least it is an alternative” (Keynes, 1935/2002 p. 37).  
Smith claimed in his “Wealth of Nations” (1776/1904, III.4.4 p.26) that “...the rise 
of commerce and manufacturers gradually introduced order and good government 
and with them, the liberty and security of individuals”. Smith did not mean that a 
better society emerged only out of the wish for material or financial gain. He was 
particularly referring to non-economic and non-consumptionist motives, which 
stood central behind the struggle for economic advance. Long before Smith wrote 
his “Wealth of Nations”, he published his book “The Theory of Moral Sentiments” 
(1759), where he was very aware of prudence as a virtue. In his description, 
prudence includes honesty, sincerity and avoidance of any disgrace and falsehood 
(VI.I.8). He speaks of “superior prudence” in which prudence is joined with greater 
virtues: “It is the best head joined to the best heart.” (VI.I.16, italics added).  
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 Related to the above, McCloskey gives a compelling argument that there is 
nothing wrong with capitalism; on the contrary, “capitalism has not corrupted our 
souls. It has improved them” (McCloskey 2006 p.23). She describes how states have 
learned to adopt the “bourgeois values” of the middle class (manufacturers, 
merchants), leading to the development of their citizens’ freedom, safety and 
prosperity. She shows how these values seem to be existential for the development 
of free modern states and for a good working capitalism. Pinker (2011) has argued 
that over the centuries, as part of civilizing processes, there is a relation between the 
spread of commerce and the decline of the abuse of power (violence) in societies.  
If for some reason the state does not absorb the values of the bourgeoisie, the 
reverse can be noticed, as happened for centuries in late empirical China (Qing 
period 1644-1911). Merchants—except for the richest and most powerful, who 
identified themselves with the political elite and were accepted by them—found 
themselves in a very unsafe society. They lacked a trustworthy regulatory 
environment, suffered a corrupt justice system as court decisions could be “bought” 
through bribery, faced high criminality and intense competition. By adapting to the 
existing emperor's ideology, the merchants could at least determine their own fate. 
By being prudent and pragmatic, merchants relied on personal relations and local 
markets and hesitated to invest in production (Lufrano 1997). It was only after 1979, 
when “autocratic” China, in the form of the China Communist Party, decided to 
reform (gradually) to a modern market configuration. This was done by supporting 
the transformation of state-owned enterprises; the promotion of private enterprises; 
and the establishment of the rule of law. Since then, the middle classes gradually 
began to have increased opportunities for education, more rights (social security), a 
growth in their economic (although not political freedom and less corruption. To 
achieve all that, the China Communist Party abandoned, over time, the idea of 
central control and planning, a core value for communist ideology. Eventually, they 
allowed and then supported increased private ownership of enterprises and 
established increased security to protect participants in the market. Already the first 
phase, between 1979 and 1993, was a big success:  
“... it generated high growth, dramatically improved people's living 
standards, and eliminated shortage, the common symptom of all planned 
economies. For example, an average Chinese consumer increased his/her 
consumption about three times for edible vegetable oil, pork, and eggs. The 
per person living space has doubled in urban areas and more than doubled 
in rural areas, and total household bank deposits, measured against the GDP, 
increased from less than 6 percent in 1978 to more than 40 percent in 1993” 
(Quian and Wu 2000).  
A gradual and parallel reform, not openly mentioned in Chinese papers, has to do 
with judiciary independence. This obviously would need a parallel and proportional 
political reform to be effective. China is not a modern free democratic state, but if 
the convincing accounts of Hirschman and McCloskey are right, eventually China 
will become one, based of course on Chinese culture and history. 
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From a historical point of view, a free market economy in the form of a system 
of merchants and (merchant driven) producers motivated by interest also needs 
financial, legal and political systems to support it. In return, they appear to gradually 
transform autocratic nations into modern, safe and relatively prosperous 
democracies.  
 The principle of self-interest as the main drive behind markets is also linked to 
Adam Smith's theory of “the invisible hand”. An instructive essay was published by 
economist Leonard Read, which aptly explains the invisible hand with a metaphor:  
“I, Pencil, the creation of a pencil am a complex combination of miracles: a 
tree, zinc, copper, graphite and so on. But to these miracles which manifest 
themselves in Nature an even more extraordinary miracle has been added: 
the configuration of creative human energies – millions of tiny knows-how 
configuring naturally and spontaneously in response to human necessity and 
desire, all in the absence of any human masterminding!” (Read L. 1958) 
italics added by author. 
How critical is freedom in terms of enhancing natural and spontaneous creativity? 
How important is the lack of “any human masterminding”? The answers to both 
these questions offer an inherent aversion to regulation. Commerce based on 
outsmarting the competition to fulfil the needs of markets requires creativity and 
self-interest, which on their own terms require freedom of expression. That makes 
the financial crisis of 2008 more than just a financial crisis. It was, in a way, an 
existential crisis regarding how to use freedom, as freedom apparently requires 
responsibility to be handled. 
 
1.1 Freedom needs responsibility 
The middle class needs freedom to develop and grow and to enrich the state. 
Freedom is the observable “mechanism”, but it’s deeply and structurally linked to 
(much) less observable, more complex class values: middle class values. It is values 
that lie behind such warnings:  
“...[when] the taste of material enjoyments develops more rapidly than the 
enlightenments and habits of liberty…[and] preoccupied by the sole concern 
to make a fortune, they no longer notice the close bond that unites the 
particular fortune of each one of them to the prosperity of all.” (Tocqueville 
1840/2010 CH 14 a)  
And:  
“These people think they follow the doctrine of interest, but they have only 
a crude idea of what it is, and, to watch the better over what they call their 
business, they neglect the principal part of it which is to remain their own 
masters” (Tocqueville, cited by Hirschman 1977 p.123).  
The implicit warnings suggest that, when too many participants (reaching a critical 
mass) lose sight of the prosperity of all, and when uncontrolled passions for 
incentives take over, then the close bond Tocqueville mentioned is denied and the 
system may crash. Tocqueville raises the idea that self-interest alone (in the new 
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economic sense) is not enough to safeguard a just society, which refers to prosperity 
for all. Principally, man needs to learn to be his own master but this has to occur in 
parallel to the existence of prudence, a conclusion underlined by many modern 
articles (e.g. Weitzner and Darroch, McCloskey). Also, Smith speaks of prudence 
in his “Wealth of Nations”; as mentioned before, he sees prudence as an enriched 
virtue which includes honesty, sincerity and avoidance of any disgrace and 
falsehood (1759 VI.I.8).  
There is an implicit warning in McCloskey’s (2006) book too, a deeper, more 
revealing warning than Tocqueville's. A number of “bourgeois values” (middle 
class values) exist and as a whole, they are much more complex than self-interest 
alone. “Man mastering himself” can be seen as the combined outcome of these 
values depending on the situation at hand. The prudence that exists within self-
interest is one amongst many bourgeois virtues. McCloskey's understanding about 
many combined values suggests that the sole drive for material gain behind 
capitalism governed by prudence alone is insufficient and incomplete. The notion 
of self-interest alone cannot keep capitalist/economic systems from going astray, a 
lesson learned by Alan Greenspan and relevant to many present-day situations, such 
as the exploitation of Bangladeshi / Chinese / African workers and illegal 
immigrants in Western countries.  
The necessity of bourgeois values and its virtue ethics produce a table of seven 
virtues which are understood to foster commerce and capitalism in order to fulfil 
their promise and to keep them on the “right” track. McCloskey defends those seven 
virtues as a “pool” that is complete for every imaginable context. Sometimes, 
depending on the context, one virtue may be sufficient; other times, in a more 
complex situation, a combination may be required. But a single virtue on its own—
prudence—cannot form the basis for a modern society, not only for economics or 
capitalism. Behind the mastery of “self-interest” more complex virtues are hidden 
and ‘at work’, making mastery possible.  
“We need to defend a defensible capitalism. We citizens of the bourgeois 
towns [middle class] need to rethink our love and courage. We need to 
nourish the commercial versions of temperance, justice, and prudence that 
were admired during the eighteenth century by some in the commercial 
societies of northwestern Europe, and by at least the merchants themselves 
in Japan. And we need to find a safe home for our faith and hope.…. If we 
can do all this ethical reinvestment, we can avoid repeating the slaughters 
and lesser sadnesses of the twentieth century” (McCloskey, 2006 p.32, bold 
added). 
This resonates with Smith’s “superior prudence” and Tocqueville's indication that 
capitalism can only work with participants who are able to restrain themselves and 
not to see themselves as apart from others unbridled self-interest cannot be a system 
property of a stable economic system. Freedom should not be abused. The invisible 
hand needs freedom too, now not only regarded as an existential part of a 
functioning economy, but also as one of the foundations of democratic and stable 
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nations. The latter suggests the importance of being very careful in tampering the 
freedom market mechanisms need. It may seem easy to defend the idea that clever 
regulations might work. The danger is not the introduction of a regulation by itself, 
but the slippery slope of the idea that state-controlled regulation, in the context of 
free markets and commerce, is ideologically right. Once on this road, it is practically 
certain that the mindset of administrators and civil servants, over time, will lead 
them to push continuously for more (micro)-regulations, which all (out of sight) add 
up, with various unintended and in the end maybe grave consequences. 
 
1.2 Major causes of the 2008 global financial crisis 
The major causes of the 2008 global financial crisis will be briefly surveyed here. 
A lot has already been written about this topic. The subject of the thesis concerns 
morality, but morality may stand central in the development of a future capitalism 
if we extend the narratives that originate from Tocqueville, Smith, McCloskey and 
from modern research (see section 1.3). It is plausible to link morality to the 
responsible handling of the existential freedom that modern capitalism is based 
upon and needs.  
 The 2008 global financial crisis became global because nowadays, with the 
existing fast digital connections, global distances are eradicated. Therefore, all 
financial (national) markets are only virtually separated. The source of the crisis 
started in the USA and rapidly had a devastating systemic, global effect on the 
financial industry and, eventually, on many national societies.  
 The many interrelated and complex causes of this crisis can be roughly divided 
between manmade and system made causes. System made causes are, for instance, 
some wrong economical models based on representative agent theories (Juselius 
and Franchi 2007 p.35) as well as the rise of complicated mathematical risk and 
derivatives models which “promised” “…more stability and risk sharing than was 
actually present.” (Colander, Goldberg, Haas, Juselius, Kirman, Lux, Sloth 2009 
p.49) Next, there is the issue of slow changes over decades in the financial system, 
as a result of political and ideological decisions, which led to an accumulation of 
freedom. Financial structures became less and less submissive to regulating 
agencies and/or to the law. This began as a change in policy in the mid-eighties 
Reagan administration. As a result of this freedom, the human factor to handle this 
freedom became more central, playing a role in the downfall of trust. The growing 
political climate was sympathetic to deregulation of the existing regulations, 
historically based on the financial crisis of the 1930s, and thus made possible the 
gradual rise of largely unregulated opaque institutions and vehicles concerning 
credit facilities and risk transfer (Gorton, Metrick 2010).  
 The gradual lessening of regulations enlarged freedom but at the same time 
shifted the moral assumptions behind those early regulations to the “players” in the 
industry:  
“It is critical for management scholars concerned about ethics to understand 
the implications of the structural changes in the financial sector and to 
  
7 | P a g e  
 
further understand that in many cases the only safeguard is the moral 
character of the financiers." (Weitzner and Darroch 2009 p.9) 
The free and largely unregulated system (shadow banking system) provided new 
avenues for uncontrolled risk taking (gambling) and thus provided a context for 
maximizing incentives (Partnoy 2010, Weitzner and Darroch 2009). The 
development of risky and questionable derivative models, leading to opaque 
security products (information asymmetry between sellers and buyers), happened 
within a growing “systemic culture of greed” (Partnoy 2010). This had been noted 
in 2002, six years before the global financial crisis, by Alan Greenspan, Chairman 
(between 1987-2006) of the US Federal Reserve:  
“An infectious greed seemed to grip much of our business community. Our 
historical guardians of financial information were overwhelmed... It is not 
that humans have become any more greedy than in generations past. It is 
that the avenues to express greed had grown so enormously.” (Greenspan 
A., testimony before the Senate banking Committee, July 16 2002) 
Unethical attitudes endanger a financial system that is based on trust, particularly 
when such attitudes multiply and become part of a growing group think, thus 
contaminating the overall financial (Anglo-Saxon, Asian) culture. The millions of 
individuals working in the financial industry cannot be blamed; they have to adapt 
or leave their job (Luyendijk 2015). But their unethical organizational culture, 
tolerated or reinforced by chief executives, forms part of a major man-made cause, 
parallel to other systemic technical causes behind the 2008 financial crisis. 
 Transparency, financial reporting and competition (“old-fashioned” banking 
principles) were important pre-1985 factors that could inhibit or severely hinder 
information asymmetry and market manipulation. The rise of the “shadow banking 
system” contributed to less transparency and openness for many products and led to 
information asymmetry blending in, more than it ever had. The implicit warning of 
Alan Greenspan in 2002 did not seem to have any effect. Therefore, greed, together 
with the other aforementioned factors, led to the 2008 global financial crisis, six 
years after Greenspan’s warning.  
 To summarize, the causes of the 2008 financial crisis are complex and 
interrelated; they took decades to develop. Also, the technical advances in computer 
hardware enlarged the decision dependence of buying and selling on complicated 
software, which pretended to foresee the future and in too many cases failed. 
Negative effects became rapidly “worldly”, given that financial markets are 
internationally and intrinsically connected through intra- and inter-net. 
Nevertheless, the human factor appeared to play a crucial and negative role and 
can be legitimately lifted out of the many other factors as the one which is of most 
relevance to the thesis. It is argued that trust is the existential foundation behind 
financial and business transactions. When trust starts to falter, because of unethical 
cultures and/or too much personal misconduct, it must be restored. But can trust be 
restored? 
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1.3 Is capitalism right?  
People may believe that free capitalism itself is unjust (survival of the fittest, winner 
takes all) and that it is, at heart, not social (exploiting employees within the 
boundaries of the law, maximization of profit and shareholders’ interest as primary 
goals, extreme incentives for top functions). It has also been argued that capitalism 
is not democratic. The 2008 crisis fit well within such a line of argument. Since the 
rise of capitalism, merchants and producers, driven by interest alone, have exploited 
others for profit, while losing sight of the rights of those they exploit. A modern 
example is shown in a September 2013 BBC documentary, “Dying for a Bargain”, 
in which Bangladeshi workers are shown to be locked in the factory where they 
work for 19-hour shifts. In this case, “locked in” must be taken literally, as the front 
gate of the factory building was shown to be locked with a key by a guard, only to 
be opened to “release” the workers after their shift.  
 This is not only a Bangladesh affair. A customer of that factory “...Edinburgh 
Woolen Mill [a UK based company] still denies its clothes were made at that 
factory, but now says it has offered financial assistance.” (BBC Sept. 2013) Time 
magazine published the following in March 2013, in its Business and Money 
section:  
“A growing dossier of evidence suggests that he [Karl Marx] may have been 
right. ... A September [2012] study from the Economic Policy Institute (EPI) 
in Washington noted that the median annual earnings of a full-time, male 
worker in the U.S. in 2011, at $48,202, were smaller than in 1973. Between 
1983 and 2010, 74% of the gains in wealth in the U.S. went to the richest 
5%, while the bottom 60% suffered a decline, the EPI calculated. No wonder 
some have given the 19th century German philosopher a second look. ... 
That’s not to say Marx was entirely correct... But the consequence of this 
widening inequality is just what Marx had predicted: class struggle is back” 
(Shuman 2013).  
Growing income inequality is not just a contemporary American phenomenon. In 
2012, the rise of capitalism in China showed a gini index of 0.61, as reported by the 
Chinese Household Finance Survey Center of Chengdu's Southwestern University 
of Finance and Economics, set up by the Finance Research Institute of the People’s 
Bank of China. A gini index statistically measures the income distribution within a 
country; 0 represents perfect equality and 1 represents perfect inequality. The 
Netherlands, for instance, showed a gini index of 0.25 for 2011 (source: Eurostat 
2013). China’s income inequality “...is way above a risk level for social unrest 
underscoring new Communist Party chief Xi Jinping’s warning that corruption may 
endanger its rule.” (Bloomberg 2012-12-09) In Brazil, the poorest 10% gained a 
little over 1% of national income while the richest 10% gained over 50% of national 
income (source: UNDP Annual HDI reports for 2000 to 2009). Similar reports can 
be found in India, South Africa and other countries.  
In October 2009, in the UK, the Royal Bank of Scotland was revived after a 
bailout of £45.5 billion. The bank’s chairman of the global banking and markets 
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department (GBM), received, in 2010, a lifetime ban from any managerial work in 
the financial sector, due to the role he played in the bank's collapse. In 2013, he 
appeared before the Banking Commission of MPs and peers to elaborate his role in 
the Libor rate-rigging scandal: 
“[He] ...insisted he tried to instill the right values in his employees but 
argued ‘you can’t impose moral standards on people who don’t wish to be 
moral” (Salmon, J. 2013, italics by author). 
In May 2013, in Science magazine, an article was published entitled “Morals and 
Markets”. In this article, the authors Falk and Szech present controlled experimental 
evidence regarding the way that market interaction changes moral values. They 
come to the conclusion that “...market interaction erodes moral values, relative to 
individually stated preferences” (Falk and Szech 2013 p.707). Many years after the 
Global Financial crisis, the present (2014) corporate culture of the banking industry 
was the topic of a scientific report published in the journal “Nature”. It concluded: 
“Our results thus suggest that the prevailing business culture in the banking industry 
weakens and undermines the honesty norm...” (Cohn, Fehr & Maréchal 2014). It 
cannot be denied that people and not machines stand in the center of financial 
systems and in the end all behavior has to do with personal choice and 
responsibility. Also, organizational groupthink (culture) falls under the 
responsibility of top management and CEOs, if we take into account contemporary 
leadership theories that have developed since the eighties. (Local) law and custom 
can make personal responsibility disappear, only to be replaced by anonymous 
corporate responsibility, but it cannot change leadership theories and their power 
over organizational cultures.  
 
1.3.1 Healthy vs. unhealthy greed 
Arguably, one of the major causes of the 2008 global financial crisis is unhealthy, 
unethical greed. This must be differentiated from “healthy greed”, whereby most if 
not all players in the market try to fulfil their personal needs (just like in sports), 
but—and this is a very big bold but—under the same, transparent rules of the game, 
equally valid for all who play the game. Everybody enjoys watching some form of 
sports, whereby the players or the team try to “crush” the other team’s aims in order 
to win the game.  
 Unethical greed, on the other hand, is destructive, disregarding Tocqueville's, 
Smith's and McCloskey's warnings without understanding. It is eventually capable 
of destabilizing the interrelated system(s) in which it participates. The covert use of 
asymmetrical information between buyers and sellers is a tool that is positioned on 
the wrong side of greed. As a tool, it relies on opaqueness, on lack of transparency; 
it is blind to “... the close bond that unites the particular fortune of each one of them 
to the prosperity of all.” (Tocqueville 1840/2010 CH 14 a) 
Does this justify the conclusion that free (unregulated) capitalism is wrong 
(unjust) and needs (strong) regulation under central governmental control in order 
to contain its “abuse of freedom”? Considering what to regulate and how far to go 
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with regulation are not only technical questions, but also social ones, as politics and 
ideology enter the debate. A principal property of ideologies, however, is their 
apparent “stubbornness” in accepting counter-ideological arguments. Besides, it is 
important to take into account that for national regulations to be effective, 
international agreements and regulations are needed too, since many national 
versions of the shadow banking system are globally, tightly interlinked.  
 
1.4 The route of regulations 
To avoid systemic, large crises in the future means to avoid the mistakes and 
wrongdoings of the past. If one were to imagine metaphorically that the 2008 
financial crash was like an annually reoccurring large number of deaths (regarded 
as one problem) amongst innocent bystanders of a Nigerian (but Shell supervised) 
oil refinery, what would be the solution to prevent future casualties? It is easier to 
focus on regulations, as they are empirically verifiable and easy to defend as rational 
and necessary. But the internal Shell investigation found a different reason. The 
employees had a good knowledge of the strict rules and procedures of Shell's high 
western standards of safety. They were however at least lackluster when it came to 
abiding by these rules. Further investigation revealed that the Nigerian majority of 
employees who were working there at that time participated in a culture in which 
safety was regarded as non-masculine, even womanly and was experienced as 
'weak', not only in the organization, but also back at home by wife and neighbors 
(source: Shell C2 management course, training presentation 1984). The idea behind 
this attitude was something like this: a good man is a brave man, originally a hunter 
or warrior; he laughs in the face of danger.  
 Now regulations sank beneath their aim and tried to regulate an ideology. In most 
cases, employees subject to rules and regulations are not involved in their making; 
regulations are already in place and imposed. Supposing, in the Nigerian example, 
that management were to introduce real democracy: then employees would be able 
to choose representatives with equal power as their supervisors in determining their 
personal and environmental safety. Shell management wants to lower the figure 
from four, five deaths a year to an average of less than one death a year, as was the 
case in Europe and in the US. This would put numerical and technical safety criteria 
against culturally determined identity, at the same table. What results could be 
expected in such a situation, with the political power between the two groups more 
in balance?  
Regulating an ideology sounds problematic; still, this seems to be what needs to 
be done in the US in order to avoid a future systemic financial crisis. The US is a 
democracy basically based on two parties, where typically neither achieves a strong 
majority over the other. The Republican Party (GOP) consists of 71% of 
conservatives including libertarians (Gallup research 2011). The GOP explained 
their core values under “OUR HISTORY”:  
“It all started with people ... who bristled at the notion that men had any 
right to oppress their fellow man. In the early 1850’s, these anti-slavery 
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activists found commonality with rugged individuals looking to settle in 
western lands, free of government charges. Republicans believe individuals, 
not government, can make the best decisions; all people are entitled to equal 
rights; and decisions are best made close to home ...With a core belief in the 
primacy of individuals, the Republican Party, since its inception, has been 
at the forefront of the fight for individuals’ rights in opposition to a large, 
intrusive government”... (GOP 2013, italics added). 
The italics refer to the existential values of the GOP. The GOP is not against a small 
government and shares this belief with classical liberals who accept the delegation 
of power away from individuals toward a minimal government. This would be a 
government that knows what its primary and existential role should be: to protect 
the rights of individuals, its citizens (personal liberty, private property, safety, 
contractual rights and so on) and under strict conditions to help the disabled, who 
are unable to use their liberal rights to participate in society.  
 Modern liberals with a more social ('leftish') view on what role a government 
should take are represented by the Democratic Party, which accepts a bigger, more 
spending-oriented government, also placing importance on fulfilling its social 
responsibilities. In “The Charter & the Bylaws of The Democratic Party of The 
United States”, the party states:  
“What we seek for our Nation, we hope for all people: individual freedom 
in the framework of a just society...”; also found on the party's website is: 
“Democrats believe that we're greater together than we are on our own” 
(2013 democrats.org, italic and bold added).  
In the same way that individual freedom stands central in the foundational text of 
the GOP, so does the idea of a just society stand central in the ideology of the 
Democratic Party. Democrats accept a bigger, more “intruding” government, but 
this must be understood in relation to the views of the GOP. Nowadays, even among 
Democrats, 38% believe that the federal government has too much power; this 
number is growing (Gallup poll Sept. 23 2013). However, a big ideological 
difference can still be found between the two parties, in regards to what the primary 
role of the government should be. 
 
1.4.1 Regulating and obstructing regulations 
Against this political background we find the debate regarding what to change as a 
result of the 2008 financial crisis. Focusing on regulation is easy as this is something 
that is empirically verifiable and can be monitored. Given that all regulation reduces 
individual freedom of decision making, and taking into account that freedom is an 
indispensable property of a free market and a core “American Dream” value of both 
parties, strong ideology enters the debate.  
 A survey of the latest news publications, five years after the financial crisis, 
shows that powerful political resistance exists in implementing even those 
regulations that would deal with the major factors which led to the crisis and its 
effects. After the unprecedented bailouts of the so-called “too big to fail” banks, in 
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the autumn of 2008, the public climate was ripe for politicians and regulators to 
work on, and finally enact (two years later) the Dodd-Frank regulatory overhaul, 
but which was not finished and needed further elaboration. With a narrow margin, 
this law passed. But since its inception it has met with severe opposition from the 
GOP and from Wall Street firms, resulting in its further elaboration being delayed, 
and also resulting in not been touched upon content of 60% (Markovich, S. J., 2013). 
The Dodd-Frank law, in any case, does not address the big banks, which are still 
considered “too big to fail”. The risk is real, in any next crisis, for another string of 
expensive bail-outs, as society is seen as not able to afford being suddenly without 
the integrated “assets” of big banks.  
 In June 2013, a bill was introduced by GOP lawmakers, revising and possibly 
annulling the implementation of a major part of the Dodd-Frank law, aiming to 
curtail the funding of financial regulatory agencies. 
 A big overall belief still seems to hold: this is the idea that unregulated financial 
markets are essential and that the self-interest of bankers will eventually lead to the 
improvement of society and to widespread prosperity. Johnson and Kwak (2013) 
argue that by the late 1990s, the conventional wisdom in Washington was along the 
lines of: “what is good for Wall Street is good for America”. This belief hadn’t 
changed in 2013. The main beneficiaries of this widespread idea are (Wall Street) 
bankers, who succeeded in persuading politicians that an essential and effective free 
market equals an unregulated market.  
“More remarkable, the responses of both the Bush and Obama 
administrations to the crisis–bailing out the megabanks on generous terms, 
without securing any meaningful reform–demonstrate the lasting political 
power of Wall Street. The largest banks have become more powerful and 
more emphatically “too big to fail,” [TBTF] with no incentive to change 
their behavior in the future” (13bankers.com 2013, underlying added by 
author).  
In June 2013, the US’s ten biggest banks grew by 28%, as compared to 2008 (LA 
Times, 09-17-1013). According to the study of Johnson and Kwak, the lobby of the 
thirteen most powerful banks in the USA is so successful that one can speak of it 
having “political power”. In the author's eyes, this power presents a threat to the 
“spirit” behind a democratic nation.  
 Democrats, on the other hand, believe that the existing new rules don't go far 
enough. The existing rules try to prevent the banks from entering another crisis. But 
if such a crisis does occur, the banks will still need expensive bail-outs. The 
Democrats therefore want the government to have the authority to downsize mega-
banks. If not-too-big-banks still fail in spite of new regulations, it is argued that they 
don't need bail-outs at the expense of tax-payers’ money. At the same time, “most 
Republicans agree that the problem of too-big-to-fail institutions has become worse. 
But they don't blame the banks and don't want to force them to shrink.” (LA times, 
09-17-1013). Many more examples can be found, not only in terms of withstanding 
new regulations, but also in terms of softening or annulling the existing regulations 
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that have been made since 2008. It is not only the GOP, but also the Democratic 
Party that makes these arguments, hesitating to “curb business”, although the 
Democratic Party does this less than the GOP.  
 
1.5 Easy regulations are “value free” or support the prevailing culture  
The immense difficulty in regulating important processes, under influence of 
opposing values and ideologies, should logically disappear when the proposed 
regulations are value-free and ideology-free. In a sense, such regulations would 
come from an accepted impartial stance. There are numerous examples of such 
regulations, widely accepted. Value-free regulations are in fact not really value-free; 
they merely do not interfere with the underlying values of those operating within 
the regulated conditions. Ideally, such regulations are experienced as technical aids 
that only help in doing the job in a better or safer way, and are not experienced as a 
sacrifice of personal freedom or worse, as disrespectful to personally held values 
and beliefs. 
Going back to the example of the Nigerian oil refinery, the question now 
becomes, not what kind of regulations must be implemented or changed, but what 
can we do about the in-company culture (regarding safety)? Culture is not the sum 
of all its rules and regulations; in fact, the reverse is true (e.g. Schein, Hofstede). 
Culture expresses itself through laws and regulations, but is much more than these, 
as it expresses itself also in many other ways. Culture, of course, does not really 
exist as an empirical entity, similarly to all reifications; but on its own, culture is a 
different kind of aggregation, an aggregation of values and norms. In reality, values, 
even when shared, are only individually real: values exist within a sole individual; 
the remainder refers to interpretations of artefacts, has to do with linguistics and is 
part of the reification. In the oil refinery example, a different approach could help: 
a contextual reframing of the “Nigerian Hero” for most or all of the relevant 
employees. The historical Nigerian hero gets an extra identity: the in-company hero. 
When “Danger” sends his active foes openly, they will still be crushed by the hero's 
bravery. It is not the laughing in the tiger's face that will defeat the tiger, but 
laughing is a brave attitude when entering the fight. Now the “classical” hero also 
becomes the in-company hero, who cleverly discovers that “Danger” has a hidden, 
darker side. In the machines, the tall stairs, in the heavy equipment and the pipes, 
the power lines and the oil on the floor and in many other ways, the hidden side of 
“Danger” 'lurks and throws accidents to take the hero's life. The weapons for its 
defeat are not hero’s ancient spears or swords, but technical regulations, rules and 
procedures. It is a story of values, but built upon important national or tribal ones. 
Whatever story is told it will be part of an educational process with the sole aim to 
reach and help each and every individual in class to transform (enrich) his values. 
Alternative to the regulative approach is the education and development of values, 
or in other words the idea of changing the culture. 
 Tocqueville's and McCloskey’s warning regarding the “need to rethink”  values 
are also connected to education. Education ideally should start at home and at 
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primary schools. What starts in the privacy of home and local community could 
safely be regarded as the “cradle” of values; but there is no clear account of how a 
government can successfully impose values in the private domain, and that is a good 
thing. What happens in (primary) schools is a different matter, though. Additionally, 
business schools and universities could incorporate ethics in their curriculums or 
emphasize ethics more, although, when it comes to values, focusing on education 
cannot aim at short term results.  
An apparent downside exists when it comes to education that focuses on moral 
values: the low contemporary societal status of morality. 
 
1.6 The frustration to hope for morality 
Sadly, morality, although highly supported in the linguistic domain, seems to have 
in practice a rather low status, which in one way is theoretically defendable. The 
mechanism of the renaissance, which ended ideology (religion) as the prime method 
of understanding and analyzing reality, at the same time severely weakened 
morality’s authority, by mercilessly highlighting its apparent metaphysical nature. 
As a spontaneous reaction to the 2008 crisis, more than 2,500 MBAs and 
business students in Harvard Business School's class of 2009, drafted and 
disseminated “The MBA Oath”, based on a brief code of ethics. Obviously, the need 
was felt by these young men and women to highlight the importance of business 
ethics, in spite of the fact that their university already, even before 2008, 
incorporated ethics in their business curriculum. But, while the teaching of ethics 
was already part of the Harvard MBA programs (similarly to many other 
universities), the drafting of the “MBA Oath” showed that such programs 
apparently lack the moral authority to sufficiently commit their allegiance. “The 
MBA Oath” transformed into a book, costing a little over 20 US dollars. Its 
commercial value, notwithstanding its fine ethical and practical content, soon 
dropped. The book can now (October 2013) be bought new for 1.87 dollars (on 
Amazon.com and other similar online sellers).  
Not everyone is convinced by McCloskey's compelling account for a universally 
applicable table of Bourgeois Virtues that would help free capitalism from abuse: 
“McCloskey probably won’t sway many readers who do not already share her 
convictions.” (Holt 2006)  
 MacIntyre, who analyzed the history of Western moral philosophy in depth, 
comes to the conclusion that moral philosophy lacks any compelling argumentative 
authority (MacIntyre, 1984 pp. 8-11; and 2007 pp. 9-13). Contemporary 
participants in the debate on morality assume that their arguments are based on 
impersonal or objective criteria. But what seems to be a moral experience for one 
could easily be a bad experience for someone else. Even when contradictory 
positions are rationally explained, conflict often arises. MacIntyre considers 
rational but moral explanations a grave mistake. The used assumed criteria make 
rational approaches seem possible, but they all lead in the end to moral 
inconsistencies, creating disagreements that go on indefinitely: “...they [the 
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disagreements] apparently can find no terminus” (MacIntyre, 1984 p.6). He 
considers modern western states in their liberal development, as morally blank. This 
sounds rather harsh, but his conclusion actually is an inevitable outcome. Morality 
has lost its previous authoritative sources, be it God during the Middle Ages or faith 
in the true “nature of man” as it was in Aristotelian ethics. The authority which 
Aristotle accepts in his arguments came from his version of what man truly is, based 
on his (metaphysical) biology. Aristotle sees man as a “rational animal”, with a 
universal purpose in accordance with his specific nature, a nature that demands and 
strives for the “good”. What is therefore good for man is his purpose. Good does 
not equal money, honor or pleasure:  
“..He [Aristotle] gives it [good] the name of eudaimonia- as so often there 
is a difficulty in translation: blessedness, happiness, prosperity. It is the state 
of being well and doing well in being well ... and in relation to the divine” 
(MacIntyre 1984 p.148). 
In this view, doing well is a core property within man's natural state and it is man's 
proper function to do well, to express something beyond himself. Aristotle explains 
the relationship between happiness, purpose and the nature of man: 
“To call happiness the highest good is perhaps a little trite, and a clearer 
account of what it is, is still required. Perhaps this is best done by first 
ascertaining the proper function of man. For just as the goodness and 
performance of a flute player, a sculptor, or any kind of expert, and generally 
of anyone who fulfills some function or performs some actions, are thought 
to reside in whatever is his proper function, so the goodness of man would 
seem to reside in whatever is his proper function. Is it then possible that 
while a carpenter and shoemaker have their own proper functions and 
spheres of action, man as man has none, but was left by nature a good-for-
nothing without a function? ... The proper function of man, then, consists in 
an activity of the soul in conformity with a rational principle or, at least, not 
without it.” (Ethica Nicomachea; Ostwald 1962 p.16) 
A modern version of Aristotle-like morality comes from Taylor: 
“Virtually everyone feels these [moral] demands and they have been and are 
acknowledged in all human societies…. We are dealing here with moral 
intuitions, which are uncommonly deep, powerful and universal…We have 
a sense of who we are through our sense of where we stand to the [universal] 
good” (Taylor C. 1989 pp. 4,105). 
The belief in God, who demands “good” from man or the belief in man's good soul 
or intuition, demanding the same (not necessarily the same good), did provide 
authority back then to moral arguments. But modern post-renaissance (Western) 
man cannot accept that reasoning anymore. As a source of authority, God or the 
soul or intuition are replaced nowadays by science and rationality, based on 
empirical grounds. MacIntyre therefore argues that morality is in need of finding a 
new status, which will make the appeal to morality rational. Rational in this context 
boils down to the use of true impartial arguments that provide authority to morality. 
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Otherwise, morality will “…indeed appear as a mere instrument of individual 
desire and will” (MacIntyre, 1984 p. 62, italics added). His warning still stands in 
the 2007 edition of his book. Individual desire and will do not mean that moral 
theories are always individualistic; millions can agree and accept a certain (group) 
view and as a result “produce” the many different schools of morality. MacIntyre 
does not mean that Kant already found the new “rational status” by providing a pure 
rational approach for morality. Also, Kant failed in the end (MacIntyre, 1984 pp.43-
47, 56). So, in order to acquire authority, moral arguments   need to be rational, 
based on truly impartial arguments.  
 MacIntyre suggests that such moral arguments are (very) hard to find; his book 
offers no solution. The discussion is not finished, he says: “...but I do not pretend to 
have embarked upon it [a solution] on this present book. My negative and positive 
evaluations of particular arguments do indeed presuppose a systematic, although 
here unstated, account of rationality” (1984, p.260).  
 However, not all approaches that defend morality are only based upon 
“…individual desire and will”. McCloskey's account of virtue ethics is not just 
based on beliefs and personal assumptions. Her account includes a historical 
exploration of the rise of middle class values, leading to modern nations supporting 
the account of Hirschman. For contemporary modern nations, which are the 
outcome of such historical processes as explained earlier under section 1.0, virtue 
ethics are maybe more “rational” in the words of MacIntyre than, for instance, ethics 
based on social consequentialism (utilitarianism). 
 
1.7 Contemporary Aristocracy 
A final warning is in place. The historical roots behind free, safe, democratic and 
(relatively) prosperous nations, according to the study of Hirschman and 
McCloskey and suggested by Tocqueville, Smith and others (e.g. Quian and Wu 
2000), refer to the state’s absorption of middle class values. The powerful elite—
the aristocracy, the military and  the church— and the peasants do not have or 
express those values as a class, because they don't need them to uphold their position 
and status in society, be it as top dog or underdog. Only the members of the middle 
class, as entrepreneurs, with no military, political or religious power, learned to 
survive through their bourgeois values and by maneuvering between powers. 
Merchants are not fearless fighters or rebels, but as entrepreneurs they are assertive, 
willing to take risks, proactively exploring opportunities. The “personality” of the 
traditional middle class is not out for power, meaning they are not power driven. 
Their markets were initially small local markets with networks of relations, in which 
often there were personal links between them, their customers and suppliers. This 
enriches their values beyond being just prudent. In this context, the idea of the 
bourgeois values makes sense. When small businesses flourish, more labor was 
generated, but always at a scale incomparably smaller compared to modern 
economics. For instance, McCloskey named the Dutch as one of the first examples 
of a rising middle class, getting more freedom because of the state, but one has to 
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take into account the small scale of that time and the time previous to it. Close to 
1800, in 1795, the total population of the Netherlands was 2.087 million (Kossmann 
1986). 
Global capitalistic economy is altogether something new, and when profit is not 
primarily based anymore on the added value of labor, but on finance (making money 
with money), only self-interest seems sufficient. This (existentially) changes the 
rules of the historical evolutionary “game”. Making money with capital which, 
principally, is not directed towards adding value to the middle class but, for instance, 
is based on speculation in order to raise more money, will, when a certain threshold 
of “volume” is crossed, lead to gross income inequality and instability. This is 
Piketty’s warning in “Capital in the Twenty-First Century” (2014). Not only income 
inequality, but also the rules of the game leading to it, do not match the existential 
historical mechanisms on which free economics and stable nations are based upon. 
The rise of “big capital” is the rise of a new class with their own values. A class, 
which historically can be compared not to the bourgeoisie or the middle class, but 
to the former aristocracy. This is a class, which historically protect its own needs 
and status often at the expense of the middle and working class, when necessary. 
The “personality” of the aristocracy is very different from the middle class and relies 
on power and/or status, values which are not principal for the middle class, but more 
importantly did not contribute in the historical rise of contemporary free states. 
It is outside the scope of this thesis to explore Piketty’s work further. History has 
proven, however, that the accumulation of wealth at the former aristocracies does 
not trickle down towards a (further) development of the middle class. To hope for 
that, in order to further allow the development of big capital, may be risky and may 
lead, in the end, to systemic consequences that nobody wants. It may be a good idea 
to make an existential (as understood historically) distinction between capitalism 
that serves contemporary aristocracy and capitalism that expresses middle class 
values; there is a danger in naively regarding them as one and the same. But what 
is the modern middle class? In the first place, the rise of democracies is made 
possible by the political absorption of bourgeois values and not by the existence of 
the middle class itself, as the example of Quian and Wu have shown. Nowadays, 
because of the processes of globalization, the traditional middle class has become 
marginalized. Small local businesses in the neighborhood have mostly disappeared; 
or, when successful, they are often absorbed by big multinational and transnational 
corporations.  
 These corporations do provide en masse labor (still) to the working class, which 
the middle class used to do.  But do these big business corporations also represent 
the bourgeois values of the traditional middle class? The answer must be no, as the 
contexts within which the traditional middle classes operate are not of those big 
corporations.  Of course, prudence and self-interest will stay and are important; but 
the top executives do not own their business, they are just employees, often with 
(some) entrepreneurial traits, but with a status of the modern aristocracy, because 
of the (immense) negotiating power of their global corporations. Gradually, modern 
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politics are also less and less linked to the traditional values of the middle class, but 
tend to be more linked to Wall Street (Johnson and Kwak, 2013) and to 
multinationals. The EU's political willingness, under the persuasion of the US, to 
allow foreign transnational companies to meddle officially in national politics is a 
sign on the wall. The EU is in the process (in 2015) of allowing the acceptance of 
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and of the 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). Part of the deal  (TTIP 
chapter 11) would be to incorporate through the Investor-State Dispute Settlement 
(ISDS) the procedure for transnational companies (in practice big multinationals) to 
meet public authorities anywhere and at any level, even governments in a 
specialized litigation court to complain about (democratically obtained) policy, 
which may hamper or frustrate their profit expectations (Poirier 2003). The 
opposition to chapter eleven of the TTIP, comes for numerous (global) civil 
organizations and (not yet) from mainstream politics. 
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Chapter 2: Research goal and questions 
 
Introduction 
The previous chapter described the main causes of the global 2008 financial crisis. 
The abuse of freedom was shown to be one of the major causes, leading to the use 
of asymmetrical information and towards the wrong side of greed. What was also 
discussed was the difficulty to find and apply regulations when different ideologies 
“contaminate” the political debate. Furthermore, the ways that existential freedom 
rose out of the shadows of history to found the development of free plural modern 
capitalistic nations was explored as was the way that freedom comes hand in hand 
with responsibilities. Regulating “existential” freedom may introduce a slippery 
slope leading potentially to gradual proliferation of regulations, which in their 
totality may severely endanger it. 
 A different approach centers upon the education of moral values in schools 
and/or business schools, an approach however which entails a severe handicap: this 
is the contemporary low status of morality, due to its lack of argumentative 
authority. Morality misses an impartial (universal) ground which would provide it 
with argumentative authority. 
 
2.1 Research goal  
The research goal of the thesis is to contribute to the ability of morality to become 
more appealing,  on the basis of rational impartial grounds, which would give 
morality back its authority, making it more valid when applied to organizational 
settings. 
 
2.1.1 Research questions 
Research question 1 
What constitutes a verifiable qualitative method for conducting interviews in order 
to enable respondents to enter a non-hypothetical true impartial state of mind 
(Husserlian Transcendental Consciousness), to explore “its” substance in order to 
possibly find a rational and impartial (universal) ground for morality. 
 
Research question 2 
How does a moral, rational and impartial ground affect moral leadership in 
organizations?  
 
The assumption of the existence of a “universal” foundation for morality, which 
might give it more authority, may be at odds with the division of the categories 
objectivity vs. subjectivity. Objectivity in science claims not only universality and 
verifiability, which all will be covered in separate sections, but also that all those 
are based on empirical findings. So certain questions may arise. The division 
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between the categories objective vs. subjective may become blurred if something 
has fundamental properties that are both subjective and objective, simultaneously. 
For instance, where does “universal subjectivity” belong, if such a phenomenon 
appears to exist? Universality is principally a typical ideal of objectivity. Also the 
division made between subjectivity and objectivity cannot be taken for granted. 
What are the undeniable, if any, factual ground rules for the categories objective 
and subjective? But before that question can be answered, what are the scientific 
rules in making divisions, or in other words what defines categories? 
 
2.1.2 Sub-questions 
Some fundamental “sub-questions” therefore come up, to which answers must be 
sought first, to help order the research process before finding the answers to the first 
research question. 
 These sub-questions are: 
1) What is Husserlian Transcendental Consciousness and how is it relevant to the 
thesis? 
2) What are categories? How are they constructed and/or defined? 
3) What is the foundation of objectivity and subjectivity? Are these foundations 
proven or are they arbitrary? 
4) Could there be a possible third domain, sharing fundamental properties of 
objectivity and subjectivity?  
5) If such a third domain exists, which methodology could appropriate that domain? 
 Sub-question 3, with respect to objectivity, has been extensively investigated by 
important philosophers (e.g. Descartes, Hume, Kant, Husserl). The perspective 
chosen for this research is to build upon their work to the extent that their theories 
are relevant to the concepts of objectivity, subjectivity and impartiality (Husserl), 
and not in terms of their overall positions, including on morality, in their wider 
theories. MacIntyre has already ascertained (1984/2007) that all the different 
contemporary versions or “schools” of morality can only be in the end subjective 
constructions, relevant to certain cultures in certain contexts. The concept of inter-
subjectivity, as an important cornerstone of the acceptance of (scientific) objectivity 
will be reviewed as well. 
 In order to answer all of the above sub-questions, the perspective of autopoiesis 
from Maturana and Varela (1980) will be used. Why is autopoiesis, a biological 
theory of the Living, relevant for the thesis? It is relevant because it is a biological 
theory, which clearly explains “biological principles / laws” in the form of 
unescapable internal structural relations defining the workings of neural processes 
in CNS and (human) brains and the ways that these structures explain but also 
determine the nature of human cognition and experience. 
 
The theoretical relevance of the research is based on the development of an 
empirically verifiable method to explore the inner world of humans and to support 
a morality based on true impartial arguments. 
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The practical relevance of the research is based on findings, which may help to 
support the development of a moral stance applicable to leadership in organizations. 
  
The nature of the research is twofold. First, it aims to find a new qualitative method 
different from existing methods, which will make it possible to acquire from 
subjects de-subjectified information, which is difficult to name “objective” but 
which is not influenced by personal opinions. Secondly, the nature of this research 
is exploratory, as it aims to explore and describe an internal, impartial yet unknown, 
domain in the expectation that an impersonal ground for morality can be found.  
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Chapter 3: The veil of Ignorance and the search for a full impartial 
mind 
 
Introduction 
As chapter one showed, finding regulations in a field of contradicting ideologies, as 
well as developing “internal, moral” regulations through upbringing and education, 
meet their own difficulties. The most important difficulty is the contemporary low 
status of morality because of lacking impartial authority. This chapter will 
introduce Rawls’ (1971) “veil of ignorance”, a contemporary attempt on 
hypothetical grounds to give morality impartial authority, in the context of a “just 
society”. An older finding from Edmund Husserl (1927) suggests that “most general 
subjectivity”, not related to morality, also leads to impartiality, but true impartiality, 
not a hypothetical one. 
 The different method of explanation chosen for the upcoming chapters is a more 
story-like approach, when appropriate illustrated with real-life examples, or 
following a narrative infused with academic knowledge, form and style. The 
downside of this choice is that it may give the thesis an impressionistic style. 
 
3.0 The fragile veil of ignorance in the social domain 
The existence of impartial-like rational arguments relevant to morality (roughly 
referring to “doing good”, being just) can indirectly be inferred from observations 
of human behavior in its different contexts or even from the development of free 
plural prosperous democratic states. But these very indirect, general facts cannot 
speak for themselves authoritatively. As arguments cannot be directly observed, but 
are made by observers, objective arguments suggest they do not explain the 
observers. Within the natural sciences, this is not a suggestion, but something that 
is already accomplished, as scientists find themselves in the relatively luxurious 
(and sometimes taken for granted) position of the facts speaking for themselves, 
mostly in a loud, clear way, making the subjectivity of the observer almost 
irrelevant. The outcome of measurements, even fragile and inconclusive, is full of 
authority and demands further empirical investigation when inconclusive. That 
makes arguments rational and impartial, leading to universally valid theories that 
explain natural laws, which principally do not tolerate exceptions.  
 As soon as a truly verifiable exception occurs, it speaks with the same 
“authoritative voice” and claims further investigation for a changed or altogether 
new theory. When new investigations are (temporarily) not possible, the gathered 
data cannot lead anymore to an explanation that presumes full authority, because 
their incompleteness leaves a space that can be filled by the researcher’s 
interpretations. When this more subjective way of interpreting data is mostly or 
always the case, we enter the social and economic sciences.  
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 Social and economic theories are fragmented, and universal laws do not exist, as 
for every important generalized finding there are some or even numerous 
exceptions. In the end, social and economic sciences are concerned with humans 
and their behavior. Many important explanatory human properties are not 
observable and cannot be measured or some can only be measured very indirectly. 
Those superficial or indirect facts or abstract facts (aggregated models) do not speak 
in a “thundering loud” way, like data in the natural sciences do. If they speak loudly 
at all; they require the researcher’s reading to become articulate. The very indirect 
nature of unempirical dynamic facts (emotions, motivation, meaning, unconscious 
assumptions, changing drives, culture and more) require, too often, an 
interpretation, something which (unwillingly) may lead to subjectivity. Making 
sense of people and their behavior in the most neutral possible way is challenging, 
especially in understanding sub-cultures that seem foreign or strange to the 
researcher. But even in the extreme case of “subjective immersion”, the scientist 
claims to be objective (in order to produce acceptable academic conclusions).  
“Even cultural anthropologists, who have usually thought of themselves as 
"participant observers" and who have deliberately set out to achieve a degree 
of subjective immersion in the cultures they study still claim to be able to 
maintain their scientific objectivity”. (Cole, 1983, p. 50; Wolcott, 1995, p. 
66)… 
“Failure to do so would mean that they had “gone native”, with their work 
consequently rendered suspect as scientific data” (Pelto & Pelto, 1978 
p.69)... 
“The achievement of the delicate balance between participation and 
observation remains the ideal of anthropologists (Stocking, 1983b, p.8), 
even though it is no longer “fetishized” (Gupta & Ferguson, 1996c, p. 37). 
Objectivity remains central to the self-images of most practitioners of the 
social and sciences.”(Angrosino M.V. and Mays de Pérez K.A., 2000 p.674)  
The long quote emphasizes that the study of human beings is almost the opposite of 
the natural sciences, where arguments do have impartial rational characteristics, 
which are hard to find in the social sciences. It is even harder to find impartial 
arguments when it comes to morality. Empirical evidence in terms of trying to make 
morality rational are missing to such a degree that one cannot speak of a science of 
morality. Morality, therefore, became part of philosophy when science and 
philosophy separated. 
The use of impartial arguments in defense of morality is to apply the use of an 
impartial position (free from personal interest) where the arguments come from. 
Impartiality is pursued on a daily basis by judges, referees, arbiters, mediators, in 
all those contexts where people expect fair and honest judgments, where opposing 
parties have (often strong) personal interests. In all these cases, just rulings are 
required. If, for instance, a soccer referee appeared to have a bias towards one team, 
this would create severe problems. To defend a biased theory of morality could 
equally lead to fierce opposition from those who do not share this particular bias. 
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But how can true impartial arguments be found, stemming ideally from a verifiably 
impartial position? If a real person could be imagined to be ignorant of all his 
personal interests, as if forgetting them all, then they would temporarily become 
irrelevant, making the person impartial. At least that is the theory.  
The reality is different. John Rawls (1971/2009), in his book “A Theory of 
Justice”, advocates a theory for just income distribution. The theory he presents has 
a “golden lining”, as it is not based on his personal view, but on a kind of universal 
view obtained under a hypothetical meeting of different people under what he calls 
“the veil of ignorance”: 
“I assume that the parties are situated behind a veil of ignorance...First of 
all, no one knows his place in society...social status...fortune—abilities, his 
intelligence and strength...his conception of the good...special features of his 
psychology...particular circumstances of their own societies—...It is taken 
for granted, however, that they know general facts about human society... 
[known] principles of economy theory;.. laws of human psychology” (Rawls 
1971 p.136-137). 
Immediately after the publication of his book, it attracted both praise and criticism. 
The praise came from liberal minded readers, and severe criticism came from the 
libertarians and communitarians (Kukathas and Pettit 1990). Rawls’ attempt was 
partly successful, as soon one forgets “his place in society...social status...fortune—
abilities, his intelligence and strength...his conception of the good...” and even one's 
own personality traits, and it becomes plausible that one's position will be close to 
or equal to a truly impartial one. 
 But looking closely under the veil, Rawls allowed general (universal) knowledge 
regarding “facts about human society”, “principles of economic theory” and “laws 
of human psychology”. These are three complex (even when generalized) topics in 
which, until today, there is no accepted universal theory. For example, the GOP and 
the democrats in the US have a very different view in regards to the “facts of 
society”; also, the question of human psychology invites many conflicting theories 
(e.g. McGregor's X vs. Y theory, nurture vs. nature theories, fragmented or 
conflicting theories about emotions and mind). Finally, the principles of economy 
invite incompatible views too (e.g. Keynesian Economic Theory versus Friedman’s 
Chicago School Economic Theory).  
 The idea, therefore, that a veil of ignorance can end up generalizing many 
contradicting theories into a unified one is too much to ask. Rawls is clearly a 
“modern liberal”, his ideology not unlike that of the US Democratic Party, 
acknowledging the state’s social responsibility, including an emphasis on poverty, 
the lack of housing, the importance of education and health care, but at the expense 
of a degree of individual liberty and property rights. Already the very aim of Rawls’ 
book, to explore impartial ways towards a just society in terms of income 
distribution, resonates with the ideology of the Democratic Party.  
 Writers such as Nozick strongly object to Rawls' theory of justice, from a 
libertarian point of view, according to which people are primarily responsible of 
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taking care of themselves, rather than the state being responsible for them, provided 
there are state-protected individual rights. Rawls' conclusion, according to which 
the redistribution of income is defended as “universally just” is felt by Nozick to be 
a form of “stealing” from the rich to give to the poor, and thus a violation of 
individual (sacred) rights (Kukathas and Petit 1990).  
 Clearly, the concept of the veil of ignorance was not universally accepted. The 
conclusion is that Rawls' veil of ignorance cannot be truly impartial, as the basic 
theories allowed under his veil cannot be acknowledged as universal or impartial. 
Still, the procedure to “produce” impartiality appears valid and may be of some help 
for the arguments of the thesis. 
Such a veil is not needed in order to accept the theories of the natural sciences, 
such as those deriving from physics or biology. The theories of the natural sciences 
get their universal authority directly from the empirical data. The need for a veil 
immediately discloses that this is not the case for social theories. Which theories 
need the veil apart from those theories which clearly lack sufficient universal 
empirical data? If the data is too unclear or too fragmented, then interpretation might 
give rise to disagreements. When theories lack sufficient explanatory empirical data 
to begin with, they also lack universal rational authority. How, then, can those 
theories be saved by a veil? The veil can only use truly objective empirical facts 
and/or universally accepted impartial theories as building blocks for an impartial 
outcome. But in that case, the veil is not needed when trying to authorize the logical 
extensions of these theories into new theories, in a similar way to how the veil is 
not needed for the natural sciences. Thus, in a sense, when a hypothetical veil 
becomes necessary, something to really validate its conclusion will be missing 
almost by definition. 
To avoid the associated difficulties of a hypothetical veil of ignorance, a different 
kind of veil is needed. Still, Rawls' idea is a promising start as he clearly has shown 
how subjectivity in any form, having to do with one's status, position, knowledge—
including self-knowledge and personality—stands in the way of true impartiality. 
Therefore, the thesis will search for a non-hypothetical veil. Under such a veil no 
knowledge is allowed, and for the rest obeys the criteria of Rawls’ veil of ignorance. 
We can presume that, when nothing known personally is allowed in, true 
impartiality must be the result. The name “veil of innocence” is chosen to 
distinguish it from the hypothetical “veil of ignorance”.  
 
3.1 The impartial mind 
An important challenge is how to acquire data from respondents, through 
interviews, whereby their subjectivity in one way or another is fully withheld from 
the acquired data. The full separation of subjectivity from the data is crucial. But 
how is it possible that data can fully be separated from subjectivity? This may sound 
unrealistic or even impossible to be achieved.  
 All qualitative interview methods are based on the premise that individuals have 
personalities, formed by their unique personal history. Their personal history is 
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linked to gender, race, and the private intersubjective contexts of family, local 
community, town and nation. Existing academic methodological approaches are 
designed in a way that allows them to be open and respectful to such differences. If 
diversity, minority voices, dissenting views or forbidden opinions exist in sub-
cultures within mainstream culture, then academic methodologies should be entirely 
able, if applied well, to find those diversities in and between the stories that people 
tell. Qualitative interviews should thus be shaped in a way that creates freedom for 
any voice, for any kind of personal opinion.  
 The “freedom for any voice”, however, eliminates any chance to successfully 
find a universal foundation for morality. The search will be to find only one voice 
that represents true impartiality amongst the chaos of ego’s many voices. In a way 
it can only be one voice. If multiple voices are perfectly impartial they will all say 
the same thing. That one voice cannot be of the ego, but must be beyond it, in the 
sense that it must be fully transcendental in terms of to the narrative we call our 
“Self”. If we are “full of our self”, then the single voice must be somewhere in the 
“emptiness” beyond all knowledge of self.  
 To silence the many voices, a new qualitative method is needed. This would be 
a method that would make all knowledge and opinions irrelevant, in the sense that 
it would have no role in determining any occurring outcomes. The question then 
becomes: “Who is interviewed under the new method, when all meaning and 
knowledge stand outside the metaphorical veil”?  
 The obvious first question would be how to find such a method, but the nature 
of that question is too open ended, if the second question—“who will be the 
impartial interviewee under the veil of innocence”—is not answered first. How can 
a specific method be developed to reach an unspecified goal? Defining a goal in 
terms of what-it-is-not (it is not subjective, it is not ego and so on) seems 
unfulfilling. Suppose the “veil” is in place and the one invited to speak under the 
veil can be contacted, who and what might he be? We know nothing about him 
except what he is not or what he does not have. 
 
3.1.1 Husserl's most general subjectivity 
To know more about the unknown and impartial interviewee, Edmund Husserl1 
(1859-1938), becomes particularly important.  
 Edmund Husserl, mathematician and philosopher, wondered how the human 
mind, regarded as the altar of subjectivity, creates the division between subjective 
and objective, between subject and object. Husserl, for a large part of his 
professional life, wondered about the grounds on which the sciences rest their 
methods of objective (impartial) research (epistemology). In the end, Husserl found 
that the foundation of any epistemology is its maker. He described his experience 
of the existence of a true impartial being of pure consciousness. In a later chapter, 
Husserl's theory, and particularly the way it relates to the pure impartial position 
                                                          
1 I am very grateful to Professor Heather Hopfl who pointed me to Husserl. 
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(state of consciousness), will be covered in depth. But for now, a small introductory 
explanation will be presented. 
 Husserl named the experience of his impartial state of consciousness 
“Transcendental Consciousness”. He also described it as: “…the most general, 
subjectivity, which makes the world and its “souls,” and confirms them.” Husserl 
(1927 p.8 bold added). “Most general subjectivity” can easily be replaced by “most 
universal subjectivity”.  
 The “most general” or universal indicates that Transcendental Consciousness is 
not a subjective property of Husserl himself, like the color of his eyes or his opinions 
about science. Husserlian Transcendental Consciousness is a consciousness that 
theoretically exists in everyone, like Kant's a priori concepts (no reference to 
empirical experience), which make the experience of the world possible and which 
are also assumed to exist in everyone. It is very likely that, not by accident, Husserl 
avoids the word “universal”. He accepts, like Kant did, that the concept of 
objectivity belongs to that which appears before the senses (appears in sensibility) 
and “universality” is exclusively restricted to empirical objectivity.  
Husserl succeeded with his method and shifted into an “empty” and impartial 
state. Husserl suggests with:  
“I, as reflecting philosophically, no longer keep in effect the natural 
believing in existence involved in experiencing the world” (Husserl, 1950 
p.59). 
This is made stronger with:  
 “… The transcendental phenomenologist reduces the already 
psychologically purified to the transcendental, the most general, 
subjectivity, which makes the world and its “souls,” and confirms them” 
(Husserl, 1927 p.8, bolds and underlining added). 
In both remarks, there is no as-if proposition, which is included in Husserl’s method 
(epoché) to reach that state. This suggests that once in that state, it is not experienced 
as an as-if state anymore2.  
 What Husserl created is a slightly different veil of ignorance than that of Rawls, 
but with an important difference. Rawls needed some general knowledge allowed 
in under the veil, not realizing that he allowed in his own subjectivity, while Husserl 
allowed nothing in and left even “Husserl” outside. What Husserl experienced is a 
state of “pure” consciousness, which theoretically is truly an impartial and universal 
state of mind, just as universal as Kant’s findings, leading to the possibility of 
perceiving an objective world. 
 Husserl realized that Transcendental Consciousness is not only the maker of “the 
world and its souls”, but also the maker of himself (ego), as he intimately knew and 
experienced himself. Husserl thus succeeded in bracketing Husserl too. However, 
what proved impossible to bracket was the person doing the bracketing. In a way, 
this resembles the rational doubt of Descartes, but with a big difference. In the terms 
                                                          
2 Husserl’s method will be addressed in the next session 3.1.2. 
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of Husserl, Descartes also bracketed the whole world that he knew, but there was 
no need for Descartes to bracket himself out. Transcendental Consciousness is the 
one that purports to be free from all knowledge be it subjective or objective. Husserl 
was convinced he reached and experienced the ultimate state, a kind of dead end, a 
final state that could not be investigated further. That particular state of 
consciousness is not a topic of interest in traditional or contemporary psychology 
and cannot be reached with existing psychological methods. Husserl says:  
“Scientific discipline for us is not that of the psychologist. ... By the same 
token, we are not concerned here with any scientific psychology and its 
problems. For the latter, the world, presupposed by it as unquestionably 
existing, is the ground; and it is precisely this ground that the epoché 
(method) to reach the state has taken from us”. (1970 p. 53, bold added)  
Since then, mainstream psychology still centers on the understanding of the subject 
in relation to its interactions with the world. 
 
3.1.2 Husserl’s method: The Transcendental Phenomenological Reduction or 
epoché 
Husserl’s method to reach Transcendental Consciousness is named “The 
Transcendental Phenomenological Reduction” or epoché. As a mathematician, 
Husserl used the notion of brackets, but did not fill them with numbers but rather 
with meaning and knowledge about the self and the world. Husserl's method, now 
primarily regarded as one that “tunes into” a full impartial consciousness, does not 
only aim at bracketing meaning and knowledge. He also fully distanced himself 
from the brackets while being aware of their content, by considering their content 
as if their status still awaits any validity in order to be real.  
About the method, he says the following: 
“…whereas this dimension [of Transcendental Consciousness] can be made 
accessible to scientific understanding, through a method of disclosure 
appropriate to it, as a realm of experiential and theoretical self-evidence 
(§32) … there is no way of documenting it empirically in a sense analogous 
to what is done in the objective sphere through inductive experience” 
(Husserl 1970 §52). 
It is possible, however, according to the above statement, to document interviews 
done with respondents as data for scientific understanding. To arrive at this state, 
Schmitt (1959) made notes from Husserl’s diverse publications about his method:  
“What exactly is this new attitude … transcendental-phenomenological 
reduction? Here Husserl provides “: I no longer attach any validity to the 
‘natural belief in the existence of what I experience'… I 'bracket the 
objective world”… In performing the reduction, the phenomenologist 
establishes himself as a ‘disinterested spectator’ and changes his practical 
aims. The result of this change of attitude is a change in my experience. 
Previously experienced reality now becomes “mere phenomenon”. This 
Kantian term is here used in a new sense; any object of experience becomes 
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“phenomenon” for the observer who recognizes the object’s claim to reality, 
but reserves decision on the validity of that claim” (Schmitt R. 1959 p.239, 
italics added). 
In total, Husserl's reduction resembles an overall general piece of advice to put all 
truth claims temporarily “on hold”; the way of thinking obviously worked for 
Husserl's (disciplined) mind set. But somehow, it does not seem convincing, as a 
framework, in enabling ‘naïve’ respondents in the context of a single interview to 
reach the state of Husserlian Transcendental Consciousness by following the 
method of the epoché.  
 
3.1.2.1 Practical concern 
A major concern might be the following: people can make an intellectual choice to 
no longer attach any validity to any previously held “truth-claims”. But it is 
conceivable that on a deeper unconscious level, the meaning intertwined in the now 
“detached knowledge”, may still be dominant, but in a dormant way, vulnerable to 
activation by the right trigger, if it’s strong enough. For instance, people who fear 
flying and thus have to discipline themselves in order to step into an airplane, 
demonstrate with the discipline they have consciously detached themselves from 
their natural meaning/knowledge which is that “flying is dangerous”. Yet, the 
“dormant”, unconscious and now dissociated part of themselves, awakened by the 
corresponding trigger (the seeing of the airplane, hearing the noise it makes etc.), 
simply ignores the “intellectual detachment” that discipline needs. The fear of flying 
is fully felt, resists or better ignores the intellectual detachment and forces the actual 
stepping into the plane by way of discipline. Triggers may unwillingly cause 
detached knowledge or subjectivity to emerge, from their “unnatural” brackets into 
experience. Something similar may also happen with the respondents. During the 
interview, there may be information or beliefs in brackets, equally vulnerable to 
(internal) triggers, such as a thought. If such a triggering thought or internal 
experience comes up, that particular “bracket” might break and its contents may 
contaminate the purity of “Transcendental Consciousness” and the responses it 
would elicit. To imagine Husserl practicing his “reduction technique” and 
succeeding in it, is also assuming he did the exercise in solitude, away from most, 
if not all, distracting triggers. On top of that, being in the state of Transcendental 
Consciousness is, for Husserl, his end goal: the goal of the Transcendental 
Phenomenological Reduction itself, a very tranquil place to be, without being 
challenged by immediate processes or context.  
 With the respondents, that particular state is the beginning state, not the end goal. 
The exploration of whether an impartial ground for morality is possible may well 
lead to a road with unexpected triggers, which may or may not introduce or 
automatically trigger a deviation from the impartial (transcendental) state. 
Minimizing that possibility will be insufficient for the research; a method is 
necessary whereby zero tolerance to contamination is required. 
  
30 | P a g e  
 
 The first four preliminary pilot interviews, based on Husserl's method, failed. 
Contamination was found to be easy to trigger. The choice was then made to 
develop a different method. There is a small department in psychology which is also 
interested in beyond-ego states: Transpersonal psychology. Maybe they might offer 
a relevant method? 
 
3.2 Psychology versus Transpersonal psychology  
The development of psychology, in becoming a science, started around 1879 when 
Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920) conducted psychological enquiries, mostly with 
students, in his laboratory. On a voluntary basis, the students were allowed to 
answer questions regarding aspects of what happened in their minds, in terms of 
their emotions and thought processes. Wundt was trying to examine how these 
thought processes might be interlinked with triggers from the outside world.  
 Even when Wundt's methods followed a positivistic framework in as strict as 
possible a way, to ensure that the research was of good quality (as similar as possible 
to the research principles of natural sciences), still, at those early days of 
psychology, Wundt was denounced: 
“… Wundt’s central concepts of voluntarism, value, and psychic causality 
were rejected as metaphysical…Behaviorism represents a logical 
development of this point of view” (Kurt Danziger  1979, p.205). 
Rejecting Wundt’s reliance on what were seen as vague inner concepts, and 
substituting those for material phenomena, which at least could be observed and 
measured, the early days of psychology developed a “new psychology”, even more 
based on positivism. Similarly to physics or biology, psychology needed to start 
with the empirical facts of “human objects”. But the old division of body and mind 
hindered Külpe, the founder of scientific psychology, as body and mind could easily 
be rephrased into object and subject. In order to purify psychology from any 
“subjectivity”: 
“Külpe now takes the critical step of rejecting unequivocally the ‘psychical 
individual’ as an explanatory principle for scientific psychology and opts 
instead for the ‘corporeal individual’” (Kurt Danziger 1979, p.209). 
The decision to denounce Wundt's findings steered psychology away from the inner, 
subjective world towards behavior, in its relevant worldly context, whereas both 
(world and behavior) can be observed and measured. The discipline of behaviorism 
followed, leading, over time, to a psychological school of thought which tries to be 
as empirical as possible by concentrating on what can be measured. Behaviorism 
accepts the psyche, in the form of thinking and feeling, as an existing, real factor, 
but assumes that all behaviors are acquired through conditioning. According to the 
theory (e.g. Kirk and Miller 1986; Michell J. 2003) it is only through the interaction 
between the individual and his environment that conditioning occurs. The 
interaction can be studied, quantified and measured in a systematic and observable 
manner, whereby internal mental states, although real, are regarded as scientifically 
irrelevant. 
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After 1970, cognitive psychology became gradually more widespread, partly as a 
rejection of behaviorism’s point of view which was perceived as too strict, but partly 
as a theory that was in fact complementary to behaviorism. Cognitive psychology 
considers the act of knowing as central. It therefore studies human activities related 
to knowledge, linking up to neurobiology, artificial intelligence (AI) and other 
relevant theories. It shares with behaviorism its reliance on objective methods, 
measuring behavior (e.g. memory and reaction time) and allows as little 
introspection as possible to be considered (e.g. Galotti, K 1994; Neisser U. 2009). 
Although in line with the rejection of Wundt’s view in accepting introspection, 
today’s mainstream psychology has gradually allowed, in the last two decades, more 
publications based on qualitative research. Yet, in the US a study about publications 
of The American Psychological Association (APA)—which is the major and 
dominating academic psychology institution in the US—revealed:  
“APA Journal Analysis: Overall, the results (1,3%) indicate that qualitative 
research is rarely seen in APA journals”. (Kidd, S. 2002 p.131).The positivist 
approach intended to close the door to possible psychological findings based on 
anything “transcendental”. Consequently, it was now only philosophers, not 
psychologists, who allowed the examination of alternative psychic domains, such 
as those suggested by Kant, Husserl and others.   
 
3.2.1 Transpersonal psychology 
A small branch exists, at the periphery of psychology, which focuses on that which 
“lies-beyond-ego”. In 1969, deriving from a humanistic background, a group 
including Abraham Maslow, Stanislav Grof and Anthony Sutich, launched the 
Association of Transpersonal Psychology. The Journal of Transpersonal 
Psychology soon followed. The group extended humanistic psychology, by 
including a spiritual dimension, which they felt was fully missing within the 
contemporary dominant branches of psychology. 
 The new branch of psychology incorporates spiritual concepts, deriving from 
many diverse sources. They refer to “peak experiences” (nirvana), wholeness, non-
duality, beyond-ego states of consciousness, self-transformation, cosmic unity and 
so on.  
 The methods of transpersonal psychology complement standard scientific 
methods, using meditation, various rituals and other aids (excluding drugs) to enter 
these states. Transpersonal psychology’s aims are to integrate psychology into a 
“holistic psychology”, enriching the definition of what a human being is and 
gathering knowledge which will “help in expanding experiences of “self-
actualization” (Hartelius, Caplan and Rardin 2007; Davis J. 2003).  
There has been criticism against transpersonal psychology, centering upon the 
charge that it does not really help psychology in its current preoccupations which 
concern the daily ordinary experiences of human beings, for example problems such 
as depression. It has been argued that Transpersonal Psychology omits common 
experiences and focuses on “top” performances involving for example super 
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athletes or people who in various contexts experience altered states of 
consciousness. Many of Transpersonal Psychology’s methods and conclusions are 
also seen as being at odds with conventional science and have been seen as 
sometimes moving towards the metaphysical.  
The academic literature of Transpersonal Psychology is small. Their articles 
often involve “holistic” meta-theories or hypotheses with little data that is backed 
up by empirical research, and that is relatively free from interpretation. Many of 
their theories are seen as being in harmony with ancient mystique, for example: 
“... tripartite synopsis of self-integration through integral yoga: psychic 
integration (harmonious development of personality facilitated by the 
discovery of a higher self), cosmic integration (integral relatedness to 
society and environment), and existential integration (spiritual unfoldment 
toward the integration of psyche and cosmos, time and eternity, nature and 
spirit). Though it is based on the viewpoint of a single individual, this 
Aurobindonian perspective on an integral approach to human psychology 
has much in common with the three major themes of transpersonal 
psychology” (Hartelius, Caplan and Rardin MA 2007). 
Transpersonal Psychology does focus on inner transcendental domains, which 
mainstream psychology avoids. In the US, the American Psychological Association 
(APA), which is the world's largest association of psychologists, have not yet (2015) 
approved Transpersonal Psychology as a mature psychological science. But in 
1997, the British Psychological Society (the British equivalent of APA) did approve 
an academic Transpersonal Psychology section, 30 years after the field’s birth. A 
related section of Consciousness and Experiential Psychology was approved as 
well.  
 Transpersonal Psychology cannot be found in Dutch academic offerings of 
psychology. In 2013, there were, worldwide, two non-US universities offering 
Transpersonal Psychology courses (registered with the Association of 
Transpersonal Psychology, atpweb.org).These courses offer a Master of Arts 
degree, one being in Canada and one in Sweden. There are, however, numerous 
non-degree Transpersonal Psychology courses that are offered by schools and 
private institutions. A single exception is an MSc program in Transpersonal 
Psychology offered by the University of Northampton in England. 
Almost half a century earlier, before the birth of Transpersonal Psychology, 
Husserl had found a way, with his reductionist method, to “enter” a transcendental 
state of consciousness. Husserl called his method the “epoché” or the 
“transcendental phenomenological reduction” (1927). The method “moves” in an 
experiential way towards awareness which leads to the state of Transcendental 
Consciousness, a state of consciousness that doesn’t however match the beyond-
ego criteria of Transpersonal Psychology. There are however some Transpersonal 
Psychology articles which do mention Husserl's phenomenological psychology. 
The reverse is not true: 
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“None of this is meant to imply in any way that existentialists or 
phenomenologists in general are inadvertent or closet mystics—not at all. 
The vast majority of existentialists and phenomenologists have not been 
concerned with transpersonal issues. Few phenomenologists have been 
interested in the transcendental aspect of phenomenology even though 
Husserl considered that facet to be the most important” (Cairns, 1976; 
Spiegelberg, 1982 and Hanna 1993 p.182). 
Transpersonal Psychology does accept a number of different unspecified “beyond-
ego” states, associated with spiritual or mystic altered states of consciousness. They 
do not resemble Husserl’s findings though. Husserl found an existing impartial 
transcendental state of consciousness apodictically described—a beyond ego 
state—but directed  towards the world, defined by Husserl as the final maker or 
source of all psychological constructions, making the world and others and the self 
(ego). Husserlian Transcendental Consciousness—“an sich”—is accepted by the 
philosophy community. 
Transpersonal Psychology does not appear, to have a model or method suitable 
for the thesis that would assist in teaching respondents in a single meeting, to reach 
Husserlian Transcendental Consciousness. 
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Chapter 4: Categories: the very first approach to reality 
 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, different approaches were reviewed in order to reach a truly 
impartial position, which is difficult. Most approaches are partly impersonal and are 
very context-bound, or “pseudo-complete”. The aim of Husserl’s epoché is to 
theoretically be able to produce a different impartiality, not tainted by previous 
knowledge or subjectivity. The full epoché, when successfully “executed”, makes 
the participant able to enter or identify with Transcendental Consciousness: it refers 
to a pure de-subjectified state of mind; as a method for the thesis, however, in terms 
of working with respondents, that method is impractical. An alternative would be to 
find a new method: named the veil of innocence, with the aim to produce full 
impartiality. 
 In order to survey deeper into the alternative approach, to reach Husserlian 
Transcendental Consciousness, one must know exactly as possible what should be 
placed (temporarily) outside the veil of innocence, as a non-hypothetical (not-as-if) 
veil in the sense that such a veil (being a metaphor) will “produce” real and full 
impartiality. 
 Subjectivity and objectivity are regarded as fundamentally different categories. 
It may well be that what would work for one category to be placed outside the veil 
might not work as effectively for the other category. So, in order to design a 
different method than Husserl's epoché, the critical difference between the two 
categories needs to be known. But first, what are categories exactly? What is the 
methodology of categorizing? The major dictionaries or encyclopedias mention that 
the forming of categories is the most basic and primary functioning of knowing, 
including aspects such as awareness, perception, reasoning, and judgment. 
 The chapter will survey what categories are and how they are formed. 
 
4.0 To categorize  
What does it mean to categorize? 
“Categorization is the mental operation by which the brain classifies objects 
and events. The operation is the basis for the construction of our knowledge 
of the world. It is the most basic phenomenon of cognition...” (Cohen and 
Lefebvre 2005 p. 643) 
The above more or less states that our “fabric of reality”, our paradigm as we 
understand and experience it, is the sum of all categories. To be able to make 
categorizations might be the very first thing biology demands from animals to do. 
In order to stay alive, there has to be an acknowledgement of what is safe and what 
is unsafe, food has to be distinguished from non-edible things, and finally itself from 
what is not-itself. Some categories are innate, like colors or warm versus cold 
(perceptual categories,) since in those cases the physical structure determines the 
sensory experience (see for example Maturana and Varela 1980; Marler 1982; 
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Mandler 2000). More abstract categories are, for instance, the aforementioned 
category of safe-unsafe. Categories free mind from investigating literally every 
particular it encounters again and again, as if it has no memory. To remember a 
single particular encounter lays the basis to start generalizing its main properties 
towards new but similar encounters. When that happens a category is born.  
“According to the classical [Aristotelian] theory, a category is defined in 
terms of a set of properties, or features, and an entity is a member of the 
category if it exhibits each of the features. Each of the features is necessary, 
jointly they are sufficient. The classical theory captures the ‘essence’ of a 
category in contrast to the ‘accidental’ properties of category members” 
(Taylor 2011 p. 643). 
Still a “hidden”, more basic assumption is needed before categories can be formed. 
In order to be able to categorize, expectations are necessary. Hume made clear that 
the notion of causality (which refers to the idea that a cause predicts its own 
necessary and identical future effect) is founded on the acceptance that the essential 
properties of a 'thing' are reliable, and even fixed in time. What are experienced as 
properties in the past will be, under the same circumstances, faithfully repeated in 
the future. This is also a necessity for the first single particular before it can be 
generalized over other similar (future) encounters, for instance the generalizing of 
the refrigerator in the kitchen into the future. Tomorrow or when coming home from 
a vacation, the refrigerator will be (must be!) as remembered; all its versions in the 
future will retain the essential properties, which have been 'projected' to all those 
versions from their past. In a sense to expect is to project memory into the future. 
Expectations, therefore, form the basis of categorizations. Then “objects of 
intentions” also stay, when categorized, in their respective categories (this makes 
the categorization of people more than a bit questionable).What is within one 
category is accepted as ‘sufficiently known' and does not need full investigation 
anymore when met next time. The infinite world is thus reduced to manageable 
chunks of information (cognitive economy). The reduction is not the only benefit 
of categories; they also sort a complex reality in a distinguishable neat order.  
 
4.1 Science needs “classical” categories  
Science normally accepts or takes for granted the classical meta-beliefs behind 
processes of categorization. It is sufficient that the “how to categorize” (tool level) 
meets approved methodological criteria. The objective status of categories for 
science can be deduced from the very existence of the categories “objective” and 
“subjective”. Both categories are equally objective and valid in reference to their 
content.  
 Rosch (1973) focused in her work on two rational conclusions of classical 
categorization theory: no member of a given category is better equipped than 
another member to be in that category as it is only what they share that authorizes 
their membership within that category. Another conclusion has to do with the fact 
that, as categories are defined exclusively by the shared (structural) properties of 
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their members, they are regarded as “objective”, independent of their “observers”. 
This is exactly what science needs. Observers “just” bring objective order to 
complexity by means of categories and, when possible, in terms of understanding 
underlying relations.  
 
4.2 Husserl's way to detect essentials 
A category is defined by a 'set' of shared essential characteristics. But what is an 
“essential” characteristic? Essentials cannot be missed; when missed or altered it 
changes the characteristics of the particular in such a way that the particular identity 
loses its ontological status. What is/are the essential(s) of a car? Husserl (1927 p. 4-
5) conceived of the eidetic reduction method to filter out non-essentials from 
essentials. For instance, we could understand if we were to reduce or alter (in 
imagination) the properties of a car in such a way that its essence was changed and 
it wasn’t a car anymore. Then what could be reduced or changed of a “car” until 
one would have to refuse to acknowledge it as being a car? In this case, an essential 
is found by removing it, for instance the number of wheels cannot be reduced to 
fewer than three; also, the car needs an engine to be driven. What is left is a set of 
minimal essentials which, together, form the identity “Car”. The identity is also the 
name of the category. This seems rather straightforward, but can be very complex. 
What is left, for instance, after the eidetic reduction of “Friendship”?  
Going back to biology, it immediately becomes clear that an animal is not a 
neutral (objective) librarian, categorizing nature. Categorization is a necessary 
biological tool of survival, but is not objective. Categories determine the behaviors 
that animals do in the world. It is elementary school knowledge that different natures 
(species, identities) exhibit different survival strategies and categorize the world 
differently. That makes categorizations submissive to their ultimate goal: the 
preservation of that particular organism (identity). Or, in other words, categories are 
colored by the identity of the species. In more than one sense, categories extend the 
identity of organisms into their environment.  
An interesting question could be “Are humans free of the biological preservation 
of identity?” If the answer is “no” then the category “objectivity” deserves critical 
attention. The idea that categories since Aristotle are objective and are merely 
waiting for their discovery, has “only” recently (1973) been challenged by SGCS 
(Second Generation Cognitive Science).  
  
4.3 Prototype theory  
Second Generation Cognitive Science (SGCS) has shown that the classic 
explanation of what categories are is sufficient for ordinary purposes but 
fundamentally wrong in its overt simplicity. SGCS introduced a new theory of 
categorization: Prototype Theory. Experimental studies done by Labov 
(1973/2004) showed that the use and function of some object categories is at least 
as important as the independent (physical) properties of that “object”. This strangely 
introduces “invisible” threads to members of another category. Strangely, because 
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the classical definition of categories is explicitly grounded by the content and 
independence of the categories and the implicitly puts a boundary between 
categories and what they-are-not: other categories. Without taking use and function 
into account, Labov found, the object’s properties alone cannot any more reliably 
match the membership criteria of the category. The result is that members of 
neighboring categories “invade” the category.  
 His example is the “cup”. The category “cup” becomes blurred at its boundaries 
and can incorporate mug, bowl or even vase, based on form and measures alone at 
the overlap of their categories. Objective clear-cut boundaries cannot solely be made 
based on the physical properties of the cup. A similar example is a table salt mill; 
some of them can equally function as peppermills.  
Empirical research by Rosch (1973) and Rosch, Mervis,Gray, Johnson and 
Boyes-Braem (1976), investigating the characteristics and use of categories, 
conclude that some members are better “equipped” to be in a category (defying the 
logic behind classical categories) and as such they are “recognized” by humans as 
better examples for that category. Experiments found that when respondents were 
asked to name examples of the category “caring parent”, they tended to refer more 
to the mother than to the father. Likewise, penguins or ostriches are less frequently 
named before swallows when it comes to being members of the category “birds”. 
In addition, “table” is more frequently named as an example of “furniture” than is a 
stool. Also, in language, the saying “prime example” refers unknowingly to 
prototypes.  
 
4.3.1 Prototypes are not about meaning 
Prototypes are time-dependent. The linguistic name of the category can be fixed in 
time, but not necessarily its prototype. The prototype of the category “bicycles”, 
during 1800-1879, was not chain-driven. Still the meaning of “bicycles”, referring 
to the category name and identity, did not change. The categories “dogs” or “cats” 
have a prototype, which has four legs, two eyes etc. But a dog with three legs at 
birth or after an accident is still considered a dog by everyone. Pure prototype does 
not really take the meaning of the word “dog” into account, which language 
(linguistic categories) does. So, a three-legged dog is not part of the category 
prototype, but is included in the linguistic meaning of the word “dog”. The category 
“dogs” refers to dogs. The category bicycle, however, is less clear. Similarly to 
dogs, it refers to bicycles, but invisibly intertwined with that is their function. The 
chainless bicycle is included in the prototype (time-dependent) while the function 
of the bicycle stays untouched. So a future prototype of “bicycle” may lose the chain 
again. 
In Prototype Theory category members “circle” around their prototype in the 
center of a category. A pure prototype does not exist in real life; it is the minimum 
“pure” set of characteristics that members approximate; it is a kind of ideal and 
exists only in the human mind (Rosch, et al. 1976; Rosch 1999). The more members 
approximate the prototype, the more they are named as examples of the category. 
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Another property of categories next to their cognitive economy is the perceivable 
distinction between categories.  
 
4.3.2 Prototypes and the (possible) marginalization of category members 
Consensual understanding of a (social) category can be based on its prototype too 
much. The more category members are “distanced” from their prototype, the more 
they are vulnerable to be marginalized from it or even denied membership to it. In 
fact, all marginalized voices prove, not that they belong to an inferior category, but 
that as members of a category they are too distant from the prototype. The very 
notion of being marginalized could not exist otherwise. Employees of the Phillips 
organization, for instance, cannot be considered marginalized when they are not 
heard or when they are even denied any participation in decision-making processes 
within the Sony Corporation.  
 
4.4 Strange and impossible categories 
Not so hidden in the classical view is the assumption that a set of shared and 
essential properties produce a category with a neat and clear boundary. But also in 
the time of Aristotle the category “family” could have no boundaries except in terms 
of reification. How far back does common ancestry go? If there is no real objective 
rule for it, then at least one of our shared ancestors is the “...mammal-like [tetrapod] 
Therapsid because it initiated the eventual transition to the mammals” (Kemp 
2005).  
 Another category which can only exist because of its prototype is “poison”. How 
can poisonous properties exist as features of their category members independent of 
the world outside the category? Why is clean “water” not a member of the category 
poison?  
“A Sacramento jury today awarded $16 million to the family of a woman 
who died during a 2007 radio station contest gone awry...a mother of three 
from suburban Rancho Cordova, died of apparent water intoxication hours 
after a failed attempt to win [who drinks the most water in a set time] a 
Nintendo Wii video game system for her children in a promotion 
[broadcasted by radio] ....” (LA Times 2009) 
In fact, “poisonous” as a property of (material) objects is a non-existing essential 
property. At best, it is a relational property to an organism outside its category. Still, 
even then, this can never satisfy the making of a category as principally nothing is 
non-poisonous when taken in at too big a quantity. If everything is potentially 
poisonous, then the category “poison” does not have a boundary. The category 
poison is therefore not defined by its members, but an extension of the vulnerability 
of the human or organism's body, members of a very different category. Only the 
prototype “invents” the category, while in the case the prototype is a prime example 
of a 100% extension (construct) of the “observer” and 0% describes the properties 
of the category’s members. Still, even though it is an “impossible” category, it is a 
very useful category. 
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When categories cannot get rid of their fuzzy boundaries, it means there are 
“neighboring” categories with fuzzy boundaries too. Prototypes have the advantage 
that, in those cases, they suggest a clearly defined category with a clear boundary 
and transform “fuzzy categories” such as “poison” experientially into more robust 
ones.  
A very fuzzy category with a robust status within the very basic perceptual 
domain of colors is the color “grey”. “Fifty Shades of Grey” is not just a romance 
novel; its title signifies the beginning of an (almost) infinite bigger category of a 
multitude of nuances of grey. It is in fact quite hard to even define a sub-category 
“dark grey” as “dark grey” still has numerous variations within its perfect fuzzy 
boundaries and towards its neighboring sub-categories. Humans, under optimal 
conditions, can detect 1000 JND (Just Notable Differences) in shades of grey 
(Kimpe and Tuytschaever 2007).  
A common category which plays havoc with the classical theory of categories is 
the category “[five] senses”. What properties do the five senses have in common? 
Even for Prototype Theory, the prototype of the category is not determined anymore 
by any individual (structural) property, but the overall abstract function of its 
members. What it is, is irrelevant for the category and what it specifically gathers is 
irrelevant too. Not a single property of their structure or of what they specifically 
do or what they specifically gather is shared. The only thing that is shared is where 
it gets its information from (a condition outside the category). The property—that 
they all are connected to the brain and transport information—is shared with many 
members of other bodily categories and cannot be essential to why they are 
members of the “senses”. Other internal organs (kidney, liver, muscles, teeth) with 
nerve tissue transport information temperature, glucose levels to the brain (afferent 
nerve fibers) etc. The member criteria for “senses” are the perfect opposite of the 
member criteria of the categories “cars” or “trees”, and are more similar to the 
category “poison”.  
  
4.5 Categories and culture 
The influence of culture was implied in the studies of Labov, whereby the function 
of the category members implicitly plays a role in the boundaries of certain 
categories. The influence of culture seems unlimited and may in some cases take 
over the category altogether. An example is a (19th) century hard wood, dark patina 
door functioning as a door in Timor (ceremonial) houses, but exclusively regarded 
as “primitive art” in Western art galleries, mostly to be hung on the wall. The two 
different cultures also determine two wholly different contexts, where the door will 
be placed. In the example, the two categories of the same door are different because 
of the different cultural points of view of the category “user”. The “door” becomes 
three different doors, belonging to three different categories for three different 
“users” of the door—the Timor man, the art collector and the scientist. Although 
the door is a member of three different categories, this is very different from the 
principle that “objects” can be a member of different “horizontal” categories, like a 
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“tree” can be a member of the categories “trees”, “forest”, “garden”, or “park”. In 
the case of the “tree”, it is still the same tree fitting the categories “trees” in all the 
other possible larger categories. 
 
4.6 Inconsistent categories rules 
Although accepted as categories, the category “trees”, “Timor doors”, “poison” and 
“[five] senses” do not share or even perfectly oppose the classical definition of what 
a category actually is. To play “at will” with or allow contradicting criteria to define 
a “category” is not an example of objective coherent methodology. Borges, in his 
1942 essay “The analytical language of John Wilkins”, presented an ancient 
Chinese encyclopedia, named Celestial Emporium of Benevolent Knowledge, which 
classified the animal kingdom in categories that would be mind boggling even to 
contemporary biologists.  
 To name a few of the fourteen (in total) listed categories of animals: “Those that 
belong to the emperor, Embalmed ones...Stray dogs... Those that, at a distance, 
resemble flies” (Borges 1942/2001). Though Borges suggested that the list was in 
fact a real ancient list, discovered by a translator, the consensus is that the list does 
not refer to a once-existing list, but was made up by Borges to illustrate his ideas 
about language and categories.  
 The point that Borges tries to make is the idea that a human being can arrogantly 
order in language, by way of classifications (categories), the infinite world, which 
is full of numerous unknowns. He says: “it is clear that there is no classification of 
the Universe [world] not being arbitrary and full of conjectures” (Borges 1942/2001 
p. 231).  
Contemporary Prototype Theory concludes: 
“...human categorization is essentially a matter of both human experience 
and imagination—of perception, motor activity, and culture on one hand, 
and of metaphor, metonym, and mental imagery on the other... 
categorization that do fit the classical theory are special cases of a general 
theory of cognitive models, one that permits us to characterize the 
experiential and imaginative aspects of reason as well.” (Lakoff 1987:8-9) 
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Chapter 5 Autopoiesis and Objectivity 
 
Introduction 
Why is autopoiesis necessary for the thesis? It is a theory, which fully opposes or 
better reverse the default handling of causal reasoning used by (scientific) observers 
to understand the empirical world. The default method, which “produces” for 
instance natural laws and satellites around the earth, is fit for purpose and useful 
when applied to the non-living world. However, in order to understand the structural 
principles of living organisms (including humans and their psychological domain) 
and the ways in which these principles explain how they determine human cognition 
and thinking, default reasoning is inappropriate.  
 The theory of autopoiesis is indispensable for the development of the thesis 
because it offers a different way of reasoning, not primarily based on the 
descriptions of observ ers. 
 
5.0 The impossibility of autopoiesis to fit in mainstream science 
Autopoiesis determines the human attitude to what is named the empirical. The 
question is how? Autopoiesis, 53 years (2015) after its conception, remains for 
many a controversial theory; researchers and academics love it or hate it, while most 
ignore it.  
 Autopoiesis, as a biological theory, is not aimed specifically at biologists. The 
theory is written in such a way that non-biologists can read and understand it. The 
theory also lends itself to applications beyond pure biology, as it governs human 
thinking and human behavior. Because the concept of autopoiesis is rather extensive 
and abstract, it allows theoretical development over a wide range of disciplines, 
including evolutionary biology, epistemology, the cognitive sciences, the 
environmental sciences, business administration, sociology and many other 
disciplines (see Razeto-Barry, 2012). There are also those who consider the theory 
invalid, inappropriate or even “fancy” (e.g. Hall 2011 p.2 & Razeto-Barry 2012 
p.545). This sort of criticism is a logical result of “reality-foundations” that do not 
match. Already, in the very first sentences in the editorial preface of the book: 
“Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living” (Maturana et al. 1980), 
there is a hardly disguised warning: 
“This [autopoiesis] is a bold, brilliant, provocative and puzzling work. It 
demands a radical shift in standpoint, an almost paradoxical posture in 
which living systems are described in terms of what lies outside the domain 
of descriptions” (Cohen and Wartofsky 1980 p. vi, italics added). 
And: 
“...a new language to talk about the phenomena of perception and cognition. 
The first consequence required that the question: 'How does the organism 
obtain information about its environment?' be changed to: 'How does it 
happen that the organism has the structure that permits it to operate 
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adequately in the medium in which it exists’?” (Maturana and Varela 1980 
p. xvi, italics added). 
The “almost paradoxical posture” of autopoiesis, in order to understand life, is not 
based on choice; it is a necessity. 
 The first question: “How does the organism obtain information about its 
environment?” is just as unfounded as the question: “What happened before the Big 
Bang”? The latter question—exploring what may have caused the Big Bang—is 
considered invalid as time originated with the initiation of the Big Bang and cannot 
possibly exist before it. Already, with Maturana's disqualification of their initial, 
rational and even “innocent” question, much more than is suggested at first glance 
is also disqualified as all answers and theories, which are directly or indirectly 
dependent on the answering of that natural but invalid question, are simultaneously 
disqualified. 
 Nonetheless, especially the notion of full self-referentiality and its maintenance 
and the consequences of “observer's logic” (e.g. see section 5.6; 6.6.1) related to the 
invalid question, are topics that can be easily misunderstood. Most criticism centers 
on the “too easy” application of the theory to the human social domain (e.g. Biggiero 
2012, Brocklesby 2004). As a response to criticism, Hall (2011 p.2) mentioned: “... 
significant misunderstandings of Maturana and Varela’s original proposal”. Razeto-
Barry comments: “the concept has not been subject [by the critics] to sufficient 
conceptual analysis” (2012 p.546) and Brocklesby (2004 p.656) added: “It 
[autopoiesis] requires a degree of cross-referencing and mental agility that many 
readers will find extremely difficult”. In spite of the criticisms against it, but also 
despite the various defenses of the theory, which address mainly the use of 
autopoiesis in the (macro) social domain (outside the scope of the thesis), it does 
offer helpful and essential insights that are relevant to the thesis. Autopoiesis is not 
just a theory. It is a theory in the way that “when you open your eyes you will see 
things” is a theory. It is fair to say that the core concepts of autopoiesis involve the 
full spectrum of the human condition.  
Still, autopoiesis is vast and complex, almost unreadable when presented as 
objective scientific texts and jargon. The different method of explanation chosen as 
mentioned previously is a more story-like approach, based on real-life examples, or 
following a narrative infused with academic knowledge, form and style where 
appropriate. The downside of this choice is that it may give the thesis an 
impressionistic style.  
 
5.1 Autopoiesis  
So, what does autopoiesis convey? All explanations that follow, unless specified, 
are based on the book: “Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living” 
(Maturana et al. 1980). It is the original book (there hasn’t been a revised edition), 
and it is the purest work on the topic. Other writers (e.g. Mingers, Temeer, Twist, 
Hall et al.) all refer (extensively) to the above book.  
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 The book offers the answer of two neuro-biologists, Maturana and (later) Varela, 
to the old philosophical question: “What is Life?” Soon, this question was refined 
by them, becoming more nuanced and thus turning into two questions: “What is the 
organization of the living?” and “What takes place in the phenomenon of 
perception?” (Maturana and Varela 1980, p. xii-xiv). Maturana and Varela’s search, 
methodology and answers to the above questions were first published in 1972, in 
their book “De máquinas y seres vivos, autopoiesis de la organización de lo vivo”, 
translated in English in 1980, published as “Autopoiesis and Cognition: The 
Realization of the Living”, which is the book referred to in the thesis. 
 Autopoiesis theory tilts relations above the properties of structural components, 
which “relate”. Components do not have as their sole function the contribution to 
the whole, in the way that all of the components of a car do for the whole car. The 
“functions” to the “Living” are the dynamic relations between the components and 
not the components themselves. This “small” shift is true for all biological structures 
and brings big shifts when answering the sub-questions, compared to contemporary 
views, leading for instance to a whole new definition of the “ego”.  
Only those parts of autopoiesis that are directly or indirectly relevant to the 
thesis’ topic will be reviewed here. Autopoiesis is a biological theory and no link is 
assumed between biology and morality. Still, autopoiesis has proven to be 
indispensable in trying to find out the difference between objective and subjective, 
and how it determines the origins of categories. One of the basic and difficult to 
understand consequences of autopoiesis is the impossibility to transfer information 
between living entities. 
 
5.2 No transfer of information  
According to Maturana and his colleague Varela, the transfer of information 
between two entities or two human beings is not possible. This makes the theory 
hard to comprehend and goes some way in explaining its negligible position in 
public awareness and its infrequent use in science, and almost zero use in 
psychology. 
“For such [living] systems, all apparent informational exchanges with its 
environment will be, and can only be, treated as perturbations within the 
processes that define its closure, and thus no ‘instructions’ or 
‘programming’ can possibly exist.” (Varela, 1979) 
This statement is not easy to understand, “closure” (a short for organizational 
closure; section 5.9) refers to the impossibility of organisms and specifically neural 
systems to react to anything, but to themselves. At first this seemed odd to me, until 
I understood that Varela was referring, in a practical way, to “meaningful 
information”, although he means it also literally, acknowledging Kant in the idea 
that we can never know “the-things-in-themselves” as we cannot access true 
information about all that we encounter in our environment (Kant 1929). If we 
reframe information into meaningful information, then Varela’s remark becomes 
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easy to grasp. So in a practical way Varela states that the transfer of meaningful 
information is not possible.  
 The concept of meaninglessness is not automatically part of the definition of 
information by anyone. It is, rather, the opposite. The tiniest bit of meaning is not 
meaningless; as a result the tiniest bit of meaning to exchange or to transfer between 
people or organisms is not possible. And meaningless information cannot be 
experienced. Pirsig, in his “Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance” (1974), 
talked about the impossibility of looking (or perceiving) without meaning at objects 
as they truly appear, before they are subjectified. Without meaning 
(meaninglessness) cannot be recognized. If meaning out of all possible choices is 
not made (yet) for that particular “event” or “object”, the first meaning stays 
untouched: a version of “I have no clue what it is”. The first basic meaning is a 
question mark. In the theory of autopoiesis, event information is regarded as 
“trigger(s)” because it / they may or may not trigger the organism to find or have 
preprogrammed / memorized meaning for it. A question mark refers to the question 
“What is it?” but it conceals the real question underneath it: “What is it for me?” as 
the question is always raised by a “me”.  
 Accurately speaking, any kind of information that is part of the world “out 
there”, reaching people (or organisms), is not transferable as Varela literally stated. 
“Information” by itself is dimensionless; it is not a unity consisting of mass, length, 
electromagnetic fields or anything else. Information is made by observers only, not 
carried into observers. Important as this is, there are no senses that can pick up 
information. However Kant solved this problem and under his accepted conditions 
human made information can be regarded as objective (section 5.14). 
“If we add to the concept of the subject of a judgment the limitation under 
which the judgment is made, the judgment is then unconditionally valid” 
[objective] (Kant 1929 p. 73). 
As a practical working model it will suffice. Varela's statement is a consequence of 
how life began, 3.8 billion years ago (e.g. Schidlowski 2008) and how systems have 
evolved since then, without being able to escape their structure; organisms can only 
execute and extend themselves. In executing themselves, they are bound to the basic 
and central principles explicated by the theory of autopoiesis.  
In understanding autopoiesis, it is very helpful to temporarily leave behind the 
human way of accepting reality and its logic. Life, as it originated in single primitive 
one-cell organisms, obviously didn’t start in the form of human beings. The 
beginning of life on earth did not try to support future human reasoning or scientific 
standards. Life started with the use of strategies and tactics to   cope and survive 
with zero intelligence and environmental awareness. All this happened and still 
happens for a lot of organisms within pitch-black, complete solitude. By itself this 
would not be that relevant for the thesis, were it not for the fact that these basic core 
“strategies” (circularity, self-referentiality and autonomy) of one-cell organisms, 
are still the same core strategies of all modern complex life-systems including 
humans. Life, since its origins, has not abandoned those early “strategies”, but 
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repeats and sustains them, not unlike the way a hologram repeats the tiniest into the 
sizeable, to realize the full gestalt.  
“..Living systems in general, and their nervous system in particular, are not 
made to handle a medium, although it has been through the evolution of 
their handling of their medium that they have become what they are, such 
that we can say what we can say about them” (Maturana and Varela 1980 
p.56, italic added). 
“...Not made to handle a medium...”, but very well appear to handle a medium, how 
can this be? How does a single cell, since its origin with no awareness of its 
surroundings and probably not of itself either, interact with its surroundings in such 
a way that it survives not only as a member of but also as a species, against all odds?  
The idea that Life needs favorable conditions is biologically a euphemism. In the 
real world, biologically favorable conditions equal conditions that are between 
barely favorable and unfavorable, to the point of almost lethal. Even today, plants 
favor a CO2 percentage of 1,000–1,300 parts per million which is far above the 
present 350 ppm ambient level. Plants get (only) one quarter to one third of what 
they need to flourish optimally. To have one third, at best, of what is really needed 
to live fully is hardly favorable (Ontario 2002).   
This is equally true for the animal world, where, except for the few “top”, elite 
predators, life is a never-ending war zone. The environment is neither Life's 
companion nor its nurse. It cannot even be perfectly neutral because sustaining goes 
against the ever-present and pervasive impact of entropy, described in the 
fundamental second law of thermodynamics. Every living system which does not 
get its energy from a source outside itself strives for and will reach equilibrium 
belonging to its lowest total energy, which cannot be used anymore by that system. 
Then the system will stop functioning and it will reach its final end-phase of 
maximum entropy, maximum disorder and when alive, death (Baranger 2000). This 
irreversible process happens for 60 seconds in each minute and eventually will stop 
our sun, the universe and all that exists within it. Life decreases the entropy of the 
system by increasing order (organization), which is a struggle against entropy. This 
struggle for resources to counteract entropy, forces processes of life to be active and 
circular. What is built up will eventually decay, and must be built up again; depleted 
energy must be restored. 
 What follows (5.5 – 5.9) is an account about basic concepts of the theory, leading 
to the core idea of organizational closure, which is important for the thesis.   
 
5.3 No observers, no environment  
Life's environment clearly did not exist in experience from the beginning of life. 
Still, in order to be better equipped in finding resources, by handling more 
effectively an environment, which the organism does not know about, a next step 
evolved: the evolutionary development of a primitive method to move (protozoa). 
Now, organisms became able to avoid conditions that were too unfavorable and/or 
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move to find food or to find a better context within their “non-experiential” 
environment.  
 Actually, the word “environment” shouldn't be used here, as the organisms were 
fully unaware of it and lacked the ability to detect it. Still, in explaining what was 
going on, the word is used for us readers as-if we observe these organisms. This put 
us in the role of the observer of organisms in their medium, that is, in what we 
acknowledge is their environment, while they do not, making our acknowledgement 
not part of any of their properties. What we, as observers, recognize or distinguish 
is called, by the authors of autopoiesis, the meta-domain of descriptions, belonging 
to the domain of observers.  
 The movement of at first the one-cells must not therefore be understood as 
movement as organisms don’t know of any environment for them to move in, and 
so “movement” does not involve relocation or reaching a different place in “space”. 
The movement of organisms (in the eyes of their future observers) must be regarded 
as an “accidental” aftereffect of internal processes, serving a pre-programmed goal: 
the restoration or maintenance of an internal self-set equilibrium: a set referential 
state. For instance, low sugar levels as an internally generated perturbation of a set 
state, or, externally, a too-sudden environmental temperature change can be a 
“cause” for being internally off-balance triggering a process to restore it. 
 The environmental cause / effect reasoning of observers to understand 
phenomena in their environment however is fully invalid for Maturana and Varela 
when it comes to knowing “the organization of the Living”. Cause and effect 
reasoning obscures the understanding of what makes life work: 
“However, I made a concession which I have always regretted. I ... talked 
about causal relations when speaking about the circular organization of 
living systems. To do this was both inadequate and misleading. It was 
inadequate because the notion of causality is a notion that pertains to the 
domain of descriptions, and as such it is relevant only in the meta-domain 
in which the observer makes his commentaries and cannot be deemed to be 
operative in the phenomenal domain, the object of the description.” 
(Maturana, Varela 1980 p. xviii, underlining added). 
 
5.4 Cause and effect I, a functional construction 
Hume deconstructed the validity of cause and effect reasoning to human 
expectations, which makes causality a model only justified in the mind (the future 
should behave like the past, see An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding 
(1772, Hackett Publ. Co. 1993; Section 4). Hume's question was about scientifically 
valid certainty. Many have concluded that a solution to Hume's induction problem 
cannot be found (e.g. Kuhn 1983, Howson 2000, Popper 2005). Cause and effect is 
not a scientific topic, but a philosophical one; there are many “schools” of thought 
or approaches to the problem of causation (e.g. Regularity theories, Counterfactual 
theories, Non-Humean theories). More or less, all these theories basically accept the 
existence of a cause and its effect.  
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But there is another obvious way to deny—outside the problem of inductive 
reasoning—the idea that A is able to reliably cause an effect B on X, even if perfect 
certainty of the effect is observed or assumed. When a cold wintery night destroys 
the fragile orchard blossom in spring, or a bullet shatters the glass window, what 
does “cause” literally mean? In a dozen different dictionaries, there is agreement 
and a similar explanation, whereby the cause precedes its effect in time. In scientific 
articles, cause is also used in that fashion. A encounters X and causes—is 
responsible for—effect B on X under specific conditions Y. In scientific realms, the 
effect(s) should always be the same for X under the conditions Y. The effect B is a 
determined consequence in X by A. A and B are necessarily linked, whereby A 
precedes B in time. This mode of thinking is so infused as if real that even the lack 
of an event or substance (A) is also accepted in logic to cause an effect. Something 
that did not exist in that place and time caused an effect on X… this is the same 
logic that accepts for instance the ‘senses’ or poison as a valid scientific category. 
The impossibility of this idea is that “to-cause” equals “to-determine”. Also, in 
common language, it is accepted that fired bullets do shatter wine glasses or do kill 
humans when fired for instance in their heart. This kind of logic is deeply embedded 
in human thinking since Aristotle and presumably earlier than that. While in reality 
(at least on the “macro-atomic level” and upwards) this is never the case, as causes 
cannot determine effects, so they cannot be cause. Cause and effect are separate 
events and can only happen simultaneously, and most of all causes and effect are 
not causally linked, there is no causal connection. How can this be?  
Strike a match and it lights, but sometimes it does not. A bullet shatters a glass 
window, but the next bullet from the same gun does not shatter the steel door. The 
wintery night destroyed 80% of the blossom, but not the remaining 20% of the same 
orchard. In all cases, the cause leads or may lead to mixed results. But the mixed 
results are secondary. Primary is what actually happened: zero determination by 
causes with their effects on all systems X. This also means that effects cannot be 
(necessarily) linked to their causes. Strictly speaking, causes do not exist as nothing 
can be caused. Even with the clause that A only gives the effect B under (strict) 
conditions to a specific system X, the clause cannot reverse reality; even then A 
does not cause or determine anything in X, but in reality; in the human mind, 
“causes” do “cause”.  It is a very functional construction from the perspective of an 
observer. If causes cannot cause or determine effects, then what happens instead 
when it seems it does? 
 
5.4.1 Cause and effect II, no time difference 
How is the strike not “responsible for the lighting of the match”? If two systems 
meet each other, one becomes an external condition for the other. The bullet is an 
external (brief and local) condition of the glass and (part) of the door, like the cold 
night is for the blossom. So are the match and the “raw” side of its box. Systems, 
objects or organisms have essential (structural) properties of their own, constituting 
their nature or their identity. When properties are expressed, simultaneously other 
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properties stay hidden as potentials, waiting for the right (external) conditions to be 
manifested. These expressed and non-expressed (potential) properties only-
together are the properties defining the system’s identity. When observers perceive 
an “object” or phenomenon in relation with its environmental “state”, only the 
incomplete can be perceived, but which is denied in the observation. The “objects” 
intended in their perceivable completeness still carry “within” them the sum 
(hidden) of all their possible “interactions”, which cannot simultaneously be 
expressed.  
 For instance, there are many basic (living) objects that can be solid, liquid or in 
gas form or for the living, for instance brain processes in between delta and beta 
waveforms, but not simultaneously (except for some categories of objects at the so-
called phase boundaries under certain conditions). A being that appears healthy may 
obscure his “illness” (invisible for an observer) that suddenly shows itself under the 
right conditions. The virus though, that has severely affected that being and seen as 
the cause of his sickness, was practically “ignored” by the systems of the others and 
did cause “nothing”.. External conditions do not determine what happens in or with 
the system. All changes or transition points are classified as system properties, not 
as properties of “what-they-are-not” i.e. their environment. The cold wintery night 
happened to a large part of the country for a million plus “systems”, apart from the 
orchard. Each underwent the cold night in his or her own way determined by their 
state and properties. All those systems and particular unities just expressed —
relevant to the condition of the cold night— one out of their many potential 
properties. The night did not determine anything for all of them, but served as a 
trigger to systems to express their properties under the triggering condition. The 
match, also, is carefully designed to ignite under specific conditions. The bare side 
of the match rubbed against the box will not produce a flame. The rubbing is just 
such a condition. But what is designed in the match stays as a property of the match. 
The rough side of the box cannot determine or cause any flames for the match. 
What makes a trigger a trigger? Infrared lights (700 nm - 1mm) from the sun fall 
on the skin and the effect is the sensation of warmth. The infrared lights thus trigger 
the experience of warmth. The same electromagnetic waves, however—but a bit 
shorter in wavelength (+/-650 nm)—fall onto the same skin and trigger nothing, as 
650nm is not a trigger for skins. Falling into the eye however, it becomes a trigger 
for the color red. The group of infrared wavelengths, which warm the skin, also fall 
into the eye, but trigger no sensation, (nor red, nor warmth) as all environmental 
triggers cannot even determine their ability to trigger as a property of themselves. 
A trigger (what will be a trigger) can only be defined by the system encountering 
the condition(s), not by the condition which seems to trigger. Causality perfectly 
assumes it does, but it does not. System X denies the old logic of causal relationships 
by determining both what will be cause and what will be effect. What “will be” is a 
property of X “set in stone” and is information wise truly unrelated to A being part 
of system X’s environment. When an observer perceives A to trigger something in 
X, A just happens to match the internal information of X, which is still a property 
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of X. Although in X cause and effect are both internally determined “as one”, the 
moment they are initiated (the when) is (for the greatest part) externally triggered 
for the more primitive living systems. Finally, cause A does not precede B. When 
system A meets X, X meets A simultaneously and none of the systems is first time-
wise. Both systems A and X, simultaneously, will express their (hidden) properties, 
when one or both are triggered, but apart from each other. The suggestion that A 
precedes its effects solely depends on the mental choice of an observer. 
Karl Pearson (1856 – 1936) is generally known to have established mathematical 
statistics. He did not name cause or the notion of causation once, he used the word 
“correlation”; Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) made havoc with the concept of cause 
and effect in “On the notion of cause”:  
“... I wish, first, to maintain that the word “cause” is so inextricably bound 
up with misleading associations as to make its complete extrusion from the 
philosophical vocabulary desirable; secondly, to inquire what principle, if 
any, is employed in science in place of the supposed “law of causality” 
which philosophers imagine to be employed; thirdly, to exhibit certain 
confusion is, especially in regard to teleology and determinism, which 
appear to me to be connected with erroneous notions as to causality” 
(Russell 1912 p. 01, italics added). 
Cause and effect thinking is very practical and indispensable for the human mind to 
order things and to make sense of himself and the world. Assumed causality focuses 
on the relation between A and X. If that relation repeats itself reliably, as it does 
often in the natural sciences, it is safe to speak of causality, leading to valid 
verifiable laws. But relations and laws both are true reifications and constructs of 
the human mind.   
 In the social domain, cause and effect relationships are often problematic and 
may produce surrogate solutions and worsen problems. As causal thinking is 
practically embedded in the stance of all observers, the logic of observers needs to 
be deconstructed (see section 6.6.1). In autopoiesis, the notion of “triggers” is 
essential in order to grasp the organization and cognition of the living. Triggers are 
also essential for the living, as without them Life cannot express itself. 
 
5.5 Organization and Structure 
In autopoiesis theory, species differ from one another because they have a different 
structure based on a different basic design. Autopoiesis names the design: 
“organization”. The organization of a system is like a “blueprint”, which determines 
the components and their relations. It tells the system to do “things” in a circular 
way. The way is circular because it builds and maintains itself in an autonomous 
manner, it organizes itself. It produces, and is produced by nothing other than itself. 
Even its design, its organization is self-made. 
“...such a system is ... defined by relations of production of components that 
generate these relations and define it as a unity in a given space...” 
(Maturana et al. 1980, p.108) 
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Living systems and all their modes of conduct are truly self-referential: 
“[Living systems] separated distinctive from systems that could only be 
characterized with reference to a context.” (Maturana et al. 1980, p. xiii, 
italics added) 
Organization in autopoiesis theory has a label, a name to identify it as that species' 
class. The name is its identity and it is the name of the generalization of that species. 
This is similar to how tigers and rabbits are the identities of their species and their 
identity gives away their nature. 
 Structure stands for material (internal components and cell-wall as component) 
and chemical physical processes. The actual living entity with all its physical 
characteristics is a structural manifestation of its organization (class / species, class 
= a biological category). Structure includes components and their actual dynamical 
processes taking place within and between the components (what is going on in 
physiology). Similar manifestations (particular structures) of a single organization 
can be recognized as belonging to a particular class (category). So every rabbit is 
not an identical clone (structure) of other rabbits, but is a rabbit very much specified 
by the organization, which in a generalized way they share. Many, if not all, 
McDonalds shops selling hamburgers follow the same basic organization, but do 
not need to be identical in structure. Organization then is not primarily about 
“structures” but mainly about the internal relations between the structures. All the 
functional movements of the people who work at McDonalds, including the inner 
workings of the ovens and refrigerators, are called “structures”. What the structures 
maintain or change (bring forth) are the processes. 
“...the relations that define the system as a unity, and determine the 
dynamics of [internal] interactions and transformations which it may 
undergo as such a unity, constitute the organization of the system.” 
(Maturana et al. 1980 p.137, bold added) 
Organization is shared between members of its kind: 
“The organization of a system, then, specifies the class identity of a system, and 
must remain invariant for the class identity of the system...” (Maturana et al. 1980, 
p. xx) 
 
5.6 Structural coupling I   
The following pages may seem a long way from the concept of morality but they 
will shed light on the applicability or non-applicability of the mainstream use of 
observer’s logic to fit or not fit the aims of the thesis. It may well be that the doctrine 
of observer’s logic, since the origin of mankind, prohibited, for instance, the finding 
of a plausible, rational, full and impartial foundation for morality.  
 An organism finds itself physically in its immediate environment, which is a 
multitude of different structures, incl. other organisms, earth and rock, water, air, 
sun etc. The structural world is what can be distinguished empirically by an 
observer. Interacting structures are (temporarily) coupled with each other (often 
recursively) in an open way. The “mechanical” coupling of the “body” of organisms 
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and their physical surroundings in autopoiesis is named “structural coupling” and 
has two sides. One is the (material structure) organism; the other side is that part of 
the environment that it is coupled with. Both happen at the same time. Structural 
coupling is literally the physical interactions—passive (sunlight warms up the 
lizard) or active (behavior)—between the physical structure(s) of an organism and 
the material world (Maturana et al. 1980, p. xx-xxviii). Structural coupling as it can 
be observed is also in all cases meaningless. The void of meaninglessness of the 
observed will be filled (mostly immediately) by the meaning observers give to their 
observations.  
 What cannot be taken for granted is that this explanation or knowledge comes 
from an observer’s point of view. When an interaction occurs between the object 
intended and a part of its environment, the observer will take it as trivial; he 
acknowledges both as he observes them.  
For instance an observer (a biologist) observes how a rain worm in his back garden 
wriggles out of a plastic box (which has fallen on the ground from the BBQ table); 
the worm then hides under a big green leaf. The biologist / observer distinguishes 
within his garden another “garden”, the habitat of the rain worm, which is the soil 
and underneath the fallen leaves and not the plastic box or the BBQ table. With the 
convincing distinction between the “two” gardens (human garden and worm’s  
habitat) by the biologist, he forgets he represents the standpoint of a different higher 
order, more evolved observer, with a bigger, more complex habitat than the 
organism observed. This is what makes it possible for the biologist to distinguish 
the rain worm’s habitat from his own. The rain worm cannot make that distinction. 
There is only one garden for him, that is, the whole garden, including the plastic cup 
and the legs of the BBQ table, with reduced “meaning” which the little creature can 
“apprehend”. Still, what in a reduced way is within the experience of the rain worm 
is excluded in its habitat by the biologist. 
“The environment is defined by the classes of interactions into which the 
observer can enter and which he treats as a context for his interactions with 
the observed organism” (Maturana et al. 1980, p.10). 
“Hidden” in that statement is what the observer can enter cannot be a property of 
the environment; and: 
“Accordingly, as for the observer the niche appears as part of the 
environment, for the observed organism the niche constitutes its entire 
domain of interactions, and as such it cannot be part of the environment that 
lies exclusively in the cognitive domain of the observer” (Maturana et al. 
1980 p.10, italics added).  
The rain worm is incapable of knowing that there is an external environment 
different from his internal instincts (descriptions) about it determining his 
interactions (niche). Also, the rain worm does not even distinguish an environment. 
The creature is blind, but can make the distinction between light and dark (as it 
avoids light); it is deaf, but senses touch and vibrations, even if not knowing what 
triggers them. Finally, it senses chemicals (food) which it likes or not (McKenzie, 
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1997). If the rain worm’s miniscule brain is removed, it does not die, but it cannot 
stop moving. The rain worm, in this way, is robot-like. Thousands of species even 
today are programmed biological robots e.g. insects, primitive fishes lizards. An 
external observer's reasoning would be erroneous to assume he/she knows the rain 
worm in such a way that its autopoiesis, its organizational closure (section 5.9) 
could be understood.  
 
5.6.1 “Having no meaning” is a basic property of matter 
At the brink that Life broke through 3.8 billion years ago and manifested itself, it 
encountered an eternal meaningless world, which may sound “depressive”, but is 
an actual blessing. “Having no meaning” as a basic property of matter is a sacred 
one. This is not poetic exaggeration and must be taken literally. The existence of 
the rain worm’s habitat, precisely, discovered by the observer, is the knowledge that 
the whole garden plus the biologist cannot determine even for a powerless rain 
worm and even for a brief second what will be meaningful to it. What is meaningful 
for the rain worm is fully determined by the rain worm's organization, not by the 
garden or the human observer nor the whole galaxy around it. This gives Life 
unlimited freedom to express itself in diversity. If already a quantum part of the 
garden could have deterministic powers over the rain worm, then matter itself would 
have deterministic powers over Life and all its evolved creatures including humans. 
It would be for mathematicians to prove that Life under those conditions might not 
have developed from the beginning.  
What does not belong to the rain worm garden does not exist for the rain worm, 
but does exist for the biologist. If the biologist picks up the rain worm and puts it in 
front of a book, the book does not exist as a description for the rain worm, but will 
be reduced to a property that the rain worm innately knows. So the book becomes 
part of its “habitat ”, but not, again, in the eyes of the observer. Books are not 
classified as elements of a rain worm's habitat.  
 
5.6.2 Structural Coupling II 
Niche, for mainstream biologists and for all dictionaries, is the organism's relevant 
external environment (habitat). In autopoiesis, niche has a very different meaning, 
it is defined as its total domain of interactions: 
“The niche is defined by the [sum of all] classes of interactions into which 
an organism can enter” (Maturana et al. 1980, p.10, italics added). 
The sum of all classes of interactions can never be observed (by an observer) or 
even experienced by the organism itself. Autopoietic niche is knowledge. It also 
cannot be part of the environment. Niche as the sum of all internal categorical 
descriptions of measurable behavior directly extends and is the consequence of the 
internal sum of all possible classes of external triggers descriptions, but including 
their meaning* for the organism. Behavior does not describe external triggers but is 
rationally linked to trigger descriptions. Autopoiesis does not name the sum of all 
possible trigger descriptions which define how to operate in the external contexts of 
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triggers. In the thesis, it is named internal niche or i-niche. There is no difference 
from a first-person perspective’s experience between an activated internal trigger 
description and the experience of the external trigger, which activated it. The actual 
external trigger is Kant’s inaccessible “the things-in-themselves”. But without “the 
things-in-themselves”, these internal descriptions cannot be primarily experienced. 
Both are needed in experience. 
 *Meaning is used indirectly here as an observer would use it. Observers do 
experience meaning in the observed, which immediately will determine how they 
handle the observed. But within the workings of nervous systems, this is not the 
case. The classification of meaning is a cognitive construct and belongs to the meta-
domain of descriptions of observers, even when they observe themselves (in 
memory mostly), but meaning is not a property of how CNS and brain works. An 
example (toy car) will be given in section 5.9 which functions (flawlessly) within 
its own specifications with its environment, while having no internal meaning for 
itself. The toy-car just executes itself without self-knowledge. The example is 
similar for rain worms, drosophila, herrings, apes and very small human children, 
which fully associates with their experiences, having no language and no self-
reflection. In that case the experience just is as it comes and the experience as a 
whole determines the experience-as-a-whole.  
 Meaning between organism and its habitat is excluded in the observation as 
meaning cannot be observed unless as a projection. What can be observed is the 
meaningless part: structural coupling (interactions). Structural coupling can be 
perfectly recorded by a video camera, because of its very meaninglessness.  
Structural coupling example. The video recording shows a number of persons (4) 
sitting at a table having a conversation about the weather while in the background a 
radio plays music from to time interrupted by a speaker. What is exactly structural 
coupling? All what the recording can record and nothing else. Or in other words all 
that the recording device is “aware” of, or structurally “knows” about, which are 
light patterns and shifts, electromagnetic wave lengths and differences and the 
movements of air molecules and the location of their source. That is all there is. No 
knowledge at all about humans, table, room, differences between music and spoken 
word, be it from the radio or from people’s mouth. All what can be picked up is 
meaningless. In the example kinesthetic information is left out, but also in that 
domain meaning cannot travel outside into the apparatus or organism.  
As soon as the video camera is replaced by a (scientific) observer, the “dumb” 
camera is replaced by just as “dumb” eyes, which equal to the camera can only 
perceive the meaninglessness of material triggers. Immediately meaninglessness of 
structural coupling from the standpoint of an observer is replaced by his knowledge 
or question marks, which both are properties of the observer. Interactions as 
(recursive) relations between organism and environment are determined by the 
properties of the organism as the environment in practice and in logic (see section 
3.1.2) cannot determine the relation. I use the word relation as it is a good word, but 
it is also a reification, a human construction of observers: relations cannot be 
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observed, because the understanding of the observer is intertwined in it, while 
structural coupling can be fully observed. In the coupling, the organism is a (set of) 
trigger(s) for that part of the environment, which interacts. 
 The environment is rather large and (infinitely) complex. Internal niche, (sum 
of all trigger descriptions) which can only partly express itself in an interaction, 
works with categories. Within i-niche there are “category (class) trigger-
descriptions” of the environment, dividing the environment in what is relevant and 
not relevant (and thus ignored) for the organism. The last sentence is valid for 
observers and works to explain things, for instance to make sense of a toy car or an 
animal, but it is not valid for the toy-car or animal itself. Full irrelevance equals full 
meaninglessness. But what is meaningful for one species is free to be ignored by 
another species. A consequence of the meaninglessness of all triggers is the freedom 
it offers to the development of species. This material meaninglessness is the 
environmental condition of the structure of Life. I-niche is an innately meaningful 
internal domain, not the meaningless external (triggers) domain. For now, simple 
creatures without an evolved brain, like the rain worm, have no awareness of an 
environment, but seem to have it from the point of view of the biologist.  
Next to the meaninglessness of “structures”, “an sich” a second basic property 
of “structural coupling”, is its “openness”. Structural coupling is open because 
structures of systems cannot be closed in relation to each other. Even far away 
galaxies are (shifted in time) in an open relation with the planet earth and with our 
sun, under the principle “if I can see you, you can see me”. Systems stand 
structurally in open relation towards one another, which can be manifested through 
structural interactions (Mingers, 1995 p.33).  
 
5.7 Internal Dynamics I, categories and circularity  
While structural coupling can be observed, not observable from the outside is 
everything that happens inside. The theory of autopoiesis regards internal processes 
as “internal dynamics”. Internal dynamics refer to “circular physiological 
processes” and their circular internal consequences. 
“... internal dynamics, its physiology—that is all the molecular processes 
that constitute the realisation of the living” (Maturana, 2001).  
The very first principle of processes that “constitute the living” is their circularity. 
Physiology is always circular and in motion. The very effect of entropy forces the 
system to build up energy in a cyclical way. Components and their building blocks 
are made and maintained; they decay and are built up again. Every output of a 
component becomes an input of another component, in order to produce and 
maintain those components in a repeated way; there is no further input or output, 
except basic chemicals (input)  and waste products. 
“Thus, the circular organization implies the prediction that an interaction 
that took place once will take place again” (Maturana et al. 1980 p.10).  
For simple zero-intelligence organisms (bacteria or simple multicellular organisms, 
like a hydra or a rain worm or a mussel), everything that they are and do is 
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explainable through their structure. Their particular blueprint genetically determines 
all structures, their relations and structural processes. They do not have a choice; 
they are determined in all that they do, which is sufficient in simple predictable 
mediums. Their niche (sum of behavior) is the effect of pre-programmed trigger 
descriptions with pre-programmed meaning. “Determined” does not mean that all 
processes, when active, are determined by their source (genes) to be active; to be 
active they need to be activated. Some processes are sleeping or are potential; they 
do not happen but need something external to their source to awaken or to develop. 
Our senses (eyes) don't have a choice either, similar to those primitive organisms. 
When we see a tomato, the color red is determined by the structure of the human 
brain, but when the tomato is green, we don’t have the freedom to see it as red. The 
color red is structurally determined, but when the internal process “red” becomes 
active (experienced in seeing) is not structurally determined; it is triggered by the 
structural coupling with  (an) external trigger(s).  
 In order to know for organisms what to do when they lack the ability to learn, 
their behavior is genetically pre-determined: this is referred to as instinctive 
behavior. A consequence of instincts is that they are fixed to triggers and cannot 
change. The environment, like all possible trigger descriptions (relevant for the 
organism), is a priori predicted. Instinctive knowledge is based on predictions of 
environmental triggers and as explained earlier, not of particular events but of 
categories of events. What is not internally predicted (coded) does not exist for the 
organism as it cannot interact outside its code. Its code is functional. This does not 
automatically mean that what exists beyond the code magically disappears from the 
organism’s awareness. Although a book is outside the code of a rain worm, still, as 
a book, when reduced to impenetrable matter, it is within the rain worm’s internal 
niche (total sum of categorical trigger descriptions). What exists will be reduced to 
what is known within the code if the encounter is a fact (unavoidable).  
But when, for instance, insects near Chernobyl live under gamma-ray conditions, 
autopoiesis does not provide any internal code to detect gamma rays and thus it is 
not possible to reduce it to a detectable trigger, usable for the insects’ autopoiesis. 
But underneath the chemical processes of the Living,  general atomic structures 
exist, which detect gamma rays as triggers, hampering or stopping chemical 
autopoietic processes and/or influencing, through mutations the Living (mostly in 
negative ways). In such conditions, some species die while others don’t, although 
they may become malformed, with reduced effectiveness (e.g. Hesse-Honegger and 
Wallimann, 2008; Møller and Mousseau, 2009).  
 Still, what is not internally coded cannot be expressed in interactions, in 
behavior. This is equally valid for humans. For instance, a man called “Hank” 
walked past a big black poster, which he had never seen before; this poster was 
hanging on a canteen’s wall and had a bright white text, saying: “Thank you Hank, 
you are THE employee of the month, have a free lunch”. Hank briefly looked up, 
didn’t react and continued his walk towards his colleagues, who all had a similarly 
indifferent reaction to the new poster in the canteen. The image was artfully in 
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handwritten Sanskrit, a 10.000 year old Indian language that nobody in the canteen 
could read or even recognize as a language. What this meant was that the writing 
on the poster, like the worm’s relation to the book, was reduced to an abstract 
drawing (object) which was within recognition, not unlike the way that 22 kinds of 
visible rock for a geologist might only be five kinds for the average tourist looking 
at the same scenery. 
The fundamental circularity of the internal dynamics is only able to produce 
circular predictions (of the outside world) which it interacts with. What is predicted 
must repeat itself to become valid.  
Internal circularity (grey) also extends over processes, which need an interaction 
with an outside trigger to proceed to the next internal phase (a-c). The reoccurrences 
of these processes need the reoccurrences of the external (A - C) triggers (the 
outgoing arrows are interactions). 
See Fig. 1:    
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                                                        c         b 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  Fig.1 Internal circularity  
  demands external circularity   
 
 “Thus, the circular organization implies the prediction that an interaction 
that took place once will take place again... In a continuously changing 
environment, these predictions can only be successful if the environment 
does not change in that which is predicted. Accordingly, the predictions 
implied in the organization of the living system are not predictions of 
particular events, but of classes of interactions. Every interaction is a 
particular interaction, but every prediction is a prediction of a class of 
interactions” (Maturana et al. 1980 p.10, underlining added). 
Predictions are not a luxury; only those predictions exist which the organism needs 
in order to be that organism. And every prediction made already belongs to a 
category. An interaction is an interaction based on triggers(s). The triggers must be 
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recognized as triggers first. The analogy with categories is relevant here, named 
“classes” by biologists, in the way that Hume also conceptualized assumptions, 
which form the basis of classes and causality: the future should be like the past, 
another extension of Life's circularity.  
 Very simple organisms have classes of predictions, with no clue what the 
predictions are about. The above sentence “…are not predictions of particular 
events, but of classes of interactions” describes that categories of interactions, 
although one-on-one structurally coupled to their respective environmental triggers, 
are not yet categories of external triggers. Triggers are environmental, but the 
organism does not know yet. One could call them proto-categories, as categories 
are a direct consequence of these internal classes.  
“...Thus for every living system its organization implies a prediction of a 
niche, and the niche thus predicted as a domain of classes of interactions 
constitutes its entire cognitive reality” (Maturana et al. 1980, p.11, italics 
added). 
The only reality that the organism knows about is the internal one. Cognition, as 
defined here, includes internal distinctions. When the rain worm tries to escape a 
human made artefact in the garden, it has no idea it is moving in its habitat or 
environment as it only reacts to internal perturbations to maintain or strive for 
internal equilibrium.  
 Proto-categories or categories for organisms that recognize classes of triggers as 
external serve and are the result of internal circularity. The existential circularity of 
internal processes is automatically reflected in the construction of external 
categories. The remark: 
“Categorization is the mental operation…. It is the most basic phenomenon 
of cognition...” (Cohen and Lefebvre 2005, p. 643). 
…is not only valid, it is biologically an existential one, as we will see later in more 
detail (section on the ego). Categories constitute the identity of the category maker. 
 
5.8 Internal Equilibrium  
Through evolutionary processes, the system has learned how to maintain from 
within a (cyclical / dynamic) self -referential equilibrium, a state of wellbeing.  
“In terms of their functional organization, living systems do not have inputs 
and outputs, although under perturbations they maintain constant their set 
states...” (Maturana et al. 1980 p.51, italics added). 
Off-balance is not a preferred state to be in, wellbeing in balance is. Processes that 
disturb this internal equilibrium (internal experienced perturbations) are countered 
with other internal operations until equilibrium is restored. This equilibrium, which 
is essential, obeys its organization by maintaining and supporting it, by keeping its 
manifestation alive. The way equilibrium is restored depends naturally on the nature 
of the system. Internal equilibrium is also the internal reference that governs niche 
(total sum of potential interactive behavior). 
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5.8.1 Internal Dynamics II, external perturbations are internally experienced 
In mediums (environments) with too much or too intense perturbations to handle—
relevant for an organism—the organism dies. The biologist sees the perturbation 
external to the organism; for instance, he sees a dead snail in a cup of water, or a 
bee dead on the windowsill in the kitchen. Both the cup and the closed windows 
were a problem that couldn’t be conquered for the organism, similar to poison or 
meeting a too dangerous predator.  
 But in actual reality, the struggle for life is always a battle inside the organism. 
One side gives internal alarming off-balance experiences that are not pleasant. 
Another internal side controls the equilibrium, programs to restore it and thus 
experiences relief. The two sides are very different from each other and use different 
internal (afferent=from senses / efferent=towards for instance muscles) neural 
pathways.  If relevant, it initiates behavior. The behavior is a byproduct for species 
which do not yet distinguish internally-generated triggers from externally-generated 
ones. This is not about behavior, it is about what the organism tries to achieve with 
it internally, that counts.  
 The internal domain of all possible interactions (niche) is explored to ease any 
experienced tension and to restore equilibrium. When this “restoring” does not 
happen, the same attempt will be repeated within the constriction of niche, but in 
vain; and when the inner perturbation is too serious, the organism will die. 
Obviously, its internal niche (referring to internal descriptions of external triggers 
and their meaning) could not cope with the threats, apparently the internal 
descriptions reduced too much the complexities of the external triggers. 
 For organisms to “handle” or “control” external systems, their internal flexibility 
expressed in behavior that handles external systems must be equal to or preferably 
greater than the variety of states of those external systems that will be handled / 
controlled: this is the Law of Requisite Variety (Ashby 1956). Evolutionary biology 
shows that evolution indeed did, and still does increase the internal complexity of 
species, resulting in their greater flexibility to handle more complex mediums. A 
landmark for greater flexibility and a much faster response time were neural 
processes belonging to the development of nerve tissues, later a central nervous 
system (CNS) and eventually a “central information processor”: that is, a brain.   
 
5.9 Organizational Closure, (Operationally Closed)  
Organizational closure is the main reason why autopoiesis is part of the thesis, since 
it governs the working of our Central Nervous System (CNS). Organizational 
closure provides an answer to the meaninglessness of triggers. The reality of 
organizational closure defines external triggers always as internal ones. The real 
external triggers as things-in-themselves stay external beyond knowledge and 
beyond (human) experience, but as triggers —described, constructed and 
experienced— they are internal. External triggers seem to be perfectly suggested 
outside, which will be covered in chapter 8. A clear example is hearing sounds while 
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sounds are triggered (structural coupling) by eternal silent triggers: vibration of 
matter (e.g. air molecules). 
 Hunger, as an internally generated perturbation, is not complex to understand in 
terms of being an internal trigger. But to realize that external triggers are also 
generated internally is highly uncommon for observers and fully taken for granted 
as its opposite. A modern example is the aforementioned rain worm or bee. What 
hasn’t been explained yet is: “What exactly is the basis of a domain of all possible 
interactions (niche) when the environment is unknown to the organism?” The 
answer has to do with organizational closure. 
 The ability, determined by the organization of the Living that it can only react to 
itself is called “organizational closure” or “operationally closed”.  
“A system is organizationally closed if all its possible states of activity must 
always lead to or generate further activity within itself... and have no inputs 
and outputs” (Mingers 1995, p.32-33).  
The idea that the nervous system has an “input” by ways of its senses is a construct 
and not real. Best is to begin with how life evolved. Regard simple organisms, 
unable to acknowledge an outside world, as biological versions of a mechanical toy-
car. But not just any car: a car that reverses and changes direction when it bounces 
against the walls or furniture. Like similar primitive organisms, the toy-car has no 
awareness of its surroundings—it is not even alive—but manages very well to 
eventually find the room’s open door when it is programmed to fill its battery in the 
corridor. What the toy is “aware” of or—to formulate it better—is  capable of, is 
reacting to its own mechanical perturbations, triggered by  collisions, without 
obviously knowing the external origin of triggers; it doesn’t need to know. In its 
internal domain of all possible interactions it does not have any way to notice walls 
or furniture. It only reacts to its own mechanical structure, thus to itself. Every 
bounce becomes a direct—different but internal—condition compared to a “non-
bounce”. The bounce and its absence offer possibilities for the system to show a 
different, but logically linked property (changing direction) out of its repertoire of 
“all possible interactions”. For the car, it can be said, knows only one internal 
trigger: when it bounces to a chair or wall (seeing this from the perspective of the 
observer. A piece of flexible metal strip is then mechanically forced to make an 
internal electrical connection, which is the first out of only two triggers that the car 
picks up. It cannot even pick up the bending of the metal strip. The organization of 
this type of car, structures the car into reverse and simultaneously makes an angle 
with its front wheels for a second; then it continues forwards in a straight line. The 
two operations ( reverse and angling) are linked as one. 
 If the car's “species” has a more complex organization, including the ability to 
find food in the corridor (battery charger), it gets an extra internal category; an extra 
predictive description of a possible environmental trigger. Now it “knows” to 
distinguish four triggers; in this case, it detects, when it bumps to a voltage contact 
with an external charger, an extra voltage at its own sensors, (it does not detect the 
actual external voltage contacts) and when it detects voltage it stops and holds its 
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position until its battery is full (third internal trigger). When the battery gets too low 
in voltage (fourth trigger) it “seeks” the repowering station. Its internal repertoire of 
all possible interactions is quadrupled, compared to its simplest version of bouncing, 
reversing and continuing to drive until its batteries are depleted.  
 But the ability of a toy-car that is not even alive to eventually find within its 
environment its “food” (charging station) is possible because it is well “coded” to 
react to itself. This is the core of organizational closure. The car does react to the 
electricity within itself only. Electricity and what electricity means (the specific sub-
system meaning) is what the car reacts to. A naïve observer would have the opposite 
experience. It sees very well how the car is “aware” of its environment and interacts 
accordingly. 
Why and how do children like sugar / candy? In fact they don't actually like 
sugar. Children like its sweetness and structure in their mouth, but sweetness has 
never been and never is a property of sugar. Also the sensation of its structure and 
its texture in the mouth is not a property of sugar.  
Sugar has no (human sensed) property of itself. The clever mammal body has 
learned that it makes “sense” to recognize because it favors high-energy molecules 
of food and knows how to appreciate them. Thus, the organisms (e.g. birds, humans) 
“projects” out of itself “sweetness” to these desirable triggers, when such molecules 
trigger the tongue. Reacting to the sweetness of sugar is the tongue’s reaction to its 
own experiential clever coded properties (taste sensations) albeit triggered in time 
by the sugar molecules.  
Carefully mimicking the external molecular form of sugar produces extremely 
low-calorie sugar substitutes. The sugar is, analogically, identical to the stranger 
standing in front of the house ringing the front door bell. No one in his right mind 
would consider the doorbell’s sound to be a property of the stranger; but this is 
something we do naturally with sugar and all that we taste. Being in the kitchen and 
moving to the front door is therefore not reacting to the man in front of the house 
but, rather, reacting to a property (doorbell) of the house itself, triggered in time by 
the man.  
 Organizational closure itself is a given; it is not free choice, but it offers free 
choice. The unconditional faithfulness of an organism to itself, because of closure, 
offers freedom to determine the nature of the outside world, according to and as an 
extension of its own organization. Closure in biology means all living systems can 
only react within themselves to themselves, in the way they themselves determine, 
according to their nature. For simple organisms, their nature is fully determined by 
their genetically determined organization. The freedom of only being determined 
by oneself is the freedom of the rain worm to be a rain worm and the freedom of a 
bird and a bear to be a bird and a bear.  
 What is relevant for the thesis is not how the human body and its components 
work, but how organizational closure governs the brain and its five senses, as well 
as the next level up beyond molecules and physical structures: cognition and 
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thinking. A prime example of organizational closure is the working of the nervous 
system (Maturana et al. 1980 p.22, 23, 26). 
 
5.9.1 Organizational Closure and the nervous system 
Briefly, it was mentioned that children do not like sugar, but they like their own 
sweetness sensation, projected to sugar and thus becoming its property. The 
experiences of sweet or sour as body-made constructions are a direct consequence 
of organizational closure and valid for all properties of light, dark—auditory and 
tactile sensations such as touch, warmth or cold. Our “sixth sense”, the vestibular 
organ, gives us every millisecond a sensation of being in a 3D world, reigned by 
gravity, like a blind man experiencing “space” around him. These sensations are 
self-made and obviously not a property of gravitational and mass related forces, 
which only trigger the self-made sensations.   
“In other words, the new approach required us to treat seriously the activity 
of the nervous system as determined by the nervous system itself, and not 
by the external world; thus the external world would only have a triggering 
role [in time] in the release of the internally-determined activity of the 
nervous system” (Maturana et al. 1980, p. xv, italics added). 
Maturana and Varela's findings are a nuanced and better explained version of what 
was hinted at by the anatomist and physiologist Johannes Peter Müller (1801-1858) 
who examined neural pathways. Müller realized, through his studies of nervous 
systems of many different animals, that the same external triggers affect different 
nerves in different ways and thus nerves are not passive messengers of external 
stimuli:  
“Die Sinnesempfindung ist nicht die Leitung einer Qualität oder eines 
Zustandes der äusseren Körper zum Bewüstsein, sondern die Leitung einer 
Qualität, eines Zustandes eines Sinnesnerven zum Bewusstsein veranlasst 
durch eine äussere Ursache”  
“Perception is not the directing to awareness of a quality or condition 
external to the body, but the directing to our consciousness of a quality or 
condition of our nerves triggered by an external cause”... (Müller, 1837 
p.254) italics added by author 
The representation of the world, as Müller noted, reflects the structure of our 
nervous system in the first place. Intuitively, the experiences of the senses by the 
nature of projection perfectly denies the organizational closure properties of its 
CNS.  
 
5.10 Abstract thinking and projection 
More evolved organisms develop external awareness, when the complexity of their 
neural system makes it possible:  
“A nervous system that is capable of treating its internally generated states 
of activity as different from its externally generated states, that is, of 
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distinguishing their origin, is capable of abstract thinking...” (Maturana et 
al. 1980, p.25) 
The word “abstract” is added when triggers are recognized as they are perceived in 
the external world. It is not unlikely that—especially the eyes more than other 
sensors—helped to make the distinction between inner and outer triggers much 
easier. Seeing distant objects, which internal dynamics cannot control, makes it 
eventually acceptable to regard the outside as independent, being “not part of the 
controller”, even when “this” all happens as neural processes within the CNS, but 
projected outside:  
“A nervous system capable of recursively interacting with its own states, as 
if these were independent entities...requires an anatomical and functional 
internal reflection so that the internal organization of the nervous system can 
project itself onto itself…The linguistic domain, the observer and self-
consciousness are each possible because they result as different domains of 
interactions of the nervous system with its own states in circumstances in 
which these states represent different modalities of interactions of the 
organism” (Maturana et al. 1980, p. 29, bold and italics added). 
All seeing and hearing or sensing of the world is an internal experience projected 
outside. Touch, smell and taste are also projected outside the brain, but to the 
periphery of the CNS: the physical place itself of the sensors. 
 The peculiarity of an independent world is internal niche. It fully determines the 
total behavior of the organism, expressing its nature by behavior, while the 
expression is fully based on the internal descriptions of what are perceivable triggers 
and thus fully based on what specifically the organism cannot be: its environment. 
And still, the inseparability of that which cannot be known and that which is 
projected—be it instinctive or learned—is a critical condition in order to realize the 
nature of the individual. They are in fact two sides of the same coin. 
 Because projections cannot be detected, the consequence is that all observers 
have their own version of the external world, unless observers are perfect clones. A 
world as it is perceived is enslaved by projection, but simultaneously it is 
experienced as the opposite: a world imposed. 
Projection makes the world turn around towards us as perfectly convincing and 
“objective”, as Kant argued. Although beyond experience, the projection of the 
internal descriptions of triggers as part of the internal “class” of all possible trigger 
descriptions give triggers a face: this face is the outside world as we know it. Internal 
niche explodes into external habitat. Still, all there is, is internal niche, apart from 
the abstract level of inaccessible external triggers. What stays true is that triggers 
are not from i-niche, but are described and are made known by i-niche. Also outside 
the domain of projection of the interacting organism but within the projection of 
observers  is structural coupling (section 5.6; 5.6.2). 
Triggers have a double face: a real face, the thing-in-themselves “face”, 
independent from and forever hidden for observers behind their variable second 
face: a mask projected by and reflecting the internal niche of any observer of any 
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kind capable of “abstract thinking”. This autopoietic conclusion could be opposed 
by some, as it seems to deny the independence of triggers towards the organism. 
The dependence of the organism is on structural coupling only. The internal creation 
of trigger-descriptions, including meaning, is independent of the world and fully 
determined by the nature of the organism. The organisms discussed for which the 
toy car is a good metaphor, do not create meaning but innately inherit it from their 
genes, which pass through their organization. If the experience of the world is a 
mirror of the organism, and “designed” by it, what is more powerful? What 
determines freedom of the organism and what is its freedom?  
Questions such as the above belong to the abstract domain of an observer’s 
descriptions. The observer is entitled to these questions, which will be discussed 
later on (section 6.9). 
 
5.11 The function of the senses 
The experience of an outside world is based on a common belief: the five senses 
(six in their completeness) are designed or developed to know an outside world, 
independent from the observer, letting the world arrive from outside in. Even within 
Kant's constraint—that we as humans perceive the world in a human way but within 
that constraint gather objective perceptions and so acquire objective knowledge—
follows the common belief that the senses are primarily evolved in order to know 
an outside world. The human experience of an independent world as it is given 
implicates the experience of the independence of observer’s towards that same 
world. Both are suggested to be independent of each other. Most if not all people 
will consider this a blessing. The independence of the senses to their content is 
easiest to understand as “passive”. A transparent (or maybe slightly colored) lens of 
a camera (the human conformation) is perfectly passive to its streaming content. It 
does not interfere and is not able to “subjectify” the image on its way to the film 
plate.   
 Objectivity is the suggestion in the experience of seeing (perceiving). 
Autopoiesis makes clear that the human perception of a world is determined by its 
organization. Senses are the peripheral extensions of the nervous system and follow 
the “logic” of its CNS, which is perfectly organizationally closed and self-
referential. The reference behind organizational closure is the reaching of and 
maintenance of internal equilibrium.  
 The tension which exists for more than a billion years in the internal dynamics 
of the organism, between equilibrium and (negative) perturbations is a cyclical, 
intimate and fundamental relationship. It is the relationship that determines life or 
death for the organism. To enlarge internal flexibility in order to counteract internal 
(negative) perturbations (externally or internally triggered) requires more variety 
and is the drive for hundreds of millions of years behind the evolution to more 
complexity, that is, a CNS, the brain and later the senses.  
 Primitive senses did already exist more than 600 million years ago, in very 
simple organisms. One of the oldest eyes with a lens is found in the Cambrian era, 
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550 million years ago (Lamb 2013, p.56). Probably because of that, the CNS and 
the brain evolved rapidly in complexity, as the eyes opened a new portal, with an 
explosion of carefully selected triggers. Or, in other words, eyes are not designed to 
see but to primarily serve the reference of well-being by giving the organism more 
flexibility to handle / control internal perturbations, albeit triggered by outside 
structural coupling processes. The first primitive organisms with eyes are still 
robotic like with no abstract thinking. 
 When a species, through processes of mutation, develops eyesight, it can hunt or 
flee for predators in a much more effective way. But hunting is an interaction that 
is based on an internal perturbation, such as hunger. If the interaction does not occur, 
equilibrium cannot be restored. Hunting becomes much more effective and possible 
with the addition of eyesight, which greatly enlarges the pool of niche. The richer 
the niche becomes, the more the law of requisite variety of Ashby (see section 
3.1.7.2) predicts that the organism will be able to handle or even control parts, which 
with a less rich niche would not have been possible. So what the eyes do is what a 
video camera can do for the toy-car, which is to offer the possibility of more 
interactions with the environment, provided that visual triggers and class 
descriptions are added to niche.  
 
5.12 The niche of clones and automatic objectivity 
Within their class, one-cells (unicellular organisms) are real or practically real 
clones of each other; there are also numerous modern multicellular species that are 
much more evolved, which are still practically clones within their class. This also 
means they share the following:  
1. a same “identical” internal-niche, which includes 
2. the same instinctive a priori categorized descriptions of environmental 
triggers, which 
3. determine thus the same detection of external triggers and their meaning for 
the organisms as experienced, which  
4. determine same or similar interactive behavior in those particular 
environments which are  described. 
Number 3 in the list informs the particular organism on how to act in order to reach 
its internal references, albeit shared with its entire clone class. Numbers 1-4 in the 
list refer to the maintenance of the being of that particular member of the species. 
This mechanism does not explain or express the environment. It purely expresses 
the organism. This is not so strange, when that is exactly the biological drive of the 
species: to maintain and organize itself in a dynamic cyclical way, within the 
constraints of its organization, or in short, to live its life according to its own but 
shared nature. 
“Clones” is another way of saying that members of a class lack particular 
properties, not determined by their organization, that gives them a distinct 
individuality. There is no freedom of choice to determine meaning.  If 
One considers a simple fish or a fruit fly, then all within their sub-class are known; 
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their respective, individual domain of all possible interactions is practically 
identical, but does not need identical structures. The amount of freedom to deviate 
from other members of the species is for non-essential structural changes, which do 
not interfere with common i-niche, Stepping in the shoes of a couple of fruit flies 
would be like experiencing, every time, the same “person” finding themselves in a 
similar, well known territory. If objectivity is based on the shared and the verifiable, 
then clone-like organisms will perfectly see and share the same objectivity; all fruit 
flies will thus objectively experience the same “Drosophila melanogaster world”. 
Paradoxically, this is an a priori objectivity. There is no subjectivity yet, unless the 
strange term universal subjectivity is used; but then there is no objectivity. Actually 
both do not exist as polarities and the concepts lose their meaning.  
The point to make, which will be explored further in a later section, is the 
paradox of the fact that instinctive, a priori knowledge conforms well to the 
definition of objectivity, if we apply human reasoning to the world of clones. A 
clone here represents the species with a pure nature, a nature which is totally 
determined by the overall organization of the species.  
What is “nature”? “Nature of” or “by 'nature” is a result of inborn or innate 
properties, but expressed in behavior or through traits (e.g. the property of long life, 
immunity to something etc.) Nature does not refer to structure, but for clones is 
determined by structure. Nature, in this sense, coincides with the internal class of 
all possible trigger descriptions (i-niche, see section 3.1.6) which immediately 
define a world mirroring i-niche. 
Stepping in the shoes of pure but different species will lead to very different 
objectivities as the reference of objectivity is not determined by the senses, but by 
i-niche. It is not that i-niche supports the world; it is the other way around, the world 
supports i-niche: 
“... since the domain of interactions of the organism is defined by its 
structure, and since this structure implies a prediction of a niche [i-niche], 
the relations with which the nervous system [including senses as the 
periphery of nervous systems] interacts are defined by this prediction and 
arise in the domain of interactions of the organism” (Maturana et al. 1980, 
p.21). 
The above quote, which more or less says that the CNS (and thus the brain) 
determines the meaning of the outside world according to its nature, is valid for all 
life, all species and not only clones. Clones were used as a straightforward example 
of a first principle of Life, as life existed during the first billions of years only in the 
form of clones or clone-like species. Still, if true objectivity for clones can be 
assumed (were we to apply human reasoning into their world), how can this be true 
for professionals, especially scientists who need objectivity?  
 
5.13 Different biological “objectivities”  
Apparently, animals do and must categorize, but obviously not with the help of 
language. Categorization studies have used animals many times (e.g. pigeons, 
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chimpanzees) but the use of language by animals, as we humans know and use it, 
has never been demonstrated. This makes the concept of “categories” older than 
categories of language. 
 It is obvious that rabbits categorize phenomena in the meadow where they live 
in a fundamentally different way than a weasel or a squirrel who visit the same 
meadow. Fundamental differences in behavior must be predicted, as the animals are 
so unlike each other. What is grass or a mouse for one will not be the same for 
another. Even accepting that the same image falls on their retina, the way they 
handle the same phenomenon proves that the same objective image “an sich”, 
cannot explain their different (or even opposite) behavior towards that same 
“object”.  
 The seemingly neutral question “What do I see, what is it?” is biologically 
important, but not possible; it is turned into the subjective question: “What do I see, 
what does it mean to me?” This appears to be the only question that can be answered. 
Of course, animals do not present that question in language; they act it out in 
behavior by investigating. They basically express their interest as determined by 
their respective natures.  
 Three different species of animals therefore will have no idea that, relative to 
each other, they see the same meadow very differently. It is their biological make-
up that makes it so (organizational closure). So far the objective question “What is 
it”, is identical to the subjective question: “What does it mean to me?” Meaning 
explains behavior very well, while facts do not. Sense-making processes are literally 
what they say: how does what I see, feel, hear etc. make sense? To make sense is to 
make an indistinguishable bond between sense (what is seen etc.) and the personal 
experience of judging what is sensed / seen. Then when “sense” is made, it will be 
part of what is sensed. But how does it become part of it?  
 
5.14 Objectivity and Kant (1724-1804) 
So what is objectivity and how does it lead to knowledge? What is really not touched 
by subjectivity? These are old questions, posed even before Aristotle and Plato and 
also thousands of years before that in the East (Upanishads). Kant (1724-1804) 
made a breakthrough in exploring these questions and paved the way to the 
development of scientific objectivity.  
 Knowledge is produced by a human mind; in fact, the structure of knowledge is 
the knowledge structure of the human mind. Given that human minds exist before 
they observe, these structures are in place a-priori to observations that are made, 
and likewise these a-priory structures cannot be falsified by observations.  
 This also means that the perceivable world cannot determine the nature of 
knowledge structures as  they are self-referential and independent of the world. The 
knowledge structures must also be necessary because, without them, we could not 
possibly have sensory experiences the way we do. Kant regards these a-priori 
knowledge structures as extremely important and absolutely necessary: 
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“Any knowledge that professes to hold a priori lays claim to be regarded as 
absolutely necessary. This applies still more to any determination of all pure 
a priori knowledge, since such determination has to serve as the measure, 
and therefore as the [supreme] example, of all apodictic (philosophical) 
certainty” (Kant, CPR 1929 p. 12). 
With this reversal, Kant opens up the possibility of a-priori structures leading in the 
end to scientific knowledge, but with an important and integral condition. 
Knowledge becomes relative (“…must conform…”) to the human mind; it loses its 
absolute character which Hume was after, but could not find. If we add to the 
concept of a judgment’s subject the limitation under which the judgment is made, 
the judgment is then unconditionally valid (CPR 1929 p. 73). 
 If a man swears with all his might that he has really seen and spoken to a flying 
purple elephant, not many will believe him. But if he discloses the very conditions 
(limitations) under which he made the judgment (the encounter happened in a 
dream), then maybe many will have no problem in believing him. Should he really 
be believed? That depends on the relevant community (“intersubjectivity”) that 
should believe him to give the judgment the status of real.  
As Kant’s a-priori knowledge of space and time is not linked to the topic of this 
thesis, I will not go further into it. What is relevant is the notion of knowledge and 
that of objectivity as possible contrasts to ego and subjectivity; all knowledge and 
subjectivity have to be “moved” outside the veil of innocence, but before that  
recognized for what it is. 
Kant begins with: 
“If intuition must conform to the constitution of the objects, I do not see how 
we could know anything of the latter a priori; but if the object (as object of 
the senses) must conform to the constitution of our faculty of intuition 
[faculty of awareness in relation to the perceived], I have no difficulty in 
conceiving such a possibility” (Kant 1929 p. 22, bold added). 
When referring to sensibility, Kant means the receptivity of the mind in terms of 
being affected by objects as they represent themselves (as they are presented in 
sensibility) (CPR 1929). The object as it “is given” (perceived) is accepted by Kant 
as a humanized version of external reality (conforming to the constitution of our 
faculty of intuition) and not a true representation as existing beyond the humanized 
version. Kant repeats (warns), more than once, that human perceptions do not 
disclose what truly exists in the world: the things-in-themselves. They are 
inaccessible and cannot be known and also fully coincide with autopoiesis where 
the true face of triggers is forever behind the human mask of projection (section 
4.0). 
Kant gives a thorough account regarding the fact that everybody can access 
objects in sensibility and become aware of them in an objective way. Kant states 
that “objective knowledge” is experienced in “intuition”. But what do we see before 
“knowing” what it is, before having a thought about it? 
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“The effect of an object upon the faculty of representation, so far as we are 
affected by the said object, is sensation. That sort of intuition which relates 
to an object by means of sensation is called an empirical intuition. The 
undetermined object of an empirical intuition is called phenomenon.” (CPR 
1929 p. 43) 
Thus “naked intuitions” are called “empirical intuitions” and are the experiences of 
“sensations”. Sensations are not (yet) knowledge but are phenomena of the eternal 
unknown, but not the “things in themselves” even though relating to them. 
Empirical intuitions are the foundation that leads to objective knowledge. 
Knowledge can only exist for Kant in the form of language, in the form of thoughts; 
but thoughts of understanding (in the form of knowledge) are not empty as they 
relate to content, the content of intuitions. 
 “..Thoughts without content are void; intuitions without conceptions, blind. 
Understanding cannot intuit, and the sensuous faculty cannot think; in no 
other way than from the united operation of both, can knowledge arise”. 
(CPR 1929 p. 64) 
In the context of Kant's theory, what is given through the senses (sensibility) is thus 
by definition objective, but is not knowledge yet. Knowledge is based on thought 
(understanding). In the above context of what is intuited, Kant states that thoughts 
which make sense are connected to the senses. Kant’s words strictly divide 
understanding / knowledge / judgment from the experience of intuitions.  
 Schopenhauer, who gives Kant full credit for his a-priori findings, critiques him 
for considering the actual, intuitive, perceptual knowledge the same as the abstract, 
discursive, conceptual, derivation of blind intuitions otherwise according to Kant, 
sensations do not make sense, they are in a way blind.  But before and without 
thinking, without conceptions, perceptions do not need to be blind sensations. 
Schopenhauer accepts direct, intuitive knowledge of perceptions well before 
thinking (in language) occurs (The World as Will and Representation / Appendix of 
Volume I 1844).  
Not distinguished in Kant’s text is that realizing does not need understanding but 
experience (like many people use their TV but don't understand how it works). 
Understanding needs thinking in language. Realizing doesn’t need much thinking 
or needs no thinking at all, but needs the repetition of experience or single trauma. 
For example: 
“…there are a lot of people who know smoking is dangerous or flying is 
safe as they accept that knowledge or even understand it. Nevertheless they 
continue smoking or avoid flying. The knowledge of dangerous cigarettes 
(“intellectual knowledge”) does not influence or motivate smokers to quit 
smoking, not really. Until a bad morning they cough up things, which 
shouldn’t be there, clearly spoiling the morning and the colors of their 
handkerchief. Now, most of them realize in that moment what they have 
already known for a long time.” (Goosseff 2014 p. 707)  
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The new realization does not even require the previous knowledge that had been 
known already, for a long time. Realizing is a kind of “Ur-Lernen”, a primal 
learning coming out of the “core” of experiencing. This would explain how higher 
animals with room for sense-making processes (realizing presupposes sense-
making processes) manage to survive instead of blindly dwelling in their 
“sensations”, as Kant theory would suggest. This critique would probably not have 
happened if Schopenhauer and Kant had met each other and talked about it as Kant 
also knew that animals do not dwell blind in their empirical intuitions. Mostly, the 
critique doesn’t regard the theory provided, but its textual manifestations which—
especially when the author is not around—may become a limitation and give rise to 
ambiguity.  
Kant’s ideas do not explain Kant, but are valid for everybody else. Everyone can 
verify Kant’s conclusions for himself: it is a universal way. This idea fits the 
organization conditions of autopoiesis. All humans are submissive to the same 
human organization. This verification however can only repeat what Kant did. It is 
a conscious verification within cognitive awareness. Reality, conforming to human 
sensibility happens for Kant in the domain of the conscious mind. A-priori 
knowledge structures are used by the part of the mind that “observes”, thinks, uses 
its logic and believes its conclusions: the conscious mind.  
What Kant does not say is what role the unconscious mind plays in this. It is 
assumed, but not mentioned, that any other role that does not refer to the conscious 
mind does not interfere or contaminate the objectivity given in sensibility.  
Husserl disagrees with how Kant accepts objective perceptions. According to 
Husserl, Kant seems to accept fragmented sensory sense data too automatically as 
a gestalt, but they are still a multitude of fragmented data in the sense of bits and 
pieces (components) of the object intuited and not the gestalt as the object suggests 
itself, as we perceive it, as it is given.  
“...these objects of experience point to a hidden mental accomplishment and 
to the problem of what kind of an accomplishment this can be. From the 
very start, after all, it must be a kind which enables the objects…to be 
knowable with objective validity, i.e., with a necessity which can be 
accepted by and is binding for everyone” (Husserl 1970, §25, italics / 
underlining added). 
Seeing a chair is a gestalt, but it is immediately built up by—or consists of—many 
different components. It may seem a bit like nitpicking, but we have other senses 
that make this more apparent. For instance, hearing a melody (the gestalt) is not 
hearing the particular notes (the components), even though we can only hear the 
particular notes. In order to see a gestalt or hear a melody something must actively 
take care of (construct) that possibility. The Rorschach test is fully based on the 
mind’s ability to construct a gestalt out of bits and pieces. But the test also makes 
clear the variable influence subjectivity has in that construction 
“…of reason constantly functioning in concealment, reason ceaselessly 
rationalizing sense-data and always having them as already rationalized. Its 
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objective result is the sensibly intuited world of objects” (Husserl 1970 p. 
§25:94, bold added). 
I wonder if conscious reasoning can do that, that fast, but Husserl's objection doesn’t 
seem fair. Kant was aware that unconscious representations play a role in acquiring 
the “given” and “intuitions”, but he classified them as “physiological” and not a 
topic for philosophy (Kitcher 2012 p.14).  Still. Kant noticed that his categories of 
understanding were incomplete and he later added the concept of “transcendental 
object”: 
“Speaking of ‘the transcendental object of sense intuition’ (das transscendentale 
Obiect der sinnlichen Anschauung), Kant says in Reflection 5554: ‘This is no real 
object or given thing, but a concept in relation to which appearances have unity’ 
(Dieses ist aber kein reales obiect oder gegeben Ding, sondern ein Begrif, auf den 
in Beziehung Erscheinungen Einheit haben.—Ak 18 p.230)” (Torretti 2008, p.84). 
Husserl and Kant both noticed that seeing / perceiving is not just a simple “being 
aware of” what automatically presents in the mind’s sensibility. Unconscious 
processes or, on a structural level, physiology also influence, in a major way, how 
an object is given. Still, both Kant and Husserl concluded that the ability of the mind 
to detect objectivity, as a result of “…which [empirical objects] can be accepted by 
and is binding for everyone” (see p. 45).  
 Kant’s explanation, but also Husserl’s added nuances, fully support the 
perception of an object (projected by autopoietic processes) as if projection can 
happen without contamination of subjectivity: If so, then all persons are able to 
project the same “object” objectively as it is given in sensibility. Also, Kant and 
Husserl knew that in the social world people may often react subjectively—and thus 
very differently—to the same events. It is not only beauty that is in the eye of the 
beholder. Still, especially scientists or people in impartial positions are known to be 
able to see and act in a relatively neutral and objective way. Or, to translate this in 
autopoietic terms, the human niche determined by the human organization in such 
impartial functions, suggest thus important universal properties too even for a 
species with unique identities like humans. But before turning our attention to how 
human niche can coincide with the experience of objectivity, another important 
topic must be noted, which is fundamental for scientific objectivity. This refers to 
its acceptance by the scientific community: intersubjectivity. 
 
5.15. Intersubjectivity  
Objectivity does not guarantee the truth. This is because all tests can be fallible, 
observations are theory-laden and perfect scientists do not exist. The truth 
(descriptions of truth) however can be approximated and “inter-subjectively” 
approved. The accepted “truth” remains valid until a better theory comes along, as 
all human assertions are in principle open to revision (e.g. Popper K.; Bhaskar R.). 
Still, a warning is embedded in the concept of intersubjectivity: intersubjectivity is 
by definition not an absence of subjectivity, a theme which Thomas Kuhn, amongst 
others, is interested in. How do we reach the status of objectivity and universality 
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with conventional scientific findings? Karl Popper, in explaining scientific 
objectivity, builds on Kant: 
“The touchstone whereby we decide whether holding a thing to be true is 
conviction or persuasion is therefore external. It must be possible to 
communicate it and find it valid for all human reason…We have to test 
validity against the understanding of others” (CPR Kant A821 B849). 
And: 
“…I shall therefore say that the objectivity of scientific statements lies in 
the fact that they can be inter-subjectively tested…but I agree that scientific 
statements, since they must be inter-subjectively testable, must always have 
the character of universal hypotheses” (Popper K. 1959 Ch. 8 p. 22-23). 
The final judgment of statements to be scientifically objective lies in their 
consensual acceptance, formalized in a shared linguistic domain. Not a single 
person can declare a finding as true and objective unless he represents a body. 
Ideally, the scientific community should be independent of the overall culture it is 
embedded in, as culture needs no conditions of “objectivity” to exist and cultures as 
a “systems of groupthink” accept hard facts as true and equally valid as the vaguest 
metaphysical concepts, depending on the content of the respective cultures. 
 The role of the scientific community with its own rhetorically constituted 
“intersubjectivity” is not small. Fundamental followers of Thomas Kuhn's theory 
(The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 1962, 1970) regarding the determining 
influence of the prevailing paradigm on the scientific community, go so far as to 
believe that the community itself determines, primarily, valid theories rather than 
the objective phenomena under scrutiny. Topics or observed anomalies, which are 
considered as metaphysics (falling wholly outside the contemporary scientific 
paradigm) or “simply” considered as not possible, will equally simply not be 
investigated and preliminary facts will be ignored. Anomalies which are seen as 
“too” distanced from the current paradigm of knowledge will not initiate curiosity.  
“Normal science, for example, often suppresses fundamental novelties 
because they are necessarily subversive of its basic commitments” (Kuhn 
1970 p. 5). 
The “Climategate” is an example of how “scientific intersubjectivity” is vulnerable 
to ideological and media influence. Much has already been written about it. Another 
example has to do with the influence of a scientific paradigm on what occurred not 
so long ago, in 2011. CERN, a European particle physics laboratory near Geneva in 
Switzerland, fired thousands of neutrinos under the earth to “Laboratori Nazionali 
del Gran Sasso” a particle physics laboratory of the INFN (National Institute for 
Nuclear Physics), close to the Gran Sasso mountain in Italy (Cho 2011; Phys.org 
2012). Those neutrinos were not sent at once, but over a period of three years, spread 
over 400 reruns of the same experiment. All those experiments were not aimed to 
acknowledge something new, but aimed to produce failure.  
 The first “innocent” experiment of sending the neutrinos to Italy revealed the 
impossible finding that they arrived 60 nanoseconds too early, showing that they 
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could travel faster than light. Under the current paradigm, this is impossible; if true, 
it would ruin Einstein's theory of special relativity.  
 The first dozens of reruns that followed confirmed the impossible first finding; 
the next three years were used in the hope of finding a different outcome under the 
speed of light to confirm the trusted old theory of relativity and to find the error in 
creating the many “faulty” measurements.  
 Three years and hundreds of reruns later, the 160-member team gave up and 
made their findings public, but not in order to proudly claim a Nobel Prize worthy 
achievement. In a humble way, they asked the scientific community for help—
“what could have been wrong?”—as they couldn’t find any error in the way they 
conducted the experiments. To try repeating the same experiment over and over 
again, over three years in a row, in order to falsify the outcome, is more than Popper 
would ever have asked for. This really shows how motivated the team was, in terms 
of holding on to dominating view in particle physics. In the end, a secure looking 
fiber optic cable was discovered to be loose, and one could imagine that this 
discovery was met with relief.  
Science, in Kuhn's view, is a puzzle-solving tool (not a problem-solving tool), 
aimed at topics unresolved, but fitting within the established paradigm. Kuhn named 
science which follows an established “culture” “normal science”. In a sense, 
normal science is not the maker and master, but the slave of its paradigm, 
unwillingly following rare stubborn reoccurring anomalies, which refuse to go 
away. Anomalies are not defined by their rare or stubborn character, but by showing 
no allegiance to the dominant theories intersubjectively accepted.  
These anomalies eventually force the community to revolutionize its thinking, 
in order to find a new vision of “reality”, forming a new paradigm which invalidates 
the old. After some time, a next generation of scientists cannot anymore 
comprehend the old way of “seeing”, fashioned by previous generations of 
scientists. At least this is Kuhn’s statement of how a change of paradigms effects 
generations of scientists.  
A clear example he refers to has to do with the incompatibility between the 
Newtonian physics paradigm and the Aristotelian view of mechanics. Much less 
separated is the difference between Newtonian and Einstein’s relativity theories and 
although their respective paradigms are fundamentally different, contemporary 
students are still taught Newtonian physics and understand them.  
Criticism of Kuhn’s theories centers on his conclusions which have been 
perceived as exaggerated. Kuhn's underlining of the scientific community's 
captivation by their paradigm fitted the cultural revolution of the sixties, which 
opposed the then rather rigid conventional “law and order” culture, where the 
theorems and authority of the political and scientific establishment were beyond 
question. “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions” was hailed by intellectuals and 
by many in the social sciences, but not by many in the natural sciences. Although 
the radical interpretations by Kuhn’s most devoted—and extreme—followers did 
not exactly express what Kuhn himself meant, he did nevertheless alienate science 
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by denying that scientific progress was based on an innate curiosity to explore and 
discover the unknown, to seek the “holy grail of truth” and “"to boldly go where no 
man has gone before” (ST 1966), in spite of any paradigm.  
“Kuhn conceded that he was partly to blame for some of the anti-science 
interpretations of his model. After all, in Structure he did call scientists 
committed to a paradigm “addicts”; he also compared them to the 
brainwashed characters in Orwell’s 1984.” (Horgan, 2012) 
The criticism of his theory by the same community that had initially, when his book 
had come out, “hailed” him for decades, increased since his death in 1996, leading 
to academic communities even “feeling cheated by Kuhn” (Mirowsky, 2003 p. 229). 
However, Mirowsky in all honesty does not blame Kuhn, but the naive attitudes of 
his (social) academic colleagues and himself, who, as he saw it, had too uncritically 
welcomed Kuhn for relativizing the self-made crown of positivist science. Modern 
criticism does not mean that Kuhn was completely wrong, but that perhaps he 
overemphasized his conclusions.  
 
5.15.1 Paradigms and categories 
A new paradigm, which is seen as revolutionary from the viewpoint of the previous 
one, is not only formed by new theories or formulas explaining new (anomalies) 
empirical findings. Very often definitions and tautologies about formerly known 
topics need to change as well, incorporating redefined categories of the previous 
paradigm. 
“Laws are often corrigible piecemeal, but definitions, being tautologies, are 
not. For example, part of what the acceptance of Ohm’s Law demanded was 
a redefinition of both [categories] ‘current’ and ‘resistance’; if those terms 
had continued to mean what they had meant before, Ohm’s Law could not 
have been right; that is why it was so strenuously opposed” (Kuhn 1970 p. 
183).  
When science progresses, categories progress too. The classic Niels Bohr rather 
mechanical models of atoms, whereby electrons follow their fixed stable orbits 
around the nucleus, had to be fully replaced by dynamic versions, whereby no static 
orbits exists and the probability remains that an electron may even be situated on 
the nucleus. This drastically changed the properties of electrons in their category. 
The difference between Bohr’s view and the modern quantum physics’ view is 
comparable to the difference between the views of Newton and Einstein on 
mechanics, although the redefinitions of electrons is not necessarily (publicly) 
recognized as a revolution. Steady progress or “evolution” does not attract headlines 
in major papers. “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions” pointed out however that 
scientific paradigms do exist and that probably the “mother of all paradigms” is 
intersubjectivity.  
The notion of “objectivity” is connected to intersubjectivity, but principally not 
to paradigms. Paradigms and cultures have a common resistance to change. The 
resistance is not only natural, but a wise and even necessary property to protect and 
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maintain the “identity” of institutions, organizations, groups and—finally the place 
where it all stems from—the precious identity of the individual. To be open to new 
things which do not support “old foundations” is not a common trait of this 
“protection program” by way of resisting change. This protection program has an 
autopoietic foundation (organizational closure) and is addressed in section 5.9. 
Objectivity does not require an open mind in science, but is connected much more 
to the use of accepted and valid methodologies to safeguard objective conclusions 
and theories.  
Even when the community acknowledges objectivity, how can this be when 
humans are not clones? Can the organization of the human species have a unique 
internal-niche which allows interactions based on objectivity? 
 
5.16 The rise of individuality 
Identity, as the name of the autopoietic organization of species, is an abstract in the 
domain of language, the domain of the observer. Class identity not only gives a 
name, but also gives away the nature of that species. The names 'fruit fly', 'goose' or 
'horse' do not only inform us about what each species looks like; their total sum of 
interactions (behavior) is suggested with it, making their nature “voiced” too. The 
link between organization and the nature of the species is thus clear.  
However, already the concept of species is a human abstraction, an observer’s 
construct. Only particular organisms have existed and can exist. Class species is a 
generalization, and generalizations can be constructed, but not observed. In fact, 
even the autopoietic concept “organization” which is so important in the theory of 
autopoiesis is a non-existing “thing”: it is a reification and like all reifications it is 
a “tool” of thought, just like all categories are. All autopoietic mechanisms and 
processes are factual and particular and happens in the realms of a single unity. 
While “organization” does determine the species, the more individual particular 
members become, the less “organization” can determine the nature of that particular 
member. On the other hand, applying the notion of organization as a given, the 
evolutionary development of species from pure clones towards, finally, unique 
individual members of species, also results in the evolution of their organization.  
 Evolving species gradually lose over the millennia their a-priori knowledge 
(instincts, gene-related data) about how and which triggers (environment) to detect 
and what they mean. The evolutionary detachment of a priori environmental 
“knowledge” makes room for individual learning (sense-making processes), 
replacing the instincts and adding new and enriched dynamic  meaning to new sets 
of triggers.  
 Sense-making processes are necessary in order to fill the void that the 
withdrawal of instincts leaves behind. Instincts are not a luxury; when they 
withdraw in time, the necessity of their particular functions stay. Instincts must be 
replaced by learning, which obeys the same function and handles the same  or 
replaced classes of triggers. Learning is also able to add nuances to or to widen the 
meaning and significance of triggers. Sense-making processes are also necessary 
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for the new triggers that were never seen or met before, or more likely never 
activated before by instincts. Many triggers at home (e.g. the parents’ belongings) 
do not make sense yet for very young children, who thus don't care about many of 
them. Sense-making processes, in later years, drastically enlarge the domain of 
structural coupling and the children's variety of ways to respond the old classes of 
previously ignored triggers. Simple fixed habitats do not ask for more than instincts 
alone which describe an ancient and apparently unchanging “world”. The soil of our 
gardens, in which rain worms live instinctively with gene-related information from 
20-30 millions of years ago, must be quite similar to soil conditions back then. In 
such stable habitats, the rain worm is “perfect” enough to maintain its autopoiesis, 
while being practically a clone of other rain worms. As clone-like organisms do not 
have an individual nature, it would not make sense to give observed rain worms 
individual names. Biologists, however, do give names when they observe (for 
weeks) a family of Hominidae (great apes) in the wild or when they observe a group 
of dolphins. 
Structural coupling interactions (see section 3.2.1) are dynamic in the here-and-
now and every here-and-now is unique in more than one way. Instincts do not have 
room for more triggers to handle than they are programmed for. Add complex social 
environments to habitats, whereby animals react dynamically to their own kind 
within herds or family groups, and instincts become unable to readjust to new 
diverse complexities, which can emerge at a moment's notice. Learning to make 
sense of complex triggers, in contrast to instinctive behavior, needs a more evolved 
and complex CNS and brain (Barash 1977 p.42; Johnston 1981 p.86). 
Learning does not produce a different “product” than an instinct does. Instinct is 
one word for two things, the source and its product: categorical information. 
Learning also has two grounds, the process of learning and what is learned: 
information, which in the end is also “class” (category) oriented. Even specific 
learnings about a single person, that are only valid for that specific person only, is 
a category with one member only (singular category). The essential of the category 
is not that it should be filled with at least two members. The first essential property 
of a category is its validity over time and into the future. It is its circularity that 
defines it as a category. In the case of having a single member, a person, the category 
generalizes its behavior in just as many generalized (future) contexts.  
When instincts are replaced by sense-making, the members of those changing 
species lose their clone character very fast. With brains, which gradually develop 
into more complex sense-making “coordinators”, organization-determined 
“members” move, just as gradually, towards a more unique individuality. Learning 
processes change the organizationally determined nature of the organism; the 
individual particular organism starts to “program” itself to incorporate present 
dynamic circumstances. The “organization” of the species delegates gradually its 
determining powers over the “nature” of its species to its members themselves. Or, 
in other words, the more individuality is free-formed, the less its common 
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organization (its species) is able to determine and predict the nature of that particular 
member of its class in a specific context.  
With organisms evolved to a more particular identity, a question of prediction 
how they will behave in a certain context can only be answered with: “It depends...” 
Before cat meets dog, can it be predicted what that particular cat (or dog) will do? 
This is in full opposition to the metaphor earlier used about McDonald’s, which has 
an “organization” complexity comparable to a single cell. The “organization” of 
McDonald’s outlets does not determine how a particular outlet is (superficially) 
structured, but it fully determines the nature of each outlet: the essential hardware 
and layout of processes, the methodology of food preparation and customer 
handling, its quality and type of products; all these can be predicted and must meet 
the “organization” standard. 
Unique identities greatly enlarge the diversity and flexibility of their class to 
better deal with contingencies. They are still bound to the shared instincts they have 
left, determined by their organization. The less the amount of the shared instincts, 
the more freedom the animal has not only to be different but to automatically create 
a partly distinguishable different habitat than other members of its class. The 
difference in habitats of members of a same class can only be proven by an observer 
by observing their different handling of the same external structures 
(structures=triggers, structural coupling processes). If two cats react in opposite 
ways to a dog, it could justifiably be concluded that the same trigger (dog) led 
internally to a different predictive description in the respective domains of all 
possible interactions of the two cats. The shared part of particular habitats is 
determined by common (enough) learnings and/or remaining instincts typical for 
that class. Shared (same) environments does not refer to shared triggers as habitat, 
although triggers maybe shared. The differences between individual habitats, as an 
extension of the uniqueness of particular identities, are disparate and may even 
become incommensurable. A wildish dog (abandoned by the culture of the people)  
in the streets of Faisalabad  (Pakistan) may very well describe people in his i-niche 
as being the opposite of the description of another dog of  the same breed, living  in 
Amsterdam with  a caring owner.  
To summarize, when instincts fully control interactive behavior, it is safe to 
assume that all organisms of a class are practically clones in precisely those areas 
of their nature that distinguishes them from other classes or species. When more 
evolved brains become capable of reasoning and of learning, the species develop 
distinct individual identities. The effect of varying individual identities also varies 
in terms of individual niches and their habitats. There is no difference in experience 
between the internal niche and the external habitat. External habitat is internal niche 
projected outwards as soon as abstract thinking is developed. The shift from 
instincts to personal learning equals the shift from an organization’s (species) 
determined nature (class identity) towards an individual determined nature 
(personal identity). The overall organization of such species then is left to determine 
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structures which provide a morphology and physiology as essential conditions to 
bring forth more free-formed personal, but still autopoietic, identities. 
 
5.16.1 Human’s unique identity and organizational closure 
The biological processes of the withdrawal of instincts seems to come to an end 
with the organism “homo sapiens”, as there are no more shared human instincts left. 
The organization of the human species has lost its biological nature completely3, 
but still determines morphological structures (forms) and physiology within the 
organizationally allowed morphological variety. The human organization lost its 
nature when it reached the phase of having no more instincts which were specifically 
needed to define humans. There are some basic instincts, such as the “instinctive” 
fear for sudden, loud noises, but this fear is shared as those conditions scare 
practically all animals. Humans are instinct-free, except for gender-determined 
instincts (not human but mammal determined). And for more than a few these basic 
instincts give the impression to not even exist. Cats, dogs, horses, chimpanzees and 
dolphins already show a remarkable and growing strong personal identity; but with 
the human species, the personal internal niche of the individual, its personal domain 
of all possible descriptions, shows the (relative) emptiness of the human 
organization to determine human nature. In other words, the autopoietic 
organization of the human species does not anymore determine unique 
individualities (personalities). Theoretically at least, the human “i-niche” has 
become completely independent of its genetic source. I-niche, as stated earlier, 
contains the descriptions of triggers integrated with meaning4, in such a way that 
the internal coupling with the possible accompanying behavior serves the 
organism’s wellbeing (equilibrium). The organization of the human species is still 
a blueprint of the bodily structures, including the senses.   
 Accepting that the organization of homo sapiens, compared to other species, has 
no or the least amount of power over its members to determine an individual (i-
)niche, the universal nature of man as a species becomes obscure as if  nonexistent 
or lost in metaphysics. The enormous freedom the human organization gives to 
members’ ability in forming a unique personal ego produces a rich and boundless 
                                                          
3 Many will object to the idea that humans are instinct-free. Babies do not start with an empty 
'slate', as Lock suggested. Still, a scientific debate regarding the nature of the individual exists 
between “nurture and nature”. The still existing debate itself tells us that a scientific answer that 
would end the debate has not been found yet. Babies, after a couple of days, may already show 
personal characteristics, very different from one baby to another, as most mothers would say. 
The assumption that only genes could cause these differences is scientifically supported by 
interpretive arguments of empirical observers. But genes in a way are the law; they pre-program 
structural features (like eye and skin color) which actually cannot be changed psychologically. 
If however personal character traits do change through psychic traumas or through 
psychotherapy, genes then become an odd explanation of the previous behavior and 
psychological makeup. .  
4 meaning in the descriptive domain of (self-)observers ( see section 6.5) 
 
  
78 | P a g e  
 
variety of personalities, maximizing the species' variety to cope with contingencies, 
but also maximizing the room for error. That a reference gets lost in the freedom of 
the human organization is suggested in the importance of religion and morality. 
Both in a stubborn way keep on existing through the millennia, in spite of their lack 
of empirical proof. Their existence however seems to persist and is locally 
determined by arbitrarily set visions, rules and justifications. 
 
5.17. Human individuality and objectivity 
What do clone species share in autopoiesis has been discussed in section 5.12.  Next 
we can find their opposite: the most individual species: humans. Clone species share 
the following:  
1) an identical internal niche, which is 
2) the shared instinctive predictions of environment, but 
3) separated in many categories, not particular events of environments 
4) describing a-priori categorized external triggers leading to 
5) interactive behavior in those particular environments which are described 
(Maturana et al. 1980 p. 10). 
 
For humans this changes to: 
H1) there are no fixed identical niches, only individual ones, which are 
H2) uniquely learned non instinctive predictions of environment, but 
H3) separated in many personal categories, not particular events of environments 
H4) describing experienced categorized external triggers leading to 
H5) interactive behavior in those particular environments which are described. 
Objectivity, leading to objective descriptions, can only follow H2-H5, but in billions 
of years these steps have a very specific function. A function which still determines 
present experiences of any species: the maintenance and sustaining of a particular 
member of a class according to its individual nature. This is irrespective of whether 
the internal information is gene-based or learned. Objectivity as real would ask for 
an impersonal nature within a class and that brings us back to clone-like organisms.  
 Can H2 produce objective information? Theoretically it cannot. This is because 
H2 is intertwined in personal niche and niche is a code made for (potential) 
interactions. The internal coupling between descriptions and interaction is the 
billion year old function of internal niche. And interactions only secondarily serve 
triggers, and always primarily serve the organism. Non-instinctive internal 
information is based on experience. What is shown is that the CNS with its 
organizational closure is not developed to objectively know a shared human version 
of the world, but is developed functionally to support and sustain the particular 
individual only.  
 (Scientific) objectivity cannot be experienced also because of the impossibility 
in recognizing and experiencing the meaninglessness of triggers. Even an unknown 
trigger evoking a full “?” is full of meaning and a significant meaning too. A 
question mark may point to a yet undisclosed important meaning. Most people find 
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it very hard to neglect the doorbell or the phone ringing. However, with digital 
phones that have caller recognition, things change, but only once one notices who 
the caller is. 
 Impartial functions such as those of judges or referees do not provide neutral or 
objective experiences. Impartial functions are functional conditions that provide 
officials in the jobs to exercise their ability to suppress or “contain” their 
“subjectivity”. 
 
5.17.1 What exactly is human “objectivity” 1 
The first example is regarding a neural component in the human brain; the second 
example derives from an article (Goosseff, 2014); the third example is an individual 
test for the reader to conduct. What Kant could not know that representations “as 
given” at the very moment they appear in the form of “appearances” in the mind 
(sensibility), are in a “hidden” way personally “edited”. 
“…of reason constantly functioning in concealment… reason ceaselessly 
rationalizing sense-data and always having them as already rationalized. Its 
objective result is the sensibly intuited world of objects” (Husserl 1970, 
§25:94), bold and italics and strikethrough added. 
Autopoiesis theory will fully agree and support the above statement of Husserl, but 
not its conclusion leading to objectivity. “... Reason constantly functioning in 
concealment” goes much further than was assumed in those days. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 2 The eye is not an objective performer 
 
What can be derived from the above figure from the “Tree of Knowledge”, 
Maturana and Varela (1987 p. 162) is Maturana and Varela’s conclusion that the 
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image we perceive as a representation of an object, as it is given, is edited, but this 
is done on the part of subjectivity. The editing has the sole reason to obey and 
maintain personal identity. We see that there is no direct connection between the 
eye and the “occipital lobe” at the back side of the brain where primarily (in 
hardware) the image is built up; a direct connection structurally does not exist. The 
ganglion NGL is a kind of “traffic roundabout”, including relay and control stations, 
that allows all kinds of non-visual signals coming from other parts of the brain to 
influence and literally “manipulate” the “pure” visual signals coming from the eye. 
This happens inside the NGL before the image is built some six inches further, at 
the back side of the brain (occipital lobe). The occipital lobe constructs a picture as-
if the influenced signal comes directly from the eye.  The structure of the ganglion 
is incapable of ‘tagging’ in its output “what “comes from “where”.  Although this 
is a perfectly legitimate process within the domain of operational closure, it 
completely destroys any objective property the eye in theory may have had. The 
hypothalamus influences the signal according to the state of the body (body 
temperature, hunger, thirst, fatigue, sleep), while the locus ceruleus is linked to the 
regulation of emotions, which according to the majority of emotional theories are 
linked to meaning. All their influences are a-priori to the observations made in 
consciousness. This process of “inter-mixing” is also true for the other senses. 
“Thus, the LGN is not simply a relay station for retinal projections to the 
cerebral cortex, since many fibers from other parts of the brain converge 
upon it and influence whatever comes out of it toward the visual cortex. This 
is shown [in Fig 2]... It is enough to contemplate this structure of the nervous 
system ... to be convinced that the effect of projecting an image on the retina 
is not like an incoming telephone line. Rather, it is like a voice (perturbation) 
added to many voices during a hectic family discussion (relations of activity 
among all incoming convergent connections) in which the consensus of 
actions reached will not depend on what any particular member of the family 
says.” (Maturana and Varela 1987 p. 162-163, italics and underlining added) 
 
5.17.2 Human “objectivity” 2, objectivity as a linguistic construct, a regulative 
idea 
We all have experienced the fact of different personalities and it is not hard to accept 
that in the end we all are unique, similarly to our fingerprints. Our uniqueness is not 
our shared ability to be aware of the world. It is how we experience “this being 
aware of the world” that makes each of us unique.  
 For instance, two boys encounter the same dog or hear the same proposition, but 
get an opposite experience of that event, while being aware of each other’s different 
reactions too. Objectively, the two boys perceive the same dog. This is logically an 
odd beginning. Who sees the same dog when each observer can see only his own 
version of the dog? The only same thing about the dog is the trigger “dog”, but not 
the perceivable trigger “dog”. Once the dog is perceived, it is already personal.  
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 Still, how do the boys handle the same trigger, “dog”, from the first-person 
perspective of a (scientific) observer? What determines their behavior? Any 
knowledge or the objective (apodictic) description of that dog cannot on its own 
explain or reliably predict the boy’s actual reaction. What the dog personally means 
to them, the meaning within the boys, not within the dog, determines how they will 
respond. We may intellectually know that our meanings of the world are subjective, 
internal constructs and indirectly express our identity. (E.g. Bannister, Fransella 
1986, Iglesias, Bonet 2012), but we are unable to experience that knowledge. 
Meaning, like the colors we see, is integrated, intertwined, “etched” by projection 
into the thing perceived. That makes that meaning is not only detached from the 
perceiver, but is also an external property of the perceived, just like the colors we 
see are properties of the perceived. The boys are only able to experience their own 
version of the “objective truth” of that dog as there is no other version for anyone 
to witness.  
 If a third (scientific) observer, standing “neutral” to the dog, acknowledges for 
himself that the two boys react to the same dog, he is referring to the dog he 
experiences, but ignoring his version of the dog is not of those of the boys. Still, on 
some level, all observers of the dog observe the same dog. But, on what level is 
this? For the boys, seconds later, memories are already forming and are translated 
into internal narratives when reflected. What do these narratives convey?  
What are true objective accounts of the dog? If a scientist asks the boys: “Give 
me an objective description of the dog you see” they cannot say: “I see a nice dog” 
or “… a dangerous dog”. Those adjectives are scientifically subjective and 
unacceptable; they destroy the possibility of objectivity. Still, such adjectives, better 
than anything else, convey precisely the structure and nature of empirical 
experience. When the boys banish these adjectives in order to be “scientists”, they 
in fact sacrifice the dog they have witnessed and don’t describe what happened to 
them. All neutral (objective) language originally had adjectives attached to it 
(unspoken or under the threshold of awareness), as all empirical descriptions 
originate from experience. It is safe to say that experience without meaning cannot 
exist and language without adjectives cannot describe experience. That makes 
(scientific) objectivity a linguistic construct, a regulative idea. With a wink to Kant:  
“But, on the other hand, they [constructs of objectivity] are capable of an admirable 
and indispensably necessary application to humanity as regulative ideas, directing 
the understanding to a certain aim” (a lá Kant CPR 1929: 395; Goosseff 2014). 
Factually the “same dog” the two boys and the scientist see together only exist as 
an abstract linguistic reduction referring to an inaccessible but real trigger: Kant’s 
“thing-in-itself”. 
 
5.17.3 Defining individual human objectivity 3 
Objectivity, standing outside human experience, but firmly inside language, is not 
an empirical human experience of reality, but a very handy and indispensable tool 
of thought.  
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Meanings can seem absent in experience and therefore as not perceived. This 
suggests the possibility of objective perceptions. Still, the meanings are there, but 
they are under the threshold of awareness. This can be tested by looking for a few 
seconds, but sequentially, at one out of two similar, but insignificant and not 
identical objects. For instance, two similar pebble stones or the same object in two 
different states (e.g. an open vs. a closed scissor). By remembering the unanalyzed 
nameless inner state-response from watching one of those objects separately from 
each other, the difference in meaning between the two internal responses comes into 
awareness. A (slightly) felt preference for one of the two objects or states / positions 
can be detected. Even insignificant triggers evoke personal meaning, but they fall 
normally under the threshold of awareness. Being focused and in a relaxed state 
makes it easier to detect more subtle changes.  
 
5.18 Submissive Objectivity: Objectivity as a relationship 
What objectivity needs in order to exist is the sacrifice of the particular human 
experience, as a reduced experience in language, which is beyond experience. Still, 
objectivity as a linguistic reduction is in countless contexts a practical necessity, for 
instance in the context of analyzing or producing. Like for the patient who is 
invisible under a green blanket, while his body is reduced to a visible part through 
a 12x12-inch-square hole when operated upon by the surgeon. A very positivist 
surgeon, who indeed cannot see the patient as a whole. He only observes a particular 
12x12 inch physical structure of flesh and bone, but in the full awareness that he is 
not primarily serving the content of the 12"x12". He knows and never forgets that 
he is truly serving what is beyond the reduction, even when this knowledge is 
beyond his perception. That makes applied objectivity secondary to its primary, that 
what it needs to serve and is connected to. The surgeon’s reduction of his patient is 
only temporarily accepted as-if true; its temporal as-if-validity will never have any 
status above or beyond the “total” human being that it is serving. The temporal 
validity of the reduction although seen as real keeps it, from the start, connected to 
“humanity”, never kept apart. This is quite the opposite of science's use of 
“objectivity”, as there is no “whole patient” and the reduction is fully accepted as 
“perfect” and complete and not temporarily as-if complete, making its virtual 
character disappear beyond awareness. Is there a price to be paid? 
 
5.19 Independent Objectivity: alienation 
A paradigm founded on the basis of the digital split between “objectivity” and 
“subjectivity”, while making them equally true and valid as if each other’s opposite, 
leads to the alienation of science from humanity, described already by Husserl in 
1935 in “The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology” 
(1970). This alienation can be reworded as the alienation between the human 
condition and the mechanical “meaninglessness”—the latter being true professional 
objectivity. Even contemporary psychology as a science still avoids entering 
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subjectivity “en masse”; it strongly prefers the logic of observation, quantitative 
rather than qualitative methods and measurable phenomena. 
As true objective data or scientific knowledge is made as free as humanly 
possible from subjectivity, it is freed from humanity itself. This also leads to that 
science cannot and should not purport to lead societies towards a better future. 
Leadership leads its followers to a future, because true leadership is a bridge 
between the realizations of futures and “humans”. The open “secret” of true 
leadership is based on relation and meaning (e.g. Schein 2010; Levy & Merry 1986; 
Waugh & Streib 2006), very much that which science keeps ideologically out of its 
paradigm. Objectivity has never been part of meaning or relation, but it’s opposite: 
independence. Societies who naively follow science are following a blind leader 
with no vision.   
To accept the reduced as real, demands a price to be paid. Scientific objectivity 
is not real but is a tool of thought and like all “tools”, it finds itself having the 
properties of tools regardless of its recognition as a tool. And like the knife does not 
favor the surgeon’s hands over those of the mass murderer, so objectivity stands 
apart from the ‘good’ and the ‘bad’ and exists in a moral void.  
The problem doesn’t have to do with tools. A tool is typically recognized as a 
tool, and its “moral indifference” to tasks and goals is fully understood, accepted 
and appreciated. The problem with scientific objectivity is the belief in its realness, 
replacing its tool like nature. Or in other words the problem with tool-like mental 
constructs is their accepted “realness”; obscuring their “constructed” status. Most if 
not all people truly belief that tomorrow exists. 
People have no problem to identify themselves with what they accept as real. 
For instance, in order to be a real politician, a real journalist or a real administrator, 
people being faithful to their job gradually identify themselves with the main criteria 
of their job. They become their function at least within their organizational context. 
When the “real” is however virtual and incomplete, what can be expected? To 
identify with objectivity, as the personal interpretation of what the daily job 
demands, simultaneously demands the loss of identification with its opposite: 
humanness. The professional freedom of artists is also the professional freedom of 
scientists, but only artists’ freedom is innocent. Scientific freedom is not innocent, 
as it is dehumanized by design. Science demands from its society freedom as a 
logical necessity in order to explore the unknown, any unknown. As science by itself 
fundamentally and ideologically misses an internal reference, it will lack and avoid 
regulations to restrain itself. Science's freedom will explore avenues leading to 
“anything at all'”. Theoretically, scientists can bring forth that it is not their duty to 
curb professional freedom from within science.  
So how far will the scientist go with his “legal” de-identification of his 
humanness, in order to be a truly objective scientist? That will heavily depend on 
the culture of the research organization. There are many cutting edge research 
institutes all over the world and because of their cutting edge quality they are 
historically linked to national interest and security. National interest and security 
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gratefully embrace the professional freedom of scientists to explore “anything at 
all”.  
Science as an institution, however bound by its belief that objectivity is real, is 
doomed to being without vision. What is already happening, guided by modern 
science, is the trend of nations that are gliding exponentially towards electronically 
regulated big-brother-is-watching-you kind of societies, that in their hearts nobody 
longs for. Modern societies following contemporary science emphasize body 
oriented life extension, but not life quality; with ongoing loss of personal privacy, a 
point might be reached that is near zero personal privacy.  
As the products of science were so successfully applied first in Western societies, 
philosophy lost its classical primary status to science, as the resource that guides 
humanity. That void was thus filled by science. 
“While we would no doubt not want to do without the useful results of 
science, these do not in and of themselves tell us how to shape our lives. In 
other words, the paradigm of science is a narrowly construed pragmatics, 
one not sufficient as a guide to action. In that sense, science does nothing to 
help us and the rise of science can be seen as tantamount to the loss of 
[human] value”. (Tito J. M. 1990 p.xxx) 
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Chapter 6 Subjectivity, meaning and autopoiesis 
 
Introduction 
The notion of subjectivity is, in the classical sense, valid as a contrast to or the 
opposite of objectivity, as if they are each other’s “perfect” polarities. In the 
autopoietic sense, comparing objectivity—as a valid contender to be compared with 
subjectivity—is logically odd and factually not possible.  A comparison of pebble 
stones versus locomotives could be done, as both are subordinate to a higher 
common category (objects). But a comparison of friendship with submarines would 
be peculiar. They do not share a higher common category. “Subjectivity” falls under 
the category of human experience. What is the category “objectivity” falls under? 
It is a category, which cannot be experienced. Logically, objectivity cannot be 
compared with subjectivity, given that subjectivity is all there is. Dian M. Hosking, 
from a philosophical point of view, reaches a similar conclusion: 
“..These involve practical acceptance of  
(a) actors as part of—rather than apart from—reality constructions  
(b) a world of multiple realities—as  ontologies,  
(c) realities that might best be treated as non-consistent and non-comparable (and 
not as multiple subjectivities)” (Hosking 2002, p. 3, italics added). 
For the sake of matching common human language and way of thinking, the thesis 
will use the classic distinctions between the categories “objective” and “subjective”, 
as-if falling under a common category. Still, when there is an apparent experience 
of objectivity this is in fact an experience of subjectivity under the threshold of 
awareness. 
The search for a (plausibly) universal moral foundation is not the search for a 
subjective opinion about it. Even were one to do a thousand interviews, when 90% 
of respondents agree on a certain view or hold a similar value, the conclusion would 
be that that 90% share a similar view or value. Multiplying subjectivity does not 
lead to objectivity. The aim of this thesis is not to collect a number of subjective 
opinions, as what is it then that will be collected? A viewpoint based on 
contemporary science would find it hard to conclude that data gathered by 
interviews alone could produce “objective content”. The aim to do just that means 
that one would be replacing the adjective “objective” with “impartial” or “neutral” 
or even “universal”. But this “impartiality” must be gathered out of “classic 
subjectivity”.  
Autopoiesis makes clear that a vital part of subjectivity involves meaning, 
whereby meaning is based on what is relevant for the organism.  The meaning of 
data is experienced and operational; it is not the data that is reduced from meaning. 
Meaning is bound to each individual and is thus subjective, and at the same time it 
is the most important property in awareness. Meaning fills experience in a life-like 
way. Meaningless experiences (meanings which fall under the threshold of 
awareness) feel (very) neutral, are easily forgotten and do not (really) motivate the 
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individual, unless it is to escape such experiences in order to replace them with more 
meaningful ones.  
Meaning is a core property of language too, but in a very different way (section 
6.11). Language becomes important for the thesis when contrasting autopoiesis with 
ideas of meaning. It is, however, outside the scope of the research to really delve 
into the question of linguistics or semiotics, deriving from the work of structuralists 
such as Saussure or Chomsky as they do not add directly or indirectly to the goal of 
the thesis 
The chapter explores the concept of subjectivity, which covers a very large 
domain as the “borders” of questions around it, or the definitions around it, appear 
to be vague or fuzzy. In developing a way for respondents to temporarily put aside 
their subjectivity, it must be separated, in some way, from the natural workings of 
the human mind.  One important way to deconstruct subjectivity is by applying the 
autopoiesis theory of Maturana and Varela (1980). 
 Subjective material objects can arbitrarily not exist. Subjectivity is a category of 
information, regarding the question of what happens in the mind of self and others, 
but also the experience of “cold” facts. “What is "subjectivity?” is the same as the 
question: “What is personal?” What is personal, but also shared (ideas and views) 
often remain subjective when facts are missing to support the shared views. 
Subjectivity and meaning will more deeply be addressed in chapter 7, looking at 
questions about internal life, in particular in relation to the concept of “ego”. 
 
6.1 Subjectivity and verifiability 
Facts that are not verifiable for a community do exist, so they stay subjective. 
Examples of this are facts about the self (e.g. feelings of pain or emotions, feelings 
of love), but also empirical facts (witnessing a crime which is then not believed). 
Subjectivity is not only based on metaphysical beliefs or errors, but on all that is not 
verifiable or not believed by a (sub)-community (intersubjectivity). Following this 
straightforward thinking, where can the strict demarcation between objectivity and 
subjectivity come from, other than from verifiability? Perceivable phenomena that 
happen in the world are verifiable, but then there are non-perceivable individual 
phenomena which are not verifiable for a community. If “objectivity” were to be re-
defined in a way that would be relevant to science, separating it as a category out of 
“subjectivity”, it would only need the criteria verifiability versus non-verifiability 
and nothing else. In other words, respecting the autopoietic conclusion that classic 
objectivity cannot be experienced, then the “new’ objectivity encompasses 
everything that is verifiable. It is for the community to decide if indirect-verifiability 
is valid enough to name the conclusions objective.  
 For instance, the strict protocol that guides physicians when “interviewing” 
patients to analyze symptoms such as pain is an example of the fact that indirect 
verifiability is accepted as objective (enough) to be a basis for administering 
medication. The opinion of one doctor—the physician as researcher in a “single 
case study”—becomes ideally the opinion of all doctors. Universality is also the 
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ideal of medical research methodologies with their strict protocols. The “dissolving” 
of the bond between empirical facts and “objectivity” can also be found in: 
“The words ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ are philosophical terms heavily 
burdened with a heritage of contradictory usages and of inconclusive and 
interminable discussions. My use of the terms ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ 
is not unlike Kant’s. He uses the word ‘objective’ to indicate that scientific 
knowledge should be justifiable, independently of anybody’s whim: a 
justification is ‘objective’ if in principle it can be tested and understood by 
anybody. ‘If something is valid’, he writes, ‘for anybody in possession of 
his reason, then its grounds are objective and sufficient’” (Popper 1959 p. 
22).  
 
6.2 No senses for subjectivity, no natural balance 
Although the world is infinitely vast and complex, to acquire knowledge about it 
can be seen as relatively simple compared to acquiring knowledge about 
subjectivity. Biology makes it possible for creatures (including humans) to explore 
in a way the outside world by offering relevant tools. Refusal to use these tools, e.g. 
by putting aside the five senses, will quickly end the creature’s life.  
 Senses that facilitate probing, in the same easy and natural way the internal world 
are biologically not needed and so for economic reasons have not biologically been 
developed. For example, salamanders who live in dark caves, but as species have 
managed to survive, have lost the function of sight as their degenerated eyes became 
blind. That was for an economical reason. Why use-up energy which is “always” 
scarce in something useless? (Packard 1894) 
 Next to these “economical” considerations, it is likely that a fish or a bird that 
have inner senses to probe “within” just as easily as to probe “without” will get lost 
and fall asleep, becoming prey to nearby predators. Therefore, retrospection or self-
reflection may not be a tool for most (if not all) of the animal kingdom; but these 
qualities are tools for humans. The ability to probe inside, to self-reflect, may even 
be the fundamental difference between animals and humans. Consciousness, which 
is able “to fold upon itself”, is, according to some, what is meant to be created in 
God's Image (Genesis1:27). But even for human beings, self-reflection, however 
useful, is not such a common trait, given the many times it is referred to as 
something to aspire to in learning workshops, trainings, coaching meetings and of 
course in counseling.  
 Our mammal ancestors did not develop self-reflection strategies, but what was 
developed instead (the ability to perceive the environment) is well developed and 
structured in the CNS and the brain. Our five senses reign in awareness; they don't 
suggest. Senses lack however a natural biological “counter-structure in the mind” 
to keep them “in check”, consequently there is no balance in awareness, like there 
is balance (equilibrium) on a physiological level. The “sensory powers” to intent 
consciousness to the world is so intense, that what is detected “inside” becomes 
simply connected and “submissive” to the external world. Literally speaking, what 
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is not connected through the senses, “does not make sense”; (or in Latin): “Nihil est 
in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu”, “Nothing is in the intellect which was 
not first in sense” (Aquinas: q. 2 a. 3 arg. 19). Aquinas adopted the ideas of Aristotle 
on this and although most contemporary philosophers do not support that idea 
anymore, this idea is still present in the English expression “it does not make sense”. 
 
6.3 Contemporary methodological approaches towards subjectivity 
The subjective domain of others cannot be observed or measured by researchers in 
the same way that it is possible to review the empirical. Subjective data is hard or 
even, sometimes, impossible to be objectified; that is because it refers to the world 
of the subject, the world of subjective experience. To research subjectivity in a 
“rich” way is to try to understand the personal domain of individuals as “rich” as 
possible within the constraints of the research goal. These personal experiences 
(perception, thought, emotions, beliefs) cannot do without adjectives and express 
themselves in stories and narratives, grounded in language. This domain, in order 
to best be understood, requires qualitative enquiry (e.g. Denzin, Lincoln, 2000; 
Alvesson, Sköldberg, 2000; H. &I. Rubin 2005; Lincoln & Guba, 1985).  
 Similarly to other qualitative methods, narrative methodology relies on criteria 
other than validity, reliability, and generalizability (Connelly and Clandinin 1990, 
p. 2-14). The “truth” of qualitative findings cannot be guaranteed as qualitative 
enquiry does not objectify subjectivity. Even in cases where findings seem truthful 
enough for the reader or listener, it is impossible to know what each respondent’s 
truth was as-experienced. Thereby, qualitative enquiry thereby often needs 
interpretation for the unavoidably ambiguous parts (Strauss, Corbin. 1998, Ziebland 
& McPherson, 2006, Patton, 2002). In the end, interviews collect linguistic data, 
and are the best possible way to collect personal opinions (personal in the broadest 
sense of the word).   
 Over the last decade, within contemporary psychology, there is more interest in 
qualitative methods. We can now speak of the field of “qualitative psychology” 
(Smith, 2008 pp. 1-3). There are different viewpoints in terms of what qualitative 
research can do, can be. For instance, on one end of the spectrum, there is 
“Qualitative Data Analysis” by Miles and Huberman (1994) where researchers seek, 
as much as possible, to follow the epistemological position of “empiricism”, in order 
to strengthen the validity of the research outcomes. They use models, tables and 
matrixes applied over large amounts of texts, especially in larger scale qualitative 
research (Henwood and Pidgeon 1994 p. 229). 
 Qualitative methodology is true to the adjective “qualitative”. It does not try to 
reduce complex social reality to numbers that can be statistically processed. The 
idea behind qualitative methodology in the social domain is to guard the reliability 
and quality of the richness of the respondents’ human experience in order to truly 
understand it. Already a century ago, understood that in order to help clients (then 
patients), the unique meaning that each “client” brings with their material needs to 
be well enough understood, in the way that this individual person understands it 
  
89 | P a g e  
 
(already a deviation from observer’s logic), to have a chance for a successful 
intervention (Freud, S., & Rothgeb, C. L. (1953).  
 However, in qualitative inquiry, a true understanding of the respondents’ 
material is at risk of distortion by the values and norms / meanings that the 
researcher (unwillingly) espouses, as what is literally heard or seen is by definition 
indirect and can only be represented by partial indicators such as signs and symbols. 
This makes qualitative research dangerous, in a way, compared to the positivist / 
conventional construct of “good science”.  
 Qualitative methods usually explore language (interviews, texts) to derive 
meaning from them. Even so, the ideal of qualitative science is to be able to have as 
much “objectivity” as possible when it comes to the researchers. Still there are 
qualitative researchers who in their role of “interactive evaluators” don’t strive 
anymore for objectivity but for interactive dialogue and participation among 
stakeholders (Abma and Widershoven 2011). 
  
6.4 To be a neutral “researcher of subjectivity” 
Interpreting other’s texts or conducting interviews is based on the idea that it is 
possible for the interpreter to control or contain his identity (subjectivity) in order 
to “copy” or reconstruct, as faithfully as possible, the other’s intention. This can 
possibly be done by becoming a kind of “disinterested observer” or “uninvolved 
observer”, as a preemptive attitude of the researcher (Schultz, 1962 referred to by 
Schwandt T. A., 2000 p. 193-195). 
 Can this be done correctly? Every meaning that is “found”, “copied” or 
“reconstructed” by the researcher is generated under real-life internal limitations 
within and is linked to a construct of the researcher’s ego. Echoes of this can be 
found: 
“...in the act of interpreting (“taking something as something”), socio-
historically inherited bias or prejudice is not regarded as a characteristic or 
attribute that an interpreter must strive to get rid of or manage in order to 
come to “clear” understanding” (Schwandt T. A. 2000 p. 194). 
According to this point of view, the uninterested, distanced or uninvolved observer 
is a theoretical illusion: “tradition is a living force that enters into all understanding” 
(Gallagher (1992 p. 87, quoted by Schwandt 2000 p. 194). 
 Gallagher suggests that stepping outside your own history is really like stepping 
outside your own skin, so how can this ever be done? Schwandt concludes that 
understanding requires the engagement of one’s biases and not their rejection. But 
how does this not become an open invitation to completely leave behind the 
objective self-image that most practitioners of the social and behavioral sciences 
strive for? Schwandt clarifies that the solution lies in only putting aside some of 
one’s biases: 
“...to examine our historically inherited and unreflectively held prejudices 
and alter those that disable our efforts to understand others and ourselves” 
(Garrison, 1996 p. 434, quoted by Schwandt 2000 p. 195). 
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There are two approaches in terms of conducting interviews as impartially as 
possible. The standard approach is to try to nullify one’s own “ego” (history) as 
researcher in order to be as objective as possible, which according to those who 
postulate the second approach that will now be described, is not possible. The 
second approach states that, in order to make sense of data you will take your history 
into account: this includes a previous knowledge of self, of others and the world. 
This approach is to maintain one’s own history, but nullify those aspects that stand, 
in the way of understanding the respondents in an impartial way.  
 In my opinion, the first approach may be easier than the second, which still needs 
a detached neutral observer. This neutral observer needs to be not only neutral to 
the respondent, but also to oneself. To distinguish between what needs to be 
“altered” ( to be “nullified”) and what not requires an honest and neutral person who 
can make this distinction; who will ponder what needs altering while interviewing 
(!). Since the knowledge of being this honest internal observer is already presumed, 
why not apply it directly to the respondents(s), by following standard interpretative 
directions?  
 
6.4.1 Looking for the meaningless in qualitative research  
The organization of the living makes it clear that every living organism, including 
humans, is an autopoietic organizational closed system, self-referential and 
fundamentally cyclic. How does this translate to the subjectivity of the human 
mind? 
 Looking for the meaningless helas plays no conscious role in science. This will 
force the researchers unintentionally to seek for meaning in the process of both data 
collection and data analysis. This will maintain and even reinforce the influence of 
the subjectivity of the researcher.  
To minimize this, qualitative interpretative methodology has developed an array of 
“safety” procedures, such as member checks of interviews, peer reviews 
(intersubjectivity), neutral observations, thick descriptions, and awareness of self-
prejudices (e.g. Denzin & Lincoln, 2000; Bryman & Bell, 2007, Alvesson & 
Sköldberg, 2000). These authors all suggest ways that might help the researcher to 
“contain”, as much as possible, his / her personal views in order to approximate the 
“ideal” of the transparent, objective, researcher deriving from conventional science, 
but with the addition of empathy.  
 However, it would possibly be easier for the researcher to minimize the 
interference from his / her unique personality if these qualitative methods also were 
to mention their “hidden” but true goal, which is to keep the gathered data totally 
meaningless in order to give it maximum validity. The intrusion of meaning will be 
much easier for the researcher to detect in experience (by the intrusion of a slight 
emotion) and thus to disregard its influence than it will be to accept the meaningful 
and to try, from within this domain, to distinguish between (blurred) meaning of 
self and of other and to keep them apart. But how to do it as easily as possible? 
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6.4.2 How to “reach” meaninglessness as-if Love: rapprochement method  
To fully “reach” meaninglessness (impartiality) as a researcher cannot be done; but 
strangely, it can be theoretically approached with unconditional love. The 
expression “Les extrêmes se touchent” can be applied here. Meaninglessness and 
unconditional love are very near to each other. Unconditional love, as an attitude, 
never says “...yes, but under the condition of...” It is a peculiar form of pure 
impartiality towards the other. Yet, unconditional love is not a topic for the thesis 
or a topic that can really be explored in science. But meaninglessness is relevant 
and can be explored. The rapprochement method, which will be explained below, 
is sufficient to gather data without personal contamination for the interviewer and 
is easier and provides a more practical attitude towards respondents. 
 Interference also will inevitably occur during the analysis of interviews / 
conversations done by others, for example when in the interview something is said 
by the interviewee that the interviewer, on some level , agrees with or disagrees with 
on some level (important enough to create emotional interference) in terms of his / 
her own values. For instance, in interviewing a “dissident voice”, the interviewer 
can agree with (and thus match) or disagree with (and thus mismatch) the opinions 
expressed. In both cases, distortion may still arise in further questioning. When 
agreeing, the researcher may leave out further exploratory questions that would 
facilitate the deeper structures of meaning to really build up, as the experience of 
the interviewer is “I already understand”. A “linguistic match” may actually be 
superficial, with the researcher not really understanding, so validation by further 
questioning could still be needed.  
 In cases where there is a mismatch of values or opinions, judgments may 
unconsciously contaminate unwillingly the interviewing process and lead to efforts 
of persuasion or manipulation of the “data stream”. Later, after the interview has 
been conducted, the researcher may, in good faith, reinterpret what is in fact 
“ambivalent” into something which more closely resembles the researcher’s 
understanding or chosen meaning.  
 On the other hand, when the interviewer’s attitude is based on respect for and 
gratitude towards the respondent, regardless of the level of seeming agreement or 
disagreement, he / she has acknowledged the following as-if it’s true, for the 
duration of the interview and prior to the interview:  
What I will hear from the interviewees is true and important to them, they 
identify themselves with their stories, making their stories part of their lived 
identity. It does not matter at all how right or wrong they are, how I may 
agree or disagree; for him or her it is the truth that they experience and that 
they are sharing with me. That by itself deserves my respect and my 
gratitude. 
The addition “it does not matter at all how right or wrong they are” means that it 
does not matter how right or wrong they are according to me, the interviewer. 
Without the distinctions true or false, right or wrong, the personal meaning (values 
of the researcher) cannot be “projected” to the triggers anymore as their 
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meaninglessness is now acknowledged and accepted. This will stop possible 
interference as “I-as-me” cannot connect to the meaningless and will find something 
else instead to connect to. This something else instead is the person behind the story 
and not the story itself. By making other peoples’ stories meaningless, as described 
above, the listener connects with the person in an unconditional way. This 
“unconditional” way will let the meaning in their stories remain undisturbed. 
Making stories meaningless does not equal making the story-teller meaningless. It 
is the best impartial way to handle the acquired data. Alienation does not occur, as 
in doing so, humanity is immediately restored for the person by giving the 
respondents respect, freedom and in some cases even gratitude. 
Is it hard to respect people behind their stories, their values, whatever points of 
view they may have? Will it be hard to become a scientist? For some yes, for some 
maybe. The alternative is to open the floodgates of subjectivity, inviting 
participating scientists to “go native” or, worse, to turn into artists, extending 
themselves in the realities they research and co-create. 
 It is the rational faculty of the researcher that has to take the lead towards further 
understanding in the domain of meaningless data. For instance, when the question 
would be how things—social or mechanical—fit together, this refers finding the 
“causal” relationships between the elements or phenomena in question, relative to 
the researcher’s goal, while the meaning of those phenomena’s content does not 
play a role.  
The nature of the research question determines how “deep” the researcher needs 
to ask in the interview and how to handle possible incongruities in the interviewee’s 
stories. If the researcher challenges, in a respectful way, the suggested or apparent  
incongruities in the story and the respondent still acknowledges them but not as 
incongruities, this shows non-interference on the part of the researcher, when he 
accepts them. It is the therapist’s task to challenge incongruities, in order to help the 
client help himself, not the researcher’s. Challenging at all times is an 
“intervention”, and will further undermine the (theoretically) objective status of the 
scientific researcher. While an engineer may safely identify him or herself as a 
creator of realities, it is in my opinion questionable when scientists choose to do so. 
In a different context, organizational consultants who are hired to solve a problem 
in an organization may already intervene during the data gathering stage. Naturally, 
a thing or two depends on the research question too. Nevertheless:  
“…there seems to be an emerging consensus that all inquiry reflects the 
standpoint of the inquirer, that all observation is theory laden and that there 
is no possibility of theory-free knowledge. We can no longer think of 
ourselves as neutral spectators of the social world” (Denzin N. K., Lincoln 
Y. S. 2000 p. 872). 
Of course this is true, but it is only true within the realms of meaning. 
 What I propose is that in the inquiry of qualitative data, particularly during 
observations and interviews, we can adopt a pre-interview attitude whereas it does 
not matter if the opinions of the interviewees are true or false, right or wrong, in the 
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same way that it does not matter for the microphone towards where it is directed. 
That makes the microphone neutral and objective. For obvious reasons this 
“detachment” of true and false must coincide with respect and empathy, which it is 
fully in accord with. Such an attitude of the interviewer will transcend the interview, 
beyond the serious remarks of Denzin and Lincoln. 
 
6.5 Meaning  
Autopoietically, meaning is not present in the relational chemical processes of 
neurons, even when meaning and relevance play a fundamental role in the higher 
levels of human cognitive processes. Autopoietic processes from within do not work 
with meaning. To act out what is meaningful (from the perspective of the observer), 
does not need understanding or even awareness. Biologically programmed 
organisms are perfectly meaningful as opposed to internal chaos. The internal 
relations between components have internal relevance and coherence. Without the 
capability of self-consciousness and reflection, meaning is the nature of an internal 
instruction linking perception of triggers through internal dynamics with (potential) 
behavior in the context of those triggers. The whole process will internally generate 
an experience which may or may not generate behavior and emotions.  
“No consideration of meaning enters into such a notion … and [is] not in the 
mechanisms of the genesis of conduct. Association in terms of 
representations related by meaning lies in the cognitive domain of the 
observer exclusively.” (Maturana et al. 1980 p. 43)  
While genes are the carriers of the autopoietic organization (identity) of the 
(primitive) organism, meaning is not part of it; but important is, the sum of all 
relational instructions in physiology produces the nature, the identity of that 
organism, anchored in its internal equilibrium determining the direction of all 
internal processes: 
“In fact, any local change that would lead to the synthesis of a modified  
conduct by the organism, must be immediately accompanied by other 
changes arising through the adjustments that this must undergo in the 
process of maintaining constant its internal relations under its changed 
behavior” (Maturana et al. 1980 p. 44, italics added). 
And: 
“The nervous system in turn has evolved as a system structurally and 
functionally subservient to the basic circularity of the living organization, 
and hence, embodies an inescapable logic: that logic which allows for a 
match between the organization of the living system and the interactions 
into which it can enter without losing its identity” (Maturana et al. 1980 p. 
39, italics added). 
Before humans, life was still existent for a very long time; but meaning (as part of 
understanding, describing a functional explanation) was not part of life. That makes 
meaning a meta-concept of rather intelligent observers with language. In that 
fashion, in many cases it can perfectly explain things like—for instance—the 
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analysis of the toy-car. All possible answers regarding the question of how the toy-
car works are meaningful, but from the point of view of the observer. As the toy-
car has no logic or understanding, a mismatch is hard to make as there can be no 
further comparison of logics. When the observer observes himself (self-reflection, 
Maturana et al. 1980 p. 25-29) he can describe meaning of / for himself and although 
it is still language, it may perfectly describes the experience under attention.  
 As an experience meaning is felt. It would be outside the scope of the thesis to 
explain more in depth that an observer of self can still make an error in the way 
meaning is found; as all meaning found is his present meaning as observer / analyzer 
and may not necessarily be the meaning of his former self in the act of its former 
doing.  
“Neither information nor truth should be confused with meaning. Meaning 
is the understanding that is generated within us, whatever the originator of 
the symbol [in language] intends…Information is neutral, meaning is 
affective, that is, involves emotion” (Jackson N., Carter P. 2000 p. 21, italics 
and underlining  added). 
Although the concept of meaning is widely and rightly used in the social sciences 
as properties of interactive intersubjective concepts and history, these do not deny 
the individual construction of meaning in the end. As part of internal dynamics, 
meaning cannot leave or enter its source.  
 
6.6 Properties of meaning and meaning in language 
Meanings are mirrored by triggers shifted in time. One fundamental principle of the 
Living is prediction, a consequence of Life's internal circularity (Fig. 1). Only 
instincts existed in the distant past for all organisms, for countless generations. 
Sense-making processes needed for constructing beliefs replace gradually instincts 
for many species, but like instincts follow principle of “fixing” the past. Still sense-
making processes do away with the ancient fixed knowledge of instincts by 
replacing it with (dynamic) knowledge acquired between a single lifetime and a 
“split second”.  
 Human behavior is not based on what is actually present in the here and now; it 
is only on a triggering level that this is so. Present triggers, when perceived, cannot 
trigger the present on the level of meaning, but do trigger the experience of the 
“present”. Any trigger we know presents itself immediately as some form of 
meaning. Any meaning of the external that is experienced gives away the “status” 
of the creator of meaning as he once was, but always as a present condition. 
Meaning “freezes” the system in time and is therefore practically always expressing 
the past. The experiencing of meanings is different and  does not suggest the past 
but a present condition.  
 An example may verify this. Our personal identity (more covered in depth in 
section 5.16, chapter 8) sees and knows the world (including making sense) not in 
its trillions of sub-components making up the whole gestalt of what is perceived. 
The brain must reduce the world into categories as earlier mentioned. This process 
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however becomes a major factor in the forming of our self-image. Everything we 
perceive is, when known, a member of a known category. All categories are cyclical 
in nature, which by itself gives away that categories are past oriented. Essential 
properties, which define the identity of categories—be it functional properties, 
relational or structural properties—are fixed and should not change in order to stay 
in the category. What once was should reoccur. It is this very past orientation which 
gives identity reliability and predictability. I would not, for example, be able to 
recognize even my wife as I think she is, were I to meet a new or different essential 
property of her, which I never would have thought possible. She may stop being my 
wife or I would need to drastically enrich my understanding of her identity. 
 
6.6.1 The tiger, Circular Logic against Observer’s logic 
Autopoietic circular logic or reflexive logic is the opposite of “observer's logic”. 
Circular logic, tilted above the logic of the “body” is the logic of meaning 
experienced from a first person perspective, that is to say, within organizational 
closure.  
 At the zoo, in front of a tiger cage, father and son watch the tiger within. Where 
is the tiger the father experiences, in time? It looks like an idiotic question, the 
answer of which would be: “...where else then is the tiger: in the present?” But how 
can this be as the senses do not dictate or determine behavior or the experience of 
sight? Only meaning does. But where does meaning come from, other than from the 
past, when meaning was formed, then “stored in memory”* to be integrated by 
projection in the perceptions of the present?  
*Memory, as “stored” information, is part of a neural network just as any other 
part of the network. All parts have a function in the same present. For an observer 
the meaning of the “memory” part is to “remember” the past, but this is not the case 
for the neural network. If a page describes the future and the next page describes 
the past, for the book all pages are equally part of the same present, supporting the 
existence of the pages forming the identity of the book. Also, all sentences and 
letters and the paper carrying them are all properties of the present. Only the reader 
projects his meaning of time in a very inconsistent way. Looking from the book to 
the bookcase upstairs, he does not experience his 5-year old IKEA book case as the 
past but as a property of the present, but he may well consider his 500-year old 
bookcase in the living room, bought at Sotheby's, as a beautiful property of hundreds 
of years ago. Certainly looking at a picture in which he is 20 years younger, when 
the picture was literally made, he will see it as the past. Even cleverly defining the 
past as language or symbol descriptions [pictures] referring to the past is odd, 
because the past is only the language referring to itself; beyond those signifiers there 
is nothing to refer to: the signified does not exist and never did.  
To put memories in a “time-line” will reinforce the acceptance of the past as 
something real. But how can symbols refer to themselves, in order to create 
something beyond them, unless the past factually does not exist and never did? But 
the human mind can construct time just like “objectivity” as a valuable and precious 
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but hidden tool. Within autopoiesis, the descriptions in niche to detect triggers are 
always past based, but only for observers. The descriptions in memory 
(programmed protein structures) are real and present and always stay in the present. 
The function of descriptions has nothing to do with the past, but refers to handling 
the present with interactive behavior showing the present identity of the actor.  
In every finished description there is an “integrated” possible instruction on how 
to handle the topic of the description. In other words every description (categorical) 
is linked to potential interactive behavior. That is the autopoietic reason for 
descriptions or in the logic of the observer, for memory. A series of collected 
memories, which even humans make secondary to their function as primary, are the 
many lessons that lead to a developed capability. For instance lessons on how to 
drive that end up with a driver’s license. The present capability of driving is not 
recognized as the cumulative collections of past memories, but is recognized as a 
present property.  For the CNS and the brain, all memories have that same function: 
to provide in i-niche descriptions and to link them with classes of interactions to 
support and maintain identity in the existing present context.  
Back at the zoo, father and tiger are in the same time as objects only. The present 
tiger as an “objective” trigger, triggers different tigers for different visitors in the 
zoo. Every tiger seen reflects the i-niche, a core part of the personality of a single 
visitor. In telling his young son that “tigers are dangerous animals”, the father does 
not explain anything about the tiger, but reveals himself: “I don't know how to 
guarantee our safety when I meet a tiger”. The tiger may respond indignantly with: 
“How can I be based on what you cannot guarantee?” This is true for all meaning. 
“I have met nice people” versus “I have met bad people”, a description on the basis 
of observer’s logic, becomes in circular logic: “I have met people, who I think I am 
able to get along with” versus “... people who I don't know how to handle in a 
harmonious way.  
Circular logic circles back to the observer; it is like a boomerang that returns 
back home, but empowering the sender. Circular logic makes it clear that the ancient 
purpose of meaning (survival) solely serves the autopoiesis of the perceiver. 
Autopoietically everything is in the eye of the beholder, including beauty. Circular 
logic, although more truthful to the inner realities of being, cannot replace however 
observer’s logic in explaining most events. Even describing or explaining Circular 
logic, needs the infusion of observer’s logic. Both are needed to comprehend human 
realities. 
 
6.7 The peculiarities of meaning 
Build into meaning are two peculiarities. The first peculiarity is the projection which 
has to do with the aforementioned example, dealing with the question of whether 
the danger is about the tiger. The second, more hidden, peculiarity refers to the 
acceptance of the past being a reliable representative of the present. Both 
peculiarities disappear in experience in autopoiesis. Meanings protect the past by 
freezing the old internal status of so many times ago, when the meaning was formed, 
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but serving the basic circularity of the Living. Protecting the past is the ancient 
equivalent of protecting present identity because physiology knows of no past as it 
can only operate in the present. 
All visitors to the zoo, at that time in front of the tigers’ area, do not see, but are 
triggered by the same tiger-as-trigger in the same time moment. Inevitably, all, at 
the same time, observe their own version of the tiger according to their own 
individual meaning; plus his cage, the buildings, the weather, the other visitors and 
all the rest, based on how they all make sense in the visitors personal history.  
The consequence is that most if not all meanings block the “present” or obscure 
the present out of awareness. This has a serious and strange aftereffect. People tend 
to assume that what makes sense to them is shared; that the world they experience 
is a common world, while in fact only the triggers as they-are-in-themselves are 
shared and inaccessible at the same time. We know from Kant that they are 
inaccessible. So intersubjectively, a common world is established which all at the 
same time resemble the unique individual one experienced  
From the meta-level of autopoiesis, when people share triggers in the present, 
but experience a variation of their unique past as properties of the perceived triggers, 
they automatically, naturally and unconsciously will assume that their 
meaningfulness or lack of it as perceived in the event, is objective and shared as 
well as long as the others are silent about it. By assuming this, on a deeper level, the 
taken for granted “normality” of their individual history and personality is 
generalized over the experience of others. Not the particular events they have lived 
through, but the meaningful conclusions leading to their generalizations and 
categories. As in the end, after transderivational search, all meaning is fully private 
and fully settled in subjectivity (Muran and DiGiuseppe 1990 p. 75) and thus the 
experienced world is truly personal ànd experienced as shared.  
Any difference in “world-experience” that forces itself to be known as a 
disagreement in the appreciation of a shared event cannot yet determine what 
follows. For all involved, the disagreement that occurs will be a next meaningless 
trigger giving freedom to all present, to express once again their own version of 
what it means. Generally however, big differences in the appreciation of events can 
potentially become a source of conflict. 
A special note must be added to the perceived newness of meaning, contradicting 
that meaning is old. Meaning, as previously explained, is literally the reflection of 
inner niche based on inner predictions of environmental triggers. But next (i-)niche 
is more complex: it is the total sum of all possible descriptions and  interactions. All 
possible interactions are an answer to all possible events in the world that fall within 
the individual's capacity to make sense of. Suppose a system's i-niche has a mere 
ten basic meaning / trigger predictions. That gives much more than 10, that is 10! 
(10*9*8*7...) ≥3.6 million possible combinations if all 10 are involved. Every 
combination as a “single” gestalt of those ten triggers looks like a new, but complex 
trigger, when first met, but the new cannot deny one of those basic ten. If a gestalt 
of 9! next or apart from the 10! is experienced in the structural coupling 9! >360k 
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possible combinations are possible. It is safe to say that the human range of old 
previous meaning is varied enough to handle 99,999+ % of all possible future 
events. Also, in practice, combinations fall outside awareness (overflow of 
information) and as there are always hierarchies of meanings, more complex 
combinations which contradict an already established, but higher meaning will 
mostly be denied or not seen (psychological factors). Thereby (cognitive economy) 
makes us perceive under the “control” of categories, which reduces the infinite to 
what can be perceived. 
 
6.8 The vulnerability and strength of meaning 
The precious differences in human personalities are for the greatest part, if not all, 
created by meaning and meaning is vulnerable as meaning can be changed. Talents 
do not determine as in a way they are internal triggers evoking meaning to their 
owners. The vulnerability of meaning and its consequential defenses has proven 
itself myriads of times through history, in all conflicts, war and in periods 
characterized by resistance to change.  
 Vulnerability and its protection are both existential. Meaning has a paradoxical 
purpose. It must, once formed, be rock-solid to give strength to identity and to keep 
at bay, as much as possible, the ensuing chaos and insecurity in experiencing the 
world. Protection is also the maintenance of the person’s identity. There are scarcely 
any people who wake up every morning with the idea: “What can I do or think today 
to prove that I am wrong?” Such an attitude would eventually lead to a form of 
“psychological suicide”. So we do the reverse in order to maintain our identity. 
 On the other hand, meanings unwillingly based on important, but incomplete 
information—wrong information or “sloppy” logic—are faulty. Faulty meanings 
determine faulty sight and all its consequences and are at the very least, not helpful 
in personal growth and development. At worst they can lead to death of the self 
and/or of others.  
 So, meanings do need their ability to transform, and preferably fast in the case 
of important mistakes. In parallel to being as solid as a mountain, meaning should 
be as weak as butterflies. Genetic information does not need protection as it cannot 
be changed by cognitive sense-making processes. Although meaning is experienced 
as true (enough), the mind does have freedom over i-niche, against meaning and 
instinct to “block” the automatic coupling between description and behavior. It 
needs discipline and self-control to do so.  
 
6.9 The freedom of meaning, constraints and freedom of choice  
Triggers cannot determine meaning, but they do bring freedom and lack of 
interference to their receivers to construct meaning in compliance with the receivers 
structural and mental properties. Freedom does not refer to realizing desires or 
longings. Happiness is certainly linked to realized wishes, but the experience of 
desires / wishes is not linked to freedom. Where “will” [I “will” this] is involved, 
there is no freedom of choice. There is freedom to choose what to do with the will.  
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 Freedom is determined by important properties of the system. Some people may 
object to the word freedom. What is one’s freedom of choice under gunpoint, after 
all? The shift that these objecting views have not yet made is to recognize that 
freedom of choice cannot go beyond the constraining properties of “I / me” as a 
system: that is, physical properties and mental properties.  
 A system’s freedom of choice is contained not by external triggers, but by the 
constricting properties of it-self. Sometimes the constraints are severe, especially 
the structural ones (in the case of violence or potential violence), in the domain of 
structural coupling. They show natural or unnatural (structural) properties of the 
system’s weakness. It is true; they will all die when the waves throw the fishes too 
far on land. All possible interactions in fish's niche to maintain its autopoiesis cannot 
handle being thrown onto land.  
 The structural limits of a system are also the limits of all its possible interactions 
with the world, but limits naturally bring about the existing limits of identity, the 
nature of the system. It is unrealistic to define freedom beyond structural constraints. 
But the system's constraints are not by definition structural, especially not for 
humans. Free-floating mental constraints, which do not have a physical (CNS) 
origin, but are based on constrained meanings, do add to a further limitation of 
overall identity. It is also unfair to define personal freedom beyond constrained 
meanings. But if properties of the system develop or change over time and become 
stronger, old constraints or “threats” (not their triggers) change with them and/or 
disappear, for individuals and for nations as well (Tunisia revolution 2011).  
To accept the power of “triggers” in the psychological domain is the 
consequence of observer’s logic, but cannot exist within autopoietic logic. What 
triggers cannot do, meanings do. Meanings are very deterministic and normative for 
the one who created them. The freedom that triggers bring to humans in expressing 
faithfulness to their freedom of choice disappears the moment meaning is formed. 
Once formed, triggers and meaning become one. The deterministic powers of 
meaning now become the deterministic powers of triggers. After the constitution of 
meaning, the world will be reversed. Now, suddenly, triggers determine “sight” and 
above all perfectly suggest in experience that they are capable of transferring their 
meaning to their beholders.  
In the introduction of this chapter it is already said: “As objectivity in experience 
is in fact subjectivity, but under the threshold of awareness... “, both subjectivity 
and objectivity are equally perfectly suggested in the reversed experiencing of the 
world.  
 
6.10 Bakhtin’s god concept 
The next part is partly based on an earlier article (Goosseff 2011).  
 In conversations with other people, we do not experience that we are only in a 
dialogue with our own meaning; we also truly experience being in dialogue with 
others’ meaning, as if meaning is transferable. What we actually do when we 
  
100 | P a g e  
 
experience “external meaning” in conversations, is experiencing them in the form 
of Bakhtin’s “superaddressee”.  
“If there is something like a god concept in Bakhtin, it is surely the 
superaddressee, for without faith that we will be understood somehow, 
sometimes, by somebody, we would not speak at all. Or if we did, it would 
be babbling. And babble, as Dostoevsky shows in his short story “Bobok”, 
is the language of the dead” (introduction, Holquist, M.; Bakhtin, 1986 p. 
xviii).  
And: 
“But in addition to this addressee (the second party), the author of the 
utterance, with a greater or lesser awareness, presupposes a higher 
superaddressee (third), whose absolutely just responsive understanding is 
presumed” (Bakhtin 1986 p. 26). 
It is not the real person in front of us who listens, in our experience, but the “higher 
superaddressee”, an internally-generated addressee within the speaker, projected 
outside over the “second party”, which defines the external second party.  
 Maturana’s view of communication states this similarly, but also in a somewhat 
different way:  
“If it appears acceptable to talk about transmission of information in 
ordinary parlance, this is so because the speaker tacitly presumes the listener 
to be identical with him and hence as having the same cognitive domain 
(which is never the case)” (Maturana et al. 1980 p. 32-33). 
A good example of this is when in Paris a person (as the actor) asks for directions 
in his best French; the other person excuses himself in English, saying he doesn’t 
speak French. Briefly, one encounters a major mismatch here between 
superaddressee and real addressee, between internal and external cognitive 
domains. Still, it is the superaddressee who starts, continues and ends in terms of 
the actor’s participation in any conversation. It is certain that in the field of 
psychotherapy many examples could be found of cases where an observer of a 
conversation interprets the all too clear signs of the other party, indicating that he / 
she wants to end the conversation, while the person keeps talking, seeming to 
completely miss those signs. Learning more about the other is a kind of 
“readjustment” of the internal superaddressee. 
 
6.11 Language and organizational closure  
“Thus, however complex the motor and sensory coordinations of speech 
may be, the peculiarity of linguistic behavior does not lie in the complexity 
or nature of the series of effector and receptor states that constitute it, but in 
the relevance that such behavior acquires for the maintenance of the basic 
circularity of the interacting organisms through the development of the 
consensual domain of orienting interactions [language]. Speaking, walking, 
or music-making do not differ in the nature of the coordinated neuronal 
processes which specify them but in the sub-domains of interactions in 
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which they acquire their relevance” (Maturana et al. p. 34, underlining 
added). 
Having in mind that language is behavior and that the CNS does not consider 
language different from walking, plus having in mind that all behavior is determined 
by organizational closure that serves the individual’s identity, what can be said 
about language? An object, like a tree or a rock, as a perceivable structure, is not a 
sign; it refers “an sich” only to itself. In the non-autopoietic realm, the tree is truly 
“objective”, with an autonomous independent identity. One, if not the most 
important aspect of autonomous “identities”, is their absence of having a “force” to 
determine meaning beyond themselves.  
 Text and spoken language play exactly the opposite role. Primary school 
knowledge dictates that signs by definition refer to meaning beyond themselves. 
The referred meaning is not free. That makes the signs by the same rules, but outside 
autopoiesis theory meaningless “an sich”. As perceivable objects in the external 
world, language becomes dependent of their observers like trees do not. Trees and 
signs (texts) “are equally given” in sensibility, but trees are trees and signs are only 
“spots” or blobs of ink on paper or screen.  
 That is not however how they appear to present themselves. Both trees and texts 
appear to be, in sensibility, equally objective and independent. Still, 'spots' on this 
paper or screen are by definition carefully designed as information to be 100% 
incomplete by themselves; in fact, they are maximally incomplete information. The 
missing part of symbols’ existence is delegated out of its structure to the mind of 
the observer, where it should exist as “shared” meaning. But any link to this 
delegated meaning is also missing. The missing link to meaning must be learned in 
parallel to the meaning itself, as both do not exist structurally on any level of the 
sign, be it visually or auditory.  
 J. Essers (Erasmus university) commented (in a personal conversation): “About 
the necessary incompleteness of language as a system of meaning, we agree: any 
symbolic order is based on self-legitimization, therein precisely lies its subjectivity; 
but that does not force the claim that meaning is private for an individual. We would 
not be able to invent it”. He pointed to thinkers like Wittgenstein and Zizek, who 
conclude that language is radical, intersubjective, completely beyond the control of 
any individual and therefore not private. “As a result”, Essers concludes, “we speak 
the language we can never really know, it is literally beyond us”.  
This view, which is shared by the public, as well as by mainstream science, 
articulates the rationalizations of observers not about environmental structures, but 
of environmental reifications. Leaving the observer's logic aside, what is within the 
individual's control is the only operational unit of language. The individual 
operation within i-niche of creating meaning to support personal identity includes 
the operational unit of language. That is the main message of the above quote of 
Maturana.  
Also, language like any other internal “operation” is controlled by and 
submissive to the autopoiesis of that particular individual. Or, in other words, the 
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use of language (behavior) and all that it means cannot escape the organizational 
closure of the speaker. This is because objectivity is a linguistic construct that makes 
it able to be shared by the deletion of adjectives (section 5.17.2), which makes 
objectivity a property of language. Language itself, as a construct, is autopoietically 
shared the same way as objectivity is shared. Also, the meaning of words and 
sentences is assumed to be free of personal adjectives—because of their neutrality 
they can be shared—but only because the always exiting adjectives are not 
mentioned. The word “coffee” refers to the drink coffee. But everyone reading or 
hearing the word “coffee” will immediately experience his or her personal version 
of the meaning of “coffee”, which will determine the missing adjective. This fact is 
so deeply accepted in any culture and it is the reason why many ask their visitors: 
“Do you want coffee or tea?” If the answer is “coffee”, it is not the “coffee” in the 
question which determined the answer, but the unpronounced adjective belonging 
to it, which belongs to the visitor only. In a sense even coffee has its 
“superaddressee”. The answer is already embedded in the visitor's adjective added 
to the word “coffee”, before the question was raised. 
That makes both objectivity and the neutrality of language fall outside human 
experience, but inside knowledge as a constructed (linguistic) assumption. Happily, 
the demand of objectivity and language to delete personal adjectives is very easy to 
accomplish. Experience-wise, the rule for objectivity or language is a superficial 
paper thin rule; because of organizational closure, the rule can never be obeyed. In 
scientific texts it is easy to delete adjectives; they were not deleted in the original 
experience of the scientists and also not in his memory. Still the existence of 
objectivity and of language’s neutrality, as-if true, makes them the best virtual tools 
we have when communicating. Yet, not unlike the millions of misunderstandings 
which daily happen in the world, (and the many more unnoticed ones), language is 
sufficient to keep the world going, but it cannot do more than that. 
 
6.12 The inability to see freely  
It has been argued that the observer’s environmental logic creates logical objective 
conclusions, omitting the projection of the observer's meaning. A good example of 
this has to do with texts. How can one objectively look at texts, unless he / she 
forgets his or her internal descriptions? Even the slightest infinitesimal link to 
meaning is fully missing from the primary and physical structures of language. 
There is a semi-logical but consistent overall structure of grammar, but grammar 
has no meaning of its own. As all meaning is missing, it should be relatively easy 
to see the signs for what they structurally are here on paper or on the screen: 
constructions of ink only. But the opposite is actually true. 
What are the black letters on the white page or the brief “sounds” of talking in 
the air? This page, which a reader can read, is structurally not a “meaningful text” 
“out-there”; however, it is experienced as one. When we experience a tree, there is 
a tree out there for everybody to experience. But text is not for everybody to 
experience.  
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                          B 
  Fig. 3 Both are not B 
 
To be able to freely see a text structure for what it means, is to see no principle 
difference between the two “objects” in figure 3. Both are not B when B is the 
meaning of the structure “B”. 
It is only when the reader can look at the B and not recognize the letter “B”, that is 
to say when the reader cannot experience what the B stands for, seeing it like the 
sign next to it only a bit different, then the observer has learned to withdraw his 
projection out of the visible structure of “B”. Then the “object” shows itself as a 
kind of form as it would be seen, for example, by a Chinese child in a faraway rural 
village not influenced by non-Chinese culture. The meaning of letters and words (in 
context) has become such a foundational part of internal niche  
 But if projections of meaning could land on paper like this and on any known 
text so perfectly, as is suggested by the text itself, then language would exist outside 
the mind truthfully and reliably, based on prescribed meaning. Those shared 
meanings would not be private and with them language would not be private. It 
would exist as an uncontrollable, unknowable multi-dynamic and very powerful 
semi-entity of its own. Such a language with its determining powers would 
completely destroy our identity as we could not anymore reinterpret and disobey it.  
In Autopoiesis, language is connotative and grounded in private meaning 
(Maturana, Varela. 1980 p. 30-33). 
“Just as it is mistaken to believe that the nervous system operates by 
manipulating the environment. It is equally mistaken to view language as 
denotative, that is, as objectively indicating and pointing to an external 
world. Linguistic behavior is connotative” (Mingers 1995 p.77). 
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Chapter 7: Husserl and the Inner Life World 
 
Introduction 
Subjectivity (also true for the concepts of objectivity and autopoiesis) is so all-
encompassing that it is very hard to find the best linear approach to describe it. In 
fact it has been hard to approach it here too, which will have its “fragmented” 
influence in this chapter, partly resolved with the many “(section x)” additions.  
 A condition for the thesis is to guide the respondents to redirect their unconscious 
and their inner life world, not unlike what Husserl did, in a way. What could this 
“inner life world” be? 
“No objective science, no psychology—which, after all,  sought to become 
the universal science of the subjective—and no philosophy has ever made 
thematic and thereby actually discovered this realm of the subjective—not 
even the Kantian philosophy … It is a realm of something subjective which 
is completely closed off within itself, existing in its own way, functioning in 
all experiencing, all thinking, all life, thus everywhere inseparably involved; 
yet it has never been held in view, never been grasped and understood”… 
(Husserl E. 1970 §29, italics added). 
Maturana and Varela would agree with Husserl on the operationally closed-off 
character of the unconscious (“…closed off within itself…”). Husserl speaks about 
the realm of the subjective.  
 
7.0 The unconscious and the non-existence of independent strangers 
About the inner life world, Husserl once said: “...yet it has never been held in view, 
never been grasped and understood”. But that was then, how is it now? 
“The concept of unconscious knowledge is fundamental for an 
understanding of human thought processes and mentation in general; 
however, the psychological community at large is not familiar with it.” 
(Augusto 2010, italics added) 
It appears, at least scientifically, that very little is known about unconscious 
knowledge. Science's contemporary knowledge of emotions is conflicting and 
essentially incomplete (e.g. Brabeck & Gorman 1992, Griffiths 2004, Solomon 
2008). Also, knowledge regarding consciousness or transcendental consciousness 
in psychology is minimal; it is more a topic of philosophy.  
 On the other hand, when trying to understand psychic phenomena, it would be 
paradoxical to approach them with the environmental logic of (scientific) observers. 
Observer's logic is theoretically unfit when trying to understand autopoiesis and 
consequently is equally unfit when trying to understand the psyche. There is a strong 
and increasing contemporary tendency in science, encouraged by the 
pharmaceutical industry, to understand the psyche with the help of neurobiology 
and neurochemistry, an approach that tries to extend observer’s logic into the 
domain of unobservable consciousness. Insofar as consciousness or the psyche are 
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sub-domains of the Living or are themselves the Living, observer's logic may be the 
wrong tool to understand the psyche and/or consciousness. 
The inner life world, as unconscious, is by definition not the domain of the 
conscious mind. The conscious mind is mostly unaware (unconscious) of the 
workings of this “other mind”, named “the unconscious” as a perfect projection of 
its own lack of knowledge.  
A similar projection would be to name someone a “stranger” and to handle him 
as such. Thus the stranger would bear the name of his beholder. In reality, a stranger 
can never be a stranger and the unconscious can never be unconscious. “Faults” like 
this become real and full of impact when they are not acknowledged for what they 
are. As soon as it is acknowledged that the stranger is not a stranger to himself, to 
his beloved ones and his friends, his “strangeness” becomes not part of him, in fact 
has nothing to say about him. When that happens, dominant observer's logic is 
gently corrected by circular logic and the fault disappears.  
 
7.1 Working preliminary definition of the unconscious 
In order to find the simplest model with which to start, I have chosen the practical 
definitions of John Bargh and Carl Jung which complement each other: 
“…in which the higher mental processes such as judgment and social 
behavior could be triggered and then operate in the absence of conscious 
intent and guidance...Those aspects which trigger and operate judgment and 
behavior (normally aspects of the conscious) in the absence however of 
conscious awareness are called the unconscious” (Bargh et al, 2008 p. 74). 
 And: 
“The unconscious is defined as the sum of all those psychic events that are 
not intense enough to enter into consciousness” (Jung 1972 p. 203). 
Bargh chooses to define the unconscious by its effects in the conscious domain, but 
without conscious awareness. He does not define how the unconscious itself 
operates conceptually or functionally, how it could or would be like. An example 
would be something like the following: when driving in a certain part of a city one 
suddenly realizes—“I am already here”?—and notices how unaware he / she was 
about that part of the journey that brought them “here”.  
Carl Jung extended Freud’s theory in a comprehensive way and came to the 
conclusion that what is in the unconscious, once was in consciousness, with the 
possible exception of the collective consciousness, which is not of interest here 
(Jung 1981, p. 3). Jung makes a very broad definition, overall, of what the 
unconscious is. I need to slightly broaden both definitions (including the definition 
of Bargh), making the point that even when the “conscious” is aware of a certain 
something-else influencing it, this certain something-else can still be called the 
unconscious.  
The wider questions of consciousness or awareness of data that derives from the 
unconscious (or the lack of awareness of it when it operates) are not relevant for the 
thesis or for the definition of the unconscious. What is relevant is the relational 
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function of the unconscious to the conscious mind and to identity in particular. If it 
must be categorized, it must be a category of function. To be conscious of the effects 
of the unconscious does not make it a conscious property. Emotions, which appear 
in consciousness, still do not derive from consciousness. Emotions derive fully from 
the unconscious, as in the following example of a woman who fears bridges. Also, 
this definition of the unconscious is slightly broad and does not explain any property 
of the unconscious, except the fact that it influences the conscious, with or without 
its knowledge, with or without its understanding.  
 
7.1.1 Illogicality as forgotten logicality, a story 
Jung posits a forgotten content of the unconscious as once being in consciousness 
(Jung 1981). With some effort, or with the application of different remembering 
techniques, forgotten or repressed information can be remembered again. If one 
becomes very cautious of electricity because he remembers having a harsh electrical 
shock some years ago, he will not speak of unconscious influences when carefully 
repairing a power connector in the present. He will remember all too well what had 
happened, and he will accept his current more developed skill as fully rational and 
not as an “unconscious influence”. 
But what about the case of a cheerful woman (24 years old) who gradually 
developed, during the last two years, a fear of crossing bridges in Leiden, a medieval 
city in the Netherlands, a fear which she never had before? The woman lived in the 
middle of a neighborhood full of bridges. Gradually, within a year, she felt too 
uncomfortable driving her old car when crossing the bridges that she had to cross in 
order to leave her quarter. Her fear grew to the point that only strong conscious 
control (self-discipline) and the aid of a friend sitting next to her could make her 
leave the city to visit friends and family and to come (towards the end of this period) 
to meetings with me after asking for help. She, her family and everybody who knew 
her could not explain her fear for bridges. It was something seen as irrational by all 
of them. Her fear seemed factually true, exhibited by her internal experiences and 
her behavior of trying to avoid bridges as much as possible. In the end, it became 
apparent that it was her growing fear of water under the bridge that made her afraid 
of crossing. It was as if one irrational fear was replaced by another, equally 
irrational, fear.  
“Irrationality” is the label, in this case, that is easily projected onto this behavior 
by the rational observer, that is, the one who does not understand. This woman knew 
she always had a fear of water, but that had never stopped her from crossing bridges 
before. She did not know why she feared water so much, but she experienced this 
fear nevertheless, which had been easy to conceal from others. Examples of this fear 
were that she never took a bath, only showers; she had avoided swimming lessons 
even at primary school, using various excuses to do so. As a child, she had played 
at the beach or in shallow water rather than in the sea. Her fear was not about water 
per se, but had to do with the idea of water being deep, at the time the depth (length) 
of her sister who was two years younger than her.  
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When this woman was four years old, she was present when her sister drowned 
in the river near their house. Her father, who came too late to rescue her sister, 
shouted out in deep grief and he saw the four year old as to blame for her sister’s 
death. Consciously, that night in bed, while crying inconsolably, the girl came to 
the logical conclusion that something like this would never happen to her again and 
that she would avoid deep, deadly water at all costs.  
The coming year the girl became severely depressed and full of guilt, and came 
to somehow repress the drowning episode, to the point that it came to be fully out 
of her consciousness. Consequently, her problems could from then onwards be seen 
as the result of the workings of the unconscious.  
When eventually, as an adult now, this woman corrected the meaning which she 
had made that night of the accident, she regained her freedom, but not based on any 
falsification of “the facts” that had taken place that day. In autopoietic “language” 
one would say: “The triggers stayed the same, but she learned to give them new but 
this time self-supportive meanings at the expense of the old self-inhibiting ones”. 
The full disconnection between “facts” and meaning proves yet again the lack of 
deterministic power that triggers have, when they rise out of “the-thing-in-
themselves” (events). It is altogether possible that another girl of that age in that 
same very difficult context would not have developed a phobia of water, but might 
have found another alternative meaning (hopefully more supporting of self-growth 
and development) to fill in the meaning-void of what had happened.  
In the above example, the forgotten “cause” of the young woman’s fear had once 
been conscious, but had later become part of the realm that was “closed off within 
itself…never been held in view”, a realm, which for a great part defined her 
character.  
This “realm”, personal and unique to each person, is crystallized in our private 
name and conveys our nature. Our name, as it is for ourselves, tells us who we are. 
What is within, closed-off does not reveal its logic in the present time and becomes 
irrational and opaque for the logic of (self) observers.  
 
7.2 “I am no longer interested in my own existence”, and the notion of time 
Husserl directs us to especially consider the part(s) which other philosophers that 
came before him left out: that which has “never been held in view”. According to 
Husserl, self-reflection can be practiced on every experience, making it possible to 
observe the inner workings of one’s own mind. That is of course what many 
philosophers / thinkers have done; but it is not unlikely that most of them have taken 
it for granted that the one who reflects is also reflecting under his own name. Husserl 
must have started reflecting under his name as well; but he reached a point where 
he realized that his name and all that it represented was a hindrance in finding out 
what is true and what is constructed. His name and what he was stood in the way of 
his deep search in trying to find a secure grounding for all sciences, finding his way 
through the categories objective and subjective. The existential meaning of his own 
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name [identity] disappeared by understanding what it actually was, not existence 
but construction.  
 “I learn to survey transcendental experience. I am no longer interested in 
my own existence.… The transcendental problem is eidetic. My 
psychological experiences, perceptions, imaginations and the like remain in 
form and content what they were, but I see them as “structures” now, for I 
am face to face at last with the ultimate structure of consciousness [identity]” 
(Husserl, 1927 p. 8).  
Husserl's Transcendental Consciousness equals real and not hypothetical 
impartiality, the first portal to find a “universal” grounding for morality. 
 “I am no longer interested in my own existence” in the Husserlian context is the 
same as saying: “I am no longer interested in my own name”. If we are not interested 
in our name and what it stands for, then there must be something else, much more 
important, which must interests us. Losing one’s name equals to an experience of 
being completely detached, disinterested, and dissociated from one’s own ego or 
identity. But, leaving place “A” will shift consciousness to a different place “B”. 
So, beyond the ego, there is another level (Transcendental Consciousness) which is 
experienced by observing its ultimate construction: ego. This may sound theoretical, 
but everybody does this naturally, maybe partly and not continuously. It is called 
retrospection or self-reflection. But the one who does the self-reflection is partly 
still the same ego, but in the present. If “John” literally looks back on what he did 
yesterday by looking at himself in memory, he is still John, but in the present. The 
ego reflects back on a particle of itself:  
“The ego which is present now, thus temporalized, has contact with its past 
ego, even though the latter is precisely no longer present: it can have a 
dialogue with it and criticize it, as it can others” (Husserl 1970 §50 p. 72, 
bold added). 
The potential of dialogue does not necessarily mean a dialogue with a past ego, also 
a present ego can be contacted (Archer 2007). But Transcendental Consciousness is 
not normal self-reflection. Husserl did something altogether different with this idea. 
He managed to step back out of all ego-in-the-present. This is a very unnatural state 
for consciousness to be in; Husserl named this state “Transcendental 
Consciousness” or “Transcendental Ego” (with capital letters). This is a very 
different Transcendental Consciousness when compared to Kant’s transcendental 
consciousness, which refers to the thinker, the as-if objective observer. Husserl 
found that the ego, including its intellectual reasoning, was a mere vehicle, a 
construct made by a hidden, but higher Transcendental Self, which by identifying 
(associating) with its construct forgets its own existence and becomes ego. 
   What conclusions can be made? In the first place that an “I-as-me” in the center 
of awareness can have an inner dialogue with a part of his personality or ego. What 
settles experience, so that in experience it becomes possible to “talk with oneself no 
matter where this oneself is in time”? We have to remember that time or memory 
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does autopoietically not exist (section 6.6.1). All memories of time exist at the same 
time and are all open for consciousness to identify with or to interact with. 
 
7.3 Realized illusions are real 
To understand ego in the following chapter, the next point of view is needed in order 
to build upon Husserl's statement that Transcendental Consciousness makes and 
maintains “the world” (section 3.1.1).  
It seems elementary and natural when one views and enjoys the sunset or a purple 
orchid. The enjoyment is fully an experience, which is felt as an emotion. The 
beauty, the majesty and other possible meanings of the sunset are all obviously part 
of the sunset, not of its spectator. This is so trivial, but let us as be the observers of 
the spectators of the next event and see how real it is. Replace the sunset and observe 
an event in Cape Canaveral during which tens of thousands of Americans watched, 
in awe, the space rocket which, with its deep thundering flames, will bring the 
astronauts into orbit. The “realness” of the event is complete, including the division 
between subjective and objective. Nobody, including the observers / spectators, will 
doubt how the realness of the sunset or the rockets is, intertwined with the realness 
of the people observing them and their experiences. Reality is true and beyond 
question and as such will be described in stories and narratives, be it the “objective 
side” or the “subjective” side of it. What is questionable is the use of “observer’s 
logic” to explain from an observer's point of view what reality is for “people in their 
natural surroundings”. If we do not apply observer's logic, the next event we observe 
would be equally “normal” and true and real as the examples above. If we discern a 
difference, it is because we have applied observer's logic between the above and the 
below example. 
 Another example: a big man, weighing over a hundred kilos, makes bold 
gestures with his hand and refuses to enter a kitchen when someone invites him in 
for a cup of coffee. The kitchen is a dangerous place. The fresh smell of coffee and 
the sunlight of the morning falling through the open windows cannot hide what the 
man fears. Under the kitchen table, near the edge of a dark shadow where it could 
easily disappear, the man sees a young and dangerous bumblebee. The fact that the 
humblebee is dehydrated and dying, is not noticed by him. Autopoietically, we 
know the big man literally does not see the same bumblebee; it is not, for him, the 
small creature that it would be for most. Triggers reflecting projections imply that 
the projections are the properties of triggers. Emotions do respond to where the 
meaning is. Consequently, perceived and dressed up triggers do not only trigger 
emotions, but also their perceived justification. In all the above three examples, the 
justifications are the same, there is no difference. Several reasons come together, 
indicating that the aim of the organization of the Living is not world-orientation but 
self-orientation.  
Biological self-orientation or self-referentiality seems to have no limits. 
Organizational closure “protects” by design the self-referentiality of humans; it 
means that all projections obey autopoiesis (for humans including the maintenance 
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and protection of personality: identity) and all personal experiences are individually 
equally justified. Every trigger is able to carry any meaning, or in other words, 
triggers have no limits in their capacity to accept any meaning projected onto them. 
The meaninglessness of triggers cannot correct projected meaning to themselves. 
The most fragile triggers can become threatening, the most innocent can appear 
guilty and so on. As most triggers perceived are real external events (except in drug-
induced cases), they make every meaning just as real reflected back to their 
beholders. Illusory meaning and real triggers are equally real as one, but not 
necessarily for third-party observers. This makes illusory meanings not as-if true 
but as true and “solid” as the triggers themselves. Consequently, the intended 
outside world as a pool of triggers serve in a rather perfect way any individual 
autopoiesis, making the nature (ego) of each individual felt as real. One could 
ponder that for some reason the objective, but triggering world, unconditionally 
accepts every subjective role it has to play in the way that every beholder demands 
of it. There is a price to pay with “unrealistic” meaning notwithstanding the 
plasticity of the human mind, which surpasses by far the limits of the human body. 
 
7.4 Rational and “irrational” thinking as conscious and unconscious 
“thinking” 
Going back to the lady who feared bridges, her friends and family considered her 
fear irrational. And as the word ‘irrational’ implies, rational thinking or logical 
thinking could not lead to a acceptable explanation that would explain her fear.  
 What is considered “rational thinking” behind judgments typically describes the 
thinking of observers, but who take their meaning projections for granted. For the 
natural sciences to find valid explanations this is mostly not a hindrance, for the 
social sciences this approach mostly is questionable The observer wants to 
understand how the observed makes “sense” to him, even when it comes to 
observing him or herself. The Taliban (and now Isis / DAIISH), who have destroyed 
hundreds of ancient monuments, do not make sense for modern (Western) 
observers; but what they do, make sense to them. They have théir rational 
explanation, just like the man fearing the one little bumblebee, an explanation that 
appears irrational for most others.   
 The woman with the fear for bridges, did not understand her fears. Even from 
her own point of view, her fears were irrational, but as an aspect of her unconscious 
mind, as we have seen, they were actually rational. The “memory”, as a present 
instruction, to handle water-based triggers, still held on to the then rationally 
“programmed” experience of the little child. Unconscious subjectivities do not 
think, but follow programs in internal niche; the unconscious mind just accepts, in 
some unconditional way, the programs. These programs were in most cases rational 
for the conscious mind when made, but in the past. Repeating thought processes 
over and over since then is not thinking, but executing (old) programs. The 
unconscious function is not responsible for defining judgement or reality. That 
important function is delegated to the conscious mind. 
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Chapter 8: What is ego? 
 
Introduction 
It appears that all knowledge and subjectivity are submissive to the autopoiesis of 
the individual: the maintenance of its unique identity (and then body). 
 The route from triggers to organisms' organizational closure, from meaning to 
behavior and to language, and from organization to unique individualities, gives a 
broad platform to analyze the ego. In order to combine one and the other, short 
summaries of previous theories cannot be avoided, so some repetition will occur. In 
the context of the research, the ego and the personality of the respondents will be 
just as they were for Husserl: a deviation from “purity”, and for the thesis a deviation 
from full impartiality. Husserl also named Transcendental Consciousness “Pure 
Ego”. This purity equals pure impartiality, disconnected from history and meaning. 
So to distance oneself from his total ego in order to become “pure”, in order to be 
able to do that, but differently from Husserl, the question of what the ego is must be 
answered. What exactly is the ego, how does it function, what does it need in order 
to function?  
 The ego is scientifically not defined precisely, and when it is it is defined in 
conflicting ways. In terms of definition, the ego is a product of mainstream 
observer’s logic. Predictably, any definitions of this kind might be autopoietically 
problematic in terms of knowing the living properties of a system. Turning interest 
towards the question of the ego is necessary because, as mentioned briefly before, 
Husserl’s method of the epoché would not work for naive respondents in a single 
first meeting 
Husserl opens interesting avenues in terms of exploring the notion of ego. He, 
Maturana and Varela were, although apart from each other, seeking similar answers. 
The difference between autopoiesis and the work of Husserl has to do with the huge 
difference in their point of departure, in terms of answering the questions that they 
each pose in quite a similar way. The biologists started their survey with single-cell 
organisms which started existing billions of years ago; the philosopher at the 
’present ‘side of time started investigating his own present human self. The contrast 
could not be greater. The biological questions:  “What is the organization of the 
living?” and “What takes place in the phenomenon of perception?” quickly become 
centered on the question: “How does it happen that the organism has the structure 
that permits it to operate adequately in the medium in which it exists?” (Maturana 
and Varela 1980, p. xvi).  
Roughly, the question states: “How does a living organism exists in the world?” 
while Husserl's question roughly can be reframed as: “How does the world exist in 
me”? Both questions are more or less two sides of the same coin. Husserl gave 
himself the difficult task of finding the bridge between subjectivity and objectivity, 
as it is rather impossible to believe that within subjectivity, within man, both 
categories are neurologically divided for the sake of conventional science. The 
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objective world and the subjective world, as they are fully experienced, do exist 
independently “outside” and are felt to be apart, but in the end do  exist as a relation 
within, serving organizational closure. 
 
8.0 What is “contemporary” ego? 
What is meant by the term ego in academic writings? There seems to be a definition 
of ego which is taken for granted; this is such as general definition that most articles 
about the ego do not define what is meant by it. For example, in an eleven-page 
article (Loevinger 1966) the concept ego is mentioned dozens of times, yet there is 
no definition given. Apparently, the concept is not defined as it is either too 
unknown or too well known. 
What follows are ten different or similar definitions of ego. According to some 
online sources (Free Dictionary, Webster, ARD dictionary and Oxford dictionary) 
but also according to the way the term is used in some scientific articles, the ego is: 
1. The self, especially as contrasted with another self or the world 
2. One of the psyche’s three divisions in psychoanalytic theory, the ego serving as 
the organized conscious mediator between the person and reality 
3. The self as the conscious subject 
4. In psychoanalysis, the ego refers to the conscious mind, based on perception of 
the environment from birth onwards 
5. The conscious and permanent subject of all psychic experiences, whether held to 
be directly known or the product of reflective thought 
6. One’s own consciousness of their identity [“self-image”] 
7. In psychoanalysis, the ego is the part of the mind that mediates between the 
conscious and the unconscious and is responsible for reality testing and for the sense 
of personal identity.  
8 For philosophy (in metaphysics) the ego refers to a conscious thinking subject 
9. The ego might refer to a person's sense of self-esteem, self-image or even self-
importance 
According to one type of definition (type 1, referred to in 2, 7 and 8), the ego falls 
within the cognitive domain of being able to be aware, to be “conscious of”, in a 
neutral (objective) way, for instance  as  the mediator or in being conscious of 
information:  about one’s own identity. Considering at least the mediator is meant 
to be in the definition a neutral mediator. 
Emotions and meaning are fully left out of this definition; they fall under the 
things which the ego can think of or be aware of. The unconscious itself, from which 
emotions or their possible influences come from, is also left out of this type of 
definition. The definitions by themselves are not precise. 
Type 2 explanations (4, 5,) contaminate consciousness with subjectivity. “The 
conscious mind, but based on...from birth on”; “conscious and permanent subject 
of all psychical experiences”. But it is altogether possible that “The self (1), the 
mediator in (2), (3) and (7) are also meant subjective consciousness and not neutral. 
Number 9 is unclear; is it about self-importance or in self-importance? Definitions 
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divide ego in a neutral awareness or in a subjective awareness they can refer to the 
“objective” thinker or the influenced subjective thinker.  The ego, as defined by 
some psychoanalytic approaches, resembles a kind of “little” psychoanalyst (the 
mediator). The philosophical definition suggests that the ego resembles a kind of 
“little philosopher”, the objective thinker; the subject does not refer to subjectivity 
but to the division between subject and object.  
Above definitions seem more or less alike, but they are not. The two divisions 
are so different that they may be regarded as each other’s opposites. Consciousness 
dissociated from subjectivity, as in type 1, or associated to subjectivity, as in type 
2, are not in any way the same. The differences explain the viewpoint of the diverse 
approaches to the “ego” and are similar to the different approaches to defining the 
unconscious, another scientifically unclear topic. 
“These and other difficulties with the monolithic, all-or-nothing division of 
mental processes, into either conscious or unconscious, have resulted today 
in different “flavors” of the unconscious—different operational definitions 
that lead to dramatically different conclusions about the power and scope 
of the unconscious (John A. Bargh J. A. & Morsella E. 2008 p. 74, bold 
added). 
For Husserl, the term ego refers to different things, but mostly he takes up the 
cognitive definition. “Ego”, “I” “Self”, "Consciousness” are all the same and can be 
mutually exchanged for Husserl. Husserl (and most thinkers) prefer to talk about 
“ego” or “consciousness”. The differences are found in their use and in their 
adjectives such as in “(psychological) ego”, “Pure Ego”, “Transcendental Ego”, 
“knowing ego”, “apodictic ego”, “me, the individual ego”, “identity” and so on. (I 
am omitting here the definitions of ego by thinkers previous to Husserl as it is 
Husserl’s view which is relevant to this thesis).  
To be conscious of something, for instance in order to investigate it, we have to 
focus upon it so that it can become the intended object, an object of attention.  
“…and the word “intentional” has been borrowed from the scholastic to 
denote the essential “reference” character of the phenomena. All 
consciousness is “intentional.” In unreflective consciousness we are 
“directed” upon objects, we “intend” them; …. Each phenomenon has its 
own intentional structure…” (Husserl 1927 p. 3, italics added) 
Husserl states very clear that consciousness can only exist in experience by 
functioning: that is, to be conscious of when there is a something to be conscious of 
(“for every cogitatio has its cogitatum” (Husserl 1970 p. 82). How can an “eye” or 
an “ear” become aware of its existence (not itself, which is different) without sight 
or sound? Husserl underlines that consciousness can only be experienced as a 
relation. As practically all internal ideas or images are directly or indirectly linked 
to the senses, Husserl coincides with the notion of i-niche in autopoiesis when 
saying that the ego always indirectly implies an object and therefore needs that 
relationship to be aware of itself. What this actually states is that the ego cannot 
experience itself without what is conventionally defined as objectivity. So in order 
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to be (in experience) as subject, an object is immediately necessary, be it primary 
(in sensibility, similar to Kant’s empirical ego) or secondary (in memory of in 
thought). However, the idea that consciousness can only be experienced as a relation 
may not be true and is not something everybody can agree with. 
Consciousness-as-an-relation is named “Relative Consciousness” in the book 
“The Philosophy of Consciousness Without an Object” by Franklin Merrel-Wolf 
(1973 p. 31) He explains how relative consciousness is a practical construct and by 
its construction unwillingly obtains properties that lead to the impossibility to reflect 
on its Constructor. Also the analogy between “eye” or senses in general and 
“consciousness”, being aware of itself in experience, suggests that the “tool-like” 
function of the senses may also be true for what Merrel-Wolf names “relative 
consciousness” or much more used by the notion of “the ego”. Relative 
consciousness as a construct is the most experienced kind of consciousness as it 
accepts sensory perceptions as a reference to itself. This acceptance, as we will see 
later on, constitutes the “ego” and simultaneously explains the necessity of 
observer's logic to maintain the ego, to maintain the construction. 
 
8.1 Ego, how can “consciousness” make the [objective] world and confirm it? 
Husserl accepts Kant's existence of an objective independent world that 
accommodates itself to human perception; Husserl accepted the experience of this 
world being part of human subjectivity, within human brains. People tend to forget 
the world as they know and experience it is by design a projected-experience which 
cannot leave their brains. 
“But let once this general world, make its “appearance” in consciousness as “the” 
world, it is thenceforth related to the subjective, and all its existence and the manner 
of it, assumes a new dimension, becoming “incompletely intelligible, 
“questionable.” (Husserl 1927 p. 7) 
Husserl goes on to say that the appearance of this world inside, with all its clear cut 
properties, but projected outside, is:  
“We may call the world “internal” because it is related to consciousness ... 
this quite “general” world, whose “immanent” being is as shadowy as the 
consciousness wherein it “exists”...” (Husserl 1927 p. 7) 
He found: “And no existence, or manner of existence, is less wholly intelligible than 
ourselves” (Husserl 1927 p. 6). How can it be otherwise? What is interesting for the 
thesis is that Husserl concluded that the objective world is “...thenceforth related to 
the subjective, and all its existence and the manner of it.” This is not an innocent, 
“light” conclusion to arrive to. Husserl deducted that objectivity and subjectivity 
are in relation to each other in some way. He could not know then that he was 
referring directly to internal niche in autopoiesis, where subject and object are 
indeed directly in relation, but subservient to and controlled by the rest of 
autopoiesis. Husserl also turned away from observer's logic to find answers within. 
Since knowledge of the CNS and the structures of neural pathways were primitive 
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at that time and inadequate in shedding light on his endeavor, Husserl could only 
turn to the “shadow of consciousness” itself to find answers. 
“...We that are, indeed, men, spiritual and bodily, existing in the world, are, 
therefore, “appearances” unto ourselves, parcel of what “we” have 
constituted. Pieces of significance “we” have made. The “I” and “we,” 
which we apprehend, presuppose a hidden “I” and “we” to whom they are 
“present” (Husserl 1927 p.7). 
Husserl names Transcendental Consciousness the “most general subjectivity” (see 
section 3.1.1). This is a play of language. He could have said: The most ‘objective 
subjectivity’, but the definition of objectivity would forbid that. Nevertheless, 
Husserl states this in a strange way. He says: “... subjectivity, which makes the world 
and its “souls,” and confirms them.” This does not sound very passive, but rather 
active; it very much echoes circular logic. To allow objectivity to enter the mind 
suggests a form of passivity. Still, Husserl does not mean to say that the making of 
the world is subjective; it is—even when made by Consciousness—an objective 
world. But that Consciousness can only be a very special one: Transcendental 
Consciousness.  
“…the motif of inquiring back into the ultimate source of all the formations 
of knowledge, the motif of the knower’s reflecting upon himself and his 
knowing life in which all the scientific structures that are valid for him occur 
purposefully, are stored up as acquisitions, and have and continue to become 
freely available” (Husserl 1970 p. 97-98, italics added). 
Transcendental Consciousness is not subjective in a “personal sense” and not 
naturally given and needs a certain kind of reflection (epoché) to be experienced. 
Husserl is very aware that the human experience of “objectivity” as a state happens 
within, albeit is projected outside. He has his questions regarding how the two are 
connected internally. In memory, looking back at interactions with the world, there 
is an implication that it is memory itself that bridges subject and object; the second 
bridge is the internal awareness of the memory.  
 
8.2 The compliant ego  
Observer's logic cannot be used. Setting subjectivity apart from objectivity cannot 
be used. But if observer's logic is set aside, projections lose their concealing 
properties and are revealed for what they are: firstly, an a priori construction (not 
mentioned as such) by Kant for the possibility of experiencing an external world. 
Some would say that the senses do this. But without projection, we would 
experience what we see situated in our eyes and we would hear the sources of 
sounds deep in our ears. Projections from the sender as projector create a perfect 
world outside us to be experienced as such. When circular logic is used as a resort, 
it “only” brings back projections to the sender, but on the level of meaning. Circular 
logic does not deny the basic projections of the senses, such as colors, sounds, 3D 
space and so on. Circular logic only shows that the world on any level of meaning 
(which means total experience) is a projection of self.  
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The easiest reminder of the true foundation of projection is for us to remember: 
every witnessed event is an internal event, and only internal events can be 
experienced. The only reason to accept this knowledge except for once finding out, 
is as a start for the “repair” or “correction” of hindering or not helping meanings, 
which would otherwise be hard or even impossible to change or to detect. That 
makes Circular logic a tool too, just like observer's logic is; but Circular logic has a 
different aim. For now Circular logic is necessary in order to find the ego's truest 
function. Husserl:  
“We have to recognize that relativity to consciousness is not only an actual 
quality of our world, but, from eidetic necessity, the quality of every 
conceivable world. ... but we are obliged with the world to vary ourselves 
also, and ourselves we cannot vary except within the limits prescribed to us 
by the nature of subjectivity” (Husserl 1927 p. 8, italics, added). 
An excerpt such as the above can easily get lost amongst the thousands of pages that 
Husserl wrote, even when this truly explains the truth of any experience. What 
Husserl states here is as close as he could have come within the limits of Kant’s 
doctrine: he is referring to true organizational closure. As experience so easily 
suggests, when no emotions are felt, objective perceptions are possible and do exist. 
Thus in experience there is no antidote to the experience of an intuited object in 
sensibility as-it-is-given which is defined as objectivity itself. Husserl’s rational 
belief in objectivity, like Kant before him and like the vast majority of present world 
inhabitants, made it impossible for Husserl to write his conclusion autopoietically 
such as this: 
“We have to recognize that relativity to consciousness is not only an actual 
quality of our world, but, from eidetic necessity, the quality of every 
perceivable world…but the world is obliged to me to vary itself also, 
through the forces within the limits prescribed to us by the nature of 
subjectivity” ( á la Husserl 1927 p. 8). 
An important conclusion must be made: Every world “made”, makes the maker 
simultaneously a congruent and compliant inhabitant of that very same world he 
made. Herein lies the promise of finding a true description of the ego.  
Note: To “make worlds” is not to make the triggers behind them. The things-in-
themselves stay “untouched” in their inaccessibility. For instance behind the “the 
structures of (any) flesh and bones” are the real inaccessible properties of the things-
in-themselves expressed in structural constraints independent of any meaning 
projected to them. 
So how is the ego made, what does it do, what does it require and why does it need 
to exist?  
 
8.3 The function of the ego 
Normally the ego is regarded and regards itself as an independent “stand-alone” 
entity, making the world which is experienced also independently from the ego as 
observer. But there is a hindering philosophical abstraction in the concept of the 
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world. No organism including humans can experience the world except in extremely 
small parts in real time. The rest of the world is outside experience. That makes the 
ego as an overall entity an abstract concept, a kind of reification as-if it is “context-
less”. A person can only find him or herself in one context at a time out of that part 
of ego relevant to it, even when all possible contexts including the one in real time 
are internally and categorically described in i-niche. There is no general context 
encompassing all possible contexts. This makes a general ego nonexistent, except 
as an abstract tool of thought suggested by an existing body which seems to appear 
the same in all contexts.  
 On a nice warm morning, an eight-year old girl sits in the garden on the grass, 
humming softly and counting wild daisies. Her hands dance like daffodils over the 
grass and the little flowers. Suddenly she shifts her attention when she sees 
something different. Before that moment she picked up a dry leaf fallen from a 
nearby tree in the form of a heart. She could become interested for a short time, even 
put it aside to take it home or she could put it aside after a few seconds and ignore 
it. There is no law-like prescription to distinguish the borders between different 
parts of the ego because of different contexts, but I would say that the girl is still in 
that part of herself that enjoys the sunny morning, counting flowers irrespective of 
her choice to pick the leave up or not. Autopoietically the sun, the garden, the 
flowers, but also the fallen leave and more, all belong to one categorical description 
of the event. If the leave had the form of a doll or a dog, something that would make 
it unfit to the event-category, that would be different. 
But now she does see something different, very different for her. Whatever it is, 
it becomes a trigger, that does not fit the overall category. The trigger will awaken 
meaning. If the meaning is important enough and not related to the morning event, 
the existing context will slip into a new one, and therefore the girl’s experienced 
world will change (different category). She now sees a big rusty key lying in the 
grass, partly in the ground. She looks startled and immediately she stands up and 
stops humming. She forgets the daisies, the garden and the lovely morning and runs 
to the house, leaving the key behind.  
If something like this happens, the key triggers a different part of her, like every 
context (trigger) —if it’s different and important enough—will trigger the compliant 
ego part. This happens at the (temporary) expense of the previous ego-part which is 
not compliant to the new trigger. 
Meeting or observing someone, is “only” experiencing a very small part of his 
“total being”, which as a totality does exist inside, but is inaccessible both to the 
observers and to the person observed. The observer can only perceive the 
incomplete (see section 5.4.1). The ego, as a unity, consists of many parts; every 
part is related to its relevant (categorical) part of the world in order to function. In 
psychology, the ego can have different roles (e.g. Block 1961, Schwartz 1987). So 
the personality of a human, or his ego, or his identity, is like a multi-faceted 
diamond. Each facet relates to a certain group of triggers, forming together a 
reference context for that part of the diamond. A reference context is like the 
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prototype of a category. It is the prototype generalization of a context which triggers 
the accompanying ego part that belongs to it and which is functional to it. Specific, 
or particular, ego parts outside their normal contexts become meaningless.  
For instance: a man, who is a rally driver and also a good cook, has won prices 
in local contexts with his gourmet recipes and has also won many races. But what 
is being a good cook worth when he is behind his car’s steering wheel? What value 
can be given to his “driver-part” when he is in the kitchen? So, theoretically, only 
one facet of the “diamond” can be observed or experienced at a time: when it 
actually operates. This is so even when many different facets can be remembered 
and may add meaning to a single facet. This may complicate things when 
contamination occurs. The functionality of the ego is the functionality of internal 
niche. The functionality of internal niche is to define interactive behavior. The 
functionality of interactive behavior is to maintain identity which at least for humans 
is mostly defined by the content (belief systems / programs) described by internal 
niche and so circularity is restored. Only from this perspective life is meaningless 
in the sense there is no “plan”, no goal, no purpose. Humans, who can only 
individually and personally make sense of the world, make a very personal ego and 
in normal self-reflection people get some awareness of their own “general” ego, but 
always incomplete and fundamentally reversed when circular logic is not used.  
The practical function of the ego is to determine how to interact and therefore 
how to be in the world, one context at a time.   
What is needed for consciousness to “construct” ego and to maintain its 
programs  is faith—often blind faith—and the ego’s “webs  of interrelated meaning” 
gets (blind) faith in abundance from its maker. Faith alone in one's own meaning(s) 
is all that is needed for consciousness to identify with or associate with its own 
descriptions and to become ego and acting it out. Faith always exists; even the most 
insecure people are precisely insecure because of their (blind) faith in all the 
knowledge they have that keeps them insecure. Even Descartes' doubt was not about 
his doubt, as the end-result of his reasoning, his doubt was rock solid.  
Another angle concerning the awakening of the ego is  seeing ego as a self-
created narrative (or script), but acted out context by context, like a very good actor, 
which by associating with the script makes the projected script on screen fully alive 
and believable. The difference makes ego’s script starts at birth or even before 
whereby actor and scriptwriter change places all the time. The science that studies 
ego (psychology) is indispensably connected to the world. Behavior is the real 
empirical proof that egos exist.  
 
8.4 The making of the ego makes the world and vice versa 
In making delicious bread or a dangerous tiger, the maker inescapably also defines 
him or herself (compliant ego). Triggers do not define him / her, but he / she defines 
the experience of triggers according to his / her present self. This present self is 
dynamic and not fixed, as the constant dance between meaning-maker and triggers 
cannot be fixed with evolutionary retreatment of practically all fixed instincts. 
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Earlier it was stated (as an example) that the tiger and the zoo and any other 
phenomenon cannot be “made” without the experience of adjectives. Adjectives 
best explain the nature of the relation between subject and object (section 5.17.2). 
When it comes to the tiger, when determining what it is for an observer (maker), he 
simultaneously creates a new self, a new ego-part, which is only valid in that 
context. The creation of the tiger (“what does it mean to me”) and (that part) of the 
ego happens at the same time, but although these two things happen as if they were 
one (one relation) they will not be experienced as such. In the making, the intention 
of awareness is towards the tiger and the simultaneous creation of a compliant ego 
is, in most or all cases, outside awareness. A successful Las Vegas tiger-trainer will 
have a different ego part related to tigers then most people. What must be taken into 
account is that the relation of Ego is a categorical relation. If a person before meeting 
or hearing a tiger for the first time already possesses the category and its sub 
categories “dangerous animals” —which is compliantly linked to a “weak”  ability 
of the ego to ensure its safety— “making the tiger”  “only” means adding a new 
member to an already existing sub category. In that case a really new compliant ego 
part is not created as it already exist. As Husserl has implied, every “world” will 
have its own inhabitant, determined within the limits imposed by itself (his or her 
own sense-making). The formation of meaning can happen at once (trauma or its 
positive similitude) or gradually over the years or even over a lifetime. This is 
common knowledge, only slightly rewritten. People do not need to “meet” tigers in 
order to “make” them. In the end, yes, inevitably someone has met a tiger, but 
personally tigers can be made without meeting one. People can accept the tiger as it 
is made (meaning) by the ones they love or trust, so they transform (interpret) the 
narratives or text of others into their own meaning. By taking the narratives of others 
seriously, they form and enriched or they devaluate their own ego. It is impossible 
to make meaning of subject and object apart, independently from each other. Only 
projection suggests this. Meaning-making (humans) is a direct core effect of a truly 
symmetrical organizational closure process, but asymmetrical in terms of the 
external. As was explained earlier, animals obey the same process without being 
aware of meaning. Meaning is invisible in the “instructions” for behavior but 
becomes “visible” in the understanding of observers.  
 In order to understand the functionality of the ego, the simplistic model of 
internal descriptions of triggers—faithful to  autopoietic internal reference defining 
its particular nature—linked to interactive behavior meant for the context of those 
triggers, needs refinement. While meaning is a core functional property of i-niche, 
it is more complex than may be suggested at first glance. It directly connects internal 
descriptions of external triggers (including adjectives) to prescriptions of behavior, 
in “default” or normal mode.  
 Yet there is a third link, “perpendicular” to the link between meaning-of-trigger 
(i-niche) and behavior (niche), which embeds niche in and makes it part of the rest 
of the internal (psychological) dynamics of the person. This connects the internal 
niche- niche link to the “running” internal “state of affairs” of the system at that 
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moment. Mood, energy level, hunger and many possible other states, all prior to the 
detection of the external “trigger”, may or may not influence niche in terms of going 
into action (or not). I-niche determines behavior when it occurs, but does not 
determine whether it will occur. The earlier model of ego parts, as a logical 
conclusion of (i-) niche, appears to be multi-layered, something which influences 
niche in a different way. For instance, the ego part which is afraid of flying has (in 
this case when someone still steps onto the airplane) a competing part in exactly the 
same external context (following the same triggers): this is the strong ego part which 
overrides the inhibiting meaning “flying is dangerous” and uses discipline to step 
onto the plane. Obviously, that part considers flying safe enough. That shows that 
in i-niche there is at least a double level, two parts which conflict with each other 
when triggered by the same trigger(s). While the default part (in the unconscious) 
feels the emotion but “lives” in the past, the pure cognitive conflicting part (in the 
conscious), that isn’t limited to an emotional response, has or may have a more 
realistic meaning of flying, by delegating (control) capabilities to the trusted pilot 
and by having faith in the capabilities of airplane designers and manufacturers. Yet, 
the use of discipline cannot guarantee a fast transfer of meaning between the two 
parts or that a transfer will ever happen so discipline will still be needed a next time 
 
8.5 The asymmetrical relation 
Meaning, as it is defined by humans, defines on its terms the perceived world, the 
relation towards this world and simultaneously meaning defines the definer. 
Meaning is an internal triplet, like a coin: it has two sides (subject-object) and a 
joining side (relation by two compliant adjectives). Meaning connects and what is 
connected cannot do without and serves by maintaining the relation. Meaning 
answers the question: “What is it for me?” while questions like “What is it?” cannot 
exist in experience, there is always a “me” when a question is raised. What-is-it-for-
me, when answered, describes the object (that part of the world) accommodated to 
the subject, and simultaneously answers “How do I handle it, interact with it?” 
whereby not-handling is also handling, both giving away properties of this “me”. 
Thus, meaning descriptions inside i-niche are descriptions of an accommodated 
world and simultaneously a prescription of behavior. The question “How do I 
handle this?” serves the existential question underneath it: “What am I in this 
context, who am I?” Triggers are necessary to raise and answer questions of 
ontology, but not the ontology of the world. The internal relation of world and 
subject is the opposite of a neutral relation between subject and object. The relation 
is, in the first place, a meaning relation. All meanings serve only the nature of the 
person (personality).There is no equality in the relation, since the relation cannot 
serve the world; it serves the internal equilibrium within the organizational closure 
of the individual. The internal equilibrium inside is the “emperor”. All deviations 
from the equilibrium, trigger above a certain threshold restoration processes which 
induces motivation. The nature of the “emperor within humans” depends therefore 
on the content of meaning. 
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Human organization in the autopoietic sense of the word determines structurally 
important things, such as components, their interrelationships and the blueprint of 
the CNS and the senses. The human “organization” might determine how 
projections occur. The organization part mixes the basic properties of sense 
sensations, like colors, pitch, tactile sensations and so on, projected outwards with 
meaning. Both types of projections of meaning and sensations intertwine seamlessly 
in order to construct the holistic experience of a world wrapped around the 
“invisible” unknown and independent nature of the-things-in-themselves. In i-
niche, trigger-meanings and self-meanings are intertwined and interrelated and 
where afferent neural pathways coming from the senses meet efferent neural 
pathways towards the muscles, they pass through a “corridor of meaning”. 
 The total internal ego of the system cannot be projected, experienced or applied. 
That would be asking for the impossible experience of all context meaning + 
descriptions simultaneously. Projection does not imply that anything observed can 
leave the observer’s CNS to inhabit an independent objective world and leave the 
“subjective”, the “me” behind. It only seems so perfectly in experience. A choice 
made in the thesis is that, for nearly everyone, other humans are the most important 
phenomena of the external world, be it positive or negative.   
 
       
Fig. 4 The relation between I and Other is Ego 
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In Fig 4, the “other” is hereby the representative of the external world. Internally, 
world- and self-meaning maintain each other to sustain their relation. Apparently, 
the relation itself is the interactive part of expressing and maintaining self-
referentiality. The relation is or fully determined by instincts and or a mix between 
learned and instincts for animals, but practically only by “learned” for humans. A 
great part is also one’s own sum of potentials or talents and they differ from person 
to person, but they don’t interfere with the functional mechanism of the ego. They 
more influence the content towards personal equilibrium. The relation changes 
when descriptions of self or world triggers changes on a categorical level. When 
one of the two changes, both changes and the reference is then changed.  
 In other words a definition of the Ego has to do with the relation between self 
and other (and the world around it). Or, put differently, the ego is the relation 
between one’s internal subject-side and one’s internal object-side, the ego is not 
being the subject side of the relation. It is the relation itself. To distinguish this 
definition from contemporary definitions it will be spelled Ego with an E. In 
contexts where it is necessary to emphasize its relational foundation it will be named 
Ego. In all other cases, even when ego is seen as a relation, it will still be named 
ego. 
 The relation between subject and object is also an asymmetrical one (see section 
8.5). This relation within defines the nature of the individual. The sum of all 
relations is the full identity of the individual and is the total sum of all meanings 
made. Or, to be more precise, all meanings are within, embedded in systems of 
beliefs and all beliefs are about something experienced in personal reality and 
economically ordered in respective categories. Behavior is the real empirical proof 
that egos are different from each other. But why is the relation between the classical 
notions of subject and object asymmetrical? Organizational closure, the very “law” 
of living organisms, does not care about the world. The internal object side of the 
relation and all their categorical descriptions do not serve the world, even adaptation 
to the world is serving the self as it experiences itself as it beliefs itself to be.   
 The Ego as a relation, will not experience itself accordingly, but as its opposite: 
ego in the common sense is a being apart and in certain ways independent from 
what stands outside as “not-me”. The knowledge of “I-am” needs the knowledge of 
“what-I-am-not”. There is much more to say about Ego (values and functions 
hierarchy) and its almost infinite possibilities for nuance and complexity, its strange 
relation with “truth” and “untruth”, growth and development, but all these ideas are 
outside the scope of the thesis, unless aspects of them emerge and become relevant 
for morality. In that case, these aspects will be discussed in further texts.  
 
8.5.1 Ego accepts itself as one third of what it is. 
Identity, as the internal relationship between self and world, accepts itself very 
differently. Ego does not consider itself to be a relationship. At best, within the 
domain of friendship and love, ego acknowledges having or worse possessing a 
relationship. Factually a relations can only truthfully be acknowledged in the 
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description “I am the relationship”. Organizational closure leaves no room for 
something else.  The ego —following observer’s logic—  recognizes itself as an 
independent whole, a complete unity, and only needs a bathroom mirror to remind 
himself of this. As for the rest: the relation and his internal “object side”—the 
world—is fully missing in the mirror's reflection. 
 A magical mirror would reflect a full Ego: the ego with all the adjective 
categories of people and important objects. The people that are most important to 
the ego, or that are unique, may fill a singular category (one member inhabitant, 
section 5.16) all by themselves, but that is because they are special. Categories of 
people and objects have their own hierarchy and the magical mirror will 
increasingly show less important people and objects in the background, until they 
fade away. That mirror would reflect ego as it is fully entitled to, a richly vibrating, 
dynamic relational identity, which the body upholds and protects. Belief in the 
normal mirror makes the ego rip the relation apart and illuminate itself as one side 
of the coin only. Now the ego becomes—and experiences as real—a standalone 
subject alone, amidst a close to infinite large and independent world not of its 
making.  
 Obviously, following the suggestions of the senses is practical, but the price to 
be paid is a consciousness separated from its own creations. With a reversed, 
disconnected world, a reversed and disconnected ego will occur too. Not only 
disconnected from the world projected out, but mainly from itself. For the ego to 
recognize itself for what it truly is, one just has to say: “I am only my relation with 
the world.” But the world is big and includes, for instance, things such as pebble 
stones. Saying: “I am my relation with a pebble stone” does not really disclose an 
autopoietic truth, but saying: “I am my relation with the other”, does. 
In spite of observer's logic, projections do not change a thing. The projected 
world (for practical purposes, on the level of meaning) is a perfect copy of an 
internal world, which exists only submissive to the ancient autopoietic strategies, 
goals and processes unchanged by projection itself; the ancient functions are only 
obscured. What if all external meanings (not triggers) were to be recognized as self-
made, serving the old existential autopoietic goals: to maintain, support and develop 
self-growth and development? For the human species, the goals are to fulfill the 
almost unlimited human potential and to thus achieve the most wellbeing. Then 
something else may be needed too, in terms of what kind of “animal” human beings 
are, what is the nature of these “special” organisms? What will be served by the 
ancient autopoietic goals of the human species?  
 
8.6 Something is missing 
Earlier was mentioned that triggers are necessary in order to raise and answer 
questions of ontology, but not the ontology of the world. The internal relation of 
world and subject is the opposite of a neutral relation. There is no equality in the 
relation, as the relation cannot serve the trigger, but must and will serve internal 
equilibrium determined by self referentiality. This alone will rule out any external 
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reasons for morality, as no trigger in the world could possibly break organizational 
closure and equalize the relation between subject and object. Biology and the 
physiology of bodies and their neural systems cannot rationally provide any basis 
for morality. Even the existence of species’ members fully depending on the 
complex (mechanical / social) interactions with others that involve cooperation—
for example interactions e.g. in groups of insects (more mechanical than social) such 
as bees or within herds of cattle, do not require morality. The existence of 
cooperation within the species’ members—is not based on ethics but on self- or 
species preservation. Also, all kinds of symbiosis occur between thousands of 
different species already, fulfilling the autopoiesis of the participating unities (e.g. 
Smith, D. C., & Douglas, A. E. (1987).   
 As humans generate ethical behavior which is not response-oriented (that is, 
needs nothing in return) and also mostly behave ethically since ancient times, 
something is fully missing in the autopoietic domain in terms of explaining 
morality. The thesis chooses to assume that the nature of internal equilibrium may 
be existentially multi-layered. As all human behavior is meaning-driven and all 
meaning comes from within, and as the “organization” of the human species gives 
maximum plasticity to its members to decide their own meaning, the self-
referentiality of humans is fully determined (to start with) by the one doing the sense 
making: that is, by Husserlian Transcendental Consciousness.  
 Freedom to make meaning also invites error and mistakes, which autopoiesis 
cannot correct or even detect. Its function is to maintain internal references, not to 
correct them. So a “paradox” exists, which has to do with the fact that autopoietic 
“forces” maintain and “protect” a “false” relation with the world, which may end in 
the  premature death of self’s and other(s)’.  
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Chapter: 9 Emotions and Morality  
 
Introduction 
Having found a practical definition of Ego to work”, which complies with the virtual 
character of objectivity and complies with autopoiesis’ mechanisms of i-niche and 
niche under the control / influence of internal states of equilibrium or “internal state 
of affairs”, (section 8.4), still is unclear where to start to find an avenue leading to 
morality. Human autopoiesis rather excludes than includes a valid source for 
humanity, which is not constructed. Apart from finding a new method which is 
different to Husserl’s “epoché” that would facilitate the respondents in acquiring 
Transcendental Consciousness, there is another challenge. Husserl accepted 
Transcendental Consciousness as a final state, impossible to investigate further. In 
fact, Transcendental Consciousness is in a way “the last man standing”, the final 
nameless and impartial observer / investigator with no knowledge at all and unable 
to intent itself, in the same way the eye cannot see itself. If there would still be some 
knowledge left, lingering in the background of the mind, the first action would be 
to finish the epoché and to put this last knowledge also in brackets to be pushed 
away as “irrelevant”. But when the respondent finds himself in this state, how can 
we proceed further? Which questions could be asked, if any, that would lead to 
impartial moral arguments? Where would possible answers come from?  
 
9.0 To intend Transcendental Consciousness beyond itself 
Accepting the possibility whereas the respondents find themselves in “Husserlian 
Transcendental Consciousness” (for the moment called “Consciousness” with a 
capital C), what questions should be asked by the interviewer? A question such as 
“what is, according to you, a basic foundation for morality?” doesn't seem logical. 
The “veil of innocence” is a context which makes the manifestation of true 
impartiality possible, a state of consciousness that experiences all knowledge and 
personal facts standing apart from him, as if its validity is unproven or as-if 
belonging to someone else.  
 Having no “stored” knowledge of itself does not magically grant Consciousness 
universal wisdom. This follows from the fact Consciousness is only what it is: fully 
apart and detached from one's Ego. In addition, awareness (consciousness) needs 
“intentionality”, something-to-be-aware-of in order to function (Brentano, 
1874/2009). Apart from the fact of whether it is true, the daily experience of 
awareness—in the form of “being aware of”—supports the idea. As all knowledge 
of the world and of the self, which one can be aware of, is part of the ego and 
contained by it, and as it is the entire ego which will be held outside the search of 
the thesis, then all this knowledge is excluded from answering any question. It is 
very hard, maybe practically impossible, for “Consciousness” to answer questions 
out of an “empty body of knowledge”. Even worse, now a condition is created 
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whereby the chance is enhanced for fabricated answers, in order to “help” the 
interviewer when questioned. 
The idea is not to ask Consciousness any questions, but to “activate” it for what 
it is good at: becoming aware of what it intents. Husserl's Transcendental 
Consciousness is not the end of the search, but the very beginning. True Impartiality 
is a starting condition, in terms of probing deeper within. In practice, it means 
directing “Consciousness” towards something other than itself, which has to do with 
focusing awareness beyond itself, to a source of knowledge that is also under the 
same veil, making it also Transcendental.  
The working hypothesis is that there will be two under the veil. Why two? 
Through the ages, a single universal thinker (source) has been accepted as the 
“maker” of concepts and thoughts. Kant named this “consciousness”, an ability to 
think (to construct ideas): this is referred to as “transcendental consciousness” 
(Kant, cited in Mohanty 1996 p. 23).  
The first primary inhabitant of the veil of innocence is an impartial cognitive 
consciousness in the form of Husserlian Transcendental Consciousness: pure 
awareness, an ability to “cognize”. The “entity” awareness has been known for 
thousands of years; it is Kant’s and Husserl’s main point of departure too. The other 
transcendental inhabitant of the veil that is assumed to exist does not have a name 
yet and has never been mentioned before in philosophy or science. It is something 
else than Consciousness, but what Consciousness can intent, and what is not of his 
making. For some reason, a single Transcendental Source of Emotions is never 
mentioned in science or philosophy. For the thesis it is simply named “Source”. A 
working hypothesis is made, that this Source which is in the transcendental domain, 
is the second inhabitant of the veil. The Source cannot be a part of the ego as the 
ego is a thought-construct in the domain of descriptions. Emotions are a fully 
different matter and are not part of the domain of descriptions or of the cognitive 
domain. That makes the Source independent from the ego or its maker, although the 
Source and Consciousness must be functionally linked. There is a parallel   between 
the Source and the story of Hans Christian Andersen, also showing the 
independence of the Source from the cognitive domain. 
 
9.1 Hans Christian Andersen (1805-1875), “The Ugly Duckling” 
When searching for a particular “something”, criteria are needed to distinct it (to 
know how to look for it) in order to intent it when found. What could be beyond 
Transcendental Consciousness, but also Transcendental? Going back to the veil of 
innocence, we know the method “only functions to exclude all knowledge about 
self and about the world. Everything else (within the Living)—being not 
knowledge— stays within the veil.  
 So what does the knowledge mean, apart from being a big set of descriptions 
referring to what it describes? In an ideal world in the case of self-knowledge, there 
should be a perfect match between the true self and one’s knowledge about it. 
Happily, self-knowledge does not exclude the possibility that one’s own ideas are 
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partly faulty and thus incomplete. Only predetermined, biologically programmed 
life-systems, such as plants and primitive organisms, follow their impeccable path 
of self-development from “birth”. There appears to be a perfect match between 
programmed descriptions and what the primitive life system truly or really is. 
 Take the example of a rose: a rose-seed that is put in the ground will develop 
under the right external conditions faultlessly into an equally perfect rosebush, with 
beautiful roses. A rose has many properties, but freedom of choice in terms of 
making mistakes is not one of them. Human beings (selves) do however have free 
choice and therefore are entitled to and will make mistakes. It is inescapable that 
some important properties of the human “self”, although existing or 
underdeveloped, are unknown to oneself and thus are not included in man's self-
knowledge or self-image, but as part of being are however included in his 
unconscious. All self-knowledge can only be incomplete. It is this incompleteness 
that fuels the drive for self-development and growth in the psychological domain. 
Beyond awareness, hidden behind “the mistake-as-truth” (false belief system), is 
the suppressed part of true being, waiting to be included in a richer self-knowledge. 
It lies dormant or it (partly) operates in the unconscious.  
 A most famous metaphor about a non-matching self-description, based on an 
important mistake, is a children’s story by Hans Christian Andersen:  “The Ugly 
Duckling”. In the story, an unhappy duckling, faithful to his mistaken self-image, 
discovers later on that he is in fact a swan. By re-claiming his true identity (rewriting 
or reprogramming self-knowledge), he becomes happy again by becoming more of 
his real self.  
 In order to understand the story, it is important to keep in mind that underneath 
the wrong idea of who he is, the duckling’s true identity being a swan stays 
unaltered as if it were untouched by the error. Still the true identity remains outside 
his awareness and therefore outside his experience. Swanlike properties and their 
“rationale” still exist within the protagonist of the story, irrespective of his own 
ignorance of it as well as the ignorance of his social context.  In truth, a real swan 
does not need a correct description to exist. But in terms of awareness of more 
evolved beings like humans there needs to be a correct description in order to 
experience itself for what one truly is. This is logically true for humans as the 
importance for a “right” upbringing shows. 
 The existence of a “true-identity” is assumed for the thesis and is somehow 
linked to the second inhabitant of the veil of innocence. To find out what it might 
be is what the research is about. 
 
9.2 The morality of babies 
The possibility of finding impartial grounds for morality, valid for all, free from 
subjectivity and from personal, cultural and historical reasons, can only exist if we 
assume that morality is innate in human beings, that it is part of us from birth, in 
some way. If morality is innate, then babies are not only sweet and innocent, but 
have the social ability to innately prefer the “good”, not only for themselves, but 
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also for others, in a non-economical way. That is to say, not as a trade-off in order 
to gain something, but as a gift: the gift of empathy. Research has found that this is 
indeed the case. 
“The current study replicates and extends the finding (Hamlin, Wynn & 
Bloom, 2007) that infants prefer individuals who act prosocially toward 
unrelated third parties over those who act anti-socially. Using different 
stimuli from those used by Hamlin et al. (2007), with somewhat younger 
subjects and two additional social scenarios, we replicated the findings that 
(a) infants prefer those who behave prosocially versus antisocially, and (b) 
these preferences are based on the social nature of the actions...” (Hamlin & 
Wynn 2011, bold and underline added). 
Hamlin and Wynn’s research found that babies of nine, six and even three months 
old preferred “helpers”, who helped the protagonist of the scenarios (a puppet) to 
reach its goal. The babies tended to dislike and avoid puppets that prevented the 
protagonist's success. Biologists might say that  this may not be the beginnings of 
morality; they might argue that third order autopoietic organisms (such as a herd or 
groups) learn that helping each other favors the group to cope and survive better 
under the doctrine of the survival of the fittest. The puppets used in the experiment 
were a dog, a cat and a rabbit. To feel empathetic towards other species, in this case 
animals does not fit that reasoning. It is unlikely that babies at that early age have a 
well-developed “mechanics” of reasoning; more likely they felt intuitively 
something about how to value the puppets’ social or anti-social behavior 
irrespective about the nature of the puppets. 
 
9.3 Morality and emotions 
There are ideas that connect, albeit in a “fuzzy” way, the “system of emotions” to 
morality. A similar statement comes from Carroll Izard: 
 “Perhaps all the emotions play some part, directly or indirectly, in the 
development of conscience and morality.” (Izard, 1977 p. 421) 
Comparable suggestions have been made by many (e.g. Brabeck and Gorman 1992; 
Weiner 2006; Turiel & Killen 2010). Haidt (2003) and Wilson (1993) go further and 
speak about “moral emotions”. 
 How would emotions help the thesis? What is the scientific status of a theory of 
emotions? To connect morality to emotions does not make morality more rational or 
easier to understand if a theory of emotions lacks the same authority which is missing 
for morality. Kant developed a pure rational system of morality, devoid of emotions. 
But in the end, he made a teleological choice (MacIntyre, 1984 p. 56). Most theories 
of morality, in one way or another, do allow a relevant link to emotions and infuse 
unwillingly the very unclear scientific status of emotions into the theory of morality:  
 “There have been no adequate theories of emotion to guide investigations” 
(Plutchik 1980)… “It appears that the only belief held in common by 
psychologists of emotions is a conviction that emotions exist and that they 
exert an influence on human beings.” (Brabeck and Gorman 1992 p. 90) 
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And 
“We describe a continuum of perspectives on emotion and highlight how 
different (often mutually incompatible) perspectives on emotion lead to 
different views ....” (Gross & Barrett 2011 p. 8, italics added) 
An overall comprehensive explanatory theory of emotions does not exist yet. 
Solomon (1993) went so far as to speak of a philosophy of emotions. Present theories 
of emotions are very fragmented, although some meet more consensus than others. 
James-Lange-based theories are out of fashion; these theories state that the body is 
primarily responsible for emotions. We feel fear for a tiger not because we assess it 
to be dangerous, but because we feel fear and goose bumps. Then, once we 
experience the fear, then we judge the tiger as dangerous. Modern neurobiological 
schools of thought, which assume that bodily factors primarily influence the 
properties of emotions, give new life to these theories.  
 Cognitive theories accept the opposite view; they claim that emotions have 
“intentionality”, meaning that emotions are about something. In this view, the 
nature of emotions is based on cognitive judgments. The intentionality of emotions 
also connects emotions, directly or indirectly, to the world. And in that sense, the 
ground of emotions is the ground of psychology: that is, the world, just like Husserl 
noticed a long time ago.  
 There are however too many exceptions to this theory; for instance an object / 
event is judged as safe (e.g. tigers in movies) and may still arise fear in terms of  
seeing tigers on the screen. The very effect of experiencing fear in perfectly safe 
environments is the reason behind the huge popularity of horror movies. Also the 
assessment of a dangerous situation (in this case, a real tiger) may not evoke fear 
for a minority of people (for instance a tiger dompteur in a circus). Also, cognitive 
theories do not explain well the fear people may have for non-existent “things” like 
zombies or vampires. Despite the many theories on emotion, the most popular ones 
tend to center on the appraisal theories of emotions (e.g. Lazarus, 1991; Scherer, 
Schorr & Johnstone, 2001).  
“Cognitive processes clearly play some role in determining when we 
experience emotional states...Numerous theorists have argued that the most 
important cognitive processes involve appraisal of the situation.” (Eysenck, 
2010 p. 572) 
One of the newer theories—“Integrative embodiment theory of emotions” (Newen 
& Barlassina 2013)—incorporates bodily origins next to the cognitive element 
(assessments or judgments).  
“While all feeling theories of emotion overlook the intentional object as an 
essential part of the emotion, the cognitive theories do tend to forget the 
feeling dimension of the emotion. Only the integrative embodiment theory 
takes all these components into account as constitutive of the emotion” (PR, 
Ruhr-Universität Bochum June 2013). 
The way how the two systems—body and mind, seemingly apart but together—
constitute an emotion is unknown. In the press release of the theory of Newen & 
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Barlassina, an emotion is mentioned “…as a separate kind of mental state, namely 
an emotion that we conceive as a complex pattern of distinctive characteristics”. 
Complex, in this context, equals however Griffiths' “complex”, denoting “how little 
we know about [emotions]” (Griffiths 2004 p. 237).  
 Feelings are important inner experiences. Any knowledge or interpretation about 
emotions, however, as it is in the domain of descriptions (observer’s logic), is based 
on personal understanding and forms part of our ego, so is not helpful for the 
research. All knowledge of emotions must be put to one side as-if irrelevant, and 
their content won’t be used. As expected, the unresolved and fragmented theories 
of emotions do not help the research to give morality a more rational and clear 
authority.  
 
9.4. Emotions and Circular logic 
The difficulty of psychology in researching emotions has to do with the use of 
observer’s logic. What could be more intrinsically embedded in the living than 
emotions? Emotions possibly exist even before the development of rationality and 
autopoietically deserve to be approached with Circular logic. 
 One of the major problems with appraisal theories of emotions is that, in 
“observer's logic” mode, different people react emotionally differently to the same 
event. Most examples can be rationally explained and support the appraisal theory. 
After interviewing, most of the different reactions are indeed based on different 
appraisals of the same event. A problem occurs when the appraisals are similar and 
the experienced emotions are not. For instance, two friends both acknowledge that 
flying is safe, but one feels safe and the other feels fear and needs to discipline 
himself in order to step into the airplane. Another example, mentioned earlier, is 
about people who are too afraid to see horror movies or leave the cinema because 
the werewolves or the vampires are too threatening. Also, there are judgments or 
appraisals of situations, which are considered very dangerous, and yet fear is not 
felt or the danger even attracts people. It is likely that all people know bungee 
jumping, under controlled conditions, it is as perfectly safe as flying, but most will 
refuse a free ride into the air anyway.  
Emotions are feeling experiences. For instance, we feel joy or sadness or anger. 
But where do emotions come from, is there a source, what are their functions? They 
originate in us, but from where and more importantly, why? In relation to Kant's 
question—what makes the experience of the world possible—when attempting to 
better understand a possible link between emotions and morality, the question here  
is: “What makes the experience of emotions possible?”, “What exists  a priori to 
emotions”?  
Suppose emotions are like the colors of the light falling on the floor when the 
light enters the house through the colored window panes. The one inside, amidst the 
colors, sees the world through what is etched on the window panes. The inscriptions 
tell him what he detects outside and control the properties of the panes, which also 
control the passing colors. Too bad when (near) identical inscriptions on the window 
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panes of other houses do not necessarily pass through the same colors. What is the 
role of the sun in all of this? Is the sun a neutral source?  
What is missed by appraisal theories, following Circular logic, is the fact that 
emotions are not about any appraisals of world events. They are strictly a response 
to Ego as the asymmetrical relation between subject and object within (section 8.5). 
Projection obscures the relation between two meanings as one. The relation 
between subject and object determines the emotions, but under the condition that 
object meaning does not primarily  and objectively serve the object (the trigger), but 
reflects the meaning of subject in relation to that context. The subject does not adapt 
to the world but uses the world serving its goal: self-maintenance. The goal adapts 
the world as it is known and experienced to itself (subject) making it a compliant 
world. This diametrically opposes the conclusions of observer's logic. 
Contemporary appraisal theories of emotions focus on the appraisal of the “object” 
side or as a separate exercise focus on the appraisal of the subject side. That cannot 
explain emotions. Strictly speaking, emotions are not responses towards the 
meaning of triggers, emotions do not respond to the world at all and never did. 
 Example 1: Driving on a B-road means regularly meeting an oncoming vehicle 
which then passes by, mostly within one meter (often less), side mirror to side 
mirror. This also means passing death itself that kills faster than a Grizzly bear. 
Nonetheless, most drivers experience this as something completely safe, safer even 
than lighting their BBQ with alcohol on a hot summer day  
 Example 2: Two people, a native and a tourist, both admit that rattlesnakes are 
quick and deadly animals. Both approach a rattlesnake lying in the desert sand, 
between some small rocks. The task is to earn one hundred dollars, by catching the 
snake with bare hands and then putting the animal into a bag, unharmed. One person 
declines and says: “Not me”. While watching the rattle snake, even the thought of 
it evokes a big fear in him. The other person is focused; he observes the snake for 
ten seconds in a relaxed way. He says “OK, I‘ll do it”. He circles around the snake 
and manage to quickly grab the snake by its end (tail). He then rapidly holds his arm 
stretched out in front of him, while bending his upper body away from the snake. 
He puts the snake into the bag. The other man asks him: “Wow… were you not 
afraid?” The man answers with a big smile: “I have done this before.” Further 
questioning reveals that the man without fear showed even more respect for the 
deadly properties of the snake than the tourist. 
 Example 3: There are some teenagers who feel uncomfortable at parties or in 
student bars; they don’t find it easy to make contact with others. They look up to 
the others, who share conviviality and joy. They really would like to join but can’t. 
Somehow an inhibiting fear resist their wish of actively joining in. The fear is based 
on a sort of mind-reading, having to do with the idea that the “other” will turn them 
down. The “why?” of the turning down has already been accepted as a fact, before 
the possibility of such an event actually happening, and is a part of their self-image. 
As mentioned above, “passing death” so many times, by the hundreds on the 
road is not the same thing as having an unwanted appointment with one of them. 
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Both drivers, approaching each other, have sufficient faith in both each other’s 
capabilities in handling oncoming traffic. Fear is thus not felt and instead peace or 
even boredom are experienced. The latter could actually become dangerous. Still, 
the hard facts are that death always “travels” on busy roads with every encounter. 
Those who object to such descriptions and regard such a metaphor as an 
exaggeration just have to imagine replacing oncoming cars with speeding bullets. 
There is no major difference between cars and bullets, but there is a big difference 
in the skill of most “drivers” in avoiding them.  
Emotional states are not responses to bullets or cars, to snakes or to teenagers at 
parties; they cannot be in spite of the sometimes overwhelming appraisals locked to 
the events, really “making clear” emotions are valid responses to the external. The 
emotional states in the case of the example “fear” of the driver, the native man, the 
tourists or the teenagers are internal response to what their awareness of what they 
are capable of.  
All fear or lack of fear is a response to the unconscious question “Do I accept, 
do I know that I am fully capable of handling the situation?” This has to do with an 
evaluation of internal niche, evaluating thus the relation between internal 
descriptions and the linked interactive behavior (see section 5.6.2). When the 
answer is yes, fear is replaced by concentration, supported by adrenaline when 
relevant. If shy teenagers knew beforehand and believed that they could hold the 
interest of others in a mutually positive and memorable way, their inner insecurity 
in that context would fade away fast. Yet, not all emotions are linked to capabilities; 
but fear as a very basic and natural emotion is coupled to the first property that 
biology requires from the Living: the maintenance of physical safety. People who 
refuse to do a Bungee jump or leave the cinema in the middle of a “scary” movie, 
react to their underdeveloped capability to handle fear “an sich”. It is the fear for 
the fear that drives them out of perfectly safe places. To feel fear or joy or other 
emotions in the safe environment of for instance a cinema or hearing a convincing 
narrative has a reason. Narratives and stories and their visual expressions in movies 
trigger emotions as the listeners and watchers relate themselves with the stories as 
if the perceived is real (enough). Identifying oneself with the realness of (visual) 
narratives and their protagonists, naturally triggers meaning and emotions 
compliant to the narratives. Identifying with the protagonist and or context of  the 
movie, severely degrades the real present  context of the safe theater 
Emotions are also responses to a “matched” equilibrium (a state of being), which 
does not demand active behavior: enjoying the warmth of the sun, the smile of 
another person, looking at something beautiful or listening to music, if ”the internal 
state of affairs” (section 8.4) allows it.  
A state of being (e.g. triggered by the loss of a beloved) may involve sadness or 
even depression, which has lost interest in “smiles of others” or in enjoying the 
morning sun. The then present “internal state of affairs” has the power to override 
the natural content in i-meaning linked to the real present triggers (see section 8.3).  
If present triggers cannot “reach” a person, they are literary overridden by the past 
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of a different context absorbed in its meaning sometimes as-if that meaning 
concerns the present. One of the most efficient ways to stay locked in the past is to 
let negative feelings stay in the present.  Much more can be autopoietically deducted 
about the workings of the very rich and important domain of emotions. All emotions 
could very well be faultless, while errors in judgments do abundantly exist. It would 
be outside the scope of the thesis to delve into theories of emotions more, as a theory 
of emotions is not directly part of the thesis.  
 
9.5 Transcendental Source of Emotions 
What might be some clues or cues that would lead to the possible existence of a 
Transcendental Source of Emotions? The concept “Transcendental Source of 
Emotions” (with “quotes”) produces only one “hit” in a Google search (and other 
online searches as of 7/19/2015). The search “source of emotions” produces 110 
million Google “hits”. The large number of “hits” for the latter search can be 
explained by the fact that most schools of thoughts if not all accept emotions, as a 
response to worldly events or to appraisals about them, matching the popular 
appraisal theories of emotions in psychology. Other sources for emotions among 
the hits vary creatively, from God, the body to arts and movies as important sources.  
 The one Google “hit” to “Transcendental Source of Emotions” refers to a 
question I posted in a philosophy forum. To find a new lead, common knowledge 
about emotions is differently interpreted. The following points, A-E, may not all 
necessarily be true, but will explain the route of thought followed in order to 
synthesize the possibility of the existence of a Transcendental Source of Emotions. 
Important clues are that emotions are of primary importance in determining “quality 
of life” as experienced and at the same time there is zero freedom to choose 
emotions. Many might disagree with both points though, especially the latter. 
 A: What is the proof of a good, joyful life or its opposite? There are two possible 
answers: to think and believe “I am happy” (or not), or to feel it. I personally have 
only known one person who believed that he was happy and who answered the 
question with: “Because I think so”. So I asked him “If you think that you are happy 
and believe it every day and you wake up every day feeling bad or depressed, 
would...” to which he interrupted, “Hell no, then I would not be happy”.  
 Most—if not all—people would agree that the real proof of a good life is to feel 
a good life. There may still be many who disagree, as for instance they may project 
happiness belonging to a future state of achieving set goals as a label to the present 
route of reaching them in spite of how they actually feel in the present. 
 B: (1) If everybody could design a house to live in for the rest of their life (or 
delegate this designing to others), who would opt for a cold, moist, draughty house, 
unless convinced that they need penance to somehow “straighten things out”? In 
this latter situation, wouldn’t it be proven that such a house was pure punishment? 
If humans could design or choose their daily feelings, who would still choose to be 
depressed, suicidal or even simply unhappy? The principle cannot be that we create 
or choose our feelings, in the same way that we choose and prepare our breakfast; 
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such an idea is disrespectful to all who feel depressed and require help. We do 
accept our feelings however not as blind coincidences, but as naturally linked to our 
appraisals. 
 (2) Appraisal theories also point to a kind of mechanism, albeit not fully 
understood, which would hold that in order to change emotions, cognitive appraisals 
do play a role. As said before (section 9.4), emotions respond to the asymmetrical 
internal relation between subject and object and not just to “objects”. Autopoiesis 
states that all processes serve an internal equilibrium, or a “set state” as the internal 
reference (Maturana et al. 1980 p. 26, 51. Yet, an internal reference does not 
automatically trigger positive emotions. For example, people who experienced 
difficulties in their childhood tend to prolong their unhappiness in adult life, which 
autopoietically fully makes sense. The biological nature of circular logic protects 
the internal set of internal descriptions regardless of what sets them once (instincts 
or learnings), and when once set, it is accepted and protected by the very process of 
organizational closure itself regardless of how they feel.   
 C: (B1) and (B2) together sheds a different light on the use of emotions. In spite 
of the fact that one knows he cannot make his emotions, we accept them to be linked 
to personal descriptions (opinions, meaning), which are under the control and 
responsibility of the conscious mind. Descriptions are personally accepted as true 
irrespective of how they feel. Some truths feel bad, some truths feel good is the 
resulted logic behind it. This irrespective-ness leads to the conclusion that in the 
possible rational domain of descriptions, emotions being positive or negative are 
not linked to the logic behind opinions and meaning and thus not linked to the 
(supposed) truth value of the logic applied. Still the opposite is happening as-if 
emotions áre linked to truth. With irrational beliefs only emotions ——because of 
the realness of how they are experienced—make (irrational) beliefs equally real by 
the intensity of what is felt. This is true for sound rational ideas too, but those ideas 
also proof their right to exist by being also logically right in the eyes of supporting 
observers.  Still there is another equally important proof to uphold, maintain and 
defend personal opinions and meaning in spite of being rational or not or in spite of 
how they feel. Meanings as subjective as they may be, have proven to be also real 
as they are experienced as (projected) properties of the perceived and not as 
meaning. Projection is the cause of the proof (section 5.17-5.17.3).  Thus meanings 
have a triple foundation of their truthfulness. The triple bind to the reality of 
“realness” of personal beliefs / meanings makes it natural to defend them against 
opposing logics in spite of how they feel. The natural habit to protect personal 
meanings, if it must against all odds, is fully backed up by the organizational closure 
of Autopoiesis.  
 D: It was clear to René Descartes that everything is doubtful except “being 
aware” of the doubt itself.  It is even possible to “be aware” of the fact that one is 
aware. Experiences, as such, are in the first person and thus universally self-
verifying. Being doubtful, or having the experience of the “deepest” uncertainty, is 
one of the infinite experiences of proof of one's own existence. This does not have 
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to do with knowledge or certainty. How can one experience his non-existence? The 
conclusion must be granted that everyone is entitled to say: “My existence itself 
must be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth including this statement”  
 This sentence has immediately consequences. Something that exists must have 
true properties. So every man and woman may also conclude: “I, who do exist, must 
have true properties even when unknown to me or all mankind”.  
 E: Handled in chapter 8, for an individual “identity” to exist as the total sum of 
constructed meanings, the true, partly true or seriously wrong meanings compared 
to the real or true self (the unknown true properties) need to be faithfully accepted 
as true. In a way autopoiesis forbids instinctive knowledge to be replaced by 
disbelief, but accepts false knowledge when believed. Descriptions based on 
disbelief are not accepted in i-niche, all constructions must be right for its maker. 
Sometimes right is not based on understanding but on trust, which is also the 
opposite of disbelief. The constructions fall in a natural way under the responsibility 
and competence of Consciousness, who made them. This is not true for emotions. 
Emotions linked to meaning cannot be changed without changing the meaning. 
Although feelings / emotions are a serious part of human experiences, they do not 
fall under the responsibility and competence of Consciousness. The experience of 
having an identity is thus determined by two “players” both Transcendental (a 
priori), whereby their relationship needs meaning in order to function. One player 
is Consciousness, a priori to meaning, the other a priori to emotions with properties 
unknown. All of the above combined make it not inconceivable that the other player  
a priori to emotions, gives an internal emotional FB loop to guide the development 
of internal descriptions of identity (making up an Ego) “true to itself”. A simple 
metaphor of this conjecture is Hans Christian Andersen's story “The Ugly 
Duckling”, described above. This emotional FB loop is also a trigger, be it an 
internal one and obeys like all triggers  its  meaninglessness  it offers to its perceiver.  
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Chapter 10: Internal communication 
Introduction 
All theories covered so far do not produce a method different enough from Husserl’s 
epoché (section 3.1.2) to guide respondents in how to become truly impartial. What 
the theories do support is that the brain, from a biological as well from a 
philosophical point of view, is able to allow the realization of the state of 
Transcendental Consciousness as a pure impartial being.  
 It is now time to seek practical, applicable theories that would make the veil of 
innocence possible as a method. Except from unusable methods, such as Eastern 
meditation methods, which takes a lot of time and perseverance or Husserl’s epoché, 
a different existing method to reach Transcendental Consciousness or ego-free 
Consciousness could not be found or likely does not exist yet. The goal would be to 
make sure that the ego and thus Ego is “at the sidelines” when the important part of 
the interview begins. Ego, practically defined as the influence of meaning to the 
pure biological metaphors (e.g. colors being a metaphor of electromagnetic 
wavelengths) of sensed triggers is best seen psychologically as the total sum of all 
meaning, be it about self or about the world. Ego, as the sum of meaning 
constructions (interrelated web of meanings), perfectly explains personal 
differences in emotions and different individual behaviors about and in the same 
context. So, how would it be possible to put the ego aside taking into account that 
it is in fact impossible for an overall central ego to exists (otherwise named a 
“context-less ego”, see section 8.3)? 
 
10.0 The possibility of consciousness to communicate with the ego 
The ego was earlier compared to a script; this is a useful comparison. Convincing 
movie stars do not play their roles as if they are following a script; it is amateurs 
who seem to be playing out scripts. Great actors from Hollywood, Bollywood or 
Tokyo become the script they play, transforming the illusion of the character into a 
convincing real person on the screen or on the stage. The well-known secret is to 
fully identify with the protagonist in the script. The process of identification is the 
merging of consciousness and information into “one”. The criteria for this sort of 
identification are different for actors from common man. Actors do not need to 
believe that the script is based on the truth. For consciousness to become the ego, 
that belief that the “script” one is involved in is based on the truth, is crucial. The 
ego is not after all the same as the conscious mind; that is why the conscious mind 
can fully detach itself from the ego and communicate with it as part of the 
unconscious mind. 
“The ability of the nervous system [neo-cortex] to interact with its own 
states, as if these were independent entities...” (Maturana et al. 1980 p. 25-
26, bold, italics added) 
And: 
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“Furthermore: …an observer through orienting behavior can orient himself 
towards himself, and then generate communicative descriptions that 
orient him towards his description of this self-orientation …” (Maturana et 
al. 1980 p. 29, bold added) 
And from Husserl:  
“The ego which is present now, thus temporalized, has contact with its past 
ego, even though the latter is precisely no longer present: it can have a 
dialogue with it and criticize it, as it can others (Husserl 1970 §50 p. 72, 
bold added). 
Accepting Husserl’s remark or the studies of Archer (2007) supported by 
autopoiesis, one can contact and communicate internally. To regard that the 
unconscious plays an important part of one’s personality is commonly accepted by 
nearly everyone and by most schools of psychology. The role of the human 
unconscious is not making decisions, it is holding information, not constructing it. 
The content of internal descriptions and niche as the sum of all interactive behavior 
is—once determined by the human consciousness—held in the unconscious and 
mostly executed with no resistance of the conscious. All ego’s information is hold 
in memory but autopoietically memory is a present structure and does not describe 
the past. As said before memory is a label made by observer’s logic. What is not 
found in science is that the unconscious has a kind of identity of its own with 
important properties of the conscious, which makes it communicable. To 
communicate with the unconscious as-if being another [consciousness] (with a 
wholly different function compared to the conscious) is generally not accepted and 
mostly seen as auditory hallucinations in psychology. Most studies research 
“patients” with hearing voices and they are categorized under “AVH” (Auditory 
Verbal Hallucinations). A lot of further study is still necessary (e.g. Larøi, F., 
Sommer, I. E., Blom, J. D., Fernyhough, C., Hugdahl, K., Johns, L. C., ... & Waters, 
F. (2012). Archer (e.g. 2007) brings forth the “normality” of hearing internal voices 
and having internal discussions and so she places them outside the psychopathology 
of contemporary mainstream (clinical) psychology and psychiatry. 
The conscious “I-as-ego” considers himself as independent and in control, as 
the “captain of the ship”, with oneself as the only crew. Therefore, the possibility to 
interview important “sub-parts” of the self, on an equal basis of being, may sound 
to some as strange, impossible or worse as something completely illusionary.  
But where is the ego when detached from I-Consciousness? By definition it must 
be in the unconscious with all the rest of what it might hold. The unconscious holds 
the sum of all information which forms the ego, while the conscious “occupies” 
only a fraction of that sum, depending on context (triggers) or disciplined will. The 
unconscious also consists of much more than just what was once in consciousness. 
The unconscious includes emotions and their source and most importantly it 
includes all information regarding the Self and it’s still to be developed potentials / 
talents, which would be experienced with the right [allowing] belief-systems. The 
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swan – duck tale shows metaphorically that not what one truly is, is experienced, 
but one’s descriptions about self, determine experience. 
Detachment from the ego not in terms of “controlling” it but in terms of 
respectfully helping it by giving it more choices still needs “will”, but not using it 
against the ego. The will here, does not comply with discipline. Although internal 
detachment is often linked to some form of disagreement, detachment in friendship 
is something that happens very often socially. Many parents or friends are able to 
be detached from the stories of those close to them, in order to help and guide them. 
To offer ego detachment as a “gift”, in the form of a choice, is to delegate the power 
of detachment to the ego and away from consciousness. The idea is when ego 
voluntarily withdraws, it withdraws from Husserlian Transcendental 
Consciousness, its maker. So how to construct this different method? Such a method 
is fully the reversal of all known methods in terms of reaching an “ego-less” state 
and almost guarantees cooperation under certain conditions, which normally are 
troublesome.  So what more is needed to develop such a method? 
 
10.1 “The Colours of your Mind”  
Meanings also imply a hierarchy. There is a fine hierarchy in meaning. The higher 
the meaning is, the more it controls “lower order” meaning. Also, even though a 
group of triggers is accepted as a distinctive unity by an observer and so in some 
form is recognized by categorization, the recognition will still leave out a 
considerable numbers of triggers that are irrelevant for the intended category, but 
are part of the larger context that is perceived. But external triggers do not only 
awaken meaning about the triggers. In the first instance they do; but the trigger 
meaning may is also supervised by one or more higher level meta-meaning, which 
may intervene and apparently this is always the case. For example, people in a room 
listening to an interesting and important presentation will quickly lose interest if 
smoke appears under the door, quickly spreading through the room. The smoke 
triggers a “safety-part” of the ego, overriding the part which is interested in the 
presentation. Did the trigger awaken the safety part or is the safety part always there, 
lingering in the background, continuously alert even if outside awareness? If that is 
the case, the trigger (in this case the smoke) does not awaken the safety-part, but 
triggers it to intervene. The consequential loss of interest in the presentation can be 
replaced by (any) other overriding meaning, for instance the shift in the presentation 
to a different ideology hostile to the audience.  
A publication by Jerry Rhodes and Sue Thame (1988), based on empirical 
research done at Philips in Eindhoven in the eighties, found three important 
functional categories turning out to be the three main master divisions of the ego. 
Their aim was to help businesses (Philips) in finding an excellent decision-making 
strategy when juggling important variables such as “Best Quality of product” 
against “Time” and against “Acceptability for others”, which includes for instance, 
costs. 
They developed a model of “thinking” dividing thinking in three modes: 
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1. The Creative Mind which got the color Green 
2. The Realist mind which got the color Red   
3. The Critical / judgmental Mind which got the color Blue 
“Everything you can possibly intend to do with your thinking is found within 
the one simple picture in Figure 3…Green is the code for the unknown, the 
as yet unrealized future…Green thinking is the fountain of creativity …Red 
is the code for what is true, what is already known…this is the thinking that 
finds out, seeks out information…It collects facts and figures…Blue is the 
code for coming to judgment, it requires personal values and beliefs” 
(Rhodes and Thame 1988 p. 38, bold added). 
As a model it is still crude and two-dimensional, but fully suited for the goals of the 
thesis. I now leave the color naming of Rhodes and Thame behind as it was chosen 
politically by the authors to avoid stereotyping amongst people. Their book does 
not speak of “parts” but of modes of thinking, assuming a different role for the 
thinker behind it. Looking at these three fully different thinking functions in the ego, 
a first thinker can be identified: the Realist. The Realist is practically not the 
objective researcher, which can be approximated.  It is the individual observer who 
mostly intimately cooperates with the critical part, which adds the adjectives.  
 
 
 
                      
   
                                                                                                                                             
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
 
                             Fig 3 The Colours of your mind 
 
 The Realist is the first inspector and uses all its intelligence to distinguish 
between true and false, what is real and what is unreal. The Realist’s concern is “Is 
it true 'for me', does it exist?” using his five senses and its logic. It does not 
necessarily mean it is free; it is heavily under the control of the Critic. This is not 
unlike the way that a rabbit and a squid will have different criteria in defining what 
is real for them and/or important enough to investigate. For humans, the Realist 
more or less resembles the theoretically “neutral” investigator, but within the ego’s 
“naïve” natural position unless neutrality violates personal conviction, then the 
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Realist is easily contaminated by the next part. The time orientation of the realist is 
the present. 
 The Critic’s concerns follow primarily the concerns of the Realist, by accepting 
all of the Realist’s conclusions of what “exists to be true (enough)”. It does not 
contradict the Realists, as it is wholly not his function to do so. The Critic’s 
functionality hovers over all processes, including those of the Realist; it guards 
internal equilibrium and meaning. The Critic needs to first separate safety from 
danger, important from unimportant, and it also needs to determine “What is good 
or bad for me?” These are all meaning-values, fully dependent on the organism’s 
biological nature and depending on the nature of personal identity, when it comes 
to humans. The “motor” behind the ego is the Critic, as it is the critic who protects 
identity. The Critic’s orientation has to do with the foundations of its references: 
these have to do with the past. 
 The Creative has to do with questions such as “What is new”, and is presumably 
linked to a relatively new part in biology; it is difficult or even impossible to discern 
creativity in more “simple” animals. Most animals do not necessarily need a creative 
part in order to maintain and live life. Only in despair, when the Realist and the 
Critic cannot fall back to old learnings and to a routine in order to escape danger, 
the creative part is required, if it has developed in that particular animal. For 
example, the call for a non-routine escape was possibly created over time using 
creativity as a property. Because the ego’s main foundation is the Critic, which is 
(cyclically) past-oriented, its ancient attitude to the really “new” is the “fear of the 
unknown”; this does not view its Creative sibling favorably. The time orientation 
of the Creative is the future. 
Rhodes and Thame added this extra remark to the Creative:  
“It [creative thinking] is…odd, upsetting convention, disturbing habits and 
the status quo [read: which is in the hands of the real powers in ego: Realist 
and Critic] and so unfortunately…can be misunderstood and suppressed” 
(Rhodes and Thame 1988 p. 37). 
This model can be applied in a broader context. For example, a monk who has lived 
his whole life in a monastery could have a highly developed Critic with great 
spiritual values, but a less developed Realist. If the monk were to leave the protected 
monastery for the city, he might find it very hard to support his economy. On the 
other hand, a man with a less developed Critic but a highly developed Realist could 
become a clever bank robber, successfully avoiding guards’ patterns and disarming 
complex security systems (when referring to “high” and “low” this refers to having 
(or not) conscience and moral values). The usability of the color model solves the 
question of how to handle the ego. A central Ego cannot exist apart from a linguistic 
general overall “label” as a self-image. But Ego as a management board of three can 
be considered. The question now is how? What else is needed?  
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10.2 The unconscious “roots” of the ego 
The unconscious is an “entity” within all of us; it holds our drives, longings, 
emotions, memory, our talents, potential, intuitions, dreams and further unknowns. 
But above all else, the unconscious is a very living, very human entity. Also, an 
unspecified connection exists between pure bodily structures and processes (e.g. the 
immune system) and the unconscious psyche, a connection which expresses itself, 
for instance, through the phenomenon of the “placebo effect”.  
An important part of the unconscious is the storage and maintenance of Identity 
(Ego section 8.5) and its reduced self-image, named “the ego”. The ego on a 
functional level can be considered to be of the three “operators”: Realist, Critic and 
Creative. The classic way to become (temporarily) ego-less, in a controlled way is 
to ignore the ego, making it redundant or putting all its criteria in brackets. But with 
these methods the fundamental relational nature of Identity is ignored. In Eastern 
mysticism and spiritual theories the ego has a bad name, as if it is the “enemy” or a 
“monkey”: 
“We know only one thing, that our minds [ego] are like monkeys, restless, 
chattering, up and down, everlastingly moving, moving, moving, thinking, 
worrying. How can such a mind look? Obviously it cannot. Then we say, 
‘How am I to train it to be quiet?’ We spend years in training it to be quiet, 
and then it becomes another kind of monkey. (Laughter.) This is not a joke. 
Please do not laugh.” (Krishnamurti 1966) 
The spiritual (consciousness) and worldly ego seem to be on opposite sides of the 
spectrum of human nature. Generally, it takes a long time, even years, to shift from 
the ego to an temporal ego-less state. This long time may be just because of a fully 
non-cooperating ego during the process of de-identification. The unconscious does 
not rectify deeply felt opinions and it turns beliefs into experience as they are 
believed. The practically infinite plasticity of the unconscious can however be used 
to the veil of innocence’s advantage.  
         To strive towards  and finally reach an ego-less state is not by definition a 
demotion of the ego, but can be reframed as its opposite: honoring the ego. What 
helps is the realization that consciousness, be it the conscious or the unconscious, 
and information (ideas, beliefs, meaning, descriptions) are best regarded as two 
fully separate and conceptually incompatible domains. It is only when 
consciousness identifies' itself with information that the separation can disappear 
and the information can be applied and expressed. To address the ego as a living 
part is fully possible by addressing it as a  “him” an alive  being, Also, a past ego—
for instance in memories—is  incomplete as even that resembles more or less  a 
small part of  the total sum of interactions and their accompanied webs of meaning 
as they were at that time. Offering this past ego new content or new contexts will 
trigger some covert aspects of it to come into view. 
 The method described is a full reversal of all known methods in terms of reaching 
an ego-less state and almost guarantees cooperation under conditions, which 
normally would be troublesome. What is necessary yet is method of contact. 
  
142 | P a g e  
 
10.3 Voice dialogue 
Autopoiesis, as well as the theories of Husserl, open up the possibility of contacting 
parts of the ego: “The ego…it can have a dialogue with it [past ego]” (section 7.2) 
A dialogue with the present “ego” might be possible, as long as the one making the 
contact is fully dissociated from it. A “discipline” specialized in (linguistically) 
making contact with “inner parts” is the “Voice Dialogue”, a technique developed 
by Stone & Stone and described in “Psychology of Selves” (1989). Stone & Stone 
found that the ego, as a single unity, cannot reliably be expressed in one voice. Their 
conclusion supports the “autopoietic but fragmented nature” of the ego coming out 
of internal niche. Although the ego considers itself to be a unity, comforted by 
seeing the same single person in the mirror plus the experiencing a single “I”, the 
Ego is based on many internal relationships, expressed in a multitude of contexts 
(section 8.3). A person can be truly assertive on the work place, but can be a “softy” 
with his wife and children; he can be a true hero on his ship, but afraid to fly; he can 
be an authoritative king in the kitchen but a humble person in other contexts, and so 
on. What voice dialogue shows is that important voices, belonging to important sub-
egos, can always be detected. It is therefore possible to bring a voice to the 
foreground with the rest of ego in the background. 
“Voice Dialogue provides direct access to the sub-personalities ... It offers 
the opportunity to separate them from the total personality and deal with 
them as independent, interacting psychic units or energy systems. …. Each 
sub-personality is a distinct energy pattern and animates our physical body 
with its particular energies.” (Stone and Stone, 1989 p. 49) 
The option that the ego can be contacted by approaching one of its sub-parts is 
practical and doable. However, the concept of sub-personality parts somehow 
suggests being part of an overall single or master ego, which cannot exist in a single 
context unless the context is (temporarily) made meaningless, but in that case we 
speak of Consciousness and not ego anymore. I have avoided to use Husserl’s name 
“Pure Ego” for it, as Husserl did not take into account the contextual foundation of 
ego’s function. All biological substrates, structures and strategies form a support 
base for a multitude of separate operations, “waiting” for the right triggers to be 
activated. The ego as defined in the thesis is a construct of original Transcendental 
Consciousness, it is hard to see the rise of a central contextless ego unless as a gross 
generalization or as an abstract idea over a multitude of contexts. This must be taken 
seriously. The ego is a multilayered, universally applicable “tool”. It would be better 
to regard the ego as the blue steel tool kit or as a “vehicle” to enter contexts one by 
one. Consciousness becomes also a tool when it associates or identifies with the tool 
(the ego-part linked to contextual triggers) in its context. Consciousness itself is not 
divided in parts and it always assumes the notion and experience of “being one”, 
being a single “I”. The “single I” experience is mostly unbroken when the ego 
“slips” from the triggered sub-part into the next during wake time as oppose to 
dream time. For instance: some minutes ago, I was in my concentrated “writer-part” 
sitting behind my keyboard, when suddenly my beloved Afghan hound entered the 
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room and pushed his nose against my elbow. I turned to him and immediately was 
filled with loving feelings. I lowered my head until I could feel his hair against mine. 
I smiled and returned to my desktop. Immediately, my mood changed and I once 
again became the anonymous writer. During this shift away and back I definitely 
changed ego parts but experienced myself as a “whole unity” all the time. It would 
be illogical to speak of that “I as ego” which shifted from ego part to ego part. One 
could rather speak of: “I as Transcendental Consciousness shifted from ego part to 
ego part”. So the ego parts are the biological autopoietic necessities to interact in 
the world. The automatic and natural process of identification is trigger-bound and 
fully obscures Transcendental Consciousness as an entity that can be experienced 
as a standalone unity, with the ability to identify. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
144 | P a g e  
 
Chapter 11: The veil of innocence method  
 
Introduction 
The following aspects of the veil have been found: 
 The first aspect is that subjectivity and objectivity are both components of 
subjectivity as internal relations for the Ego. Objectivity as a construct of reduced 
subjectivity, exists in language only. So, the two categories, subjective versus 
objective cannot exist as separate realities next to each other as one is virtual and 
the other is real. To put the subjective outside the veil includes the objective. 
 The second practical aspect is to use the rapprochement method during the whole 
interview.  
 The third aspect is to replace the idea of a central master-ego with a different 
mode of approaching ego: the functional ego as the result of cooperation between 
three specialist functions, a Realist, a Critic and a Creative function, something 
like a Management Board of three which represent the whole “ego-organization”. 
An important aspect, which the veil as a method needs is the communicative ability 
of “The Board”, which can be approached with a method similar to voice dialogue. 
As said before the internal communicative abilities between Consciousness and 
“ego” has been supported by different authors e.g. Maturna et al., Husserl and 
Archer. 
 The “tone” of previous texts, from the preface to this chapter, although 
concerning a diverse range of topics is still in line with the dominant reality of 
“adult” consciousness. The rule for scientific contexts in particular is to use 
“mature”, objective and impersonal—and sometimes even abstract—language,  not 
unlike the tone of financial reports and legal articles. Yet, the reality concepts of the 
conscious are not the same as those of the unconscious. It is safe to say that they are 
practically each other’s opposite. A clear example is how odd dream realities can 
be for the conscious as they are natural for the unconscious. This does not make the 
unconscious irrational or incomprehensible. Still, the veil of ignorance operates on 
the unconscious level and therefore must match the “language” and in a way the 
culture of the unconscious, even when they are not generally known.  
 
11.0 Regulative ideas about the unconscious 
The following assumptions are not necessarily true, but function as a form of 
'regulative ideas'. Yet, the ideas are true enough to distill principles that make the 
veil method work under the conditions that are set for the thesis. The world of the 
unconscious is fully independent of the world outside; they are practically 
disconnected. Autopoiesis, in describing organizational closure and all that it 
entails, comes closest to revealing the workings of the unconscious. The human 
unconscious, as a psychic domain, has very little, if any at all, content of itself that 
is linked to the world. It is also autopoietic. This is a consequence of being 
Transcendental to the world. All Kant’s a priori findings are also not “content linked 
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to the world” although it is seductive to make the link. A priori properties of the 
mind are what is said, they are only of the mind, but give the mind certain 
capabilities, for instance to perceive / interpret the perceived lack or non-presence 
of objects as space, like the lack of light is seen as darkness. Kant could have named 
darkness another example of an a priori faculty of the mind, while colors linked to 
the world are not. In spite of its independence of the world, the unconscious as a 
system has obviously no problem in carrying and sustaining the worldly reality 
constructs of the conscious mind, which is a different thing than being connected to 
the events of the world.  
The use of an attitude that is suitable in order to interact with objective, reasonable 
and mature adults may, in various ways, not be useful when communicating with 
the unconscious unless what is common between the conscious and the unconscious 
is being addressed.  
For instance, persuasion techniques based on “facts” that may work in the “real” 
world may have little or no effect when it comes to interactions between the 
conscious and the unconscious. People can tell many times themselves that flying 
is very much safer than walking in your own house, to no avail for losing their fear 
of flying. The adult conscious communicative attitude is based mostly on 
interactions between adults, and in terms of humans, their egos are all practically 
sense and world oriented. Our unconscious is different enough to appreciate a 
different “nonprofessional” attitude, similarly to the way most adults intuitively use 
in communicating with young children. The aim when responding to the child of a 
stranger is to make the child feel safe, comfortable and in some cases even loved. 
Especially the last aim covers all possible others. In that case what is common 
between consciousness and unconsciousness is addressed: respect and maybe even 
love for Life itself as it is expressed, irrespective of any subjective content defining 
the personality or body of the child. The model that works best, that is even 
necessary, [in my experience], is to approach the unconscious too as a lovable 
“child”, while simultaneously accepting it is not a child, but something far beyond 
it.  
 Parts from a thick description will be used as an example to illustrate the method.  
 
11.1 Method layout  
To illustrate the explanation of the interview method in 11.3, a discussion of the 
method will be given, based on a real interview. 
 First purposeful sampling must be made in order to find the “right” respondent. 
Not unlike when interviews are done in English, the interviewer will only “sample’ 
people who already speak English. This first filter is so natural that it is mostly taken 
for granted. From experience, I would say that two to three percent of respondents 
are not initially able to be in touch with their unconscious in a single meeting. It 
takes a number of sessions to teach them how to do that, which is outside the scope 
of the thesis. The unconscious has its own “tone”, and most, but not all, people are 
able to pick up this “language” very quickly to make a dialogue become possible.  
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 To distinguish beforehand who is capable for this kind of interview, the 
respondents are sent a small exercise to be done at home. They can then post back 
their response to this exercise. They are not aware of the goal of this exercise, in 
order not to influence the outcome. If they pass, further arrangements are made, 
leading to the final interview. The goal of the home exercise explained in section 
11.3.1.1 is to determine if the potential respondent is able to make contact with his 
unconscious. From the 27 interviews that have been conducted so far (the aim is to 
conduct more than 32), one respondent didn’t succeed in the home exercise and 
therefore the interview with him wasn’t carried out. 
The interview itself consists of 3 phases:  
 The first phase functions as a precondition that would make phase two possible. 
The goal of phase one is to help the respondent understand what the interview is 
about and what his role would be. In this preparatory phase, the respondent will 
offer a “contract” (11.2.2) to his ego to reach an “ego-less” state.  
 In phase two, the respondent will contact, while being in an ego-less state, “his” 
Transcendental Source of Emotions and “interview” it. 
  In the third and last phase (11.2.3) the respondent will come back to a normal 
ego-state and evaluate and share his experiences, while also answering some 
questions. Also, conducting “test” exercises are part of this phase, verifying, in a 
way, the answers given by the “source” to validate them.  
 Finally, a link to morality, if found, will be formulated.  
 An administrative part of (post)-phase 3 involves the written member check 
signed by the respondent. For all three phases the researcher will use the 
“rapprochement method” (see section 6.4.2).  
 
11.1.1 Interview layout Phase1 
After a welcoming, general introduction in phase 1, the home exercise is done, 
whereby the respondents will experience the existence of a Source of Emotions 
(henceforth called “Source”) and its ability to communicate, although that 
conclusion will generally not be made. One could ponder if such a contact can be 
made from the very beginning of the interview trajectory, why spend time and effort 
to develop an ego-less state? The answer has to do with safeguarding non-
interference from the ego and thus from subjectivity. The home exercise will 
convince the respondent that he has a source of emotions which “react” to conscious 
communication. The repetition of the home exercise in the context of the interview 
will add the insight that any given response is a reaction to language. That makes 
the emotional source accessible and thus “interview-able”. Such an “interview” will 
not be common and precautions will need to be taken. Certain conditions must be 
fulfilled in order to have a trustworthy interview using the method.  
 In the first phase of the interview, the researcher will briefly explain Rhodes’ et 
al. ideas about the three important parts of the ego. Next will be the explanation of 
Voice Dialogue and the possibility of contacting the “ego”. As soon as the 
respondent can understand the three major divisions of the ego and can appreciate 
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the fact that he or she must therefore have those parts within himself, the second 
and last part of phase 1 of the interview method will begin. 
 
11.1.1.1 Interview layout Phase 1, part 2: the contract 
To contact the three ego (master-) parts may still sound complex and/or difficult, 
but the opposite is actually true. It is as if the parts are “all the way” present in the 
unconscious, prepared to make contact with their conscious “sibling” at any time 
(see section 11.3).  
 When contact is made, the three parts will be offered a 'contract'. When the 
contract begins with one of the parts of the ego, who is offering? It is the “I am” 
still associated with the other two parts. By subsequently approaching the three 
parts, the “I am” detaches itself from the ego (full dissociation) in a three-step 
process. Or better, the three ego parts withdraw from consciousness. 
 The contract between “I-am” and the ego serves as a condition to help or 
persuade the “ego” to understand the necessity to withdraw fully from the conscious 
as an interactive “power” and to stay distanced as-if uninterested.  
 This is fully the opposite of the approach of Eastern methods or Husserl's epoché, 
whereby Husserl is actively bracketing the ego making it meaningless in the sense 
of invalid.  In return for the ego’s voluntary withdrawal in the new method, he will 
receive all the knowledge obtained when the detachment ends. The new knowledge 
will be about the source of emotions, its possible reference and other “important 
things” which may be very interesting for the ego (or not). The ego, in the end, is 
given actually full power to determine and judge the information by its value, as he 
chooses it to be. The contract will make clear to the ego that there is nothing to lose 
as it is only information that will be gathered, which has been there all the time 
anyway, but now will be made known. All this knowledge will be owned by and 
will stay at the disposal of the ego, to serve him and only him. The knowledge will 
not be imposed by Consciousness; that is the deal.  
 Were it not for the contract, one or more of the ego's many parts may 
(unwillingly) influence or distort the processing and/or outcome of the data, making 
it “impure” and unreliable. All efforts will then be in vain. Another important 
advantage of the contract shows that it involves the ego in a respectful way, which 
greatly enhances the ego’s cooperation. 
 
11.1.2 Interview layout Phase 2, making contact and the nature of the questions 
The “internal interview” between the respondent in an ego-less impartial state and 
his Source is not an ordinary interview. It is within one mind but also between agents 
“apart”, as-if independent from each other, as in a way they are. The Source is not 
under the control of consciousness (section 9.4). As a Transcendental Source, it is 
beyond the subjective content of the unconscious and even beyond the experience 
of emotions, which for the experiencer includes his meaning about the emotions 
influencing the experience.  
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 How can a reliable contact be made? The Source’s most important property is 
its ability to initiate emotions; emotions themselves are its “primary language”. 
Especially the distinctive division between positive and negative feelings can be 
applied to communicate beyond words. When interpretations seem necessary, they 
will be reflected back to the Source to be checked for their validity.  
 Preliminary test-interviews showed that the most reliable answers (internal 
responses) that were considered true for the respondents, in terms of finding the 
reference between positive and negative feelings, were those positive and negative 
feelings themselves. This can only happen with a minimal but clear set of closed 
questions, offering simultaneously the two opposites. A question such as “Do you 
agree when X happens?” will lose its slight influence in steering the respondent and 
will become more “open”, as in: “Do you agree or disagree when X happens?”  
 In communication between people, next to the verbal part there is an important 
nonverbal part, which is, to a large degree, under unconscious “control”, for instance 
a minimal twitch under the eye, a (slight) change in pitch or tone; or in other cases, 
it is completely obvious, such as blushing etc. In the case of the thesis interviews 
there is a “pure” interaction between Consciousness and Source. The nonverbal is 
replaced by subtle feelings, which are easy to detect, and which support the nature 
of the answers. 
 To find the content of the questions it was autopoiesis that led the way. In 
autopoiesis, the concepts of self-development, growth and survival are fundamental, 
under conditions of full self-referentiality, which is personal for humans. Taking 
that as a guide in dozens of interviews, conducted preliminary to the thesis, the 
central “existential theme” for the Source’s main reference turned out to be the 
starting theme of self-development and growth, but towards its real nature. 
Although Consciousness constructs descriptions in the end about self, it is “only” 
information. There is no guarantee that the information is true / just to its real self. 
This is not unlike the children’s tale of the Ugly Duckling, whereby the emotions 
supporting its “ugliness” transformed into joy when there was a realization in terms 
of its real nature: being a swan. The realization shifted internal set references. 
 This is very different from normal autopoietic self-referentiality as animals in 
the wild are not supposed to make an error in their identity, which originally came 
from the “organization” of their species. A, “organizational” reference, which 
practically dissolved for humans, to be replaced by individual choice in sense-
making processes (section 5.16.1). In autopoiesis self-referentiality expressed in the 
world is nestled in the relation between internal meaning descriptions of triggers 
and interactive behavior descriptions, where in the end trigger description and 
interactive behavior meet. But self-referentiality of the Source is expected to be 
wholly different, it is fixed around a dynamical “true self”, whatever that may be, 
compared to the many irregular, conflicting or even “impossible” references which 
are autopoietically accepted because they belong to the ego. Mental health 
institutions around the world do exist in finding out how to help egos with “wrong” 
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internal references which (severely) hinder themselves in being “happy” and 
interacting successfully in their society.  
 As this part of the research is purely exploratory, some questions may arise. 
Some respondents, the ones who were interviewed later on in the process, received 
one or two extra questions, which were not really necessary, but enriched the 
answers of earlier questions. In all cases, member-checks were used as recurring fb-
loops during the interview. 
 
11.1.3 Interview layout Phase 3 
The last part is to interview the respondent—now fully back within his subjectivity 
(ego)—about his experience in phase 2. The answers gathered will lead to simple 
exercises in order to try out their validity. If the answers are true, predictions can be 
made for the experience of emotions in a given context (deductive investigations). 
These can be tested with the provision of the right triggers.  
 Finally, the respondent will be asked if s/he can possibly deduct a (major) link 
between the reference found and morality and moral leadership.  
 
11.2 Method illustration and its (pre) conditions. (Real life example) 
Because the method is new, an illustration will follow as a discussion of a typical 
application of the “veil of innocence”. The method may look strange or non-
academic at first, and may even seem alien to some. The approach is not aimed at 
the conscious, of which the communicative paradigm and methods are so familiar. 
It is very precisely geared to get rapport with the unconscious.  
 
11.2.1 Preparation interview phase 1 
1) The first task of the researcher is to explain and prepare the respondent in terms 
of being his own “investigator”. This will not come as a surprise to the respondent, 
as in previous meetings this was mentioned; in fact, often this is precisely the reason 
for a respondent to become interested in participating in the research. 
2) The first crucial and important condition that must be met is a safe and 
(preferably) “warm and harmonious” environment in which the interview will be 
conducted. A secluded table in the office canteen, for instance, will not be adequate. 
Even a separate room in the office will make it much harder or even impossible for 
some respondents to detach from his ego, as the office itself forms a multitude of 
strong triggers to keep the respondent (unwillingly) associated with his daily 
“professional” self. What would be much better is for the respondents to find 
themselves in a quiet, non-professional, inviting context, in which they have not 
been before. 
 
11.2.1.1 Interview phase one: repeating the preparation home exercise  
It is important for the respondents to feel at ease and experience functional rapport 
between interviewer and interviewee. The rapprochement method is perfect in 
enhancing rapport. Functional means not intimate or too personal. Functional 
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rapport mostly refers to the lack of hindering and negative relational aspects, which 
might negatively affect the interview.  
 Many interviews, under normal qualitative research conditions, will be directly 
influenced by the quality or lack of “rapport” between interviewer and 
interviewee(s). The validity and “completeness” of the gathered data increase 
greatly with established but appropriate rapport (e.g. Bogdan & Biklen 1982 p. 4; 
Seidman 2012 p. 98-101).  
 Rapport, as a condition for the interviews which are conducted under the veil of 
innocence, is a necessity. Necessary is that potential interviewers, must feel 
comfortable and peaceful by the idea that they will conduct interviews under the 
conditions of the veil of innocence method. The addition of “peaceful” is added so 
as not to confuse the needed rapport of the researcher with that of the comfortable 
feelings that people such as police investigators may have when they are 
interviewing their suspects.  
 In the introductory phase one, the interviewer explains what the aim of the 
interview is. It is for the respondent to get in touch with possible inner “sources”. 
In order to help them stay neutral, the more vaguely and generally the aim is 
described, the better. There is no help for respondents to infuse their own ideas with 
what will happen.  
 They learn that the interview has three phases: phase one, which is now, and 
which is a conversation between researcher and respondent; phase two, where the 
researcher shifts to the background, providing some verbal guidance through the 
posing of closed questions, and during which the respondents conduct their inner 
interview with eyes closed; and the last phase which is a kind of plenary review 
between respondent and researcher. The eyes closed are understood as a token of 
respect towards the inner world, shutting out the external world and its dominance. 
 In the beginning with open questions, the researcher offers some information 
about the home exercise and explores with the respondent how it was experienced. 
This exercise has already taken place, so all this leads to the establishment of even 
more rapport. [The home exercise will be repeated in this first phase and will be 
explained below].  
 When a person seems nervous or ill at ease, a short relaxation exercise may take 
place (e.g. Herbert Benson, M. D., & Klipper, M. Z. 1992). There are numerous 
similar short exercises, and the selection of which one is chosen is not important. In 
all the interviews conducted (as of 28 march 2015), an extra relaxation exercise 
didn’t prove necessary. Respondents who already seem at ease and relaxed do not 
need the exercise.  
The repetition of the home exercise is to put the respondent more at ease and to give 
him confidence, as he has already successfully done it before. The goal here, in 
phase 1, is to further educate the respondent about the workings of his own 
unconscious. It goes as follows (part of a thick description): 
R: “Peter, we will now repeat the home exercise, do you think you can do that?” 
P: “Yes” 
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R: “Can you close your eyes and imagine an internal listener, at some inner place, 
where most people expect their feelings to be, somewhere between chest and 
stomach. You know the saying ‘butterflies in the stomach’”? 
P: “Yes” 
R: “Ok. Now, assume the internal listener to be somewhere there. Say to this internal 
listener something like, “Hi Peter, I have my eyes closed now, that means I am not 
interested in the room I sit in, I am not interested in any other person, only you”. 
There is another voice in the room, which helps me to make contact with you, so 
now you know. I come, but as a friend”. 
The researcher watches Peter with his eyes closed and afterwards Peter gives a little 
nod to sign he has done that part. 
R: “Say to this presumed inner listener something unpleasant; as if you were a harsh 
critic of something small that happened, for instance about forgetting once to brush 
your teeth. Criticize, with the wrong tone of voice, but you have to mean that tone 
of voice. As an instruction, I ask you to do-this-as-if-true. But when you do it, you 
do not play as-if. You act as “true”; you are harsh; but do not exaggerate too much, 
be mildly unpleasant, stay believable.  
Remember your internal response to your harsh criticism, be it images or words or 
a feeling, or anything else that may change. Just observe it, do not analyze it, don’t 
name it. Give me a nod afterwards, while staying inside with your eyes closed”. 
R watches Peter’s non-verbal behavior and waits for the nod. After the nod: 
“Ok Peter, offer your apology now and say it was just an exercise, you didn’t mean 
it at all. Then say something nice, something you are proud of or that you truly 
acknowledge as positive; and of course you have to mean it too. Remember the 
response; don't analyze it; say goodbye respectfully. Say that the goodbye will be 
for a short moment and that you will return. Then afterwards, still with your eyes 
closed, reflect on the two remembered internal responses and compare them, and 
after that open your eyes”. 
…Peter opens his eyes.  
R: “So, were the responses identical or different?” 
P: “No, the first time I felt a pressure5, something negative; the second time I felt 
relief, more space.”  
R: “Which was more positive to you”? 
P: “The second response”. 
R: “How did you experience the responses, were those responses by accident, at 
random, or did you experience them as direct responses to what you said?”  
Peter accepted it was not a random response at all. 
R: “Well Peter, if it is not at random, we must conclude that somehow your 
unconscious part that made those different responses understands the meaning of 
your mother language and responded to it? What do you think”?  
                                                          
5 Other respondents may say “I felt some sadness, anger, some defense… and the second time, a smile, joy, a 
good feeling”. 
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P: “Yes I agree, that is how I experienced it.” 
R: “Well, if this inner listener can understand your language, we can have an 
interview with it, no?”  
[Most respondents react in a surprised way and acknowledge that possibility.] 
R: “But before we continue, I have to explain something to you first.” 
The above first exercise is a repetition of the exercise they did at home: home 
exercise. 
 
11.2.1.2 Interview phase one: Explanation phase 
A. The researcher explains Rhodes’ et al. theory of the three “parts” of the mind, 
the three major internal sub-personality parts, which together form the personality 
or the ego. 
 After the respondent understands the theory and acknowledges that he himself 
must have these three categories too, the researcher asks him to provide examples 
of the three parts. The researcher, in his dialogue with the respondent, wants to be 
clear that the respondent truly realizes how important and functional these three 
parts are for him; actually he cannot do without any of them. As they are that 
important, they deserve full respect. The researcher explains the contract to the 
respondent (Section 11.2.1.3).  
 
B. The researcher conducts the following dialogue: that, for the sake of argument, 
people experiencing freedom will not voluntarily obstruct or sabotage the 
fulfillment of their will or their property. For instance, if people in perfect freedom 
(also free from possible guilt or other freedom-obstructing meaning structures) 
could design and build their own house, the way they want it to be, in order to live 
in it, who would choose to live in a cold, damp and drafty house? Respondents will 
say something like nobody or “not me”. 
 R: “Ok. So if like the house you could make your own feelings (to live with), 
who then would still feel depressed or sad or unhappy?” The respondents will 
acknowledge that probably nobody would; the more critical respondents will 
acknowledge the same, after realizing the addition of the meaning of “free” and 
“freedom” in “if they would be free and have the freedom…”  
 The end conclusion will then roughly be that the nature of feelings, being 
positive or negative, is not under conscious control. The conscious can choose to 
block or allow its own feelings to be felt, but cannot change their nature while 
keeping the rest the same, the “rest” being the beliefs (meaning) or interpretations 
of reality linked to those feelings. The goal of the dialogue is to make clear to the 
respondent that while ideas, interpretation, beliefs and meaning are under the power 
and responsibility of the conscious or ego, feelings may not be under that power. 
Few respondents ask further questions, but reflection on some examples from their 
personal history will answer their questions as soon as they realize emotions do not 
follow wishes, but (any) information held true stored in the unconscious. If the 
respondents also realize that feelings prove much more than words can do, the 
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experienced quality of human lives (being happy or not, content or discontent and 
so on) they develop or acknowledge respect for this very important “emotional 
source”.  
 
11.2.1.3 Interview phase two: preparation phase   
 R: “Ok Peter, can you go back to your unconscious and close your eyes” After 
seeing this happening, the researcher continues: 
 “Relax… say inside without focusing on a specific part of you: ‘Hi, I am back’ 
in your own words… and realize that you must have an inner Realist, like Rhodes 
described clearly. Now just address your Realist by just behaving as-if he is there, 
listening to you. Your as-if attitude is the tuning of the radio to a specific station, 
you intent to him. When you are in that phase, can you give me a little nod?” 
After the nod:  
 R: “Remember your appreciation for this part and the Realist’s indispensability 
for you. Without him you wouldn’t be here but could find yourself in a mental 
hospital. Now tell him that, show him your respect and honor him. Tell him his 
indispensability for you, but say nothing that you don’t truly mean; after that, give 
me a nod.” 
After the nod: 
 R: “Say to him you are going to do an exercise to learn how to make contact with 
a source where emotions come from. Tell him the exercise does not have the 
slightest chance of success without his full cooperation, he is too important not to 
be involved… Have you told him this?” 
 P: “Yes” 
 R: “Now offer him the contract. Ask him to fully abstain from the interview by 
remaining a disinterested observer until the end, like watching a movie, and 
allowing all that he sees and hears, regardless if he believes it or not. Does he 
understand that?” 
 P: “Yes” 
 R: “In exchange for his detachment, you offer him that all those answers given 
until the end of the interview don’t create a commitment to anything. He, as the 
Realist, is fully free to use them as he sees fit or to throw them in the dustbin if he 
wants to.  Can you accept that”? 
 P “Yes”. 
 R: “Ok, offer him the contract then”. 
… 
 P: “I did this and he accepts”. 
 R: “Ok, thank him"... 
 R: “OK, ask him now to move to a different ‘place’6 [where he normally is] and 
to sit a certain distance from you to symbolize his detachment and ask him to let 
                                                          
6 These detached places vary from respondent to respondent. Most respondents show some surprise or amusement 
when noticing an inner movement or a different place for the Realist to go to.  
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you “know” when he is there. Remember there is “infinite” space in your inner 
realms.”  
 The researcher asks the respondent to repeat the process with the Critic and the 
Creative part. After realizing that the contract is a win-win situation all respondents 
noticed their three major parts are willing to cooperate. Now, the respondent is in 
his “ego-less” state, as “the management board of three” are in three different places 
and have withdrawn from him. This new state is experienced as neutral and very 
peaceful and doesn’t feel strange; it feels comfortable. It is a real waiting state, a 
kind of beginning; it needs something to intent to or will go into meditation. 
 
11.2.2 Interview phase two: interview within 
Peter sits quietly with his eyes closed. 
 R: “OK, Peter can you remember the home exercise and the exercise we started 
here? Those internal responses were feeling-based and made you realize you have 
a “center”, which understands the meaning you express in language and which 
already is in touch with you, the thinking mind. Is this recap right?”  
Peter agreed. 
 “Can you now address this place, you know, where the butterflies can be, and 
act as if there is this listening source? Can you tell him that you know now that he 
understands your meaning, and acknowledge the emotional power he has over how 
you feel. Give him the respect he truly deserves and if you feel some judgment 
emerging, gently remind your Critical part of the contract you just made with him.” 
 After the contact is made, the researcher keeps this uncommon and “odd” 
interview with the “heart of the unconscious” as simple and short as possible. From 
experience, I have found that the respondent’s ego does not want to stay too long in 
this “artificial” and “unnatural state” of detachment. Also, the average respondent 
in “Transcendental Consciousness” has no special knowledge or experience of this 
sort of state and thus no capabilities in handling this peculiar state. It is thus better 
to keep this phase of the interview short. 
These are the few closed questions, designed to minimize the involuntary 
temptation of the powerful Critic to influence the answers. 
 R: “Peter, address your emotional source and ask him the following question 
exactly as you hear it from me and tell me the answer”:  
1. “If I have a belief—regardless of what causes my conviction—which has a 
hindering and maybe even a temporal blocking effect on my development and 
growth, will you give me a positive or a negative feeling linked to this belief?” 
 P: “I will get a negative feeling” 
2. R: “Ok, Peter, now repeat the process with the next question”: –“If I have a 
belief—regardless of what causes my conviction—which has a supportive and 
helping effect on my development and growth, will you give me a positive or a 
negative feeling linked to this belief”? 
 P: “I will get a positive feeling”. 
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 R: “Peter, can you verify the answers by repeating them to him and by asking 
'him', did you invent them [the answers] in your head so to speak, or are these truly 
honest answers?” 
 P: “These are his answers”. 
This is an important phase; Peter will give an internal summary of the answers 
given, as a kind of internal member-check, if these answers were fantasized or truly 
genuine answers of the emotional source. After confirmation of the genuineness, 
the next question is asked:  
 R: “Peter you know we also have feelings which are about other people, family, 
friends or strangers. Can you ask him, the following question”: 
3. “If I have a belief about somebody else—regardless of what causes my 
conviction—which intentionally through my behavior has a hindering and maybe 
even a temporal blocking effect on his development and growth, will you give me a 
positive or a negative feeling linked to this belief?” 
 P: “I will have negative feelings”. 
 R: “And the next question”: 
4. "If I have a belief about somebody else, which intentionally through my behavior 
has a supportive and helping effect on his development and growth, will you give 
me a positive or a negative feeling linked to this belief?" 
 P: “Then I will get positive feelings” 
 R: “Peter, his answers suggest that 'he' uses the same reference to determine your 
emotions, be it about ideas about yourself or about somebody else. Ask him if this 
conclusion is right”. 
 P: “Yes it is the same reference”. 
 R: “Ok, we are almost there, one last question. Ask him with the same words”: 
5. “I and almost everybody else make a principal and fundamental difference 
between “I” as “me” and the other or stranger outside of me…do you make or need 
to make that distinction too in order to determine which beliefs need to be linked to 
a positive or negative feeling?” 
 Peter takes slightly more time before he answers: “No he does not make that 
distinction”.  
 R: “Are you sure that you heard this well?” 
 P: “Yes”. 
 R: “Still, Peter, can you verify his answers by reflecting them back to him and 
check these are really his answers?” 
 P: ... “They are the same answers he gave me”. 
 R: “Any doubt?” 
 P: “No”. 
 R: “Good. Peter can you thank him for his answers and his cooperation and tell 
him what you want to tell him and give him a respectful goodbye. After that, 
remember everything, but stay inside with your attention and just give me a nod 
when you have said good bye.” 
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 After the nod, the researcher asks the respondent to thank his three ego parts and 
invite them back to their natural state in order to find himself back within trusted 
external reality when he opens his eyes. 
 This ends phase two of the interview.  
 
11.2.3. Interview phase three: plenary interview  
The last phase resembles a kind of plenary, a debriefing whereby the “classic” 
qualitative interview method is used (infused with the rapprochement method). The 
researcher asks how the respondents experienced the interview, especially the 
middle phase. Also, there is a question about whether the respondents can make a 
link between the answers of the Source and general morality and how this may affect 
leadership in organizations. 
 The answers form part of the chapter “Raw data” which will be given soon after. 
In the appendix (x) there are member checks of all the interviews signed by the 
respective respondents and one thick description which covers practically all the 
interviews. Also, in the raw data narrative, the more deductive tests (trigger tests) 
will be discussed, as the tests fully depend on the supplied answers. 
 
11.3 Who qualifies for the interviews? 
Finally, with this new method, who is suitable to be interviewed? The answer must 
be that it could principally be everybody, regardless of their gender, race, 
background, history, or any other subjectivity that makes people different from each 
other. The veil of innocence method pretends exactly to “annul” subjective 
differences, so the fact of different personalities should not make a difference. There 
is however a basic condition for possible respondents to fulfill: they must be able to 
make contact with their unconscious, which is the case when they can successfully 
finish the home exercise, designed to test that ability.  
 In practice, 98+% (estimation) of possible respondents are able to finish the 
exercise successfully 
The respondents are preferably approached by their friends or their colleagues who 
has been asked to “spread the word” in terms of inviting people as different from 
themselves as they can find, together with an open invitation conducted in a large 
lecture room with 80-100 students present. The respondents who were interviewed 
consist of a mix of gender, nationality, religion, profession, age and so on. However, 
most were Dutch-speaking respondents and thus the majority of the interviews were 
done in Dutch 
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Chapter 12: Raw findings 
  
Introduction 
As the phases of the interviews are rather different from each other, the data found 
will be arranged along the same configuration. The data is presented as it is. No 
conclusion or analysis will be done in this chapter, in terms of attempting to answer 
the research questions. As the interviews are still going on, 28 respondents have so 
far been interviewed (as of March 2015). One respondent could not finish the home 
exercise and was therefore not interviewed. All findings are based on the conducted 
interviews and may change with further interviews. As more interviews will follow, 
this chapter will be updated accordingly. This chapter precedes the end chapter: 
“Conclusions and discussion”.  
 
12.1 Findings, Phase one part one and two 
All respondents who were interviewed were able during the “home exercise” to 
distinguish a positive / negative experiential difference, qualifying them for the 
interview. All were equally able to repeat the exercise in the first phase of the 
interview. All understood the explained theory of Rhodes et al. and were able to 
communicate the contract to the ego, letting it be accepted by it, as a management 
board of three. They all entered the second phase of the interview fluently.  
 
12.2 Findings, Phase two 
In phase two, all the respondents contacted a different ‘other’ inside themselves. 
Why an ‘other’? All respondents didn’t know beforehand about its existence as an 
“unconscious” able to communicate. This communication, although in language, is 
a bit different when communicating with another “real” person. Another person will 
accept the utterance and its accompanying nonverbal “carrier”, as the trigger to give 
its personal meaning. In the “inner world” this is not the case. The (emotional) 
Source itself does not react to triggers as they appear before the conscious mind in 
the form of thoughts or knowledge. The Source reacts directly to the meaning that 
the internal triggers carry. The impossibility to transfer meaning between the 
internal and external world is missing within. It is not only possible, but always 
perfect. For instance, when during an exam a student is solving a math problem, the 
source seems passive (emotions under threshold of awareness); but as soon as the 
student looks up and notices the clock at the wall, the source does not “see” the 
clock or react to what the student concretely is thinking. The student may think “it 
takes too long; I may not be able to complete the exam in time.” The student may 
start to feel fear or pressure (or not). Neither the image of the clock nor the sentence 
(the corresponding thought) is a trigger for the Source, but reacts depending on what 
it means to the student. If it means “I will fail and I must not fail”, he will feel fear. 
If it means “I am not good enough, I don’t belong here”, a form of sadness may be 
felt. If it means, “Ah well, I did my best, next time I will do better”, a kind of solace 
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may be felt. Just as autopoiesis found that it is not event-triggers, but what they 
mean that triggers i-niche, so this “mechanism” seems mirrored in the internal 
domain of consciousness and emotions. 
 
12.2.1 Findings 
All the respondents in their ego-less state experienced the same identical answers 
from their Source of Emotions. All of them could connect to the “Source”, which is 
not a difficult enterprise as “She”, seemingly deeply buried in the unconscious, is a 
very active part of Being and very alert to what the conscious mind is doing 
regarding its meaning structures.  
(1) The first question was: 
If I have a belief—regardless of what causes my conviction—which has a 
hindering and maybe even a temporal blocking effect on my development and 
growth, will you give me a positive or a negative feeling linked to this belief? 
All respondents experienced in one way or another a negative feeling and/or a 
“negative” in language. 
 
(2) The second question was:  
If I have a belief—regardless of what causes my conviction—which has a 
supportive and helping effect on my development and growth, will you give me 
a positive or a negative feeling linked to this belief? 
All respondents experienced in one way or another a positive feeling and/or a 
“positive” in language. 
 
(3) The third question was: 
If I have a belief about somebody else—regardless of  what causes my 
conviction—which intentionally through my behavior has a hindering and 
maybe even a temporarily “blocking” effect on his development and growth, 
will you give me a positive or a negative feeling linked to this belief? 
All respondents experienced in one way or another a negative feeling and/or 
“negative” in language. 
 
(4) The fourth question was: 
If I have a belief about somebody else—regardless of the cause of my 
conviction—which intentionally, through my behavior, has a supportive and 
helping effect on his development and growth, will you give me a positive or a 
negative feeling linked to this belief? 
All respondents experienced in one way or another a positive feeling and/or a 
“positive” in language. 
 
All of them presented, after the first four questions, a summary of the answers (a 
kind of internal member check) which was acknowledged and agreed upon by their 
“Source”.  
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(5) And the last question asked was: 
I and almost everybody else make a principal and fundamental difference 
between “I” as “me” and the other or stranger outside of me…do you need or 
make that distinction too in order to determine which beliefs need to be linked 
or get a positive or negative feeling? 
All of the respondents who got this question experienced in one way or another the 
answer: “No, I do not make any distinction”. 
 
There was a sixth question, which was not part of every interview, but gives more 
insight in the nature of emotions:  
The more the topic of my conviction is important to me, how does that affect 
the intensity of the emotions I get? 
All of the respondents who got this question7 experienced in one way or another the 
answer: “They will increase”.  
 
The last member check question was:  
 The answers I got, did I (involuntarily) made them up all by myself in my 'head' 
or are these truly your answers? 
All respondents experienced in one way or another the answer: “These are my 
answers”. 
 
After the last member check, where the above answers were affirmed by the 
“Source”, a respectful farewell followed. This ended Phase 2 and the respondents 
entered their “default” state of being back in normal ego. 
 
12.3 Findings, Phase three 
The following two exercises are something like experiments to test the reference 
given. As the reference is rather simple and straightforward, it should be easy to 
construct contexts to trigger emotions. All those who did experience the tests gave 
the same outcome and more or less made the reference work and supported the 
answers of the Source. 
 More than half of the respondents, because of what they experienced, wanted to 
know more about how the answers given could be applied or could guide actions, 
something which is outside the scope of the thesis. Still, they are easy to deduce. 
 
12.3.1 Trigger test 1 
The respondent is asked to look at an imagined world event of an almost 
insignificant level, where he can see himself. The insignificance is on purpose so as 
not to “disturb” the ego's possible (very) different reference in distinguishing 
between good and bad or positive and negative. The imagination is about: 
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R: “There is a big droning wasp in the kitchen while you [respondent] are preparing 
a meal. Option one. See yourself picking up a whisk and killing the wasp. 
Remember now your internal (feeling) response as an observer of yourself, don’t 
analyze it or give it a name, just remember it when you see yourself doing it. 
 Option two. Now see yourself in exactly the same circumstances, but see 
yourself picking up a glass and a piece of paper. You catch the wasp under the glass 
when it stands still on the kitchen table and you slide a piece of paper underneath 
the glass. See yourself maybe with some annoyance releasing the wasp through the 
open kitchen door or window. Remember your internal state as observer, don’t 
analyze it or give it a name, just remember it.  Compare the two states, 
which feels better, more positive to you?” 
All respondents who did the exercise chose the second option. 
 In the plenary after, this exercise is discussed; it doesn’t seem like a “big deal”, 
but it is reiterated that even then the experienced emotion is not “constructed” by 
will, but “out of itself shows itself”. The ego has the full freedom to decide what 
meta-meaning the exercise gets. 
 
12.3.1.1 Trigger test 2 
The respondent is a bit more accustomed now to “how it works” and receives a more 
“serious” example to imagine. The respondent is asked to watch an imaginary world 
event. 
A murderer of a little child has been caught by an angry crowd. They have beaten 
him up severely, and they are searching for a big rope in order to hang him from a 
tree. One man stands apart from the intensely angry and shocked group of people, 
and you ask him: “I see a really angry crowd, full of bitterness and hate and I see a 
child murderer; what are your thoughts about this, as you look so calm and different 
from the others?” 
 The man says, while pointing at the guilty man who is on his knees, groggy and 
beaten, with the hands tied behind his back: “I see a man, who made one of the 
biggest mistakes a man can make. I will never do such a thing as I am far further in 
my development as a human being than he is.”  
 R: “Now repeat those words, believing them as if they are your own; feel those 
words on your lips as if they are true, while looking in your mind at this man on his 
knees. Then tell me, what do you feel?” 
 All respondents who did the exercise, felt compassion. Some, at first, called it 
pity, but when elaborating on that experience of pity, it turned out that what they 
meant was compassion. They all acknowledged the compassion they felt, did not 
deny the facts in any way. Two women who were not part of the respondents group 
but part of a much bigger audience during a lecture, strongly objected and were 
upset about their initial response of compassion; they found the reaction of the 
village crowd a much more appropriate one, but only when back in their normal 
ego. The as-if condition in making something appear true is all that is needed (in 
that context) to temporarily shift out of one’s ego into a newly constructed one. 
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In the plenary of this exercise, all respondents were quieter, as though the exercise 
took some energy. Some had thoughts about religion, which is outside the scope of 
the thesis. 
 
12.3.2 Morality and moral leadership  
It is notable that all the respondents came, using different words, to a similar 
conclusion. If CEOs or those in power were to respect and take into account the 
individual rights, needs and properties of, in particular, their clients and their 
employees and, more generally, the needs of their markets, environment and 
society, seeing these rights as equal and important as their own, they would follow 
the Source’s code and would be considered moral leaders by the respondents. 
Similar examples were mentioned in a broader context, from the fields of world 
politics and nationalism, mentioning also leaders such as Gandhi or Mandela. 
 When the example of the 2008 GFC was mentioned, the respondents agreed the 
event would not have happened. Regulations wouldn't be called for and for instance 
regulations in another domain to protect the weak or minorities would not be 
needed. All respondents recognized as well that by being such a leader or politician, 
man would not primarily be faithful to his people but by his internal reference he 
would primarily be faithful to himself as he truly is. 
 Member checks of the interviews (emphasized phase 2) can be found in the 
Appendix (CD rom) 
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Chapter 13: Conclusions and Discussion 
 
Introduction 
This chapter will offer some answers to the research questions and sub-questions 
and discuss them. In the discussion, two new theories are introduced, which were 
chosen after the data emerged, as they were at that point seen as relevant. That is 
why Buber (1878-1965) and Levinas (1906-1995) were not addressed before. The 
sub-questions relevance are explained in section 2.1.1; 2.1.2 
 
13.0 Answering the sub-questions 
The following sub-questions address philosophical topics; they are: 
1. What is Husserlian Transcendental Consciousness and how is it relevant to 
the thesis? 
2. What are categories? How are they constructed and/or defined? 
3. What is the foundation of objectivity and subjectivity? Are these foundations 
proven or are they arbitrary? 
4. Could there be a possible third domain, sharing fundamental properties of 
objectivity and subjectivity?  
5. If such a third domain exists, which methodology could appropriate that 
domain? 
 
The first question’s answer is: “Husserlian Transcendental Consciousness” is 
Husserl’s name for what he found and experienced to be as theoretically the most 
pure impartial state of mind. The state of mind that is transcendental to the world, 
thoughts and any knowledge be it about the world or self. He describes it as a “pure” 
mindset (section 3.11; 7.2.1). Its relevance for the thesis is maximal. To find true 
impartial arguments for morality, and not hypothetical ones, one must start from a 
pure impartial position, which is not hypothetical too. Such a position is “Husserlian 
Transcendental Consciousness”. By itself however it does not provide moral 
arguments as this state of mind has no knowledge. What it is able to however, is to 
intent to “something”. This ability is used to intent a most pure impartial state of 
mind to another aspect of human beings: a transcendental (pure) Source of Emotions 
(section 9.4).   
 
13.1 What are categories? How are they defined? 
Life’s circularity leads to the expectation that what once was must reoccur (section 
5.7). In other words, what was experienced in the past involves valid descriptions 
of the future. This is an important property of all categories to give it reliability. The 
use of categories is millions of years old. Categories are, in the first place, cyclical. 
Working with categories is an essential necessity, in order to handle the endless bits 
of sensory information (cognitive economy); this was the case for organisms long 
before the development of the species Homo sapiens.  
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 The autopoietic version of categories (named classes) is the class-link between 
internal niche and (external) niche ( habitat), which is the link between the sum of 
all classes of trigger descriptions including meaning and the sum of all classes of 
interactive behavior descriptions linked to them. That means that categories, in the 
first place, serve the autopoiesis of the individual organism or human being (e.g. 
section 5.6.2; 5.10; 8.3).  
Above question does not have a simple answer. It depends on the contexts categories 
are used for, as the question “How are they defined” leads to incompatible 
definitions, depending on what mode of thought is used. Still, categories are 
existentially necessary (cognitive economy, section 4) and originally stem from 
biology, where only one “mode of thought” is known, depending on whether the 
category “thought” is exclusively restricted to humans or not. When meaning is the 
central theme behind any utterance, something which is considered primary, then 
biology has its own primitive (non-verbal) language. Even a kind of abstract 
thinking is possible for non-humans (Maturana et al. 1980 p. 25). When biology has 
language, animals think and act through their meaning experienced and apply what 
the thesis names “circular logic”. Within circular logic (section 6.6.1), categories 
are personal tools, formed around personally subjective meaning (categories formed 
around prototypes) and categories define a relationship not only between its 
members, but also with its creator: the maker of the categories (section 4.3.1). Grass 
will be categorized differently by a weasel and by a rabbit, as categories are an 
essential part of internal niche (section 5.6.1). A human example of the imbedded 
relation between the identity of the category and its maker is the category “poison” 
or “stranger(s)” (section 4.4). Circular logic takes into account one’s own projection 
as personal and it is only projection, be it in awareness or not, that runs its cause for 
all living beings (e.g. section 5.1; 6.7; 8.4).  
The opposite of circular logic is “observer’s logic” as if projection of meaning 
is disregarded or does not exist. Thus, strangers and poison have real properties of 
their own, which grant them membership in their respective category, as–if 
independent of the category maker. This is the classical view of categories, since 
Aristotle.  Both definitions coexist, parallel to each other, depending on the level of 
awareness of the human being. In science, it is practically only observer's logic that 
is used, which is perfectly functional for the non-living. Observer’s logic produces   
objectivity. 
 
13.2 What is objectivity and subjectivity? Is their difference proven or set? Are 
they related? 
This question is an old philosophical one. Since Emanuel Kant, the principal 
foundation is accepted for objectivity. In the classic way (since Kant) objectivity 
exists before language as “something” appears in what Kant names human 
“sensibility” (a universal property of the mind), something, which provokes a 
question mark or a thought. What “is given” in sensibility and appears before 
“consciousness” is accepted as objective (section 5.14).  
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 Kant restricted this idea of objectivity to the kind that only humans are capable 
of. It is a “between-humans-shareable-objectivity”, describing not the real truth but 
the human version of it. Since then, different schools emerged, but modern science 
more or less accepts the foundation of Kant's thinking, that what is given in 
sensibility (in front of our senses) is in principle an objective perception. 
Subjectivity, consequently, is a non-empirical domain with feelings, memories and 
thoughts which are personal. 
 The biological structure of brains, including the human central nervous system, 
is incompatible with the notion of Kant's objectivity or with contemporary scientific 
objectivity (section 5.17.1 -5.17.3). The concept of objectivity is virtual; it is a 
human, linguistic construct that in the end differs from person to person in terms of 
their experience. 
 That makes subjectivity the ground of all human experience including 
objectivity, from large experiences to insignificant small ones, from subjective to 
objective, whereby objectivity is a subjective experience reduced to incomplete 
language descriptions (without adjectives), describing what is empirically 
experienced. The existence of adjectives in language is the only truthful way to 
describe human experiences. Strict objectivity avoids adjectives in order to stay 
neutral and “universal”. However, it is safe to say that experience without meaning 
cannot exist and language without adjectives does not describe experience. In short, 
objectivity exists only in language and outside human experience. An analogy is the 
existence of an “objective” concept, like the notion of “tomorrow” or “yesterday”, 
which exist only as a linguistic construct of the mind, active or inactive, as a 
property of the present. Also, words such as chair, typewriter and numerous others, 
do not describe how they are experienced by their users with a missing 
corresponding adjective. This makes the category “objectivity” a virtual 
category, which cannot be the opposite of subjectivity. The existing category 
“subjectivity”, without a real counterpart, requires that its meaning be contrasted 
with a virtual category. The human mind, however, is “magical” enough to be able 
to accomplish that challenge. 
 
 13.3 Could there be a possible third domain, sharing properties of both? 
The answer to this question could be yes, or it could be no. It depends on the point 
of view of the questioner. On the level of experience (and, after all, everything can 
only be experienced), objectivity does not exist, in the same way that it does not 
exist for animals. From that standpoint, that means that the polarity between 
subjective and objective is false.  
 This is a solid conclusion that derives from the theory of autopoiesis. It is not 
possible to detect anything objectively through the CNS (central nervous system, 
section 5.17.1). Still, accepting the necessity of objectivity in modern societies and 
science, but now recognized as a tool with its own constructed rules, a third domain 
can be considered to exist. This would be a domain that fulfills the criteria of 
subjectivity as non-empirical but that simultaneously fulfills the objective criteria 
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of being verifiable and universal, provided that the academic community accepts it. 
Even the strongest proof of facts evaporates under the pressures of intersubjectivity.  
 The solution lies in the method of verifiability. Science accepts for instance the 
existence of feelings and emotions as objective facts, not subjective, as literally 
everyone can individually verify their existence. Kant and Husserl also used 
personal “verifiability” as the basis of their theories, accessible for all who want to 
explore it. That makes their main theories intersubjectively accepted, as non-
metaphysical theories. 
 
13.4 If such a third domain exists, which methodology could appropriate that 
domain? 
The objective status of Kant's “sensibility” or the existence of Husserl's 
“Transcendental Consciousness” was and still is only individually accessible. This 
has not changed in the methods used in the thesis for the interviews, which are 
appropriate in terms of “entering” a domain which shares the essential properties of 
subjectivity and universality. Also, the veil of innocence, as the method and answer 
to this sub-question, relies on personal verifiability.  
 The method of the veil is, however, different in one way. Previous methods to 
reach an “ego-less” state of mind require development (which may take years) of a 
skill, in order to be able to “escape from subjectivity”. The reason for this very long 
time in developing the skill might be as its development happens without the 
cooperation of the present ego. Therefore, the process may feel like a struggle that 
needs determination and perseverance in order to succeed. The veil of innocence 
can be realized in the time of a single interview, but requires a second person, a 
helper. This does not mean for a variety of reasons outside the scope of the thesis, 
that the veil of innocence will initiate the state of “Being” (spiritual) mediations all 
over the world try to accomplish. Pure Consciousness (ego-less state of mind) is an 
important but only first step to enter “different (spiritual) domains. 
 A secondary aspect of the veil of innocence is that it adds a kind of 
“intersubjective verifiability”, as in theory the respondents who have experienced 
the detachment of full ego can be grouped together and can share their experiences. 
 
13.5 Sub-question’s conclusions 
It is mainly the theory of autopoiesis which opened up a new attitude to approach 
or describe reality, faithful to how our brain functions in creating realities. It 
therefore provides a new platform that allows us to look again at topics that were 
addressed (centuries) earlier, and to deconstruct them. 
 Constructed realities within language and the use of impossible notions such as 
the “future” or “objectivity” are very helpful and even necessary constructs, but not 
part of a reality that can be experienced by a CNS, except in the form of thoughts. 
As objectivity as experience does not exist, but as a tool, what is the aim and 
function of autopoietic “organizations” (section 5.5) for bypassing objectivity? 
Evolutionary biology shows the development of species from the simplest 
  
166 | P a g e  
 
(biological machines fully determined by their structure) towards the freest species 
with minimal to no determination by their structure: that is, humans. But all living 
systems, from the simplest to humans, share some existential important basic 
properties. Not only in terms of being alive, but in terms of aiming to stay alive in 
a way that is determined by and expresses their nature [identity]; to develop and to 
interact as well as possible with an environment that fulfill their needs. 
 In order to even experience the possibility of life and self-expression, off spring 
is needed to make that possible for the next generation of the species. Interaction 
with the outside world always must and serve the “organization” of the species. This 
autopoietic conclusion is inescapable. A bear always has interactions which are 
“bear-like”, as rabbits act in a “rabbit-like” way. But what is human like? Human 
like is, in one word, ego-like and ego like is practically free from its biological 
“organization” which was once the main determination (section 5.16) for the nature 
of species. The fact that there is practically infinite freedom of human expression 
makes it as hard to define a universal human nature, as it is easy to define it for 
insects or bears.  
 The almost practical impossibility to define a universal human nature is caused 
by the freedom to construct the ego, which stands between Consciousness and the 
observed, be it others or the self. The ego not only subjectifies the opinions of 
others; it also subjectifies its personal opinion about itself. No logic (circular logic 
/ observer's logic) can help the ego to find its true nature. This is something that has 
always been known, giving rise to equally ancient methods in an effort to deny the 
ego altogether or in terms of a modern version of Husserl's epoché, bypassing the 
ego to find truer answers than what the ego is able to find.  
 But Husserl ended his journey right there. His inquiry led to a truer relation 
between subjective and objective, not to delve further into the properties of the 
Transcendental domain of Being. He found and described the relation between 
world and ego on the one hand and the maker of world and ego: Transcendental 
Consciousness on the other hand. But he, similarly to Kant, accepted the all too 
convincing power of objects / phenomena given in sensibility, (the sensitivity of the 
mind as it is affected by sensory experience) to appear as being truly objective. A 
suggestion accepted without the possibility of knowing that sensory organs were 
never developed for that reason  and no CNS is able to process objective information 
(section 5.11). The world of the senses, triggering meanings, which in turn create / 
maintain  the ego in that context (chapter 8), is therefore unfit to establish the 
promise of a universal human nature, which as an extension of itself could express 
universal morality.  
 An appropriate method as described above is the veil of innocence to free the mind 
of ego constructions and to experience true impartiality. A kind of purity that 
theoretically should be universal, and a first beginning of finding (again 
theoretically) a universal human nature. 
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13.6 Research questions 
The main research questions, as described in chapter four, are: 
 
Research question one 
What constitutes a verifiable method for conducting interviews to enable 
respondents to enter the state of Husserlian Transcendental Consciousness in order 
to explore its substance to possibly find a plausible, rational and impartial ground 
for morality? 
 
The question is an integrated question that consists of two questions, as the 
development of a new method was first necessary in order to answer the second part 
of the integrated question.  
 
Research question two 
How does a moral, rational and impartial ground affect moral leadership in 
organizations?  
 
13.7 Answering research question on 
First part of research question one is about developing a suitable method. 
The method found and already in depth explained in chapter 11 and summarized in 
section 13.4 is named the “veil of innocence”.  The veil turned out not to be a 
forceful way to silence or to push out the ego, but a contract between the ego on the 
one hand and the “I am” on the other hand. By subsequently approaching the three 
main parts of the ego as a “management board of three” representing the totality of 
the ego, the ego detaches itself gently and consensually from the “I am” (chapter 
10). This method avoids internal struggle, discipline and force and makes it possible 
for the respondents to reach a state of Husserlian Transcendental Consciousness 
within the time frame of a first interview. 
 
The second part of the main research question one is:  
“... What may possibly be a plausible rational and impartial ground for morality?” 
The answer can only be given indirectly; its plausibility stands intersubjectively 
open. 
To answer the second part of the main research question 1, the thesis did not find a 
moral foundation as a separate foundation or “source” of its own. Moral behavior 
appeared to be an extension of a moral being; the findings would have been better 
served by the question: “Is there a common moral being (nature) of human beings 
and what is it?”  The respondents experienced a common “Source” of emotions with 
a reference, which grants morality also a common ground. The main findings that 
are valid for the respondents are: 
1) Emotions exist as messengers, being responses to meaning only. Emotions 
exclusively express a single Source, which stands apart from and is fully 
independent (transcendental) of any perception and its meaning of the world.  
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2) The existential “Source” of the reference suggests having no particular identity 
by altogether disregarding identities or egos unless they serve its reference. 
3) The reference is identical for self and other(s) as its “Source” does not make a 
distinction between self and others in “applying” the reference. 
4) The reference meets the autopoietic criterion of self-referentiality; its self 
referentiality is absolute (cannot be tampered with) 
5) The essential message of the reference is twofold and linked like the two sides of 
one coin are solidly linked. One is to guide sense making (meaning making) 
processes of the conscious to avoid personal errors in order to develop principally 
in a state of wellbeing (error free state) a true unique personal nature. This is in line 
with the maintenance of autopoiesis. The second supports the first but adds to self-
development the essential truth that no other Being exists as less or more than self 
as-if all others and self are essentially  connected as-if one. The faithfulness to both 
messages simultaneously can offer a glimpse into the universal nature of human 
beings. 
The above points were not plausible for the respondents, but became certain 
because of what they experienced.  
 
13.7.1 The unexpected thing 
The unexpected thing about the Source “applying” its reference by reacting only to 
meaning is that although it disregards the sensory experiences of the world and of 
the egos in it, it intimately acknowledges the extra existence of others as not 
standing apart from itself. The acknowledgment is done, “as-if” and this is 
hypothetical, the source is deeply related to itself as it exists in others. In that case, 
it does not need sensory perceptions to know of the existence of others as apparently 
a transcendental connectedness seems to be the case. The reference for the 
experience of emotions turns out to be fully independent of the world (as triggers) 
and even independent of consciousness and (its) thoughts. Its self-referentiality fully 
bypasses observer's logic; however, it also fully escapes the hidden (theoretical) 
assumption of pure self referentiality: solipsism. The Source, by its reference, 
denies the biological borders of its “containment”: that is, the human body. It thus 
surpasses it.  
 Seemingly, the Source only depends on what it is, which is not further 
investigated in the thesis. Thus pure impartiality for the human observer, as an 
abstract concept, cannot exist: the most basic basis for existence is according to the 
reference beyond-ego-interconnectedness. Only within the domain of 
interconnectedness can impartiality exist in relation to ego-content. 
  
13.7.2 Doing good beyond subjectivity, a balanced plural view 
The reference of the Source basically refers to the fact that being “good” or doing 
“good” is exclusively linked to feeling good as a relational, but default property. 
Existence as it should be when it is honest to itself, according to the reference. 
Positive feelings (about context X) directly or indirectly show support for personal 
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development and growth (in context X), but cannot be —-in awareness—at the 
expense of the development and growth of others. The “in awareness” is an 
obligatory condition needed to incorporate personal responsibility, reflection and 
learning, as these are the internal conditions which are “evaluated” by the Source. 
For instance, when a person is not aware of—or genuinely forgets—the ecological 
consequences of his decisions, he will not get feelings about that omission, except 
maybe afterwards in reflection. This important given will be further discussed in 
section 13.8.2.  
The Source may be absolute in its reference, but with weak or even negligible 
power in consciousness. The power of the Source to determine decisions or behavior 
seems practically zero, which lies in the web of meaning of the ego. As a note, 
positive feelings are still positive when they are not negative. Feelings may fall 
under the threshold of awareness for the less valuable or important thoughts of the 
ego (section 5.17.3) and thus are not appreciated as positive feelings, while they still 
linger as taken for granted in the very background of consciousness. But even if not 
in awareness, not picked up positive feelings cannot define a negative experience. 
In that way, there can be two kinds of neutrality: a negative and a positive one. 
The Source does not acknowledge the other as a stranger, as being less or more 
or different from self, but on the level of Being. This makes self-development only 
complete by in-cluding the equal rights of any experienced other for their 
development into well-being and development  too, and by ex-cluding infringing 
contexts or ideas that hinder or make those rights invalid. The rights of others 
however are contained within the same  limits.. The rights of others acknowledged 
cannot include the infringement upon what can be named “my rights”. This leads to 
a point of view which even though very liberal and plural, is immediately balanced 
by existential connectedness between all humans. Watching the other, in his / her 
circumstances, even in a passive way, will be personally and immediately evaluated 
by the Source, and its evaluation will be felt, or not when for different reasons these 
feelings exist under the threshold of awareness.  
Why experienced other and not all others and those beyond the horizon?  Doing 
well surely cannot be restricted by universal interconnectedness if we may believe 
the respondents findings? This is an important question and the answer comes from 
for whom are the messages of the Source intended? The answer is for the identity 
of the individual. In that case an ancient wisdom requires that individuals should 
not surpass personal competence by exceeding personal responsibility, which is 
primarily contained by personal power. To feel responsible for realities beyond 
personal power will immediately and rightly initiate personal feelings of being 
incapable and powerless, which according to the Source are linked to personal errors 
in meaning (overestimation of the ego). This changes for instance when being a 
Minister of State or having a similar function whereby because of the function, the 
power of the system one belongs to, drastically enhances personal power and 
responsibilities. This important given will impact in a later section the discussion 
about morality 
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 Any negative feelings, including those under the threshold of awareness, indicate 
to the observer that his (projected meaning) is wrong or incomplete. This is a hard 
conclusion to accept, unless meaning is reframed. It also makes the reference seem 
close to “alien”, compared to historical and contemporary views on how to judge 
events. Deeper into the nature of emotions and meaning can be found in section 8.2; 
8.5; 9.2-9.3. 
But what meaning can be found in observing “sin” and not feeling negative? 
This is not a hard question to answer, but almost impossible to accept within the 
limits of the contemporary worldly view of what is “real”. What is “real”, in the 
paradigm of establishing knowledge, solely rests upon observer's logic. Sensory 
perceptions persuade the observer to accept in the social domain “What you see is 
what you get” as understanding, however the acceptance of “WYSIWYG” denies 
the impossibility of peripheral bodies to develop “insight”. Eyes and ears are 
structurally not even able to stream “skin-deep” information, but only information 
that is much more superficial than that. In most cases the depth of pure sensory 
information covers the length of some molecules. Only circular logic is able to 
experience over and above intellectual knowledge that all perceivable behavior 
follows the unperceivable “inside”. Projected meaning can only pretend to explain. 
The Transcendental domain is deeply buried under projection and constructed 
meanings and far beyond the senses to detect. As the Source is beyond subjectivity, 
it is also beyond psychology and its relatedness to the world and to the ego. That 
does make the Source’s reference also beyond the perceivable sin of the world, all 
perceivable sin. Although Source’s  reference is not a luxury, but existential, as it 
determines the experience of dread and happiness and everything in between, it does 
not however aim to be practical in a material world with both material and 
psychological demands. The Source without subjectivity will strike the ego as 
absurd or at worst inhuman. The thought may be: what could be beyond himself 
(the ego), invisible, not of the world he knows so well and is also alien to the way 
he thinks? At best, while extending his existence by including knowledge about the 
Source, the ego will address the Source as a sub-human situation,. How can the ego 
recognize —even when true— his existence only as a virtual tool (a script), a 
vehicle of interaction / expression and not a Being? That the ego in spite of his own 
ideas is not a Being is easily demonstrated for instance by convincing movie actors, 
who change their identity by identifying with the descriptions about the protagonist 
in the script. A more profound example is the ability of personalities to change 
(drastically) by changing successfully their ideas and beliefs and or meanings. The 
tool like function of i-niche linked to interactive behavior is autopoietically proven 
and a life necessity.  It is not demoting Ego, but pointing to the opposite of how the 
ego denies itself by regarding itself as an ontological being.  
Thinking about the consequences of what the respondents revealed, one is met 
with many questions, one more interesting than the other. For example, there might 
be questions such as: “what are the various, deeper meanings of the different 
emotions”? Or in other words: “why is sadness so different from anger if both warn 
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about the same error of not being true to real self? Why is the Source so ‘inhuman’ 
in terms of allowing innocent children to feel unhappy of fearful? Or, put 
differently, why does the Source not make any distinction between adults and young 
children? What is the relationship (“meaningship”) between the Source and “sin”, 
between Source and ego, and finally between Source and Source? Some of these 
fall outside the scope of the thesis.  
Within the constraints of the thesis, only a few of these questions will be 
addressed, offering an answer to the first research question about morality. If the 
findings could be true enough to be generalized widely, they may have been true 
since ancient times. Moving towards relatively modern times, I have chosen the 
theories of Martin Buber and Emanuel Levinas, both of whom deeply and intuitively 
understood the existence of what could not have been anything else than the Source. 
Their theories will be addressed in relation to the Source, but a warning might be 
useful. Both writers offer a philosophical, metaphysical narrative which in its 
ambiguity cannot escape any (my) interpretation.  
   
13.7.3 "Ich und Du", the incompleteness of Transcendental Consciousness as 
Being 
In his book “Ich und Du” (1923), later translated to “I and Thou” (1937), Martin 
Buber (1878-1965) presents his thoughts about what he truly believes to be the 
fundamental structure of human experience. He makes a primary distinction 
between two modes of human relating towards the world, and in particular, in terms 
of the way other humans are experienced. The two modes are incompatible and fully 
oppose each other on the level of meaning. 
The first mode refers to the way the ego perceives the world (observer’s logic). The 
ego’s fabric of reality is a reflection of autopoiesis' individual internal niche: a web 
of constructed but internal individual meaning-relations between an self-image 
(subject) and the world as object-designs, including others (chapter 8). The existing 
intertwined relation of meaning between I and “objects / phenomena” is for most 
beyond awareness and makes personal responsibility for the relation hard or 
impossible to accept.  
It is the logical consequence, but a pitfall of projection. By projecting individual 
meaning it loses its subjectivity and becomes an “objective” property of the 
perceived “objects”. Then the “power-of-what-it-is” stands strongly apart and 
looms over the observer as said before in chapter eight. 
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Fig. 5  I-Thou is an external relation, I-It is an internal relation 
 
Ego with a cursive E is the internal relation between I-as-me (subject) and the world-
as-object. Buber noticed when an external body is defined as an “It” the relation 
between I-as-observer will transform “I-as-me” into an “It” too. The relation then 
becomes an “I (as It)-it” relation. Autopoietically deduced internal niche is material 
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(it) based (sense and world oriented) since, although it only serves internal 
references (asymmetrical relation), it principally connects all its resources to 
interactive behavior aiming at the world (structural coupling section 5.6.2.) All 
structural coupling are it-based relationships, all in order to maintain or strive for 
internal equilibrium. Also Ego is settled in a relationship of compliance with the 
world it projects (section 8.2). One of the most basic identifications of 
consciousness to start the construction of the ego and to become Buber’s It, is by 
framing itself to being a he or a she, to being tall or short, to being whatever the 
bathroom mirror or behavior shows. 
 Buber’s second mode of regarding others is altogether different and is 
“completely” split from the first, but it is not its opposite as Transcendental Being 
(Buber’s “whole being”)   has no opposite in its subjective reduction the ego..  
“If I face a human being as my Thou, and say the primary word I-Thou to 
him, he is not a thing among things, and does not consist of things. This 
human being is not He or She, ... nor is he a nature able to be experienced 
and described, ... But with no neighbor, and whole in himself, he is Thou” 
(Buber 1937 p. 8). 
The symmetrical relation I - Thou transforms I into a Thou too, which is then named 
“whole Being”, beyond knowledge and subjectivity. Meeting in the form of 
experiencing a Thou is not a normal experience and cannot be compared to normal 
experience. The “meeting” is autopoietically not possible, even when it happens. 
The meeting rejects the borders of autopoiesis as it falls outside internal niche 
altogether (or bypasses it). I-niche can only work with categorical [thus reduced] 
descriptions. Still Buber says: “…nor is he a nature able to be experienced…” when 
what he means is: 
“Thou cannot be appropriated, but I am brought up short against it. The 
characteristic situation is here one of meeting: I meet the Other. In the reality 
of this meeting, no reduction of the I or of the Thou, to experiencing subject 
and experienced object, is possible. So long as I remain in relation with my 
Thou, I cannot experience it, but can only know it in the relation itself (Buber 
1937, p. vii; underlining added). 
Buber defines “experience” in a perfectly autopoietic way, as something internal, 
even when experienced in a projected sense. Already in his early work, Buber 
mentions and confirms autopoietic main principles: “The man who experiences has 
no part in the world. For it is “in him”, and not between him and the world, that the 
experience arises (Buber 1937 p. 5). Experiencing Thou as it is in normal parlance 
is named by Buber, meeting Thou in order to distinguish it from normal projected 
experience. The meeting is a living relation manifested, which cannot be reduced to 
a projection of an internal description belonging to any class / category. The 
relation, as a meeting, cannot be internalized back into the descriptions of the ego 
because Buber's Thou, being beyond descriptions, is trigger-less: it is not a trigger 
which can accept projected meaning. It can be remembered afterwards as an 
impoverished description as what can be remembered of the real (intense living) 
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meeting is beyond words, beyond any cognition, but with the domain of emotions. 
What emotionally happened can be fully remembered.  
 How is this "Thou" different from a normal “you” as It? Buber explains: “he is 
not a thing among things, and does not consist of things.” Buber does not refer to 
the visible body or the invisible mind of the other as that is fully applicable to the 
ego as well. Thou is also not related to things; it is fully independent of things 
something which does not apply to the ego. When the ego is freed from subjectivity 
and of any descriptions of its body, it disappears and Consciousness takes over that 
becomes a Thou if it speaks the word Thou. Buber realized that Thou is in the 
present, similarly to all subjectivity is in the past (section 6.6.1). Autopoiesis 
confirms this with its notion of “circularity”, which is also the mechanism behind 
the past-oriented character of all categories. Buber says: 
“...he [I as It] lives in the past, and his moment has no present content. He 
has nothing but objects. But objects subsist in time that has been” (Buber 
1937 p. 12).  
All I - It relations are autopoietic, and indeed not-between the “I” and the world as 
it is in the here and now, as the relation stays firmly put within the biological 
boundaries of organizational closure. Thou oversteps biology and escapes 
organizational closure and its past. The meeting between I and Thou transcends both 
into the present and bypasses the limits of autopoiesis: 
“Let no attempt be made to sap the strength from the meaning of the relation: 
relation is mutual” (Buber 1937, p. 8). 
Thou is more than Husserl's Transcendental Consciousness. Buber: “No deception 
penetrates here; here [Thou] is the cradle of the Real Life” (Buber 1937 p. 9). Buber, 
in his poetic way, extended Husserl's Transcendental Consciousness, being  the truly 
impartial one, free from any subjectivity, free from any ideas about all he knows, 
free from the ego, but incomplete as a total human being. Transcendental 
Consciousness is still a singularity, the conscious perceiver, analyzing and 
functioning in the domain of cognition, all else even his own feelings, triggers to 
intent to. 
 Buber names “the inborn Thou” that already exists in babies and children, the “a 
priori of relation” (Buber 1937 p. 26). Not the internal relations as the ego knows it, 
but relations as a meeting in the present, expressing the true “man”, of which he 
says:  
“For I speak of nothing else but the real man, of you and of me ...not of an 
I, or a state of being, in itself alone. The real boundary for the actual man 
cuts right across the world of ideas as well (Buber 1937 p. 13, italics and 
bold added). 
Cutting across all ideas points to the transcendental status of Thou. Meeting the 
other by meeting Thou in the other cannot be done through subjective channels. 
The Transcendental Being is Lovable. Only Love arises, which is not the love that 
the ego is able to give:  
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“Love does not cling to the I in such a way as to have the Thou only for its 
“content”, its object; but love is between I and Thou” [there is no content] 
(Buber 1937 p. 14). 
The love which Buber talks about is not only the responsibility of an I for a Thou, 
but is without condition, cannot be bound to any given content or meaning, as 
Thou—in not being a thing—becomes  boundless. What is referred to here is 
Unconditional Love, as all conditions are left behind. It is only after the meeting, in 
reflection, back in “experience” of being the ego again, that meaning arises or is 
constructed, possibly reprogramming the ego. This is not so strange, as meeting 
Thou is a dangerous and frightening encounter for both egos; this is because both 
egos, briefly “evaporate”, do not exist in the meeting. Voluntarily starting the 
process of I – Thou, especially with Thou in mind, for instance by looking into each 
other’s eyes indefinitely, will evoke resistances and quickly fear as soon as 
something unworldly happens. Finally, an important consequence of the existence 
of Thou arises, fully coinciding with the reference of the Source expressed in the 
aforementioned test (number three), referring to hanging a man from a tree: 
“Good people and evil, wise and foolish, beautiful and ugly, become 
successively real to him; that is, set free they step forth in their singleness, 
and confront him as Thou” (Buber 1937 p. 15).  
More similar to “Ich und Du” than Levinas is “willing” to admit, is Levinas’ theory 
about the “absolutely other”, representing innocence and humanity. 
 
13.7.4 Totalité et Infini: essai sur l'extériorité (1961) 
Emanuel Levinas (1906-1995) witnessed and experienced war; in his book “Totality 
and Infinite: an essay on exteriority” (1969), he explores his ideas about the 
impossible dance between “morality” (peace) and war, as if they are equal partners. 
He exclaims that they are not; one is real and infinite and the other is un-real and 
totalitarian. The latter is based on denial, concealed behind the mask of reason (real 
politics). 
 Levinas' philosophy, in his book, is his ultimate answer to the question “How 
may mankind find ever lasting peace?” He builds upon his earlier ideas, influenced 
by Husserl and Heidegger, which in a sense refer to a search in terms of 
understanding that human beings are more than any knowledge about them can 
describe. Knowledge, especially in the form of scientific descriptions, seeks to find 
and unconsciously sustain (Kuhn) through forces of organizational closure, the ideal 
universals (generalizations). Only these (systemic) universals can answer the 
ancient call for cognitive economy (section 4.0), a call for the reduction to 
“sameness”, serving categories coming from a deep drive out of the animal 
kingdom. It is this reduction of reality to sameness or to the past (generalizations, 
categories) that builds up a total paradigm (system) of (objective) knowledge or 
intersubjectively accepted knowledge of facts and norms, which can only be 
(unwillingly) sustained  by feeding cycles of war and peace.  In the social domain 
reductionism alienates what is reduced away. When a breaking point or saturation 
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point is reached, the “reduced” will resist. It is not that science causes this drive, but 
science is the most pure expression of reduction. 
 The danger that Levinas acknowledges in sameness doesn’t only have to do with 
generalizations or universals, but also includes polarities which conceal sameness. 
Similar to war and peace that are not true polarities of each other, but expressions 
of the same, belong to each other as sides of the same coin. The coin needs both 
sides in order to exist and becomes a higher “mechanism” which keeps both sides 
“alive”, sustaining the cycle between war and peace.  
 In his preface, which Levinas wrote after finishing the book, he says: “The peace 
of empires issued from war rests on war. It does not restore to the alienated beings 
their lost identity. For that a primordial and original relation with being is needed” 
(Levinas 1969 P. 22). 
“But in the absolute the subject and the object would still be parts of the 
same system, would be enacted and revealed panoramically. Exteriority, or, 
if one prefers, alterity, would be converted into the same” (Levinas1969 p. 
290). 
Although the authority of sameness is perfectly autopoietic, it is not able to 
encounter or make contact with the exterior world most in the form of other people 
and their values, given that others observed are existentially different in the presence 
of the observer from his knowledge about it. Reduced knowledge which also defines 
the observer in that context (compliant ego 8.2). The problem here is not knowledge 
about “dead / inanimate” objects and their relations. To reduce the inanimate with 
observer’s logic is innocent and worth-full. Existential criticism on sameness by 
Levinas is not aimed at conventional science like physics or biology to name a few. 
But, the totality of the (scientific) knowledge-producing-machine intending 
humans, animals and plants, cannot distinct objects from humans or from any other 
living objects as facts, because of the principal use of observer’s logic. The primary 
position of observers and scientific observers, is Buber's I - It relation, which is a 
logical consequence of autopoiesis and its CNS.   
 It is the route not to use observer’s logic as scientists that brought Maturana and 
Varela to their theory of autopoiesis. Levinas words it differently: 
“For the things the work of ontology consists in apprehending the individual 
(which alone exists) not in its individuality but in its generality (of which 
alone there is science)” (Levinas 1969 p. 44). 
And: 
“Individuals are reduced... The meaning of individuals (invisible outside of 
this totality) is derived from the totality. The unicity of each present is 
incessantly sacrificed...” (Levinas 1969 p. 22, bold added). 
Similarly to Buber, Levinas too, using different language, intuitively understands 
the workings of i-niche and what the ego is all about. 
 In order to leave war behind, Levinas’ solution lies in the acknowledgement of 
the other’s true and only real status, which can only happen in what he names the 
ethical relation. The foundation of that relation can be allowed into experience in 
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the face to face relation between I and the Other. The face of the Other demands (as 
a first): “Thou shall not commit murder” (Levinas1969 p. 199). The face doesn’t 
refer to the mouth and the cheeks (etc.) but refers to the eyes as a first. The I – Other, 
for Levinas, is not a symmetrical relation, in the way that it is for Buber's I - Thou. 
As a contrast, there are from three different perspectives regarding the other, three 
foundational possible relations. 
 The first is the asymmetrical autopoietic relation: all meaning, including those 
others functionally and solely serves the ego (the observer) and not the other in 
the maintenance of “I as ego”. In nature it leads to the doctrine of the survival of 
the fittest. This ‘system also serves Levinas’ ”sameness” and its main game is 
power. 
 The second relation is Buber’s symmetrical one: I become a Thou in “I – Thou” 
and the one in the meeting, is the innocent one without an Ego. 
 The third relation is Levinas’ asymmetrical one: The demand on the part of the 
Other over me and is also egoless. 
Levinas speaks about what the other demands. The demand is experienced within 
the relation itself. To obey the demand is not to follow rules, but involves the 
consequence of allowing something greater than the self [something beyond 
subjectivity] to emerge in the relation [a third party]. Levinas presents an important 
addition, something which Buber left out and perhaps took for granted. Buber's 
essay is his “finale”, which involves the realizations of his experiences and insights, 
derived from studies of the “Good” in the Torah, in Zen Buddhism, in the 
Upanishads and in many other “holy” sources as well as includes experiences where 
“Good” cannot be made, but is allowed to be expressed as an extension of what is 
always real and always there.  
 Levinas, on the other hand, was also a soldier in war; he took daily notes about 
his war experiences in a military prisoner's camp, after he was caught, in which he 
had been separated (as he was an officer) from the Jewish prisoners. The Nazis did 
not know he was a Jew. Levinas might have noticed that it was forbidden for Jews 
to look in the eyes of their tormentors, not unlike the way that the hood over the 
head of the convicted makes the last gaze between executioner and the condemned 
impossible. The hood keeps guilt dormant for the executioners left behind.  
Levinas' ethics is the road to establish the relation with the Other. He names 
ethics, on their own, “optics”, in terms of a way of seeing (Levinas 1969 p. 23). 
Levinas learned that in the eye contact, the (unwilling) power of demand over the 
ego becomes manifest as he experienced it: 
“The eyes break through the mask—the language of the eyes, impossible to 
dissemble. The eye does not shine; it speaks.” (Levinas 1969 p. 66) 
The eyes of the Other (when they break through subjectivity) transcends Buber's “I-
it” relation, that the whole body authoritively dictates and which is easily accepted 
by executioners in their own I-It relation. But how do the eyes break through the 
mask and speak in the present?  
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“The infinite paralyses [ego's] power by its infinite resistance to murder, 
which, firm and insurmountable, gleams in the face of the Other, in the total 
nudity of his defenceless eyes, in the nudity of the absolute openness of the 
Transcendent”. (Levinas 1969 p. 199, italics added) 
Can infinity be seen? 
It is easier and more indirect to experience what the eyes show more directly:  
“The epiphany of the face brings forth the possibility of gauging the infinity 
of the temptation to murder, not only as a temptation to total destruction, but 
also as the purely ethical impossibility of this temptation and attempt” 
(Levinas 1969 p. 199, italics added). 
All that is good in the observer will resist murder and experience it relevant in 
context, as a temptation, not unlike pure lust is a temptation in a different context. 
All that is good in him is vulnerable to the total nudity of defenseless eyes. 
Defenseless means that autopoietic resistance to death, frantically searching in fear 
for an escape, has been given up. At that moment the ego surrenders and in a way it 
“dies”; its i-niche is shut down and full de-identification of the ego is the result. 
What is left is a being that is free from the ego, transcended and now behind the 
eyes. “irreducible to phenomenality, understood as a reality without reality, is 
effectuated in the non-postponable urgency with which he requires a response” 
(Levinas 1969 p. 212). 
The “irreducible to phenomenality” refers to what Levinas mentioned earlier:  
“Here, contrary to all the conditions for the visibility of objects, a being is 
not placed in the light of another, but presents itself in the manifestation that 
should only announce it." (Levinas 1969 p. 65, bold added). 
It  resonates strongly with Buber's “...he [Thou] is not a thing among things, and 
does not consist of things. This human being is not He or She... nor is he a nature 
able to be experienced and described... But with no neighbor, and whole in himself, 
he is Thou” (Buber 1937 p. 8). Levinas states that sensory organs only “announce” 
an experience which is far beyond them.  
 What is beyond the senses also means beyond the ego / self and its subjectivities. 
Ego-free defenseless eyes cannot be ‘a’ trigger as it cannot accept the projection of 
ego-meaning. Then “sameness” or any categorical reduction is shut down too. This 
is the “...reality without reality”. It brings the projection machine of the observer to 
a sudden halt, which just as suddenly, but not for long, releases the ego of the 
observer in the moment and transforms the experience beyond personal history, in 
an analogous way to Buber’s meeting. Yet even when this happens for a first time 
it becomes a senseless trigger by itself, it will trigger a meta-meaning soon after its 
beginning or when the brief moment is over, in reflection, as if freedom of choice 
is more important than meeting the absolute Other or Thou. The meta meaning will 
be awakened next time and may vary between a welcomed one or its opposite. The 
freedom of forming meta-meaning is total and includes the possibility of accepting 
Thou as experienced or the denial of Thou, even when experienced. 
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13.7.5 Levinas resists Buber 
Levinas gives Buber's meeting a slight twist. “Language as the presence of the face 
does not invite complicity with the preferred being, the self-sufficient “I-Thou” 
forgetful of the universe;” (Levinas 1969 p. 213). Buber's I - Thou, which Levinas 
obviously read, seems for him too noncommittal, in a sense too abstract, too far 
away from real politics and from society. It is not primarily about spirituality or 
God; it is about ending war and changing the taken for granted overwhelming power 
of the Totality of a human thought system that produces knowledge. The 
authorization of the face is humanity itself beyond the face, which is witness and 
which is already served by the Other who also stands in the world, as part of the 
universe.  
“The epiphany of face qua face opens humanity...is a destituteness, a 
presence of the third party (that is, of the whole of humanity which looks at 
us), and a command that commands commanding” (Levinas 1969 p. 213, 
italics added).  
Humanity here is not hypothetical but experienced. Presenting the essence of 
humanity as a reference to counter the alienation of Totality, resonates with 
Husserl's indictment of the alienation of science from humanity. In essence, Levinas 
understands that “knowledge is based on (gross) reduction”. By generalizing (in fact 
categorizing) that one small part of perceived humans into personal knowledge will 
make it part of the Ego, but still a reduction. As we have seen, even the notion of 
causality is based on (gross) reduction considering that any observer can only 
perceive a small part of the total sum of properties, always partly expressed by 
interaction of any intended unity. For conventional science, it is a tool like  
approach; for the social sciences and practical naïve (political) categories outside 
science it produces Levinas’ Totality and in the end war.  
Humanity is not a choice, but “a logical consequence of what the experience of 
innocent eyes offer him.” (Levinas 1969 p. 65) That makes the real identity of 
humans beyond the senses, beyond subjectivity, beyond categories, beyond 
phenomenology, and also beyond autopoiesis and finally beyond words. This does 
not mean that Levinas found the true autopoietic organization shared by all humans. 
The human biological organizational “blue print” is cyclical by nature and by 
cognitive economy needs categories. 
Sameness for Levinas excludes the “Other” as something absolutely “not-me”. 
“Transcendence or goodness is produced as pluralism. The pluralism of 
being is not produced as a multiplicity of a constellation spread out before a 
possible gaze, for thus it would be already totalized, joined into [my] entity. 
Pluralism is accomplished in goodness proceeding from me to the other, in 
which first the other, as absolutely other, can be produced” (Levinas 1969 
p. 305, italics added). 
Buber's Thou can be regarded by Levinas still as a reduction, a kind of 
categorization, with no room for fundamental uniqueness. Sameness is, for Levinas, 
the opposite of true exteriority, the domain of the real, unique, absolutely other; and 
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previously to the theory of autopoiesis, Levinas already knew from Husserl that 
what humans experience as an outside world—how different this may be from “me” 
the observer, observing them—can only experience the observed as reflections of 
his own constructions: “Their alterity [the world and all in it] is thereby reabsorbed 
into my own identity… as possessor (Levinas 1969 p. 33). Levinas strongly avoids 
any kind of sameness as a solution against the mechanisms behind war. It is 
precisely the search for sameness, as reduction, which in the end produces war by 
denying plurality. All too often, differences before sameness provide a justification 
for conflict. The ideology of sameness takes its virtual reduction as real, not virtual. 
This error will make sameness like all virtual things considered as real, fragile. Its 
fragility therefore makes it vulnerable to perceived attacks, which in the end begs 
for its defense. Its defense, when grave, will regard sacrifices made as the ultimate 
proof of sameness true nature: not being a virtual ideology, but descriptions of true 
reality worth dying for. Especially death is its ultimate proof of its true value. Not 
particularly a strategy for Levinas to free a total system from producing war next to 
peace. 
 
13.7.6 Desire and Goodness 
“To posit being as Desire ...is to affirm that to apprehend oneself from 
within—to produce oneself as I—is to apprehend oneself with the same 
gesture that already turns toward the exterior to extra-vert and to manifest—
to respond for what it apprehends—to express; it is to affirm that the 
becoming-conscious is already language, that the essence of language is 
goodness, or again, that the essence of language is friendship and 
hospitality”. (Levinas 1969 p.305) 
Levinas adds language, but language, which lies in the extension of “Desire”. For 
Levinas, “Desire” (with a capital D) is the metaphysical desire of the ego for the 
absolutely other, always beyond his grasp and beyond his descriptions as the true 
one “not being me” (Levinas 1969 p. 33).  Here Levinas "Desire" resonates with 
Buber: “Desire  itself  is transformed as  it  plunges [in the meeting] out  of  its  
dream  into  the  appearance.” (Buber 1937 p.11-12).  The other can never be grasped 
by knowledge. The longing for an absolutely other, but what the senses alone cannot 
offer, produces nostalgia on an existential level. “Levinas' Desire” is not based on 
and cannot be satisfied by triggers, which in the end only trigger the ego and all its 
internal categories, which is its foundation. Only unconditional love can do this as 
only such love can accept the absolute differences between individuals. Such a Love 
cannot be apprehended by ego, but apparently innate in Consciousness can be 
approximated by Ego’s descriptions. Levinas uses language as language 
(unconsciously) presupposes a real other [beyond organizational closure]. 
Consciousness within ego intuitively understands deep inside, others out there are 
beyond all his reduced knowledge about them. Others are fundamentally not him 
and cannot be him—even when he “owns” them—and that forces language to exist. 
In the ego's naiveté, he forgets that their transcendence is exactly what he “Desires” 
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and what language rests upon. But once the ego realizes how absolutely other the 
other is, always beyond all his descriptions, he also realizes that the other cannot be 
controlled and that his power to redefine him is useless. Then the door to the other 
will be unlocked, but doesn’t stand open yet to meet him. Once the ego also realizes 
and accepts how deeply and unconditionally he loves their transcendence, by Being 
an unbreakable part of it, the door opens and all language, starting with “the 
language of the face” shines through its origin, and becomes a language of 
goodness.  
Finally, ever-lasting peace stands upon: 
“Peace therefore cannot be identified with the end of combats that cease for 
want of combatants…. Peace must be my peace, in a relation that starts from 
an I and goes to the other, in desire and goodness, where the I both maintains 
itself and exists without egoism” (Levinas 1969 p. 306, bold and italic 
added). 
Here Levinas underlines the absoluteness of the other when its uniqueness is 
sustained. That is the practical must in a society that wishes to leave the origins of 
war and peace behind. So, within the value of what humanity is, lies the inclusion 
of freedom in order to allow the absence of sameness, and to allow only sameness 
as an accepted but virtual tool to serve the essence of humanity, not unlike the 
surgeon who serves the whole patient that he cannot see. 
 
13.7.7 Conclusion so far 
What does the Source, as experienced by the respondents tell us, preceded by the 
ideas of Buber and Levinas, and in relation to their writings? A note. In order to 
explore in a deep way what the findings might mean, in relation to morality, may 
seem unscientific as it fully enters what has been defined as transcendence. Still, it 
is an analysis and discussion, constantly monitored by the findings of the 
respondents, which are validated by their member-checks. 
What is found in the beyond ego Transcendental domain? Buber’s I as Thou, 
Levinas’ humanity, the Source of the respondents and also Husserl’s Transcendental 
Consciousness, but not Levinas’ absolutely other. What is part of the domain is the 
freedom to become an absolute other and the Goodness that is his inheritance. The 
deconstruction of Levinas’ “humanity” and Buber’s “Thou” ends in Transcendental 
Consciousness and Transcendental Source of Emotions, assumed to be present in 
all humans, but in this context with a “twist”. In default, Consciousness and the 
Source operate in different functional domains. In experience they stand apart as 
thinking from feeling. Consciousness’ essential task is to get rid of important 
question marks using inductive and deductive reasoning, in order to find and 
validate the answers with integrated meaning. Any answer found, be it about the 
world or the self, brings into experience an Ego, as a kind of vehicle to operate in 
the world by self-expression.  
The Source does not know question marks. It uses itself as the reference for his 
Conscious part to evaluate the constructed meanings. The Source practically 
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defines: “I am relation”. The function of the Source apparently is to guide his 
Consciousness with feelings in the right direction of constructing Ego. Ego (in 
contemporary sense) merely acknowledges that all feelings, good or bad, are his 
feelings and that he possesses them. All emotions, from the ego’s perspective, give 
him always right, that his thinking is as real (“faultless”) as the accompanying 
feelings themselves are experienced.  By default the ego only operates in the context 
of observer’s logic, unless a stubborn feeling resists the ego’s logics: conscience.  
When observer’s logic considers meaning as a property of triggers, feelings 
become rational responses to triggers (section 5.17.2) and the FB-loop of emotions 
gets lost. Thereby the internal reference as a guide gets lost too. Sometimes 
conscience pops up ( a direct relation with the Source) but misses rational authority. 
This may explain the stubborn existence of morality through the millennia. 
It appears that the Source and the ideas of Buber refer to the same thing: an 
beyond autopoiesis interconnectedness. And on the level of Buber’s meeting it may 
very well be so. But Levinas is right too when he says that this knowledge is by far 
not enough, as ‘sameness’, the origin of ego, has no problem to contradict the 
transcendental truth out of its experience and replaces it with an I-It relation: an 
indispensable criterion for conflict and war. The freedom of choice (section 6.9) as 
an innate property of developed consciousness seems not developed or ‘given’ to 
Consciousness for staying the same, to become fixed. Accepting Buber is right, what 
which the Source appears to support, we were once copies or extensions of a 
Transcendental Sameness, which is not the same as Levinas’ “sameness”. 
Transcendental Sameness disappeared when we became unique individuals, at the 
moment that processes of always individual sense-making begin defining 
experience. Still, Transcendental Sameness can be experienced in Buber’s meeting 
or meeting Levinas’ innocent eyes. 
Buber’s meeting or experiencing Levinas “innocent demanding eyes” are not 
default states, but rare exceptions. Although Source and Consciousness have sheer 
opposite functions, in these rare cases they become united as if they are one. 
Transcendental Consciousness identifies itself, in that context, with his Source.  
Levinas’ absolute other is not a meeting but a logical consequence, of the 
transcendental freedom of the other to realize his absolute unique experience of 
existence. He may not be unique in the Transcendental Domain, but to experience 
that domain as Transcendental Consciousness alone is already rare. To experience 
one’s own Oneness between Consciousness and Source is even rarer. Far more 
“natural” is to experience one’s own knowledge in the form of Ego, which makes 
everyone also truly unique.  The command thou shall not murder means:  grant me 
my innate absolute freedom to develop myself as a unique being.  
Thou returns to a normal “you” when the Source withdraws from the eyes. The 
withdrawing is a necessity and it is the only way to honor and uphold the internal 
freedom of choice given to one’s own mind (Transcendental Consciousness). This 
refers to the freedom for the experiencer of Thou to identify with his past again, to 
become unique again and be once again part of and in the world. To be part of the 
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world and to accept oneself as a unique being is the only way to experience, to 
develop and to grow.  
In terms of Being (Source + Transcendental Consciousness), I cannot see a 
principal difference between Levinas and Buber. Levinas has creatively defined 
sameness as a totalitarian system, but he cannot deny that a million different faces 
become one by the eyes, when they offer their innocence. Levinas' demands may 
not come from the Other as the purity of defenseless eyes offer also freedom of 
choice. The Other through his defenseless eyes, reflects—or better—gently 
reminds, not commands, the executioner of his own innocence. It is the observer, 
who feels the resonance within of his own innocence, a force to uphold his moral 
Being, which does command: “Don’t kill or hate your brother”.   
To stay close to the respondents' findings, the thesis will not go into a possible—
even more deeper and transcendental—origin of the Source and Being. Both Buber 
and Levinas conclude that awareness of the existence of Being in the other can only 
be done from within as a gift, standing outside time and outside the ego. Goodness 
is founded by the infinite space, which is freedom for “me to be me” and for the 
“other to be the other”, based on a relationship, which, when recognized, is 
established as the one that has always been “Desired”. The most basic existential 
nature of humans is revealed by the Source, with its reference expressing in short: 
“I am (a) relation” as a beyond-ego Being including  “I am the sum of all possible 
relations” as Ego. The relation is a given, it is unconditional, it just is and makes 
any human a moral Being underneath his ‘subjectivity’. The Source’s only message 
appears to be, “Develop towards your real self by learning to choose knowledge to 
allow yourself, so you will experience being a happy part of others as they are part 
of you.” Freedom, plurality, and Goodness and even Love are all consequences or 
extensions of that message. In order not to get lost in the external world, full of 
numerous different dynamic phenomena, the Source acts as an emotional guide, 
offering only two roads of emotional travelling, whereby one is wanted and  Desired 
and is as much as possible open to the present, the other road accumulates suffering 
and loneliness and holds on to the past. 
 
13.8 Research question one, second part    
The second part of the main research question one is:  
... What may possibly be a plausible rational and impartial ground for morality? 
All of the 27+ respondents, randomly selected, belong to Levinas’ humanity. If the 
Source is universal then we all belong to humanity as Levinas defined it. In that 
way we all are connected on an existential level with each other. To respect the 
Source’s message and uphold these existential relations with others respectfully 
defines a moral Being. All humans appear to have a Source with the same reference. 
The reference governs emotionally all routes of possible choices and their 
accompanying experiences. Individually matching the universal reference of the 
Source is matching Levinas’ humanity; and as mentioned before, the match leads to 
peace and happiness in a personal way. But what kind of morality is it? 
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If we delete the category “morality” of all contemporary content, while holding 
the name intact, what then remains intact? What are the absolutely minimal 
essentials? Whatever it is, it must be a universal fundamental description of human 
property. Humanity cannot impose the inhuman against itself as its purest value. 
Morality still being for the sake of argument an empty category, what does the 
Source fills in? What are the practical consequences of what the Source tells us 
about humanity? Morality does not “request” to appreciate, uphold, sustain, respect 
and help others in exchange for an anticipated response. It is not any economy. Take 
away the condition of a necessary response and true morality becomes 
unconditional.  
Morality is normal and natural and merely passively describes attitudes and 
corresponding behavior of humankind, following its founding nature. In-Being 
oneself morality would be taken for granted and almost never mentioned, in the 
same way that daily showers are never mentioned in the papers. Only in the absence 
of truth, in the totality of an all-encompassing thought-system that reduces 
uniqueness out of experience, morality through the ages pushes in a stubborn way 
again and again against the inhuman. Buber, Levinas, the Source and other similar 
theories concern only the Living. Observer's logic or Buber's I-It relations are 
perfectly adequate to approach nonliving “Its,” as things do not necessitate morality, 
unless the non-living become conditional contexts for the living.   
In order for the empty category of morality to be “filled”, the minimal (essential), 
but universal good qualifies. The reference of the Source perfectly matches that 
condition. How can it be more minimal, more universal, and more faithful to 
Levinas’ humanity? What can be more minimal than the foundational truth of Being 
“I am a relation”? A relation which will determines one’s own experience, if chosen 
wisely. A choice for happiness or a choice for its sad absence depends on the use of 
free choice, embedded in the untouchable and infinitely private sense-making 
processes. The Source’s reference as the guide to make the right choices is 
existentially rigid and unavoidable but offers equal freedom, to the same degree, to 
disagree. Disagreement can be chosen, but the truth cannot be changed, only its 
experience will be replaced for anything we actually do not want and do not 
“Desire”. 
To think and behave morally or ethically, in the words of Levinas or Buber, or 
according to the Source, is the result of only being oneself as one just is: a moral 
Being a priori to Ego.  
To integrate one’s own moral Being into Ego’s viewpoint to look at the world, 
will automatically also change the world accordingly as all world-experiences are 
compliant to their observers. Almost all—if not all—destructive behavior derives 
from, or is accompanied by, new or old (forgotten) negative feelings, perfectly 
corresponding to negative meaning projected to the objects intended because they 
are Buber’s “Its”. The feelings however are neither from the ego, nor by the ego and 
even not directed to the ego. The ego cannot possess his feelings, like he possesses 
his internal descriptions.  
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The possessor has owner’s right to change his possessions, but emotions stand 
as true independent realities like unmovable mountains before him. They are not of 
him and cannot be changed by him like he cannot change the reference which 
emotions rest upon. They are the Source’s messages to change his mind, but with 
the freedom not to. All misconstructions not expressing a moral Being, as different 
as they may be, have only one cause: the misreading of one’s own emotions for not 
knowing what they are. Sin is not part of humanity but sinful behaviors as part of 
realized illusions in their abundance deny humanity. Illusions made real amply exist 
in the world. Illusions to exist for instance in the relation between two observers 
need blind faith by both that what they know is real. Still it is possible to detect what 
presents itself as real but is actually illusory. Circular logic is able to deny what is 
real by observer’s logic (projected illusions are real when the projection is taken for 
granted). Feeling hateful or fearful by perceiving triggers can only be understood 
by Circular logic to be projections of one’s own meaning. The Source adds to those 
feelings that they point to an important error. Nothing believed, belonging to and 
situates within the living system should obstruct its development and growth. All 
what is projected situates within.  But mistakes within are recognized outside as 
real. That is how autopoiesis works to protect individual identity by the processes 
of organizational closure.  
Note. What are not addressed are the plentiful feelings of joy, freedom, peace, 
or laughter, which also exist abundantly and even more in the world. When people 
are unaware of their Source, they can still believe (maybe sometimes for the wrong 
reasons) “truth” descriptions meeting the standards of the reference. Such 
descriptions produce joy, vitality or peace in those contexts; they do not hinder 
personal development and health, but maintain or enlighten it by allowing it for 
others. 
 
13.8.1 Authority and treason 
When error invades the mind, joy disappears, at best replaced by pleasure. Who 
opens the door for error? Why is that door so widely open to invite all mistakes? 
But mostly: why is that an existential good thing? 
How can the eyes of the other remind me of my innocence, how can the Source 
remain his reference in the midst of terror, havoc and war, unless they are beyond 
sin and within innocence? Not innocence as the opposite of sin, as that cannot be, 
like light cannot be the opposite of darkness. But more important is the question: 
“Why did “Innocence” nota bene nestled in the foundation of any individual [if the 
Source or Buber or Levinas is right], not block errors and obstruct their becoming 
with correction?” Why does the (real) Swan internally not correct the becoming of 
the ugly duckling in Hans Christian Anderson’s story? Levinas' Infinity, Buber's 
Thou as fundamental as they may be and the Source all stand passive to errors as if 
they are bound to a pledge of allegiance to non-intervention. What is it about errors, 
that in the highest schemes of things they are so “cherished” that the Wise do not 
interfere in principle and (modern) God (at least), when He exists, never?  
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Error then cannot be the enemy within the grandest scheme of things. It must be 
the “smoking gun”, the inevitable proof of all proofs, of the greatest imaginable gift 
given to humankind when biology released the species. The gift of unconditional 
freedom of choice. Love or the perfect outcome do not prove freedom, but perfect 
freedom proves unconditional Love by allowing all errors as a choice. A tree, a rose, 
a lovely sunset, all as beautiful as they may be, have neither chosen for their beauty 
nor their perfection. They are “fixed”, determined by their properties and---like 
leaves falling—abide any wind.  
A complete lack of freedom can be found in trillion perfect things, and in the 
primitive of the Living. This stands in stark contrast to human development because 
of its internal relation of choice. Only then, when the mind (Consciousness as ego) 
accepts within free will his foundation is his gentle Source unconditionally loving 
him, his morality cannot be made, but returns. The bond does not need 
acknowledgement, but consciousness needs to know it to allow the bond into 
experience. Consciousness cannot make inner Truth but it is the perfect decision 
maker to create the experience of Truth. For Ego it does not really matter what is 
changed first, the meaning of subject or object, in order to change. Both form Ego 
equally simultaneously (Section 8.4-8.7).  
The authority of morality is the authority of what a human being is, beyond its 
constructions of subjectivity or objectivity; that internal “phenomenon” which is 
more than flesh and bones: a moral Being. The innocent and lovable nature of every 
human being, but with such unworldly—literally a beyond the senses—standards. 
The reaching of the ego to allow what he really is, only needs the knowledge of its 
existence, which through the millennia could not be based or proven by anything 
the senses offer. The denial of this is the ego’s road back to treason of all that he 
holds dear. The treason is unacknowledged in the grandest scheme of things as if it 
never was, since the unreal cannot exist in the briefest moments of time. The nature 
of moral transcendence cannot be scientifically grasped, but a metaphor may touch 
upon it: 
“Every night before going to bed, the mother did not need to set the clock at 
seven to awaken her little boy the next morning. The boy woke every 
morning, almost to the clock, and when awake he called for his mother. But 
not this morning. She heard him cry and sob and when she glanced at her 
watch, it was almost six o’clock.  
She rushed to him anxiously and found him sitting upright in his bed. 
Something was not right. It was not his crying that upset her. Mothers 
intimately know the crying of their babies and toddlers. This crying didn’t 
involve something different in his tone of voice, but more something in his 
eyes. Or better, what she noticed was what was not in his eyes. As she had 
rushed into his room, he looked up to her. He quickly turned his face away, 
before she realized there was a trace of guilt on the boy’s face. She bent over 
and in tears he said:  
  
187 | P a g e  
 
“Please mummy, can you forgive me?” For a brief moment she was startled. 
She picked the toddler up and hugged him close to her.  
“Oh my beloved one, I will always forgive you, but why?”  
He said between his sobs: “I have... burned... the whole house down and... 
everyone is ...dead”. The poor little boy clearly was still “living” inside his 
dream. The mother comforted him, feeling relieved, soothed him and 
whispered in his ear:  
“Nothing you experienced was real, my precious one. All these mistakes 
you imagine you made were dreamt and were not real. All the mistakes you 
will ever make are not yet realized by you, that you act out of a dream. 
He looked up to her in wonder. She smiled, “My endless Love, you do not 
need to understand all this right now, how can I ask you to be more than you 
can realize?”  
 
13.8.2 Universal morality cannot personally exist 
The last sentence of the above metaphor is its core message. The respondents “de 
facto” showed one Source for one person to be experienced. The fact that thirty or—
theoretically—six billion people have a Source with an identical reference cannot 
change the message of that last sentence. The reference of the Source becomes 
meaningless and out of function when it is regarded outside the personal context 
within it operates. The Source gives personal FB and this must be taken literally. 
The Source as a source of personal emotions needs personal descriptions of meaning 
out of Ego in order for ego to experience his feelings. That makes the messages of 
a universal Source and its morality, in practice always personal. 
How can unique personalities, which also do not share the precise same phase of 
personal development, identically experience a context (considered identical in the 
descriptions of observers)? When offering the Source different webs of meaning—
which may even include knowledge of the Source—about “identical” contexts, 
(slightly) different emotional responses will be the results.  
Examples. A toddler in his curiosity innocently dissects a live little frog and while 
he feels good about it, his toddler friend is intuitively upset by watching it. In a 
burning house, the owner saves his dog first, then the content of his safe; afterwards, 
he has no time left to save his two cats. Nevertheless, all things considered he feels 
very positive about what he did. A man, under extreme conditions and while 
endangering his own life, rescues the life of his neighbor’s two children, but stops 
short of saving the other children. Another man, after saving his own children 
continues to try to save others, at great risk to himself. Despite this, the first man 
feels happy and is proud of himself in a similar way that the second man is. The 
occupying forces took revenge by appointing six civilians to be shot, out of a group 
of 100 villagers of varying ages. All six appointed were young men. At the very last 
moment, one person in his sixties asked permission regarding whether he could be 
swapped with the youngest. The request was granted and the man felt a deep peace. 
Another man had to choose, in a split second, whether to save his family of five at 
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the expense of not saving a bus full of passengers. He saved his family and was very 
happy about that decision for the rest of his life. And so on.  
 All behavior in the examples aimed at doing good (except the example involving 
dissecting the frog). All genuine moral behavior is equally moral from the point of 
view of the Source. Genuinely giving in to a moral Being inside can only be 
maximal. It is maximal but within the constraints of personal reality (Ego). The 
conclusion does not match the logic of observers, but follows Circular logic 
perfectly. If a boy and a man genuinely jump as high as possible, an observer 
immediately notices that the man jumps (much) higher than the boy. But from 
within, their effort was equally maximal, with exactly the same intention.  
 If a critic states that saving a hundred strangers is more moral than saving your 
family of five and if he is genuine, he is still wrong to judge the different choice to 
the one he would have made. It is important to  remember  that the dissecting toddler 
did not feel any guilt while exploring the little frog, not unlike the man, who also 
felt no guilt when he deeply offended a woman from another culture to his own, 
having no clue about this misunderstanding. The Source does not work with the 
opinions of others; they all have their own unconditional Source to do that. One may 
predict that the critic experiences some negative feelings when he states his 
judgment, meaning that he incorporates an error of his making.  
 What stays however across all egos is the core message of the Source, what feels 
negative points to an internal error in meaning and then, when an important error 
gets materialized in behavior, it does not make the error true because its expression 
can be observed. Observations cannot distinguish in the social world what is real 
from realized illusions.  
 Personal behavior based on free choice can be categorized in three different 
domains. 
1) Genuinely doing harm to others, meaning hindering or stopping their 
development and growth directly or by supporting or creating contexts 
infringing the right of others for development and growth. Feelings: Negative.   
2) Being indifferent or not helping others. Feelings: negative or positive (above or 
below the threshold of awareness) 
3) Genuinely helping or supporting others in an active way. Feelings: positive. 
Option 1 is wrong when the person feels negative or has learned not to feel it by 
suppressing it, but is also rightly wrong for observers, who have knowledge of the 
Source. Except in rare cases, this kind of behavior will be internally accompanied 
by negative feelings and even then (for instance the “positive” feelings after 
revenge) when deconstructing the experience it is still against the code of the 
Source. Behavior type 1) must be considered carefully. Stopping a burglar in the 
process of stealing is not hindering his growth and development into learning to 
express his moral Being, which he is, but not what he believes himself to be. 
Stopping the burglar is not stopping him from what he is. Beating him up after he 
is unable to continue stealing is “honoring” his mistake, the fact that he continues 
being a burglar, which he is not. Honoring mistakes is mirroring (copying) mistakes 
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internally, making illusions real, now from the point of view of the “righteous” 
observer. The stealing, but also the fact of doing harm after the “danger” is 
cancelled, belongs to category 1) and denies humanity. 
 Category 2) is more complex. It is a needed position in games and sports, because 
they are principally innocent entertainment for spectators. And in that context it is   
alright even preferred to identify with the game. Still, in sports, not helping the 
competition happens (guaranteed by a referee) principally in a respectful and ethical 
way. But what does indifference mean outside sports, e.g.in gaming in the broadest 
sense of the word?  
 There is a lot of “gaming” going on with “dangerous” identifications in politics, 
economics and finance, but in principle with few or no referees. Feelings guide (if 
the Source is known) the participants in worldly “gaming”, about whether their 
actions are just or not; but how will they be judged by society?  
 Category 3) is easy to recognize as just. This is Levinas’ humanity in a micro-
context and does not need more words to be understood. Category 2) is much harder 
to evaluate for observers. How to detect right from wrong when observing or 
judging the passivity of others without imposing “observer’s morality”? How can 
observers make a better judgment than the Source of the observed?  
 Questions like this are rare and hardly necessary in a congruent, coherent, 
genuine form of society, such as that described by Levinas. But in that ideal world, 
imposing morality on others is not necessary anymore. Living in world that is not 
ideal needs a different model of morality: supportive morality. 
  
13.8.3 The illusion of guilt and supportive morality 
Morality cannot be understood along the criteria of guilt. Guilt expects from the self 
that it is able to act out an idea, which is still unknown to itself. The essence of guilt 
is a paradox. “I should have known”, “I should have done” is guilt's illusionary 
tactic of blame, denying the actual reality that at that time it was not known, so it 
could not be avoided.  
 Blame does not make these distinctions, like the little biological machines of the 
senses cannot distinguish the relation between meaning, knowledge and behavior 
(capabilities). Blame also does not care in its accusations about any of these. Still 
every behavior is a logical, not irrational extension of meaning, while meaning can 
be highly irrational, but never on purpose. During the act, the highest description in 
power, relevant for that part of the ego, will always be served and any error at that 
level is not recognized by consciousness as a fault. The mother is truly right to say 
that it is an error to expect a child to jump higher than his developmental stage 
allows. Guilt assumes it is not; the child must be able before it is able.  
 The boundless nature of all Thou renders its potential also boundless, making all 
individuals children again in the grand scheme of their development. Most adults 
can easily forgive little children, as blame is blocked by their understanding. To 
blame a little child, saying things such as “You should have known”, in many cases 
makes no sense for the adult observer and for the child. The adult understands the 
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innocence of the child is preserved in spite of the child’s mistake. The child cannot 
know or at least cannot yet realize what he knows; therefore he / she is granted the 
right by his adult observers to make mistakes. By accepting the innocence of the 
child, observers deny their preferred (default) observer’s logic and replaced it 
without knowing with Circular logic. This returns morality within the personal 
limits of conscious reasoning and responsibility, it serves the Source. However to 
undo the blockage of blame and to reserve guilt for adults, rests upon the pretention 
of the observer that he now also understands. He knows why he, as the accuser, is 
entitled to blame, but he forgets the irrationality all blame needs to exist and he 
simultaneously denies his ability for Circular logic.   
 True justice can only individually be applied and True justice follows the Source. 
It is not a justice that can serve any “Totality” or any other group think, or 
contemporary society or even a society with the best intentions. Personal justice, 
“infinite” and real, follows the Source's reference serving I - Thou as a principle and 
includes Levinas' plurality. Total justice, even at its best, with good intentions, is an 
average, a generalization, a gross reduction in order to protect and uphold the state 
(the village or the tribe) as its first cause. So, if unavoidable, its justice will be at the 
expense of doing justice to the ‘anonymous’ individual.   
 The division between personal and systemic justice is noticeable in different 
schools of ethics, such as the virtue ethics who are closest to the “found reference” 
and deontological schools, which in fact protect the rulers of a (local) total system, 
and in which authority lies in the end in the hands of violence. The Taliban and Isis 
are modern examples of this, but also little villages with their strong local ethics are 
examples, which can only exist by avoiding or excluding strangers unless they fully 
comply. Simple totalitarian societies (and they are always simple) fully follow Total 
justice and could just as well replace all their judges by machines. Democracies feel 
intuitively the tension between Total and personal justice, which makes most 
verdicts doing equal justice to both, an impossible compromise and beyond what 
any future artificial intelligence can muster. 
Totality founded by observer’s logic existed in Levinas' time and fifty years later 
still exists today. Likely it will at best still exist some centuries further down the 
road. We don't live in an ideal world and law and order is necessary to uphold a 
society as a systemic external condition with a certain function. The most just 
function would be to respect the Source’s message amidst billions who do not know 
or are not able yet to realize its messages. To help them grow, a supportive morality 
is needed. One which is unable to do perfect justice to humanity in the present; it 
will not fit Levinas’ society yet. Such a morality needs judges and supportive 
politics with the knowledge that the best practical morality is a compromise between 
personal and systemic justice, but in service to protect the becoming of a society, 
which embraces humanity.  A compromised justice, which keeps the idea intact 
valid in the presence that every suspect before court against all perceptions is-not 
an “It” and can never be one what the senses offer. In spite of all suspect’s proven 
sins, WYSIWYG is existentially the opposite of what he is. To start from there, will 
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gradually end the blame game and will support the inescapable development to 
plural societies, which understand deeply that nobody falls, or are out of grace with 
themselves on purpose and that any kind of blame needs the blind faith of the 
accuser who is lost in his own righteousness. Just like modern democratic states did 
not develop out of a controlled and planned way, but allowed to be guided by an 
“invisible hand”, so hopefully a second hand, evolved out of the first, will guide 
existing states over the centuries to a kind of Levinas’ state. 
 
14.0 Research question two 
The addition of leadership has been chosen because leaders (as is well known) act 
willingly or unwillingly as role models and are often followed and copied by others, 
which will qualify them as followers, although they follow themselves. Leaders thus 
lead by example and influence culture much more than any those with fewer powers 
in the organization are able to, without the approval of “higher” authorities. 
What is within the scope of the thesis to explore is a fraction of “supportive 
morality”, namely the answer of the second main research question:  
 
“How does a moral impartial ground affect the properties of moral leadership in 
organizations”? 
 
There are many theories regarding what good and moral leadership should be or 
could be. I choose only one here as one will do when it perfectly fits supportive 
morality for managers and leaders in business and strongly resonates with the 
findings of the research. The one found is the earlier mentioned “The MBA OATH”. 
The authors of the book “The MBA OATH” (Anderson and Escher 2010) 
understand that no words can fulfill the true nature of morality in relation to the 
complexity of the world; but they have offered something refreshing:  it is not 
necessary. The oath acts as a reminder and makes it easier to awaken or better invite 
outside consciousness the deep, hidden knowledge of the Source in the unconscious. 
Once awaken, but accepted and maintained by the ego, it becomes possible for ego 
to be gradually rewritten and the compliant world will be rewritten as well in 
experience (section 8.2). The book is not a product of a gathering of old and wise 
professors and philosophers, but comes from a young generation of students from 
the year 2008/2009. As a spontaneous reaction to the 2008 Financial Global Crisis, 
more than 2,500 MBAs and business students in Harvard Business School's class of 
2009, drafted and spread “The MBA Oath”, based on a brief code of ethics. The 
book begins with, and from thereon defends and explains:     
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Fig. 7 The MBA Oath 
 
“As a manager, my purpose is to serve the greater good by bringing together people 
and resources to create value that no single individual can build alone. Therefore 1 
will seek a course that enhances the value my enterprise can create for society over 
the long-term. I recognize my decisions can have far-reaching consequences that 
affect the well-being of individuals inside and outside my enterprise, today and in 
the future. As I reconcile the interests of different constituencies. I will face difficult 
choices.  
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Therefore I promise: 
  
I will act with utmost integrity and pursue my work in an ethical manner. My 
personal behavior will be an example of integrity, consistent with the values I 
publicly espouse.  
 
I will safeguard the interests of my shareholders, coworkers, customers, and 
the society in which we operate. I will endeavor to protect the interests of those 
who may not have power but whose well-being is contingent on my decisions, 
 
I will manage my enterprise in good faith, guarding against decisions and 
behavior that advance my own narrow ambitions but harm the enterprise and 
the people it serves. The pursuit of self-interest is the vital engine of a capitalist 
economy, but unbridled greed can cause great harm. I will oppose corruption, unfair 
discrimination, and exploitation. 
 
I will understand and uphold, both in letter and in spirit, the laws and contracts 
governing my own conduct and that of my enterprise. If I find laws that are 
unjust, antiquated, or unhelpful I will not brazenly break, ignore, or avoid them: I 
will seek civil and acceptable means of reforming them.  
 
I will take responsibility for my actions, and I will represent the performance 
and risks of my enterprise accurately and honestly. My aim will not be to distort 
the truth but to transparently explain it and help people understand how decisions 
that affects them arc made. 
 
I will develop both myself and other managers under my supervision so that 
the profession continues to grow and contribute to the well-being of society. I 
will consult colleagues and others who can help inform my judgment and will 
continually invest in staying abreast of the evolving knowledge in the field, always 
remaining open to innovation. I will mentor and look after the education of the next 
generation of leaders. 
 
I will strive to create sustainable economic, social, and environmental 
prosperity worldwide. Sustainable prosperity is created when the enterprise 
produces an output in the long run that is greater than the opportunity cost of all the 
inputs it consumes. 
 
I will be accountable to my peers and they will be accountable to me for living 
by this oath. I recognize that my stature and privileges as a professional stem from 
the respect and trust that the profession as a whole enjoys, and 1 accept my 
responsibility for embodying, protecting, and developing the standards of the 
management profession, so as to enhance that trust and respect.  
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This oath I make freely, and upon my honor." (Anderson and Asher 2010 p. xv-
xvi) 
 
The MBA Oath's aim is not to fully cover all possible contexts and decision points, 
which is neither possible nor necessary. They invite the Source, in difficult non 
routine contexts—within personal development, power and responsibility—to “stop 
whispering”. The Oath allows and invites the Source to answer out loud, when the 
question is asked: NOT “What should I do?”, but “What is the best I can do in my / 
this job-context, that helps me to become more of my true self?”  
 The question will not only honor man’s real nature and Being, but is the only 
valid question that can be asked in order to become genuinely human and to be 
recognized by others as genuinely human. The question opens the sum of all internal 
known resources in general and, in particular, pushes near developed ones into 
awareness. Any other question asks to deviate from personal growth and 
development. This is another important good thing about The MBA Oath, that it 
will block job identification. 
 
14.1 The identification with one’s organizational function may not be a good 
thing 
Before discussing role or job identification, there is a vast library of books and 
articles since the fifties about this topic, increasingly popular nowadays. Still, in 
academic theory there is no difference between the ego and personal identity. 
Academic identity theories are solely based on observer’s logic that first tries to 
categorize things in order to understand later with further analysis. An approach 
which leads to the classical ego or identity definitions as a model which autopoiesis 
cannot support.  
 The above question [“What is the best I can do in this / my job-context, that helps 
me to become more of my [relational] true self?” to the Source and/or following the 
Oath will both block any unconscious motivation to identify oneself with the job. 
Job identification will reduce one’s own personality on the level of meaning and 
values, in order to fit in with the perceived demands of the job; once there and much 
more dangerously, this opens the door wide open to further identifying with the 
culture behind the job. Good people can become unethical when they identify with 
an unethical culture, which requires their “innocent” identification with their 
function, a process made clear by research (Falk and Szech 2013; Cohn, Fehr & 
Maréchal 2014). It is much better for executives and other role models in the 
organization, instead of role identification, to stay oneself in the role, while at the 
same time not denying their job responsibilities. 
 What the Oath will support is that a human stays a human in whatever job he is. 
It does not support the idea of the man becoming the job, but instead it looks at how 
the job can become humanized. The deconstruction of opposing logics only shows, 
in the end, the hidden alienation of their thought-system from humanity, caught in 
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an ideology of weakness maintained by fear. This may be fear that the job cannot 
be done right, or that moral decisions are against effectiveness or more profit, 
against professionalism; that moral decisions will weaken the cause. What causes 
can be weakened by morality, except the ones “we” should not want?  It is against 
humanity as Levinas defined it and extremely arrogant of the ego to believe that his 
virtual thought systems to defend an unethical approach or way of doing, is superior 
to his own innocence and those of others.  
 The question to the Source “How can I answer this context with my real  self” 
will be perfectly answered every time and will push one even further in becoming 
a better man, a better leader  and a better professional, doing his (very) small part in 
developing a better world. Happily the answer that “intuitively” rises, as right as it 
may be, shares the autopoietic meaninglessness of all triggers.  Also in this case “I-
as-me” has the freedom to accept the answer or to push it aside or even silence the 
question. What meaning the answer or even the question will have is fully 
determined by free choice an often taken for granted unimaginable great gift out of 
the grandest scheme of evolution. When one finds himself in a wrong system, too 
far apart from humanity and ideologically bound by a “truth” which needs Levinas’ 
[cruel] Totality to survive, the answer from the Source might be:  “Get out of here”. 
On the other hand, logically organizations do not ask for unethical cultures, but 
they cannot defend themselves against the gradual [de-]formation of one as the 
unintentional result of the combined forces of job identification. What the nature of 
jobs is, is of course a major factor in this. But feeling responsible for the job being 
done successfully does not require any identification as all jobs are only functional 
for the organization, they are not entities, they are a collections of required verbs. 
Someone does not “become his car” when driving through the city and he, who 
drives does not become a driver either, he is still himself behind the steering wheel. 
He may be named a driver in the domain of descriptions, for clarification purposes. 
Neither the car nor driving itself are entities, needing identification. Verbs 
integrated as important aspects of capabilities can be learned and are in all cases 
tools. To be human cannot be learned but can be allowed. To become the tool is an 
error, to use the tool in human’s hands is to humanize the tool. Even with the best 
intentions to become the tool, is to dehumanize, which in extreme cases where 
utmost concentration is needed mostly hand eye and or eye body coordination (e.g. 
in  sports, the surgeon) is innocent. Genuine trustworthy people, having their heart 
at the right place, do not even need to be charming, in order to be admired or 
followed or supported in organizations. They are admired not because they fulfill 
their job requirements. The latter is just a minimum condition.  To admire or 
worship distanced leaders or public figures because of their (immense) successes or 
their created image, is far away from admiring them as a member from humanity. 
The Source’s references, Buber’s Thou and Levinas’ humanity all welcome 
“The MBA Oath” as they are fully compatible with it. It lead to a leadership where 
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the leader does not only feels morally responsible for the corporate products / 
services of his organization or department but also feels equally responsible and 
accountable  for the processes of their becoming and the possible effects it may have 
for environments and clients. Such leadership is announced in modern theories of 
leadership like e.g. transformational leadership (Avolio, B. J., Bass, B. M., Riggio, 
R. E., Orr, S. S., Ciulla, J. B., Krishnan, V. R., ... & Riggio, R. E. 2008) and more 
so in servant leadership (Van Dierendonck, D. (2011).  
 
14.2 The MBA Oath and the previous Global Financial Crisis 
Would the Oath have avoided the Global Financial Crisis if it was part of the culture 
of the financial industry?  The answer can only be a full yes, if a sufficient number 
of executives had taken the Oath voluntarily. When a critical mass of executives is 
ethical, they will automatically transform the general financial culture that Alan 
Greenspan has spoken about, towards an ethical one. 
“…my aim will not be to distort the truth but to transparently explain it and 
help people understand how decisions [products] that affects them are 
made.” (Anderson and Asher 2010 p. xv-xvi)  
And 
 “I will strive to create sustainable economic, social, and environmental 
prosperity worldwide”, something which resonates with “... notice the close 
bond that unites the particular fortune of each one of them to the prosperity 
of all” (Tocqueville 1840/2010, ch. 14 a).   
The above will end what is described as one of the major human factors causing the 
crisis: the wrong side of greed (section 1.4.1) whereby seller and buyer do not share 
the same information about products and services, while mostly buyers expect that 
they do. The covert use of asymmetrical information is the dark side of greed and 
violates all forms of even compromised morality.   
 The Oath however covers much more than the above and goes the extra mile to 
contribute in the development of a better world, starting with the idea of executives 
growing into humans who accept themselves being part of humanity. In the end, 
McCloskey's Bourgeois virtues appear just right. Every one of them fits personal 
development of the self and of the self with others, and gives richness to the MBA 
oath. The Source however critically lifts one of the seven virtues up to reign over 
the others to hold them in check: Love. If all human verbs directly or indirectly 
serve Love, the human species grant finally the freedom human autopoietic 
organization has given the species a long long time ago to leave behind its 
identification with his animal past. 
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Samenvatting 
Universeel acceptabele en rationele criteria voor het oplossen van morele geschillen 
schijnen niet te bestaan. Wat moreel acceptabel is in Amsterdam kan als 
verwerpelijk worden beschouwd in Peshawar (Pakistan). Om moraliteit zoveel 
mogelijk een onafhankelijk status te geven onafhankelijk van bijv. lokale culturen 
of persoonlijke voorkeuren, zijn er in de geschiedenis filosofisch uiteenlopende 
benaderingen ontwikkeld. Een echte onafhankelijke status berust echter op 
uitgangspunten, die vanuit een even echte onpartijdige positie komen. Een echte 
onpartijdige positie voor morele beginselen blijkt in de praktijk moeilijk haalbaar. 
Vandaar de ontwikkeling om “echte” onpartijdigheid te benaderen via methoden 
gebaseerd op veronderstellingen. David Hume (“judicious spectator”) en Adam 
Smith (“impartial spectator”) zijn klassieke voorbeelden, van het toepassen van een 
hypothetische onpartijdige positie (“veil of ignorance”), die nodig zijn voor de 
ontwikkeling van hun morele theorieën. Alhoewel morele theorieën daardoor voor 
velen aannemelijk wordt gemaakt, geldt dat niet voor (vele) anderen. Het is daarom 
niet vreemd dat moraliteit een filosofisch onderwerp is en geen wetenschappelijke. 
Dat verzwakt echter aanzienlijk de autoriteit van moraliteit en diens invloed over 
politieke en economische processen. MacIntyre (1986 p. 6-11) gaat zelfs zover door 
te zeggen dat sinds de klassieke oudheid de werkelijke grond van moraliteit het aan 
enige rationaliteit ontbreekt en dat diens autoriteit uiteindelijk terugvalt op de 
persoonlijke willekeur van het individu of de cultuur van de groep.  
Het algehele doel van het proefschrift is het vinden of plausibel maken —door 
kwalitatief onderzoek—van een niet-hypothetische, rationele basis voor moraliteit. 
Dat wil zeggen dat de antwoorden via interviews verkregen, geheel onafhankelijk 
zijn van de persoonlijke historie, cultuur, waarden en belangen van de respondenten. 
Met zo’n basis kan moraliteit een beroep doen op echte onpartijdige argumenten. 
Allicht helpt dat moraliteit een geloofwaardiger autoriteit te verlenen in die 
contexten waar het nodig is, zoals bijv. in de huidige financiële industrie. Meerdere 
onderzoeken na de 2008 Global Financial Crisis hebben aangetoond dat naast 
systemische oorzaken van de crisis, de cultuur als medeveroorzaker van de 
financiële industrie gebaat zal zijn met de introductie en ontwikkeling van morele 
waarden (o.a. Partnoy 2010; Falk and Szech 2013; Cohn, Fehr & Maréchal 2014).   
Wanneer het onderzoek een rationele en universele basis voor moraliteit plausibel 
heeft gemaakt, wordt verder onderzocht hoe zo’n basis effect kan hebben op 
leiderschap in organisaties. Maar eerst is het nodig een objectieve methode te vinden 
of te ontwikkelen, die geschikt is om een niet subjectieve basis voor moraliteit vast 
te stellen. Echter met welk aanknopingspunt te beginnen?  
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Moreel gedrag of het “juiste” doen of “goed doen” is meer dan wat zakelijk of 
politiek gezien is vereist. Goed doen onder de conditie van er iets voor terug willen 
is een transactie en komt bijv. via symbiose in de biologie al miljoenen jaren voor. 
Goed-doen volgens ethische normen houdt niet in een goed vakman zijn, die zijn 
“goed doen” achterlaat wanneer het aan het einde van de dag tijd is om naar huis te 
gaan. Volgens Aristoteles is goed-doen gedefinieerd als-goed-zijn als mens naar 
zijn medemens toe. Dat reikt verder dan de kwaliteit van goed vakmanschap. De 
thesis neemt de veronderstelling van Aristoteles over. Het-goede-doen in de morele 
context is zonder economische redenen; het is onbaatzuchtig. Maar de kwestie van 
het-goede-doen laat onmiddellijk het probleem zien: “Wie definieert wat juist of 
goed is en hoe doe je dat?”. De verklaring van de aanwezigheid van goed of juist 
gedrag (of gedrag in het algemeen) is immers niet te vinden in het gedrag zelf. De 
algemeen geldige vraag over alle culturen heen: “Waarom doe je dat?” is daarvoor 
nodig. De essentie van moreel gedrag vindt ergen plaats in het innerlijke domein 
van de mens.  
De werkhypothese van het onderzoek gaat ervan uit dat moraliteit uiteindelijk niet 
gebaseerd is op persoonlijke of groepsvoorkeuren, maar op een bestaande maar 
(nog) onverkende innerlijke reden. Tegelijkertijd ontstaat de moeilijkheid zo’n basis 
in het innerlijk van de mens via een objectieve methode vast te stellen. De 
psychologische biedt in dit geval geen uitkomst. Wanneer een innerlijk gegeven 
onafhankelijk is van persoonlijke waarden en historie of met andere woorden 
onafhankelijk is van alle subjectiviteit, dan kan dat universele gegeven alleen 
aanwezig zijn in het transcendentale domein van de mens. Zo’n domein is vrij en 
onafhankelijk van de invloeden van het ego (persoonlijkheid) en bevindt zich 
gelijktijdig vooraf (a priori) aan de wereld en diens gebeurtenissen. Dat is juist niet 
het aandachtsgebied waar de psychologie en wetenschap zich mee bezig houden. 
Dat maakt het aantonen van een niet-subjectieve basis voor moraliteit op zijn minst 
vrij lastig. Het transcendentale domein van de menselijk geest is wel verkend, 
onderzocht en (gedeeltelijk) beschreven door o.a. Kant (e.g. CPR1781) en Husserl 
(Fenomenologie 1927).  
Vooral Husserl is onmisbaar voor de thesis vanwege zijn ontdekking van het bestaan 
van een “pure” (onpartijdige) menselijke geest, die in principe in iedereen aanwezig 
is. Ook Kant’s transcendentale eigenschappen van de menselijke geest om tot het 
ervaren van een wereld te komen zijn intersubjectief als universeel aanwezig 
aannemelijk genaakt. Husserl’s “Transcendentale Bewustzijn” of “Pure 
Bewustzijn” vrij van kennis en subjectieve inhouden is een veelbelovend begin om 
het exploratieve onderzoek via interviews te beginnen. Echter, Husserl’s methode 
(epoché) om in zijn zuivere ego-vrije “state of mind” te komen blijkt niet geschikt 
te zijn om respondenten in die staat te brengen. In de context van één enkel interview 
lukt Husserl’s methode niet.  
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De eerste onderzoeksvraag leidt tot de opdracht om een andere kwalitatieve 
methode te vinden of er één te ontwikkelen die wel geschikt is. Een andere “epoché” 
methode geschikt voor het onderzoek is onbekend en is ook niet gevonden. 
Wetenschappelijke kwalitatieve interview methodes zijn ontworpen om juist de 
persoonlijke meningen en of kennis van de geïnterviewde zo ongekleurd mogelijk 
weer te geven.  
Zoals eerder is vermeld is het algehele doel van het proefschrift het vinden of 
plausibel maken van een niet-hypothetische rationele basis voor moraliteit. Het 
toepassen van de nieuwe methode brengt de respondent echter alleen in een 
bewustzijn staat dat door Husserl is aangegeven als “Pure Bewustzijn”. Het is 
daarom nodig om vanuit die niet hypothetische, onpartijdige positie het 
Transcendentale Domein verder te verkennen om een algemeen aanwezige, 
begrijpelijk basis voor moraliteit te vinden. Wanneer zo’n basis is gevonden gaat de 
tweede onderzoeksvraag over welk praktisch effect zo’n basis logischerwijze kan 
hebben op leiderschap in organisaties.  
 
De benadering om de onderzoeksvragen te beantwoorden is een exploratieve 
zoektocht. Daarvoor is de deconstructie methode gekozen, een methode die 
gehanteerde en voor de thesis relevante begrippen en definities kritisch uitkleedt tot 
op het laatst deelbare “component”. Dat blijkt echter niet voldoende te zijn. Het is 
nodig gebleken om de biologische theorie van Maturana en Varela “Autopoiesis” 
(1972/1980) als uitgangspunt te nemen. Ze hebben onderzocht met welk doel—
sinds het ontstaan van het leven— de interne wisselwerking tussen het organisme 
en de wereld is ontstaan en hoe die plaats vindt. Wat centraal naar voren is gekomen 
en ook geldig is voor “mensen”, is het begrip “organisationele geslotenheid’ 
(organisational closure). Organisationele geslotenheid determineert individuele 
zelf-referentie, individueel zelf-behoud en individueel zelf-onderhoud (waaronder 
het behoud van de species) onder het paraplubegrip zelforganisatie. Zelforganisatie 
kan alleen van de eigen informatie betekenissen uitgaan omdat organismen niet in 
staat zijn externe informatie betekenissen in zich op te nemen. Informatie is 
dimensie-loos en kan niet worden opgepakt door machines of zintuigen. De 
betekenis die de informatie heeft voor de ontvanger van zintuigelijke prikkels kan 
niet door de wereld “als zender” worden bepaald. 
Dat is de harde kern van de autopoiesis theorie, wat anti–intuïtief overkomt. Doordat 
de soort “homo sapiens” door de natuur als het ware is “vrij” gegeven en dus niet 
meer via genetische overdracht (instincten) de wereld opgedrongen krijgt, is het 
principe van organisationele geslotenheid (voortaan “closure” genoemd) vooral 
voor het psychologische domein van de mens van belang. Individuele zelfreferentie 
houdt dan in dat alle streefwaarden en betekenissen, die individueel geldig zijn voor 
het bereiken of verstoren van een innerlijk evenwicht niet bepaald (gedetermineerd) 
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kunnen worden door externe gebeurtenissen. Door autopoiesis toe te passen op de 
deconstructie van de menselijke persoonlijkheid of het ego blijkt het ego niet een 
biologisch gegeven te zijn (wat voor sommige talenten en het lichaam wel het geval 
is). Het ego is een zelfgemaakte informatie constructie. Het is de som van alle 
relaties tussen de (dynamische) betekenissen van het “ik” en dat wat als niet-ik is 
gedefinieerd, wat over het algemeen de buitenwereld inhoudt. In de thesis is de 
relatie als Ego weergegeven. De relatie heeft zowel een ik-beschrijving (klassieke 
ego begrip) als wel een contextbeschrijving nodig en de één ontstaat automatisch 
uit de ander. De beschrijvingen zijn naar elkaar toegewend (compliant) omdat de 
neurologische relatie niet de wereldbeschrijving dient, maar uitsluitend de 
zelforganisatie van het eigen organisme. Dat maakt de wereld beschrijving 
ondergeschikt aan zelf-organisatie processen. Closure zorgt er letterlijk voor dat 
alleen de eigen beschrijvingen kunnen worden ervaren. Er is geen tweedeling tussen 
subject en object voor het zenuwstelsel. De relatie ertussen is de functionele eenheid 
die voor de overleving en “de aard van het beestje” nodig is. Een “ik”-idee apart 
van de relatie die het met de wereld heeft, en die de onafhankelijkheid van de wereld 
naar het ik toe suggereert, is niet alleen incompleet maar ook nog onjuist. Zelfs de 
veronderstelde onafhankelijkheid van de wereld bij het observeren ervan 
weerspiegelt nog steeds de geprojecteerde subjectieve betekenissen van de 
waarnemer. Dat maakt de ervaring van een wereld letterlijk tot een weerspiegeling 
van het persoonlijke karakter. Closure via de fysiologie en vooral de anatomie van 
het zenuwstelsel determineert dus de onmogelijkheid van het ervaren of het hebben 
van objectieve waarnemingen. Er is een envoudige oefening om dat aan te tonen. 
Wat door experts en wetenschappers onder objectiviteit wordt verstaan, is dan een 
gereduceerde, maar linguïstische versie van de ervaren werkelijkheid. Het is 
weliswaar niet te ervaren, maar als een virtueel taalconstruct is het een essentieel en 
onmisbaar instrument van beschrijving zoals de wortel van -1 onmisbaar is in de 
taal van de wiskunde. Objectieve beschrijvingen zijn gekoppeld aan het standpunt 
en de daarbij behorende logica van waarnemers, die echter de werking van hun 
eigen organisationele geslotenheid en de limieten van hun zenuwstelsel buiten 
beschouwing laten. Projectie-processen zorgen ervoor dat de betekenissen 
(subjectieve bijvoeglijke naamwoorden) van de waarnemer worden ervaren als 
waarneembare (objectieve) eigenschappen van het waargenomene. Dit is volkomen 
analoog aan een ander closure gegeven: de projectie van kleuren (of geluiden), 
waarbij kleuren en of geluiden ook alleen kunnen worden ervaren als objectieve 
eigenschappen van het waargenomene. Een wetenschappelijk voorbeeld van 
waarnemerslogica is de onderscheiding, die een waarnemer maakt —en die 
zintuigelijk opgedrongen wordt— tussen organisme en diens omgeving, als 
uitgangspunt te nemen om bijv. interne structuren of interactief gedrag van het 
organisme te verklaren. De benadering ontkent closure-processen en levert in 
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beginsel foutieve verklaringen op. De andere logica, “Circulaire logica” is meer een 
reflexieve meta-logica, die in de eerste plaats van projectie van betekenissen uitgaat 
en van daaruit tot verklaringen komt. Deze logica accepteert de essentiële relatie-
identiteit van de waarnemer, vooralsnog gebaseerd op biologische autopoietische 
principes. Het accent van beide logica’s ligt in de verschillende benadering om 
ervaringen te verklaren. Beide logica’s hebben hun eigen aandachtsgebied waarbij 
praktisch iedereen waaronder professionals en wetenschappers, alleen waarnemers-
logica gebruiken. De dominante logica in de wetenschap levert voor niet-levende 
fenomenen echter verhelderende en goed bruikbare resultaten op, maar voor het 
verklaren van levende organismen en psychologische fenomenen (moraliteit) is het 
feitelijk niet geschikt. Ook de ontwikkeling van autopoiesis als theorie kon pas een 
doorbraak krijgen toen hun onderzoekers Maturana en Varela (1972 / 1980) 
begrepen dat de causale logica van waarnemers storend is om bijv. de werking van 
zenuwstelsels en hersens te kunnen begrijpen. 
 “However, I made a concession which I have always regretted. I ... talked about 
causal relations when speaking about the circular organization of living systems. To 
do this was both inadequate and misleading. It was inadequate because the notion 
of causality is a notion that pertains to the domain of descriptions, and as such it is 
relevant only in the meta-domain in which the observer makes his commentaries 
and cannot be deemed to be operative in the phenomenal domain, the object of the 
description.” (Maturana, Varela 1980 p. xviii, underlining added) 
 
Met de beginselen van autopoiesis begon de kritische deconstructie van de voor de 
thesis belangrijke begrippen als categorieën, causaliteit, objectiviteit, subjectiviteit, 
inter-subjectiviteit, betekenissen (taal), ego en tenslotte gedeeltelijk het bewuste 
versus het onbewuste waaronder de functie van emoties. Via vele ondersteunende 
conclusies, is de eindconclusie te maken dat ego de eerder beschreven relatie Ego 
is. Een andere onmisbare conclusie voor de thesis stelt, dat (pure) ego in staat is een 
interview met zich zelf te houden (Maturana et al. 1980; Husser 1927, Archer 2007). 
Met behulp van de theorieën van Stone en Stone (1989) en Rhodes en Thames 
(1988) is een methode ontwikkeld die in één enkel interview willekeurige 
respondenten in staat stelt in hun pure onpartijdige “state of mind” te komen. Een 
staat, die voldoet aan de criteria van Husserl’s Transcendentale Bewustzijn of “Pure 
Ego”. Van daaruit kon een verdere zoektocht beginnen, die echter niet direct naar 
moraliteit leidt omdat er geen aanknopingspunten zijn. Eerst was het nodig als 
werkhypothese de suggesties te accepteren van eerdere auteurs (bijv. Wilson 
(1993); Izard 1977; Haidt 2003) dat moraliteit verbonden kan zijn of is met emoties. 
Het deconstrueren van emoties via Circulaire logica levert een afwijkende theorie 
over emoties op met de hoofdconclusie dat emoties niet kunnen reageren op interne 
of externe prikkels, die via “denotatieve” taal principes beschreven zijn. Of in 
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andere woorden emoties kunnen niet op de buitenwereld reageren en zijn daar ook 
niet voor bestemd. Emoties reageren op het ego, ze verschijnen als een reactie op 
de interne relatie tussen subject en object en niet apart op de één of de ander wat in 
de huidige theorieën over emoties nog het geval is.  
De voor de thesis gevolgde veronderstelling is dat een rationele onpartijdige basis 
voor moraliteit indirect gevonden kan worden via de functies of doelstelling van 
emoties. 
Wanneer via de gevonden methode de respondent zich met zijn transcendentale 
domein heeft geïdentificeerd, is de volgende stap niet het zoeken naar allerlei 
“ethische emoties”, maar wat transcendentaal aan emoties ligt. Kan door elke 
respondent een zelf evidente “Transcendental Source of Emotions” (Bron) 
individueel worden aangetoond? In de afgenomen interviews (30x; augustus 2015) 
is zo’n Source (Bron) gevonden èn intern geïnterviewd door de respondenten in hun 
ego-loze onpartijdige staat. De antwoorden van de Bron  zijn intern meerdere malen 
gecheckt met een zogenoemde “member check” om er zo zeker mogelijk van te zijn 
dat “ego” zich niet met het interne interview heeft bemoeid.  De verkregen 
antwoorden waren voor alle respondenten identiek, wat logischerwijze ook te 
verwachten is als subjectieve verschillen èn kennisovereenkomsten tussen de 
respondenten zijn komen te vervallen. De Bron gaf zijn interne referentie prijs: alle 
interne betekenissen (ongeacht hun (ir)rationele herkomst), die het individu helpt in 
zijn ontwikkeling en groei, voelt positief aan. Autopoietisch wil dat zeggen dat de 
interne betekenissen harmonisch zijn met de werkelijke aard van het eigen 
potentieel, dat op ontwikkeling wacht en die ook krijgt. Interne betekenissen die de 
eigen ontwikkeling storen of blokkeren voelen negatief aan. Die betekenissen zijn 
gebaseerd op een vergissing. Een vergissing is gedefinieerd als dié informatie voor 
waar aannemen dat niet strookt of samenvalt met de juiste beschrijving van het te 
ontwikkelen eigen potentieel. Het sprookje van “Het lelijke eendje” van Andersen 
(1843) is een metaforisch, maar duidelijk voorbeeld van een interne 
beschrijvingsfout op (in dit geval) identiteitsniveau.  
Echter moraliteit valt met deze verklaring van emoties ook indirect nog niet af te 
leiden.  
Omdat ook emoties ontstaan bij het weten over of observeren van andere mensen 
—iemand anders krijgt een ongeluk of geeft geboorte aan een prachtige baby— is 
dat onderzocht. Welke referentie gebruikt de Bron bij ideeën over anderen? Het niet 
geanticipeerde antwoord is voor de Bron hetzelfde antwoord. Elke overtuiging die 
ondersteunend is naar de eigen ontwikkeling of via het eigen gedrag naar die van 
een ander, voelt goed aan. Ideeën of overtuigingen, die tot gedrag leiden om de 
ander niet te helpen of zelfs zijn verdere ontwikkeling te verhinderen of onmogelijk 
te maken, levert een (flink) negatief gevoel op. De extra vraag werd toegevoegd: 
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“Mensen maken een essentieel verschil tussen het “ik” en de ander, maak jij dat 
onderscheid ook of niet?” 
Het antwoord van alle geïnterviewden was, dat zo’n onderscheid door hun Bron niet 
wordt gemaakt. Het antwoord overstijgt de beperkingen van het biologische lichaam 
en diens autopoiesis. De mogelijkheid is er nu om een link met moraliteit te maken 
of een referentie te hebben om in zekere zin moreel gedrag te beschrijven of vast te 
stellen. Moraliteit blijkt geen aparte bron in het wezenlijke van de mens te hebben, 
de mens is essentieel een moreel wezen, dat wacht om toegelaten te worden, om 
beschreven te worden ( ontwikkeling). Het kan niet worden geconstrueerd. 
Theoretisch gezien, als de essentie van het persoonlijke zijn een relatie met de ander 
inhoudt, dan wordt de medemens —als een interne positief beschreven betekenis— 
onmisbaar voor het eigen welzijn. Het bewijs van welzijn is echter niet een 
beschrijving (idee) maar de daarbij verbonden gevoelservaring. Wat de Bron 
weergeeft, is dat binnen het transcendentale ego-vrije en dus foutloze domein, de 
Bron als referentie geen onderscheid maakt tussen het ik en de ander. Elke 
ontkenning van deze oeroude, maar altijd onbewijsbare wijsheid zal gepaard gaan 
met een negatieve emotie. De emotie is bedoeld als een interne negatieve feed back-
lus, die verwijst naar een foute beschrijving. Het wel toelaten van verbondenheid 
tussen het ik en de ander is de meest kernachtige definitie van liefde, ontdaan van 
alle romantiek. Het is echter geen liefde, die gebaseerd kan zijn op voorkeuren of 
andere condities, die het ego kan opwerpen, het is immers een transcendentale 
onderstroom van Liefde. Verdere nuanceringen en beantwoording van de 
voornaamste vragen komen in de thesis aan bod.  
Uit de vele theorieën die perfect aansluiten bij de gevonden referenties van de Bron,  
zijn die van Martin Buber ( “Ich und Du” 1923)  en Emanuel Levinas (“Totalité et 
Infini 1961/1969) gekozen. Levinas’ ”humanity” en de manier hoe dat fenomeen 
zich aandient en Buber’s “Thou” geven weer hoe de Liefde in het Transcendentale 
Domein zich laat kennen via een wezenlijk te ervaren verbinding tussen het ik en 
de aanschouwde ander. Levinas probeert van daaruit een maatschappij te 
beschrijven, die het individuele unieke en de vrijheid die daarbij behoort om dat 
unieke (de absolute ander) tot ontplooiing te brengen, accepteert. Zijn maatschappij 
is gefundeerd op de kern van de mens, die alle mensen met elkaar verbindt en 
gelijkwaardig maakt. Die wezenlijke verbinding, die aan de wereld vooraf gaat, 
doet mensen onderdeel zijn van een prachtige mensheid met een onverliesbare 
onschuld. Ook een mensheid, die vanuit zijn wezen in staat is een ethische 
maatschappij te ontwikkelen waar de oeroude roep voor oorlog om verschillen te 
vereffenen, is verstild. De bril om zo naar de ander te kijken en te herkennen voor 
wat hij is, noemt Levinas moraliteit zelf: “Ethics is an  optics. (Levinas 1969 p. 23 
English translation). Transcendentale verbintenis betekent niet dat de informatie 
waar individuen zich noodzakelijkerwijze mee identificeren om zo een 
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persoonlijkheid te ervaren, ook gelijkwaardig aan elkaar zijn en evenveel respect 
verdienen. Per definitie maakt het ego naast liefdevolle beschrijvingen vergissingen 
over zichzelf en anderen en soms zijn de liefdevolle niet meer terug te vinden. Alle 
liefdevolle verbindingen van de bron, van Buber, van Levinas en de talloze anderen 
in de mystiek en sommige religies, slaan op een wezenlijke verbinding, die 
onafhankelijk is van gedrag of denken. Niemand kan dus zijn vergissing ook zijn, 
ongeacht de ernst van de vergissing.  
In autopoiesis wordt die verbinding in Ego gemaakt, maar zonder de betekenis van 
de transcendentale referentie van de Bron af te dwingen. Zo blijft de vrijheid van 
interne betekenisprocessen (sense making processes) ook voor interne prikkels 
(emoties) gegarandeerd. Het ego wordt een moreel ego wanneer het zich als Ego 
(h)erkent. Om moraliteit zo praktisch mogelijk te maken verandert Transcendentaal 
liefdevol zijn in respectvol zijn. Wat dat kan inhouden is onderdeel van de 
beantwoording van de laatste en tweede onderzoeksvraag. 
 
De laatste onderzoeksvraag gaat over hoe de gevonden basis voor moraliteit effect 
heeft op leiderschap in organisaties. De gevonden basis voor moraliteit mag dan zijn 
aangetoond bij de respondenten, het is zeker niet nieuw. De gelijkwaardigheid van 
anderen naar het zelf toe en de onderlinge “onzichtbare”, maar wezenlijke 
verbintenis (liefde) tussen mensen is via mystiek, religies en filosofie al lang 
geleden verondersteld en beschreven. Uit de vele moderne teksten die er zijn over 
moreel leiderschap, heb ik die van Anderson en Escher (2010) gekozen omdat het 
direct praktisch is. De auteurs hebben, als reactie op de 2008 financiële wereldcrisis, 
hun boek “The MBA OATH” uitgebracht. Hun zienswijze en veronderstellingen 
sluiten op een zakelijke en praktische manier naadloos aan op de respect en 
transparantie die de Bron vraagt om aan medemensen te geven. De eed voor leiders 
(managers) is beschreven als een lange termijn ethische belofte aan eigen 
werknemers, de eigen organisatie en diens relevante functionele omgevingen, zoals 
de maatschappij en indirect de rest van de wereld. De eed belooft dat de leider zich 
houdt aan de negen regels die de eed uitmaakt. De eerste van de negen regels zijn:  
“I will act with utmost integrity and pursue my work in an ethical manner. My 
personal behavior will be an example of integrity, consistent with the values I 
publicly espouse” ., (Anderson and Asher 2010 p. xv-xvi)  
  
Met de gehele Oath accepteert de manager of leider binnen de verantwoordelijkheid 
van zijn functie dat zijn persoonlijk welzijn niet boven het welzijn kan staan van 
alle relevante anderen, in zoverre de organisatie daar direct of indirect mee te maken 
heeft. Het gezamenlijke welzijn kan het best gediend worden met eerlijke 
transparante processen, en met respect voor de behoeften, rechten en bezittingen 
van anderen. De leider belooft ook dat hij op zijn gedrag kan worden aangesproken 
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De eed kan van een enkeling niet meer verwachten. De eed werkt voor het individu, 
die de eed herkent als een reflectie van zijn eigen wezen naar de wereld toe. Het 
helpt de organisatie wanneer voldoende leiders dat begrijpen, zodat de waarden 
erachter onderdeel van de cultuur zijn geworden. 
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